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In 1840 the indigenous Maori tribes of New Zealand ceded the sovereignty of New 
Zealand to the British Crown in return for the protection of the chiefs' rangatiratanga 
(internal government of the tribe) and the tribes' lands, forests, and fisheries. This agreement 
is known as the Treaty of Waitangi. This thesis considers the extent to which the common 
law of England recognised the rights embodied in the Treaty of Waitangi upon the Crown's 
assumption of the territorial sovereignty over New Zealand. 
Since the principles of the common law developed in an organic manner through the 
history of British relations with non-Christian societies the present study has used 
comparative material of an historical as well as strictly legal character. It is believed 
previous studies of Maori rights upon British annexation have suffered from the failure to 
assess the Maori tribes' position in terms of a continuum of British colonial constitutional 
history. Having isolated the relevant common law principles from the body of British 
practice and other sources, each of the three Parts ends with the particular application of 
these principles to the New Zealand setting. 
The thesis is based upon the distinction between imperiwn (a right of government) and 
dominiwn (rights of private ownership) and is divided into three Parts. The first Part looks 
at the principles governing the Crown's erection of an imperium over non-Christian 
societies. Part II looks at the effect of British sovereignty upon the customary law of the 
Maori tribes. Finally, Part III assesses the common law's recognition of the traditional 
property rights of the Maori. The conclusion reached is that the common law recognised the 
continuity of Maori customary law and property rights but qualified this by limiting any 
viability of the customary code to Maori relations inter se and restricting the alienation of 
the tribal title to the Crown. To that extent the Treaty of Waitangi was not so much a 
source as declaratory of rules which would have applied in any event. 
The present study does not consider at length the contemporary status of these post-
annexation rights given the Maori by the common law. However, it has significance for 
contemporary as well as historical Maori claims and amounts to a revision of previous 
assessments of the common law's response to British annexation of New Zealand. 
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PREFACE 
This thesis is my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in 
collaboration. During the course of research leading to this dissertation I have published 
various papers on the question of Maori rights under the common law. This activity has 
been prompted by the topicality of the subject. One of these papers was first written in 
support of an application for a Research Fellowship at Sidney Sussex College and eventually 
published as "Aboriginal Title in the New Zealand Courts" (1984) 4 Canterbury Law Review 
235. Part III of this dissertation draws upon this paper, particularly chapter 8, but in an 
expanded and re-evaluated manner which includes material omitted from the earlier, less 
sophisticated account This dissertation is not substantially the same as any submitted for a 
degree, diploma or other qualification at any other University. The word limit set by the 
Department of Land Economy for dissertation length has been exceeded with the kind 
pennission of the Department's Degree Committee (26 January 1987). 
P.G. McHugh 
27 January 1987. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Let us cede the whole of this area, with its pine-covered mountain ridge 
To gain the goodwill of the Trojans. Let us draw up a treaty, fair to 
Both sides, and invite them to partner us in the Kingdom ... 
1 
UNIVERSITY 
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The Aeneid, xi, 320-322 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCfION 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century the islands of New Zealand were under the 
control of the indigenous Maori tribes. l Although Captain Cook had visited the islands 
towards the end of the previous century, itinerant whalers and traders following soon 
afterwards, it was not until the second decade of the nineteenth century that the trickle of 
British colonisation, missionaries and their families, began. By the mid 1830s British 
interests and settlement in New Zealand had grown and threatened to increase to such an 
extent that the Crown's formal intervention was both necessary and inevitable. In 1840 the 
Crown's representative in the islands entered into a treaty with the indigenous tribes by 
which they ceded their sovereignty in return for a guarantee of their lands, forests and 
fisheries and, so the Maori text signed by most chiefs provided, the retention of 
rangatiratanga (self-government). This pact was called the Treaty of Waitangi after the 
idyllic site in the Bay of Islands in New Zealand's northern island where it was first signed. 
The same year the Crown formally annexed the islands and New Zealand became a British 
colony. 
At the time of annexation traditional Maori life had certain features which, inevitably, 
were being affected by British settlement. Over the previous centuries the Maori had 
developed their own code of social behaviour as embodied in their customary law and tribal 
concepts of lea,dership, decision-making and land tenure.2 The stewardship of Maori society 
was vested in the chiefs (rangatira) of the sub-tribes (hapu) and paramount chief (ariki), if 
any, of the tribe (iwi) who acted in counsel with the tribal elders (kaumatua). Land was the 
source of conflict between the tribes, the whole of the country being divided among the 
various tribes whose boundaries were frequently contested. Land was viewed as a tribal 
resource exploited for the communal benefit. Hence the early to mid-nineteenth century 
Maori ideas of alienation conceived the 'sale' of tribal land to a European as no more than 
a grant of permission to come and live upon the tribal land so that the tribe might obtain 
such material benefits from the Pakeha (non-Maori) presence as blankets, guns . and 
suchlike? Occupation of the tribal land gave the tribe member turangawaewae, meaning 
literally a standing place for the feet. In emphasizing an individual's association with the 
2 
Varying estimates of pre-contact Maori numbers have been made, some identifying a figure as high as 1 million. 
The accepted analysis is Lewthwaite 'The Population of Aotearoa : Its Number and Distribution" (1950), 71:1 
NZ Geographer, 35. Lewthwaite's estimate of 240,000 is accepted by Pool The Maori Population of New 
Zealand 1769-1971 (1977), 49. 
See Firth R Economics of the New Zealand Maori (1959) passim; Metge The Maoris of New Zealand, rev ed, 
1-28. 
Lords Committee (1838), evidence: F1att, 39-41; Fitzroy, 171; Montefiore, 57; William Webster Claim (1925) 
[1926] AJIL 391 at 393 (Anglo-American Claims Tribunal). 
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lands whereupon the spirits of his ancestors roamed and its conferral of status within the 
tribe, turangawaewae gave Maori society a spiritual and social continuity. Land was thus 
central to the structure of traditional Maori society. Traditional notions of leadership were 
equally as important. The chiefs, who mostly obtained status by birth, were the jealous 
custodians of their authority. A chiefs subordination of his own gain to that of his people 
increased his stock of mana (dignity, standing) and, hence, authority. Although a chief had 
no greater right in the tribal land than an ordinary sub-tribe member, the hapu being the 
primary land-holding group, his status was soon recognised as giving him paramount powers 
in relation to the 'sale' of land to Europeans: He was, in a more general sense, the ultimate 
determinant of his people's welfare although it was the rare (and foolhardy) chief who 
ignored his elders, lesser chiefs and the prevailing tribal sentiment. The chiefs status and 
authority were described as rangatiratanga:5 
At its most general, rangatiratanga (being derived from 'rangatiratanga': chief) means 
'evidence of breeding and greatness'. Here, 'breeding and greatness' allude to the 
two main criteria for leadership: primogeniture (generally male) and proven ability. 
'Evidence', for its part, turns on the concept of 'mana'. Mana is that .power and 
authority that is endowed by the gods to human beings to enable them to achieve 
their potential, indeed to excel, and where appropriate, to lead. It is in the nature of a 
spiritual contract mediated by the priests, chiefs and elders of a tribal group between 
an individual member of the group and their deities. What is looked for, then, in a 
rangatiratanga is evidence of a working out of a high order of spiritually sanctioned 
power and authority. Primogeniture, insofar as it refers to proximity by way of a line 
through the ancestors to the supernatural source of such power and authority, may 
thus be called the prescribed factor in rangatiratanga, and ability the achieved factor. 
Implicit in all of this is the matter of reciprocity: between the individual and his god, 
and between the individual and his tribal community. Both sets of relationships are 
specific ' and closed to the community, both operate only within the laws and checks 
and balances of its political system. A rangatiratanga is a trustee for his people, an 
entrepeneur in all their enterprises. 
Given the characteristics of traditional Maori society, in particular the emphasis upon land 
and the mana of the chiefs, it was not surprising that the Maori chiefs only agreed to British 
sovereignty on the basis that both aspects of tribal life were apparently to be unaffected, 
indeed, expressly protected by the Crown. 
The chiefs who signed the Treaty of Waitangi believed that their rangatiratanga, that is 
the internal government and regulation of the tribe, was to be respected. Although there . was 
no like provision in the English text of the Treaty, indeed the language would have 
struggled to find an equivalent term, the Maori text of the Treaty expressly reserved the 
rangatiratanga of the chiefs. They ceded to the Crown the kawanatanga of the islands, a 
4 Lords Committee (1838), evidence: Walkins, 27; Flatt, 37,39-42;48; Montefiore, 63; Polack, 82-3; Wilkinson, 
100-1; Mackay to the Native Minister, 17 March 1890, OVANJ, 1-2; Martin The Taranald Question (1860),2-6; 
Clarke to Fitzroy, 1844, OVANJ, 8-9; Hadfield, evidence to the New Zealand House of Representatives, August 
1860, id, 9-10. 
Kawharu "Sovereignty vs. Rangatiratanga" (1984),5. 
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transliteration from the English word 'Governor'. The meaning of the word kawanatanga 
was discussed extra-judicially by the first Chief Justice of the colony, Sir William Martin, in 
his pamphlet The Taranaki Question (1860):6 
The rights which the Natives recognised as belonging thenceforward to the Crown 
were such rights as were necessary for the Government of the Country, and for the 
establishment of the new system. We called them "Sovereignty"; the Natives called 
them "Kawanatanga" , "Governorship". 
This interpretation was underlined by the context in which the missionaries had previously 
used the term kawanatanga in contradistinction to rangatiratanga. The term had been used, 
for example, to describe the office held by Pontius Pilate as Governor of Jerusalem with 
authority not the supreme power held by Caesar or God.7 To the Maori kawanatanga had 
connotations of maintenance of order and peace and protection rather than the interposition 
of a new and local authority. Were the term rangatiratanga used to describe the authority 
ceded to the Crown by the chiefs in article one of the Maori version of the Treaty there can 
be no doubt they would not have signed. Indeed most of the chiefs' misgivings concerning 
the Treaty expressed during the negotiations of 5 February 1840 had related to this point 
To give a strong example, Tareha, chief of the Ngatirehia, was reported by Colenso to have 
addressed the assembly in these words:8 
"No Governor for me - for us native men. We, we only are the chiefs, rulers. We 
will not be ruled over. What! Thou a foreignor, up, and I down! Thou high, and I, 
Tareha, the great chief of the Ngapuhi tribes, low! No, no; never, never ... If all were 
to be alike, all equal in rank with thee - but thou, the Governor up high - up, up, as 
this tall paddle" (here he held up a common canoe paddle), "and I down, under, 
beneath! No, no, no. I will never say 'Yes, stay.'" 
Kawharu has found:9 
6 
7 
The Maori people's view ... could only have been framed in terms of their own 
( culture; in other words, what the chiefs imagined they were ceding was that part of their mana and rangatiratanga that hitherto had enabled them to make war, exact 
retribution, consume or enslave their vanquished enemies and generally exercise 
power over life and death. It is totally against the run of evidence to imagine that 
they would have wittingly divested themselves of all of their spiritually sanctioned 
powers - most of which powers, indeed, they wanted protected. They would . have 
believed they were retaining their rangatiratanga intact apart from a licence to kill or 
inflict material hurt on others, retaining all of their customary rights and duties as 
trustees for their tribal groups. A counterpoint to this is the fact that many of those 
Martin The T aranaki Question (1860), 9-10. 
Ross 'Te Tiriti 0 Waitangi" (1972) 6:2 Nz/H, 140-1; Waitangi Tribtmal Finding ... on the Manukau Claim 
(1985), 90-1; Kawharu "Sovereignty vs Rangatiratanga",5. The missionaries used the term rangatiratanga to 
describe the Kingdom of God in the Maori version of the Lord's Prayer. 
Colenso Authentic and Genuine History of the Signing of the Treaty of Waitangi (1890),24-5. Tareha's status 
amongst the tribes is discussed in Buick The Treaty of Waitangi (1936), 136-7. 
"Sovereignty vs Rangatiratanga", 9. 
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who opposed the Treaty did so precisely because they took the view that they had no 
need of the Crown's protection of their rangatiratanga, or else that protection would 
compromise it. 
The Maori interpretation of the Treaty of Waitangi, one directly supported by the Maori text 
which most chiefs signed/o as a guarantee and protection of their rangatiratanga has 
remained consistent throughout the history of their relations with the Crown.11 
In signing the Treaty of Waitangi the chiefs were assured that the tribal lands as well as 
their rangatiratanga would be preserved and protected by the Crown. The Treaty guaranteed 
the tribes' "full, exclusive and undisturbed possession of their lands and estates, forests, 
fisheries, and other properties which they may collectively or individually possess". In many 
ways the chiefs would have associated the land guarantee with the protection of their 
rangatiratanga in as much as they believed the ancestral land would continue to be 
governed by the customary law. Thus the Waitangi Tribunal recently advised the 
Govemment: 12 
We consider that the Maori text of the Treaty would have conveyed to Maori people 
that amongst other things they were to be protected not only in the possession of 
their fishing grounds [Le. property rights] but in the mana to control them and then 
in accordance with their own customs and having regard to their cultural preferences. 
We consider that this is the proper interpretation to be given to the Treaty, because 
the Maori text is clearly persuasive in advancing that view .... 
In a nutshell, the reservation of rangatiratanga and the land guarantee together 
constituted the Maori belief as to the consequences of British sovereignty. The Crown 
acquired the mere kawanatanga, the power "to make laws for the good order and security of 
the country but subject to an undertaking to protect particular Maori interests".13 
Unsurprisingly, in reaching this belief the Maori looked not to the general principles of 
English constitutional law, in which they could hardly have been versed, but the promise of 
the Crown in the Treaty of Waitangi. As the settlement of the country progressed and the 
Maori called the promises in the Treaty of Waitangi into question, they returned constantly 
to the Treaty as their take or cause of action and basis of right. On behalf of their people 
the chiefs demanded of the Crown the recognition of their rangatiratanga and protection 
from the loss of their tribal lands to European interests. 
The Maori certainly had their own view as to the consequences which their agreement to 
\ British sovereignty was to have had but to what extent did the principles of English 
constitutional law recognise Maori rights upon the Crown's assumption of sovereignty? Was 
10 Ross "Te Tiriti 0 Waitangi", 133. 
11 eg Orange 'The Covenant of Kohimarama" (1980) 14 NZlH 61, esp 70-5. 
12 Report Findings and Recommendations of the Waitangi Tribunal in fishing grounds in the Waitara District 
(1983), [The Motunui Claim], 60. 
13 Waitangi TriblUlal Manukau Claim, 90. 
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¥ the Maori impression justified as a matter of law? This inquiry forms the basis of this thesis. 
The term "aboriginal rights" has been used as a compendious term to describe those 
Maori rights which are recognized by the common law to derive from the original tribal 
occupation of territory before the time of European settlement, the phrase "since time 
immemorial"14 being often and misleadingly used. The term captures the catholic dimension 
of the relevant constitutional principles in that they had developed and evolved (and 
continued to do so after the British annexation of New Zealand) from the Crown's formal 
relations with tribal societies throughout the non-Christian globe. The primary source of 
these constitutional principles is "colonial law",!! in particular that part of English law 
affecting the Crown's acquisition of an imperium (right of government) in foreign territory 
and the consequential status of local rights. By the early nineteenth century the common law 
had developed certain principles on this question, Lord Mansfield's judgment in Campbell v 
Hall (1774)16 being an influential tidemark. 
An important common law source of colonial law was the established and formal 
practice of the Crown. The rationale for this, and it is one which we will see constantly, 
was that that the Crown's formal conduct was assumed to be consistent with if not governed 
by legal principle and hence a source from which the principles could be isolated. Thus 
Chapman J could say in R v Symonds (1847) that the "certain established principles" 
applicable to the Crown's "intercourse ... with the aboriginal Natives of America and other 
countries" were to be found in "a line of judicial decision, the current of legal opinion, and 
above all, the settled practice of the colonial Governments".17 These sources had "concurred 
to clothe with certainty and precision what would otherwise have remained vague and 
unsettled" .18 The identification of the relevant constitutional principles which cumulatively 
allowed the common law to give expression to 'aboriginal rights' is to be made, therefore, 
from the formal conduct of the Crown so much as the caselaw, opinions of the law officers 
and other sources as treatises, pamphlets and suchlike. 
'1 • Aboriginal rights', then, are those common law rights derived from the legal principles 
governing the Crown's acquisition of an imperium in territory inhabited by tribal societies. 
This thesis is concerned with the aboriginal rights of the New Zealand Maori. As one might 
expect with such a body of constitutional principle touching upon an aspect of the Crown's 
prerogative, its recognised right to conduct the international relations of the United Kingdom 
(which includes the right to acquire territory) free from judicial restraint, there are some 
14 Technically the phrase means since the commencement of the reign of Richard I (1189): Halsbury's Laws of 
England (4th ed),xn,para 407. Aboriginal claimartts have never been required to prove occupation from this date. 
I' The Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, 28 & 29 Vict c 63, section 7 defined "Colonial Law" to "include Laws 
made for any Colony by such [colonial] Legislature as aforesaid or by Her Majesty in Council". The tenn 
therefore comprehends the relevartt statutory artd common law sources. 
16 (1774) Lofft 655, 98 ER 848; 1 Cowp 204,98 ER 1045; 20 St Tr 239 (KB). 
17 (1847) [1840-1932] NZPCC 387 (NZSC), 388. 
18 Id. 
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aspects of the Crown's relations with tribal societies which give rise to enforceable rights 
whilst others do not. Enforceability must, however, be always distinguished from 
cognisability. It is clear that certain 'aboriginal rights', such as the Crown's usual 
recognition of tribal sovereignty (or somesuch capacity) in its formal establishment of an 
imperium over that society, may be recognised by the courts notwithstanding their inability 
to require the Crown's continued subscription to such a position in its future relations with 
other tribal societies. 
The Treaty of Waitangi recognised certain rights of the Maori tribes but were these part 
of the corpus of constitutional principles herein termed 'aboriginal rights'? Earlier these 
Treaty rights were divided into two aspects, those associated with rangatiratanga (self-
government) and those concerning land rights. The distinction is artificial, at least from the 
Maori view, for the chiefs, like the medieval rulers of Europe, viewed government and land 
tenure or ownership as one. Nonetheless English constitutional law affecting the Crown's 
acquisition of territory distinguished imperium, a right of government over the region and its 
inhabitants, from that of dominium, the ownership of land. The distinction in the 
constitutional theory between imperium and dominium corresponds with that taken between 
rangatiratanga and the tribes' rights of land ownership according to the traditional tenure. 
The distinction between imperium and dominium underlies the format of this thesis which 
divides into three major Parts. The first Part considers the Crown's acquisition of an 
imperium, that is the government of the Maori people. By the mid-nineteenth century there 
were certain established principles affecting the means by which the Crown established and 
exercised an authority over non-Christian societies. The origins of these principles are noted 
and their application to the New Zealand context is discussed. The second Part considers the 
introduction of English law into New Zealand and the extent to which British sovereignty 
disrupted the customary code de jure. Particular attention is paid to the rules concerning the 
common law status of colonies, their function and relationship to the position of the Maori 
tribes. Influential misconceptions have grown about the legal consequences of New 
Zealand's common law status as a 'settled' colony. This Part challenges these 
misinterpretations. The third Part focuses on the question of dominium, the Maori ownership 
of their ancestral land. This particular aspect of 'aboriginal rights' has become known as the 
'doctrine of aboriginal title'. Part three assesses the applicability of the doctrine to the land 
rights of the Maori. 
Since the present study is pIimarily concerned with the ongms and basis of the 
aboriginal rights of the Maori, the inhibitions of length have restrained any lengthy 
progression onto the contemporary status of these rights. This is an inquiry which the writer 
has pursued elsewhere.19 Nonetheless general comments and conclusions of a contemporary 
19 "The legal status of Maori fishing rights in tidal water" (1984) 14 VUWLR 247; "Aboriginal rights and 
sovereignty" [1986] N7LJ 57; "Aboriginal servitudes and the Land Transfer Act 1952" (1986) 16 VUWLR 313. 
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character showing the continued importance of aboriginal rights to present-day Maori claims 
have been offered where appropriate. The response to these constitutional principles 
comprising the aboriginal rights of the Maori has been heartening, the Government,2O 
Waitangi Tribunal,21 and, most dramatically, the courtsn having reacted positively. 
The present study is surprisingly novel. Previous studies have touched upon the 
constitutional status 'of Maori rights upon the Crown's assumption of sovereignty but usually 
as incidental to a general historical inquiry into Maori-European relations through the 
nineteenth century. These writers have generally restricted themselves to the material dealing 
specifically with the New Zealand frontier and, lacking legal expertise, understandably have 
treated the legal dimension as but part of the overall historical picture. Occasional forays 
into the question of Maori rights have been made by constitutional historians with a notable 
superficiality of approach. These writers have eschewed the isolation of the relevant 
constitutional principles in favour of the incantation of late nineteenth century judicial 
utterances on the question, themselves not remarkable for their grasp of the constitutional 
record.2J Slattery has termed such occasions "judicial day excursions",24 a description and , 
deprecation as apposite for most New Zealand as Canadian judicial treatments of aboriginal 
rights. Generally speaking the various studies and judicial 'excursions' neglect the 
comparative and historical dimension essential to the isolation and comprehension of the 
relevant principles: New Zealand was not annexed in a constitutional vacuum. By 1840 the 
Crown had over two centuries of relations with the Indian tribes of North America and the 
Mughal Empire. It was simultaneously consolidating and pacifying its settlements in Canada, 
obtaining a foothold in Africa by treaty with the native tribes and settling Australia. New 
Zealand in the mid-nineteenth century was part of a larger imperial 'picture, a long playing 
\ one at that. It would be chauvinistic to think that the constitutional principles employed by 
the Crown and its advisors for New Zealand were substantially dissimilar to those applied in 
other regions. Nonetheless, the neglect or at best token reference to the constitutional 
continuum underlying British colonial practice characterizes the prevailing approaches to the 
aboriginal rights of the Maori. It will be seen, for instance, that constant referral was made 
during the 1840s to the applicability within New Zealand of certain principles of American 
law regarding the character of the tribal title to land. Most commentators, commencing with 
20 Minister of Justice A Bill of Rights for New Zealand (White Paper) (1985),75; Interdepartmental Committee on 
Maori Fishing Rights First Report, para 24. 
21 Kaituna Claim (1984),10,45; Manukau Claim (1985), 50-2. See also the public comments of the Tribunal's 
chairman Chief Judge ETJ Durie: "Address to the New Zealand Section of the International Commission of 
Jurists" 10 May 1985 (unpub. transcript) and "Part IT and Clause 26 of the Draft New Zealand Bill of Rights" in 
Legal Research Foundation A Bill of Rights for New Zealand (1985) 175. 
n Te Weehi v Regional Fisheries Officer. Unreported judgment of the High Court, Christchurch, 19 August 1986. 
-S_~}36Adi~. The Crown has indicated it will not appeal Williamson J's decision. 
2J Notably Fodcn Constitutional DevelopmenJ of New Zealand (1938) and New Zealand Legal History (1965); 
Rutherford Acquisition of British Sovereignty in New Zealand (1949); Molloy "The Non-Treaty of Waitangi" 
[1971] NlLf 194; Robson, ed New Zealand. The DevelopmenJ of its Laws and Constitution (2nd ed 1967), chap 
1. 
24 "Land Rights of Indigenous Canadian Peoples" (1979),4. 
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Prendergast CJ's judgment in Wi Parata v The Bishop of Wellington (1877),1.5 have vaguely 
acknowledged this relevance yet neglected to inquire into its importance and ramifications 
for Maori claims. The point is noted here simply as illustrative of the proposition that one 
cannot begin to understand much less identify the character of the aboriginal rights of the 
Milori without joint resort to the local and larger context. One must be aware both of the 
stock of contemporaneous legal nonns obtaining at the time of the assumption of 
sovereignty as well as the detail of the historical process by which that sovereignty was 
acquired and maintained. The historians have generally focused on the latter aspect to the 
cost of the fonner. As a rule, legal inquiries have shown familiarity with neither. 
Apart from the present writer's work and an article by Hookey,26 the most recent 
treatment of the aboriginal rights of the Maori has tried to break the mould of earlier 
judicial and academic approaches by looking at the historical context and attempting to 
isolate, with no great success it must be admitted, the contemporaneous legal nonns.27 This 
writer reaches a similar conclusion as those whose intellectual and methodological strictures 
he has criticised, finding that English constitutional law affecting the colonies took little or 
no stock of Maori rights. This conclusion facilitates a 'neo-Marxian' approach28 in which the 
whole of the events of 1840 acquire conspiratorial overtones in as much as the Treaty of 
Waitangi is characterized as a device to guarantee the Maori certain rights which English 
law was not equipped to recognise. This interpretation is crudely cynical and violates the 
legal and historical record. 
It is submitted that the annexation of New Zeland and consequential question of the 
aboriginal rights of the Maori cannot be divorced from a colonial and constitutional tradition 
dating, at the latest, from the first days of British relations with non-Christian societies. 
These principles, which had in turn evolved from a medieval, feudal and Christian 
background, developed in an organic manner through the centuries of British imperial 
activity and were in a certain state of development at the time of the annexation of New 
Zealand. This organic body of rules was constantly evolving and growing in sophistication. 
If this is a warning against the attempt to overlay some kind of retrospective blueprint upon 
the whole of British relations with tribal societies, it must nonetheless be admitted that 
beneath the rich variety of British encounter and idiosyncratic responses to particular non-
Christian societies there lay certain well-established and fundamental premises. These were 
1 never substantive restraints upon British activity, except perhaps in the excuse, so much as 
• guidelines to the manner and fonn of the Crown's relations with non-Christian and, more 
particularly, tribal societies. These principles were incorporated by the common law into 
colonial law. 
1.5 (1877) 3 NZ Jur (OS) 72 (se). 
26 "Milirrpum and the Maoris: the Significance of Maori Land Cases outside New Zealand" [1972] OLR 63. 
'1:1 DV Williams 'The Use of Law in the Process of Colonization" (1983). especially chapter 2. 
28 Letter to the writer. 1 November 1983. 
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It will become plain as the thesis progresses that the present study is wide-ranging and 
ambitious. Its basic theme is that the aboriginal rights of the Maori must be assessed in 
terms of the contemporaneous legal norms understood in their organic character and 
particular application to the New Zealand setting. Unavoidably this has required the 
reduction, consolidation and elimination of a great deal of comparative as well as the more 
local material. The 'writer has concentrated upon those aspects of colonial law and New 
Zealand legal history which he feels to be of particular importance although in places this 
has left some incompleteness of detail. An attempt has been made to identify such failings 
and areas of potential future research in the text 
In closing this Introduction it may be noted that this thesis implicitly combines two 
tasks. On the one hand it is primarily a study in colonial legal history concerned to isolate 
the state of the constitutional art in the 1840s as the Crown asserted its sovereignty over 
New Zealand. On the other hand it is more than an exercise in historical and constitutional 
explanation since the conclusions it offers have significant consequences for contemporary 
Maori claims. This combination of historical inquiry and contemporary relevance should be 
kept in mind as the thesis is read. 
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PART I 
BRITISH SOVEREIGNTY OVER NEW ZEALAND 
PART I 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES AFFECTING THE CROWN'S ACQUISITION OF AN 
IMPERIUM IN TERRITORY OCCUPIED BY NON-CHRISTIAN SOCIETIES 
A. INTRODUCfION 
The Treaty of Waitangi was regarded by the Crown as meeting a necessary prerequisite 
to its formal annexation of New Zealand. The recognition of the requirement of Maori 
consent to British government over the islands was in keeping with long-established British 
practice in relation to the acquisition of an imperium, that is a right of government, over 
non-Christian societies and their territory. The Crown consistently presumed the juridical 
capacity of non-Christian societies to grant rights of government, both long before and well 
after the events of 1840. In this sense the Treaty of Waitangi was part of established British 
practice. The requirement of the non-Christian society's consent to the British imperium 
within their territory, and certainly at least over their society, was much more than a moral 
imperative. The Crown treated the requirement as legal in character notwithstanding its 
unenforceability, as opposed to cognisability, in the English courts. This will become plain 
in the present chapter. In the following chapter we will see the particular application of this 
legal pre-requisite to New Zealand taking the form of the Treaty of Waitangi. 
1. Imperium 
The Crown has the prerogative power to conduct the foreign relations of the United 
Kingdom.l Under this prerogative it enjoys the power to acquire rights of government (an 
imperium) within territory beyond the realm. Having acquired or in contemplation of the 
acquisition of such tights, the Crown may use its prerogative power to constitute judicial, 
legislative and executive bodies for the territory wherein these rights may run. 2 In certain 
circumstances the Crown may also hold a general legislative (as opposed to constituent) 
2 
4 Co Inst, cap xxvi; 1 Bla Comm, cap 7; 16 Vin A br, M a; Chitty, Prerogatives of the Crown (1820), cap 4; 
Com Dig, tit prerogative cap B. 
See the opinions in Chalmers Opinions of Eminent Lawyers, on various points of English Jurisprudence (1814), 
1,29-57; Hope Scott "Report on British Jurisdiction in Foreign States" (1843), App VI in Jenkyns British Rule 
and Jurisdiction Beyond the Seas (1902), 242 at 256; Forsyth Cases and Opinions on Constitutional Law (1869) 
169,170,186 (erection of courts of justice); Roberts-Wray Commonwealth and Colonial Law (1966),145 . 
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power in relation to the territory beyond the realm.' 
The acquisition and constitution of an imperium over foreign territory are separate acts 
involving the exercise of two different powers. The rights of government will be acquired 
through the Crown's conduct of its foreign relations as, for example, by treaty, conquest or 
usurpation from the local authorities. The imperium so acquired mayor may not receive 
formal constitution · from the Crown. Where no such constitution is forthcoming the 
imperium may be termed informal and lacking royal authority lies beyond the reach of 
English law. Where this informal imperium is exercised by British subjects over persons 
other than the subjects of the Crown it will generally take effect as a delegation under local 
law.4 Where, however some power of government (judicial or otherwise) is exercised by 
British subjects over British subjects without formal constitution from the Crown, English 
law will regard this as unlawful.s The Crown will usually constitute an imperium over 
territory beyond the realm through the grant of letters patent under the Royal Seal.6 
A fOlmal imperium may establish either personal or territorial rights of government. The 
personal form of imperium is usually associated with an extraterritorial jurisdiction whilst 
the latter is linked with the assumption of territorial sovereignty or establishment of a 
Protectorate.' The difference between the two positions is that a territorial right recognises 
some form of sovereignty in the Crown over the particular region whilst an extraterritorial 
jurisdiction imports a disavowal of any sovereign title to the territory limiting the Crown's 
4 
6 
, 
In colonies of the Crown this power is subject to the rules in Campbell v Hall (1774) Cowp 204 as amended by 
statute, see below, chapter 4. Some writers have felt that prior to the Foreign Jurisctiction Act 1843, the Crown 
lacked any ordinary legislative power in foreign territory not a colony: Jenkyns British Rule and Jurisdiction, 153 
and Piggolt Extraterritoriality (1907), 18-22. The charters issued by the Crown prior to that Act indicate, 
however, that the Crown considered it had some capacity to constitute powers of legislation (albeit limited) in 
territory to which it ctid not claim any territorial sovereignty. 
For example, the zemindary over regions of Bengal acquired by the East India Company from the Mughal 
authorities during the early eighteenth century, these rights of government receiving no fonnal constitution or 
authorization from the Crown. Also Papayanni v Russian Steam Company (1863) 15 ER 862 (PC); Paunceforte, 
memorandum, 1876 (nd) FO 97/497:np; Wright and Davidson, memoranda, 19 December 1887 FO 
97/562/5736:#18,16-20. 
It appears, however, that British subjects forming settlements in unoccupied territory for which the Crown refused 
(as with the British Honduras during the late eighteenth to early nineteenth century) or lacking knowledge of its 
existence does not (as with the PiLCaim Islands during the nineteenth century) exercise a constituent power have 
some inherent right to provide their own legislative, judicial and executive bodies: Phillips v Eyre (1870) LR 6 
QB I, Roberts-Wray Commonwealth and Colonial Law, 151. For the laws (notably 'Burnaby's Laws' (1765)) 
enacted by the British Honduras settlers Burdon, ed Archives of British Honduras, I, passim (Bumaby's laws at p 
100); and for the Pitcaim Islands, Brodie Pitcairns Island and the Islanders in 1850 (1851), 84-91. 
Procedural formalities see Corn Dig, tit "Patent", cap 4; Chitty Prerogatives of the Crown, 389-90. Note Letters 
Patent Act, 1863, 26 & 27 Vict c 76 and see Roberts-Wray Commonwealth and Colonial Law, 144-145. After 
1843 an imperium not involving the claim to the territorial sovereignty (that is, an extraterritorial jurisdiction or 
Protectorate) was erected by means of an Order in Council under the Foreign Jurisdiction Acts. The Act gave the 
Crown concurrent constituent powers for a foreign jurisdiction - the late nineteenth century charters to the 
African Companies were issued on this basis (Law Officers to Salisbury, 8 August 1885: F084/2275) cf Hall 
Foreign Powers (1894), 10. 
Until 1892 a Protectorate was considered a species of extraterritorial jurisdiction, after that date it was treated as 
a form of sovereign right (acquisition of the 'external sovereignty') over the protected region, see below B.3.ii. 
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imperium to certain classes of person.8 This, however, is the modern understanding. In 
reviewing the historical development of the principles affecting the Crown's acquisition of 
an imperium in non-Christian territory it is not helpful to associate a personal fonn of 
government with a mere extraterritorial jurisdiction. The Crown's charters for North 
Ainerica, to take an important example, constituted a personal of government yet also 
contained clear declarations of some sovereign title over the New World. In reviewing early 
British practice one has the problem, therefore, of discerning the character of the imperium 
(and, consequently, its relation to the indigenous inhabitants) from the tenns of royal 
instrumentation and practice which did not strongly distinguish personal from territorial 
rights of government. Some confrontation of this problem is necessary in order to 
understand the historical development of British practice in relation to the acquisition of an 
imperium over non-European territory. 
2. jurisdiction by legislation distinguished 
The hallmark of an imperium (in both the fonnal and infonnal aspects) is that it confers 
a local power upon the Crown. This distinguishes an imperium from what may be tenned 
'jurisdiction by legislation'. 
From Tudor times the Crown made English subjects abroad liable for the commission of 
certain crimes in territory wherein the Crown claimed no imperium. Admiralty jurisdiction 
on the high seas excepted,9 this amenability to trial for major crimes abroad derived from 
Act of Parliament. The basis of this liability was the ongoing allegiance a subject took to 
the Crown wherever he ventured, a bond not severed by departure from British shores. 10 
This fonn of subjection was asserted as early as the Acts 33 Hen 8 c 23 (1541-2) and 35 
Hen 8 c 2 (1543-4) which allowed a commission to be issued for trial on British soil of any 
person found guilty or acting as an accessory to any offence of treason, murder or 
manslaughter committed inside or outside British territory." The Act 10 Will 3 c 25 (1699) 
made any theft, robbery, murder or other felony upon land in Newfoundland and adjacent 
islands capable of being tried as if committed within England.12 The liability of the British 
subject for any acts of treason, murder or manslaughter was placed on a more organised 
8 An extraterritorial jurisdiction is a delegation from the local authority allowing the bodies formally constituted by 
the Crown to exercise the powers conceded within the framework of the lex loci: Hope Scott "Report", 243; 
Papayanni v Russian Steam Company,' The Laconia (1863), 2 Moo PC (NS) 161, 15 ER 862; Forsylh Opinions, 
232; Hall Foreign Powers and Jurisdiction of the British Crown (1894), 135; Japanese Imperial GovernmenJ v P 
& 0 Co [1895] AC 644; Secretary of State v Charlesworth [1901] AC 373; Casdaghi v Casdaghi (1919) LR 
App Cas 145;· Piggott ExJraterritoriality, 5,41. 
9 Halsbury's Laws of England (4th ed).I.paras 301-2 (extent of criminal and civil jurisdiction of Adrniraity courts). 
10 Opirlion of Attorney-General Yorke (1731), Forsyth Opinions, 427-429; The Griefswald (1859) Swab Admir 434 
; JF Stephen A History of the Criminal Law of England, IT, 58; Piggott Extraterritoriality, 25; Hall Foreign 
Powers, 2. 
11 Discussed in Hall Foreign Powers. 13; Jenkyns British Rule and Jurisdiction, 138. Note amending legislation and 
consolidating statute 24 & 25 Vict (1861), c 100. 
12 Section 13. Amended (1802) 42 Geo 3, c 85. 
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footing with the Murders Abroad Act 181713 and the Imperial Act 9 Geo 4 c 31.14 
This legislative practice was not a fonn of imperium over the territory wherein the 
British subject might commit the crime for which he could be held culpable under the 
relevant Acts. The practice involved no local jurisdiction but merely established the 
susceptibility of the alleged offender to trial on British soil. This still required the suspect to 
come onto British soil for proper trial with all the requisite presentation of evidence and 
proof. A subject was as notionally liable to trial for acts of treason committed in some 
European country as in barbarous lands or deserted islands. In short, such legislation was 
not considered nor was it treated as the assumption of an imperium within the land affected 
by the legislation. 
In the strict theory of English law it has always laid within the power of Parliament to 
assert any fonn of imperium over any person in any territory.1S The now-hackneyed example 
of a modem commentator is that if Parliament wanted to prohibit the smoking of a cigarette 
on the streets of Paris it lay within its theoretical competence to do so and English courts 
would be required to give the law effect. 16 In practice, however, Parliament refused to 
legislate for non-British subjects in territory wherein an imperium had not been obtained 
previously by the Crown. In 1832 a Bill relating to New Zealand was rejected by Parliament 
on the grounds that it would not legislate unilaterally for foreign territory in a manner which 
affected other than British subjects. Similarly the West Africa Settlements Act 187p7 and 
the Courts (Straits Settlements) Act 187418 claiming jurisdiction for courts in British territory 
over foreigners committing offences within the immediate vicinity of the respective British 
possessions were justified on the basis that the foreign offender had come onto British soil 
and thus "may be said to have submitted himself in some · fonn or other to British 
jurisdiction; he has by his own act come within the allegiance of the Crown" .19 A draft Bill 
of 188120 erecting courts with jurisdiction over Paci fic natives for offences committed in 
non-British territory lapsed, it being thought inappropriate for Parliament to erect unilaterally 
an imperium over the natives not previously acquired by the Crown through conduct of its 
13 57 Geo 3 c 53. Note other examples of this practice 9 Geo 4 c 83 (crimes in Pacific to be tried in Australian 
courts); 6 4& 7 Will IV c 57 (Cape of Good Hope Punislunent Act repealed and re-enacted in 26 & 27 Vict c 
35, also 53 & 54 Vict c 37); 24 & 25 Vict c 31 (Sierra Leone, also 53 & 54 Vict c 37); 3 & 4 Will 3 c 93 
(China, see also 6 & 7 Vict c 80). Generally, see Johnston Sovereignty and Protection (1973), ch 2. 
14 Cases under this jurisdiction are discussed in Lewis On Foreign Jurisdiction (1859), 17-27; also Queen v Most 
(1881) LR 7QB 244. 
15 Dicey The Law· of the Constitution (1885), 39-40; British Coal Corporation v The King [1935] AC 500,520 per 
Lord Sankey: "But that is theory and has no relation to realities". 
16 Jennings The Law and the Constitution (5th ed, 1959). 170-171, approved Manuel v Attorney-General [1983] Ch 
77. 95 per Megarry VC. 
17 34 & 35 Vict c 8. 
18 37 & 38 Vict c 38. 
19 Jenkyns to Herbert, 4 April 1882 CO 225/11. 
20 Text in CO 225f): 296-297 and CO 225/11:19-20. 
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foreign relations.21 To the extent, therefore, that Parliament enacted legislation affecting 
territory beyond the realm any statute was either for territory wherein the Crown had 
obtained an imperiwn from the local power or, secondly, was limited to British subjects 
making them liable to trial on British soil for serious crimes committed beyond those shores. 
This position was modified in 187522 and 187823 when jurisdiction by legislation became a 
fonn of imperiwn to the extent the Crown conferred upon itself by statute the power to 
constitute local courts in uncivilised territory with jurisdiction limited to British subjects. 
Even here the Crown's advisors recommended the trial of British offenders should best take 
place on board a British ship so as to give the proceedings some colour of ratione loci.24 
We turn now to consider British practice in relation to the acquisition and establishment 
of an imperiwn in non-Christian territory. Although this practice was organic and constantly 
evolving it is nonetheless possible to analyse it in tenns of three general periods or stages of 
development. The first period begins in the sixteenth and ends in the mid-eighteenth century. 
During this period the rules underlying British practice were, at best, in a crude state of 
development. During the late eighteenth to early nineteenth century defmite and more 
sophisticated rules began to underlay British practice. This second period transfonned about 
the mid-nineteenth century into a third period which although emerging some years after the 
conclusion of the Treaty of Waitangi was to have a crucial effect upon judicial 
interpretations of the Treaty's guarantees to the Maori. 
B. BRITISH IMPERIUM OVER NON-CHRISTIAN SOCIETIES 
1. The early practice (fifteenth to mid-eighteenth century) 
a) British imperiwn in the East 
i) British practice in the Ottoman Empire and the European precedents 
Fonnal British relations with the infidel societies of the 'Old World' began with the 
Capitulations2S of the Porte (1580) by which trading and certain judicial privileges in internal 
matters were granted to English merchants in the Ottoman Empire. These privileges obtained 
by treaty, or capitulation as it was known, were fonnally constituted by Elizabeth I through 
21 Law Officers to Hicks Beach, 20 March 1879 CO 225/4:23-5; Jenkyns to Herbert, 4 April 1882 CO 225/11:21-6; 
Earl of Derby, note, 31 January 1883 "The Bill is a complete innovation in regard to its theory", id, 18. Some 
officials unsuccessfully argued otherwise Brarnston, memorandum, 2 May 1881 and Kimberley, minute, 22 May 
1881 CO 225/9:303-10 (further see Selbome to Kimberley, 30 May 1881, id, 299-300). 
22 Pacific Islanders Protection Act 1875 38 & 39 Vict c 51. 
23 Foreign Jurisdiction Act 1878 41 & 42 Vict c 67. 
24 Paunceforte, minute, 15 October 1881 CO 225/9:313. 
2S The term derived from the capitula, paragraphs or headings into which the early grants were divided. 
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a licence of trade (1581)26 and royal commission (1582),27 the latter instrument appointing a 
consul with judicial powers according to the terms of the Ottoman grant. Over the following 
decades the privileges of the Levant Company, the body as which the merchants became 
incorporated, were renewed by the Crown,28 eventually being made perpetual with the 
judicial and legislative power over the English merchants being given to the Governor and 
Deputies of the incorporated Fellowship (1605).19 This charter recited how the English 
merchants had "there peaceable and safe traffique against the Turkes Galleyes by reason of 
the capitula cion of intercourse holden by us with the Grand Signior and by the residence of 
our Ambassador within his Domynions".30 The charter proceeded to empower the Governor 
and his assembled deputies "to make ordaine and establishe statutes lawes orders 
constitucions and ordinances as well for the good rule and government of the said Governor 
and company of merchants of England trading into the levant seas and their sucessors as of 
all and singular other subjects of us our heirs & successors entermedling or by anie means 
exercizing merchandize in anie part of the Signorie of Venice or the Domynions of the 
Graund Signior" .31 The Company's legislative power extended over all English traders in the 
Levant irrespective of formal membership of the Company and to that extent the power was 
more than a mere capacity to pass by-laws incidental to incorporation. This legislation, like 
the exercise of the judicial powers, beside the usual provision for non-repugnancy to English 
law was not to be "contrarie repugnant or derogatorie to anie treatise league capitulacions or 
covenants betwene us ... and anye other Prince or Potentate made or to be made ... "32 The 
judicial powers received further provision in the capitulations of 1641 and 1675.33 
The form employed by the Crown to give effect to the arrangements with the Ottoman 
Empire were much if not exactly the same as those the Cro.wn had already employed in 
relation to her subjects trading and establishing merchant communities in Europe. During the 
late-medieval period English merchants in Europe had sought constituent instruments from 
the Crown much like those being given within the realm for guilds and boroughs. Royal 
permission and constitution was solicited for a number of reasons. First, the Crown held the 
26 PN, n, 57. 
27 Id,64. 
28 PN, n, 370 (1592) SC, 30 (1600). 
19 Text in Epstein The Early History of the LevanJ Company (1908), 153. This charter remained the Crown's 
constituent instrument for its jurisdiction in the Levant until 1825: Hope Scott "Memorandum", 248. 
30 Epstein, supra, 156. 
31 Id, 186. 
32 Id, 188. 
33 13 crs 429. 
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prerogative power to licence overseas trade.34 Secondly, it held the power of incorporation 
from which the power to pass by-laws was derived. 35 In addition, the Crown held the power 
to forbid passage out of the kingdom.36 Cumulatively these meant that any trading enterprise 
intending to do business beyond the realm without royal constitution faced a great if not 
insuperable initial handicap. The Crown was only too willing to assist its subjects in such 
enterprise and made important grants of privileges to English merchants in Pisa (139p7 and 
1485),38 the Hanse (1404),39 Netherlands (1407)40 and Norway (1408):1 These royal 
instruments established a local jurisdiction amongst the English merchants with a royal 
functionary exercising a judicial and limited legislative rule styled on English law. Since the 
Crown was constituting a local jurisdiction which excepted, if only partially, her subjects 
\Il from the lex loci, the permission of the local ruler was treated from the first as a necessary 
~ antecedent to the Crown's formal grant All the late medieval grants were founded on this 
basis.42 The Tudor and early Stuart monarchs continued the practice of constituting bodies of 
merchants in order they might trade in Europe. Elizabeth I, for example, granted charters to 
the Merchant Adventurers (1564),43 the Muscovy Company (1566)44 and Eastland Merchants 
(1579).4.5 James I, to give more examples, granted charters to merchants trading to Spain 
(1605) and France (1611).<46 Like their late medieval predecessors, these charters were used 
35 
YB 40 Ed m, 17,18; Coke "Notes of Prerogative" SP Dom Eliz L cclxxvi, 81. The power was affirmed in East 
India Co v Sandys (1683-1685), 10 St Tr 371, at 571 and Opinions of Sawyer (1681) and West (1718), Forsyth 
Opinions 422 and 423, but also held that the Crown could not grant the right to enforce such a monolopy by 
forfeiture: Home v Ivy (1670) 1 Sid 441 (Canary Island Co); Nightingale v Bridges (1690) 1 Show KB 135 
(Royal African Co). The power was no longer claimed after the late seventeenth century: Baker An Introduction 
)1 
to English Legal History, 2nd ed (1979), 379, and by the late eighteenth century this claim to a prerogative was 
unlawful (Corn Dig tit 'Trade", D 1; Chitty Prerogatives of the Crown, 163; Forsyth Opinions, 421,433-435.), all 
such monopolies requiring statutory authority (for example, NicholI v Verelst (1778) 2 Blac 1277 (CP), Camden 
v Anderson (1796) 6 TR 723 (KB». 
1 Bla Comm 475; Carr '1ntroduction", SC, xi-lxxxvii. The power to pass by-laws was an inherent attribute of 
incorporation: Norris v Staps (1617), Hobart 211, 80 ER 357 at 358. Occasionally licences of trade were given 
without any incorporation: grant to the Barbary merchants (1585), PN, IV,268, grant to merchants between the 
Senegal and Gambia (1588), id, 285; merchants of the 'Seralen' region, SC, xliv. 
36 This will normally be exercised by a writ ne exeat regnwn (other means see Vin Abr, tit "Prerogative of the 
King", cap GB 1; Chitty Prerogatives of the Crown, 21). The origins of the prerogative are of some doubt 
(furack "Early English Restrictions" (1968». See Opinion of Thomson (1718), Chalmer's Opinions, 246; 
Hawkins A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown 2nd ed (1724); Opinion of Macdonald (1788), Forsyth Opinions, 
164 
37 Rymer's Foedera, vii, 693. 
38 Id, xii, 389. 
39 Id, viii, 360. 
40 Id,464. 
Id, 511. 
42 Hope Scott "Memorandum", 247; Hall Foreign Powers, 132-133. The indenture between England and Florence 
(Rymer's Foedera, xii, 389) would contradict these writers' view of the 1485 letters patent as exceptions in not 
resting upon actual consent of the local sovereign. 
43 Text in Cawston and Keene The Early Chartered Companies (1896), 254; see also Rymer's Foedera, 464 
(charter of 1407) and Cawston and Keene, op cit, 249 (charter of 1505). 
44 PN, L 313 (first grant of privileges from Russia); id (first charter, 1554); id, IT, 73,85,279,355 (subsequent 
Russian grants); 8 Eliz 1 c 17 (1566) and 10 & 11 Will 3 c 66 (1698) (parliamentary re-incorporation). 
45 Text in Sellers, ed The Acts and Ordinances of the East/and Company (1906), 142; confirmed by Proclamation 
of Charles 1 (1629), text in Cawston and Keene Early Chartered Companies, 63. See also PN, I, 170 and 
Rymer's Foedera, vii, 511 (earlier charters) and PN, L 122,139 (first grant of privileges without incorporation). 
<46 SC, 62. 
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to erect a local jurisdiction in territory over which the Crown made no territorial claim and 
were based upon the permission of the local ruler. The power of government in the territory 
given by these instruments was always expressed in personal terminology. Elizabeth I's 
charter to the Merchant Adventures (1564), for example, made it clear the local jurisdiction 
therein constituted arose "by force of any privileges, Powers, Liberties, Graunts, 
preheminences or Authorities hereafter to be granted or made to the said Fellowship ... by 
any the Lord or Lords, Govr or Govrsof the said Foreign Countries & Townes or of any of 
them or of any part of them ... "41 The charter gave the Governor and his Assistants "full 
Jurisdiction, power, and Authority lawfully to Rule and Governe the same Fellowship ... and 
pacify all manner of questS discords and variances, between themselves & between them or 
any of them and other Merchants ... in the said Foreign Countries".48 The power to hold 
courts and enforce the laws of the Fellowship affected any English subject coming within 
the Company's sphere of operations, an indication that the Company's powers were not 
limited to its own members and hence, were powers going beyond mere incorporation. The 
jurisdiction constituted by the charter was, therefore, expressed in personal terms and arose 
not only from the royal grant but the consent of the ruler in whose lands it was to be 
exercised. 
The Crown's formal practice in relation to the acquisition and constitution of an 
imperium in the Ottoman Empire was a carryover from its settled European practice. The 
same forms and underlying principles were observed for the formal requirements of the 
British merchants trading to this non-Christian part of the globe were not so radically 
different from those for European trade. This practice was clearly predicated upon a 
recognition oCthe international personality of the Ottoman Empire. The rights of government 
obtained were limited to English subjects and constituted in a personal manner. No rights 
were sought or exercised over any indigenous inhabitants of the Levant,49 indeed the 
consular jurisdiction obtained by capitulation was initially applied only imperfectly amongst 
the British merchants of these parts.50 The Crown's capitulatory regimes in Morocco (1721) 
took an almost identical format as that for the Ottoman Empire.sl 
ii) Early British practice in the East Indies 
In 1600 the Crown granted a charter to the East India Company to enable the 
exploitation of the trading privileges its subjects had obtained in the East from the Mughal 
47 Cawston and Keene Early Chartered Companies, 269. 
48 Id. 264. 
49 Although certain rights obtained in mixed suits - see Capitulations of 1675: 13 crs 429. 
so Bullard Large and Loving Privileges. 20. 
SI Articles of Peace and Commerce between Great Britain and Fez and Morocco (14 January 1728). 33 crs 79; 
Additional Articles between Great Britain and Morocco (10 July 1729). 33 crs 217. Also see Bullard Large and 
Loving Privileges. 24-25. 
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authorities. The East India Company was incorporated and given exclusive trading privileges 
in those parts of the East Indies not "in the lawful and actual possession of any such 
Christian prince or state, as at this present is, or at any time hereafter shall be in league or 
amity with US".52 The charter was renewed in 1609 and made permanent in 1612.53 These 
charters neither contemplated nor made provision for territorial acquisition, presupposing, as 
well, that any powers of rule exercised by the Company were to be limited to its own 
members and their servants. The laws and ordinances passed by the Company were to be 
"for the good government of the same Company, and of all factors, masters, mariners, and 
other officers, employed or to be employed in any of their voyages".54 The earliest charters 
for the East Indies clearly contemplated that the exercise of any imperium was limited to 
British persons and derived from the consent of the Mughal authorities. 
The format which British trade took in the East Indies differed from that of Europe and 
the non-Christian regions where the 'capitulations' applied. In those parts the British 
merchants mostly lived, traded and mingled amongst the local population. In the East Indies, 
however, the Company established 'forts' or factories55 as they became known which acted 
as bases for British trade.56 These factory sites were purchased and established with Mughal 
permission and upon the understanding that the Company would supervise and regulate its 
own affairs within.51 The charter to the East India Company of 1661 acknowledged the 
'factory' format which British trade had taken,58 giving the Governor and Council of the 
Company the power within their factories to "Judge all Persons belonging to the said 
Governor and Company or that shall live under them in all Causes whether Civil or 
Criminal according to the Laws of this Kingdom and to execute judgment accordingly".59 
Thus, unlike the earlier charters, this one acknowledged the factories of the Company and 
provided for their government but still defined the imperium in a personal manner. This 
personal imperium also extended over all British subjects and employees of the Company 
beyond the factory towns. Again the basis for this imperium was the permission of the 
Mughal authorities. 
Throughout the seventeenth century the Company consolidated its control of the factory 
towns. Letters patent of 1726 constituted an imperium, first, over all British subjects and 
52 Text in Mukherji, ed Indian Constitutional Documents (/600.1698), I, 1 at 13. 
53 Carr, SC, xlviii; Archbold Outlines of Indian Constitutional History (1926), 13-14. 
54 Indian Constitutional Documents, 1,13. 
55 The difference between the capitulatory and factory fonns of imperiwn is stressed by Comewall Lewis On 
Foreign Jurisdiction, 17, Forsyth, Opinions, 231-232 (notes); Jenkyns, British Rule and Jurisdiction, 149. 
56 Article ccxxix, The lawes or standing orders of the East India Company (1621). 
57 The first factory was established at Surat on this basis (1612): Kaye The Administration of the East India 
Company (1853), 65; Jain Outlines of Indian Legal History, 2nd ed (1966), 12-14; Setalvad The Common Law in 
India (1960), 5; Fawcett The First Century of British Justice in India (1934) xvi. 
58 Archbold Outlines of Indian Constitutional History, 15; Jain Outlines of Indian Legal History, 10-11. This charter 
appears to have been a copy of a charter obtained from Cromwell in 1657, since lost: Ilbert The Government of 
India, 16. 
59 El Co Tracts, np. 
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Company employees within the East Indies and, secondly and most importantly, over all 
persons within the Presidency Towns of Bombay, Madras and Calcutta making them 
amenable to judgment in civil and criminal matters according to English law.(\() The first 
aspect of these letters patent, the continuation of the personal imperium over British subjects 
and Company employees throughout the East Indies, was simply in line with the recognised 
practice under Mughal pennission. The second aspect, however, was an assertion of a 
tenitorial imperiwn in as much as the Crown claimed jurisdiction over all the inhabitants of 
the Presidency Towns. 
Bombay had been ceded by Portugal to the Crown in 166061 so here the Crown's 
tenitorial sovereignty was clearly established, however Madras and Calcutta had been 
obtained within the framework of and subject to Mughal sovereignty.62 The erection in 1726 
of a government over all persons in Madras and Calcutta transfonned what had until then 
been a personal into a territorial imperiwn.63 Prior to that what powers of government the 
East India Company had practiced over native inhabitants of these towns it justified as 
delegations from the Mughal authorities. In Madras English magistrates had exercised a 
jurisdiction since 1654 in place of the native Adijar in choultry COurts.64 In Calcutta 
jurisdiction over the local natives and those of the surrounding towns was exercised in 
zemindary courts established under Mughal authority in 1698 and 1717.6S The 1726 letters 
patent were not treated as disrupting the operation of these courts despite the ostensible 
extension of English law to all inhabitants of the town.66 Indeed, letters patent of 1753 
declared the applicability of Muslim and Hindu law to the native inhabitants of the 
Presidency towns.67 Lord Brougham observed in The Mayor of the City of Lyons v East 
India Company (1836):68 
" ... enough has been said to show that the settlement of the Company in Bengal was 
effected by leave of a regularly established Government; in possession of the 
country, invested with the rights of sovereignty, and exercising its powers: that by 
pennission of that Government, Calcutta was founded, and the factory fortified, and a 
district purchased from the owners of the soil, by pennission of that Government, 
and held under it by the Company, as subjects owing obedience, as tenants rendering 
(\() Text in El Co Tracts, np. 
61 Herts Comm Tr, 11,21. 
62 Kemal "The Evolution of British Sovereignty in India" [1957] !YBIL 143; Jain, Oullines of Indian Legal History, 
17-18 (Madras), 45-49 (Calcutta); Cowell History and Constitulion, 8. 
63 Advocate.General of Bengal v Ranee Sumomoye Dossee (1863) 9 Moo Ind App 427, 19 ER 786 (PC). 
64 Fawcett British Justice in India, 208. 
6S Id,209. 
66 Id, Archbold Outlines of Indian Constitutional History, 32. 
67 Text in El Co Tracts. In Bombay the 1726 letters patent's extension of English law to all inhabitants had been 
taken literally, a result which eventuated in the 1753 letters patent: Fawcett British Justice in India, 224-225. 
68 (1836), 1 Moo PC 175, 18 ER 66, 103-4. 
20 
rent, and even as officers exerclsmg, by delegation a part of its adminstrative 
authority. At what precise time, and by what steps, they exchanged the character of 
subjects for that of Sovereign, or, rather, acquired by themselves, or with the help of 
the Crown, and for the Crown, the rights of sovereignty, cannot be ascertained; the 
sovereignty has long since been vested in the Crown ... " 
This development illustrates that by the early eighteenth century a factory could entail 
either an extraterritorial (personal) or territorial fonn of imperium. The failure of the 1726 
charter to distinguish the two fonns indicates, perhaps, that the Crown was not thinking in 
such tenns but simply intended and constituted its factories as sites of a thorough English 
imperium without pondering the type of imperium therein erected.69 Whatever the fonn of 
imperium, its acquisition and even enlargement clearly related in some way to the consent of J the indigenous authorities: By 1726 the Company's control of Madras and Calcutta had 
grown so comprehensive that the unwitting declaration of a territorial sovereignty over the 
towns in 1726 may be justified as a de jure reaction to what had already occurred de facto .70 
One other explanation suggested in 1757 and, it will be seen, perhaps more applicable to the 
factories contemplated in Africa, was that the Mughal authorities in permitting the factory 
thereby vested both the property and the sovereignty in the Crown.71 This explanation which 
blends imperium with dominium does not square with the British practice which shows the 
territorial sovereignty over Madras and Calcutta to have been gradually rather than 
instantaneously obtained. 
It was observed above that during the early eighteenth century the Company was 
exercising some administrative and judicial functions under Mughal authority over the native 
population not only within but surrounding the Presidency towns. The zemindary of 
Calcutta, in particular, had grown to cover approximately 800 square miles of the Bengal by 
1757.72 The exercise of such powers received no fonnal authorization from the Crown until 
the end of the century73 and so took effect simply and strictly as a delegation from Mughal 
law.7• This function was strictly infonnal not being constituted by royal instrumentation. 
Clive' s famous victory at Plassey (1757) brought a large area of the Indian subcontinent 
under British control. It is interesting and not without significance that the Company did not 
seek to enforce any rights as conqueror for the Crown but obtained a grant of diwani 
69 Letter of the Judges of the Supreme Court to the Secretary of the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of 
India (September, 1830), paras 5 & 6, text in pp (1831), VI, Part 5 (No 26, Encl 4 at p 117). Cowell History 
and Constitution, 15; Setalvad The Comnwn Law in India, 12. 
70 Watson "Fortifications, Force and English Trade in India" (1980), 88 Past and Present, 70 at 81 -82; Morton, note 
to Commaul ulDeen v Goring [1777jlnd Dec (OS)64, n 104. 
71 Opinion of A-G Pratt and S-G Yorke in El Co. Tracts, np. A misleadingly abbreviated version of this opinion 
was reprinted in ChaImers Opinions, L 195. 
12 Archbold Outlines of Indian Constitutional History, 44. 
73 The Act of Settlement, 1781 21 Geo 3 c 63. This Act authorized the enactment of Regulations for the 
administration of justice in the region: below, note 
7. Archbold Outlines of Indian Constitutional History, 44; Jain Outlines of Indian Legal History, 45-49; Setalvad 
Comnwn Law in India, 11. 
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(1765rl from the defeated Emperor. This gave the Company important functions of 
government over the population of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, the 'Mofussil' as it became 
known, under the ostensible umbrella of Mughal sovereignty.76 Although the Mughal's 
sovereignty was in reality a fiction, the officers of the Company initially maintained that the 
grant of diwani had done no more than give the Company certain powers under the Mughal, 
a position which would have secured the Company from interference by the British 
government." By this view any imperium in the Mofussil would be, at best, extraterritorial 
and pursuant to the charters of 1726 and 1753 limited to British subjects and the employees 
of the Company. By the time of the Regulating Act (1773)78 it was difficult, however, if not 
impossible to deny the Crown's territorial sovereignty over the Mofussil. Although no clear 
declaration of this sovereignty was made until 1813,'9 the inference had been overwhelming 
and local courts proceeded upon that basis.80 The relevant constitutent instruments issued 
after the Regulating Act, however, only extended English law to 'British subjects' and the 
employees of the Company81 leaving the indigenous population with their own laws applied 
in the Mofussil courts organised, first, by Hastings81 and later pursuant to the 1781 
legislation.83 This gave some basis for the argument that the Crown held no sovereignty over 
the Mofussil. The problem as to the character of Crown's imperium over the Mofussil does 
75 
76 
" 
78 
79 
80 
81 
Text in 43 CTS 217,219. 
Cowell History and Constitulion, 24-25; Jain Outlines of Indian Legal History, 82-84. 
Cowell History and Constitution, 19; Archbold Oullines of Indian Constituliona/ History, 44, 62; Firminger Fifth 
Report, vii - xiii. Warren Hastings initially took the view that the sovereignty remained in the Mughal. His 
Regulations of 1772 for the administration of justice in the Mofussil (establishing the adalat courts) were 
predicated on that assumption: letter from the President and Council to the Directors of the East India Company, 
3 November, 1772; text in Archbold Outlines of lruiian Constitutional History, 53-59. His position modified after 
the Regulating Act (1773): Firminger, op cit, xiii,xxi. 
13 Geo 3 c 63. This Act spoke of the "territorial acquisitions and revenues" of the East India Company. 
The Charter Act 1813 53 Geo c 155 declared the "undoubted sovereignty" of the Crown. The Act was taken as 
declaratory: Mayor of the City of Lyons v East India Co. (1836), 1 Moo PC 175, 18 ER 66 and enacted as a 
result of The Fifth Report from the select committee on the affairs of East lruiia (1812). 
Commaul ul Deen Ali Khan v Goring and others [1777) Ind Dec (OS) 64, n 104 per Impey CJ and Chambers J, 
contra vide Hyde J; Reporters' note, ibid; letter of the Supreme Court Judges (1830), pp (1831),VI,Part 5, (no 
26, encl 4, at 117), 12-15. See also references in Firminger Fifth Report, xiii-xxi; Cowell History and 
Constitulion, 32; R v Shaik Boodin (1846) 4 Ind App (OS) 397, 422-424; Stephen The Story of Nuncomar and 
the Impeachment of Sir Elijah Impey (1885), IT, 129 observed that the authors of the Regulating Act "wished that 
the King ... should act as sovereign of Bengal, but they did not wish to proclaim him to be so". 
See, most notably, the letters patent establishing a Supreme Court in Calcutta (1774), text in Gen App 1 "Report 
on the Administration of Justice, and c. in the East Indies" in (1781) Reports from Committees of the House of 
Commons (1st series), vol V; Act of Settlement, 1781, 21 Geo 3 c 63. The failure to define precisely the extent 
of the applicability of English law granted by these charters led to major clashes between the Supreme Court at 
Bengal and the Company - classic account is Slephen Nuncomar and Impey, IT. Also, letter of The Supreme 
Court Judges (1830), supra, paras 26-33; Cowell History and Constitulion, 37-58. 
82 Hastings Regulations of 1772: letter from The President and Council of Bengal, 3 November 1772, text in 
Archbold Outlines of Indian Constitutional History, 53-59. These Regulations were enacted under the authority of 
the diwani, Hastings doubting whether the Regulating Act conferred any legislative power over the Mofussil: 
83 
Rama Fois, Legal and Constitulional History of India, IT, 253-4. 
21 Geo 3 c 63. This gave the Governor-General and Council a legislative power over the Mofussil under which 
Regulations were passed organising the native courts, collection of revenue and c. These Regulations, which were 
not subject to a requirement of non-contravention of English law, were codified as the Cornwallis Regulations 
(1793). The legislative power assumed by the Company in the Mofussil was probably in excess of that conferred: 
Cowell History and Constitution, 36; Ilbert Government of India, 59; Rama Fois, Legal and Constituliona/ 
History, ll,254. The power received further provision: 37 Geo 3 c 142. The Regulating Act (1773) and letters 
patent thereunder (1774) had exercised no constituent power in relation to the native courts. 
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not alter, however, what for present purposes was the important feature of British practice: 
Whatever fonn it had, extraterritorial or territorial, the Crown's imperium over the 
inhabitants of the Mofussil was clearly based upon the grant of diwani and thus originated 
from formal Mughal submission. 
In reviewing British practice in the East Indies until the mid-eighteenth century it may 
generally be obserVed that British imperium was established with Mughal consent. There 
was a clear recognition at this time, and it was one which subsequently received judicial 
acceptance,S4 of the Mughal authorities' capacity to enter into treaty relations with the 
Crown. Until the grant of diwani (1765) the Crown had limited its formal imperium to 
British subjects and the employees of the Company except in the Presidency towns where, 
in the case of Madras and Calcutta, its control had become thorough. In other words the 
Crown's fonnal imperium was territorial in the Presidency towns and personal elsewhere. 
The grant of diwani eventually became treated as the basis of a territorial sovereignty over 
the Mojussil, this imperium being implicitly recognised by the Regulating Act (1773) and 
charter issued under its authority. Whilst the constituent instruments for India were often 
unclear in their identification of the imperium therein constituted (extraterritorial or 
territorial), whatever rights of government were claimed by Britain over the native 
population through these formal royal instruments or by the infonnal means of mere grant 
from the Mughal authorities (zemindary courts, for example) had a clear foundation in 
native submission. This submission was signified by formal treaty or grant ( diwani, 
zemindary) or by the natives placing themselves under the Company's rule (native 
employees and those visiting or inhabiting the Presidency towns). 
iii) Early British practice in Africa 
Although the Levant and East Indies were the major theatres of early British activity in 
the eastern parts of the non-Christian globe, the Crown had also issued some constituent 
instruments in relation to African territory prior to the mid-eighteenth century. As with the 
earliest Crown grants for the East Indies and those for the Levant the first charters for 
Africa were simply licences for trade and constitution of the merchants trading in the 
particular region. The Crown made no provision for territorial acquisition in these early 
charters85 but, recognising some juridical status in the African chiefs typically authorised, 
trade into any territory being "under the obedience of any King, State, or Potentate of any 
S4 Nabob of Arcot v East India Co (1793), 4 Bro CC 180, 29 ER 841, 2 Yes Jun 56, 30 ER 521; Amerchund 
Burdeechund v United East India Co (1826) 4 Ind Dee (OS) 547; East India Co v Syed Ally, Habiboon Nissa 
Begum (1827), 7 Moo I A 555; Mayor of the City of Lyons v East India Co (1836) 1 Moo PC 175, 18 ER 66; R 
v Shaik Boodin (1846), 4 Ind App (OS) 397; Secretary of Stale in Council of India v Kamachee Boye Sahaba 
(1859), 7 Moo Ind App 500, 19 ER 388; Ha'ri Bha'nji v Secretary of Stale for India in Council (1882),5 ILR 
(Mad) 273. 
85 Grant to the Exeter merchants (1588), PN, IV,285-291; grant to Gregory and others (1592), PN, V,54-5 (extract); 
grant to the African Company (1618), SC, 99. 
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region dominions or county in Gynney or Brynney ... "86 By the Restoration, however, the 
Crown was granting letters patent for Africa on the basis that the grant of factory sites by 
native rulers conferred a territorial sovereignty upon the Crown. After constituting the 
Company with the requisite powers over its members, the letters patent to the Royal African 
Company, for example, stipulated that the Company "shall have the ordering rule and 
government of all s'uch forts factories and plantations as now are or shall be at any time 
hereafter settled".r! As with the 1726 letters patent for the East India Company these do not 
appear to have been issued with any awareness of the result of claiming a jurisdiction over 
all persons within the factory towns, namely the establishment of a territorial sovereignty. 
Without using a formal distinction between the two types of imperium the African letters 
patent simply constituted the factories as sites within which the British could assume full 
control, the same approach taken in the East Indies in the early eighteenth century. As a 
result, the African charters treated factories from the first as a form of territorial imperium. 
Although this view of the consequences of a grant of a factory site by a native ruler was 
unwarranted in the East Indies, it appears to have been an interpretation upon which the 
Crown's formal practice for Africa was able to proceed. In short, the Crown implicitly 
anticipated a simultaneous grant of territorial imperiwn and dominium. 
These post-Restoration charters for Africa coupled with the 1757 interpretation of the 
letters patent for the East Indies suggest that factories in non-Christian parts of the globe 
were by the early eighteenth century generally considered as pockets of British territorial 
jurisdiction. This assumption could be justified in terms of the intention behind the 
establishment of such factories, namely the erection of a base for English traders within the 
narrow confines of which British control would be complete:88 
"The laws and usages of Eastern countries where Christianity does not prevail are so 
at variance with all the principles, feelings, and habits of European Christians that 
they have usually been allowed by the indulgence and weakness of the Potentates of 
those countries to retain the use of their own laws, and their Factories have for many 
purposes been treated as part of the territory of the Sovereign from whose dominions 
they come". 
This understanding was certainly the basis upon which it was suggested during the 1830s 
that the Crown establish factories within the New Zealand islands from which some control 
of the lawless British subjects might be made. 
(iv) The Publicists' approach. 
86 Grant to the African Co (1618), Se,99 at 103. 
r! Charters of the Royal Adventurers into Africa (1660 and 1662), se, 172; also charter of the Royal African Co 
(1672), se, 186. 
88 Advocate-General of Bengal v Ranee Surnomoye Dosee (1863), 9 Moo Ind App 427, 19 ER 786; cf Piggon 
Extraterritoriality, 12 (municipal control of a factory does not import territorial sovereignty). 
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During the sixteenth to mid-eighteenth centuries British practice for the non-Christian 
East employed similar manner and form as that used by the Crown in its dealings with 
Christian nations. The Crown's main interests in these regions were trading rather than 
territorial. What territorial claims were made in lOyal instruments were probably inadvertent 
or unwitting but limited to the factory sites and designed to facilitate and encourage English 
trade. An important aspect of such encouragement was the creation of some local 
jurisdiction through the constituent instrument given the community of Englishmen in these 
foreign and non-Christian regions. As in Europe the jurisdiction erected by the Crown was 
personal although the Crown began claiming a territorial jurisdiction within the factory 
towns of the East Indies and Africa. Whatever the power of government established by the 
Crown, personal or territorial, it was nonetheless founded upon some acquiescence by the 
I non-Christian power over whose territory the English jurisdiction was to run. The practice 
\ 
necessarily imported, first, a recognition by the Crown of the sovereignty (or suchlike 
juridical capacity) of the particular infidel society and, secondly, an acceptance of the 
derivative character of any English rights of government within their territory. 
These two important postulates implicit in British practice in infidel parts of the 'Old 
World' were made explicit in the work of the publicists and propogandists of the sixteenth 
to mid-eighteenth centuries. Continental theorists such as Bodin (1577),89 Cacheranus 
(1566),90 Grotius (160491 and 1625),92 Suarez (1621),93 de Freitas (1625),94 Lyserus (1676)95 
and Pufendorf (1688)96 found Christian princes might enter into treaty relations with non-
Christian powers but in the main limited the treaty-making power to trade and commerce. 
Grotius' work, in particular, enjoyed some influence within England being used, ironically, 
against him and in support of English claims against the Dutch to exclusive rights of trade 
in the East Indies by reason of Mughal grant (1613).97 De Freitas apart, these writers 
stressed the secular aspects of relations between the Christian monarchs and heathen princes 
of the East. These relations arose mainly for reasons of trade, it was accepted, rather than 
from any Christian duty to take the work of God eastwards. 
89 Bodin Les Six Livres de la Republique (1577) L-VI-ii, and see Alexandrowicz Law of Nations in the East Indies, 
30-1. 
90 Cacheranus Disputatio an Principi Christiall() (1566). See Alexandrowicz, supra, 86-87. 
91 De Jure Praedae Commentarius (1604), trsl ed 1950,220. Also Alexandrowicz, supra, 45-9. 
92 De Jure Belli QC Pacis Ubri Tres (1625), Trsl ed 1925, 397. 
93 De Triplici virtute theologica (1621), Trsl ed 1944, section VI. 
94 De justo imperio lusitanorum Asiatico (1625), discussed by Alexandrowicz, supra, chapter 3. 
95 Disputatio Politica de Foederibus cum Infidelious (1676), discussed by Alexandrowicz, supra, 88. 
96 De Jure Naturae et Gentium Ubi Octo (1688). Trsl ed 1934 esp at 233, 340-341. Pufendorfs work did not 
distinguish Christian from non-Christian societies other than to state their equal subjection to the same principles 
of the jus gentium. 
97 Clark "Grotius's East India Mission to England" (1934), 20 Trans Grot Soc 45. The Dutch had a long tradition 
of treaty relations with the polities of Asia, see the many treaties of the Dutch East India Company in 227-231 
CTS. The treaty-making practice of the European nations in this part of the globe is described in Alexandrowicz 
History of the Law of Nations in the East Indies. 
25 
Within England the various writers and cases took a virtually identical tack. Gentili 
(1589),98 Protestant refugee and reader in civil law at Oxford, Zouche (1650)99 and Pott 
(1682)100 found it was lawful for Christian Kings to enter into treaty relations with infidel 
monarchs. Coke appeared to contradict this position in Ca/vin's Case (1606) when he 
pronounced all infidels to be perpetual enemies of the Crown with whom no relations were 
permissible. 101 This position was not only contradicted by what had become the established 
practice of the Crown but Coke's own position in Miche/borne v Miche/borne (1609)102 and 
the Institutes. HtJ In an Anonymous case (1640) Coke's comments on infidel status were 
dismissed as residual Crusading zeal. 104 Molloy's text De Jure Maritjmo (1682), called the 
first text on colonial law by no less an authority than Chalmerslos and in its 4th edition by 
1688, found that treaty relations with infidel powers were lawful.106 The same assumption 
underlay East India Company v Sandys (1682-85).107 The recognition of infidel sovereignty 
implicit in the Crown's practice was certainly plain by 1757 when the Attorney and 
Solicitor-General advised that the Crown's rights of sovereignty over the Presidency towns 
of the East Indies arose from grant of the "Mogul". The opinion not only recognised the 
legality of treaty relations with the Indian princes but held the Crown's rights of territorial 
sovereignty arose from their consent (or, the opinion proceeded, conquest). 
It is plain that from the sixteenth century the Crown recognised, even if only passively, 
some juridical status in the infidel societies of the East. It transacted with these societies on 
that basis adapting and applying the tools of its European practice to the East Its powers of 
government in these infidel regions were erected and exercised with infidel consent and 
support. Indeed were such support not forthcoming the exercise of even a personal 
jurisdiction over English subjects of the Levant and East Indies could not have succeeded. 
These features of British practice may not have been strictly governed by but they were at 
least consistent with the theory of the likes of Grotius, Gcntili and Pu fend 0 rf. Certainly 
British practice was wholly consistent with a recognition of an infidel sovereignty which by 
the mid-sixteenth century had become accepted not only by the various publicists on both 
sides of the Channel but within the Crown's own courts. 
b) British imperium in the New World (to the late eighteenth century). 
98 De Jure Belli Libri Tres (1589), Trsl ed 1933, lib 3, cap 19. 
99 Iuris et Iudicii, sive, Iuris Inler Genies (1650), Trsl ed 1911, 101. 
lOO De Foederibus Fidelium cum infidelibus (1686) discussed by Alexandrowicz Law of Nations in the East Indies, 
87. 
101 (1608),7 Co Rep la at 176; 77 ER 377. 
102 (1609), 2 Brownl & Golds 296, 123 ER 952 (CB) 
103 4 Institutes 155. 
104 (circa 1640), 1 Salk 46, 91 ER 46 (CP). 
IOS History of the Revolt of the American Colonies (1782) . Reprinted 2 vols (1972), I, 173. 
106 De Jure Maritimo et Navali (3rd ed, 1682), 113-114. 
107 (1683-1685), 10 St Tr 371. 
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i) early charters 
It is usual to date European claims in the New World from the Papal Bull Inter Caetera 
(1493)la! issued in the year after Columbus' voyage. By this Bull Alexander VI divided the 
non-Christian world between Spain and Portugal. Subsequently villified by the Protestant 
nations as a donation which it was not in papal hands to make, the Bull appears to have 
been intended not so much as a grant to title to these lands as a demarcation of zones in 
which the Iberian powers were to have exclusive responsibility for conversion of the 
heathen. 109 
Soon after this Bull Henry VI granted a series of letters patent authorizing adventure into 
and acquisition of land in the New World. lIO These letters patent showed token deference to 
papal authority,lll the grants of 1501 and 1502 were to a joint Anglo-Portuguese enterprise, 
but in the main the Crown asserted from the first the right of Christian princes "to find, 
discover and investigate whatsoever islands, countries, regions or provinces of heathens and 
infidels, in whatsoever part of the world placed, which before this time were unknown to all 
Christians".112 Having made this or similar protestations, Henry VI's letters patent proceeded 
to authorise the grantees upon discovery of such lands to ~'conquer, occupy and possess, as 
our vassals and governors lieutenants and deputies therein, acquiring for us the dominion, 
title and jurisdiction of the same towns, castles, cities, islands and mainlands so 
discovered".ll3 Discovery and conquest were thus laid down as the conditions precedent to 
English right over territory in the New World. The grantees were empowered to rule the 
land so acquired as conquests. The letters patent of 1501 and 1502 also went on to give the 
grantees "full power and authority to rule and govern all and singular the men, sailors and 
other persons removing and making their way ... to the islands, countries, provinces, 
la! Text in Davenport, ed European Treaties bearing on the History of the United States (1917), 61. The Bull of 
May 1493 purported to "give, grant and assign forever to you and your heirs and successors, Kings of Castile 
and Loon, all and singular the aforesaid countries and islands thus unknown and hitherto discovered by your 
envoys and to be discovered hereafter, provided however they at no time have been in the actual temporal 
possession of any Christian owner, together with all their dominions, cities, camps, places and villages, and all 
rights, jurisdictions and appurtenances of the same". The grant was clarified in the Bull Dudum Sequidem (26 
September 1493) and modified by agreement of Spain and Portugal in the Treaty of Tordesillas (2 July 1494) 
subsequently confirmed by Julius IT in the bull Ea Quae (1505). 
lOO Initially the Bulls were treated as a grant of title over these lands: Pagden The fall of natural man· (1982), 28-
30. However during the early sixteenth century the Spanish jurists and theologians cast doubt upon the temporal 
authority of the Pope and limited the Bulls to the spiritual sphere: Las Casas Brevissma relacion de la 
destruycion de las Indias (trsl ed 1583), fo1 C 1 v; Vitoria De Indis et de invre belli Relectiones (1539), trl ed 
1917; lib 3, cap 10; Suar6z De Triplici virtwe theologica (1621), trl ed 1944, 744. Also see Muldoon "Papal 
Responsibility for the Infidel: Another Look at Alexander VJ's Inter Caetera" (1978), LXIV Cath Hist Rev 168; 
Oonelan "Spain and the Indies" in Bull and Watson, eds The Expansion of International Society (1984), 75; 
Batlori 'The Papal Division of the World and its Consequences" in Chiappelli, ed First Images of America 
(1976),211. 
llO Letters patent to J. Cabot and sons (1496), text in Biggar, ed Precursors of J. Cartier (1911), 7; letters patent to 
S Cabot (1498), id, 22; letters patent to R Warde, F Femandez et al (1501), id, 41; letters patent to H Eliot, J 
Gonzales et al (1502), id, 70. 
III Goebel The Struggle for the Falkland Islands (1927), 57-59. 
112 Letters patent to Warde (1501) in Biggar, ed Precursors of J. Carlier, 41 at 51. 
113 Id, 7 (1496 letters patent); 51 (1501 letters patent); 81 (1502 letters patent). 
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mainlands and places before-mentioned".114 The grantees were authorised "to make, set up, 
ordain and appoint laws, ordinances, statutes and proclamations for the good and peaceful 
government of the said men, masters, sailors and other persons aforesaid".lls The letters 
patent of Henry VI constituted a power of government over all English persons going to the 
New World but as against the "heathens and infidels" set up no such right other than to 
authorize their conquest 
ii) The Salamanca Divines 
In the period between these letters patent issued in the giddy days of the New World's 
first discovery and the Elizabethan charters to Gilbert (1578) and Raleigh (1584) the debates 
of the Spanish theologians, the Salamanca Divines as they became known, had given some 
meaning to the term "conquest" as applied to the New World. The Spanish Crown had 
consistently worried about the manner of its subjection of the Indian societies of the New 
World and sought to give it some colour of law,116 witness the Requirement (1514),117 
Valladolid Disputation (1550-1), llB . laws of Burgos (1512)119 and the laws of the Indies 
(1542).120 The prevailing opinion was that the duty to Christianize the heathen societies 
justified their conquest but only after their voluntary submission to the word of God had 
been refused. 
The Salamanca Divines, notably Las Casas and Vitoria, specified the grounds upon 
which it was lawful for a Christian prince to assume an imperium over the Indians and their 
lands. Vitoria, probably the best and certainly the most sophisticated and influential example 
from the Spanish school,l2l argued that Spanish title over the Indians derived lawfulness 
from one of six and possibly seven grounds. These grounds involved either the forcible 
conquest of the Indians or their voluntary submission to Spanish rule. Vitoria stated that 
conquest of the Indians must proceed from a just cause. Such causes arose upon the Indians' 
breach of the jus gentium, the law of nations or nature and were either secular or religious 
114 Id, 51 (1501 letters patent); 81 (1502 letters patent). 
llS Id. 
ll6 The leading accounts are Hanke The Spanish Struggle for Iustice in the Conquest of America (1949) and Pagden 
The fall of natural man (1981). 
ll7 This was the document read in Spanish to the Indians requiring their voluntary submission to the Spanish King, 
their refusal justifying the Spanish recourse to forcible subjection : Las Casas Brevissma Relacion (1542, trl 
1583) ; Porter The Inconstant Savage (1979), 157-158; Hanke Spanish Struggle for Iustice, 31-38; Muldoon 
"John Wyclif and the Rights of the Infidels: The "Requerirnento" Re-examined" (1979), 36 The Americas 301. 
llB Hanke Aristotle and the American Indian (1959), 38-73. 
ll9 Hanke Spanish Struggle for Iustice, 23-25. 
120 Id. 91-95; Las Casas, Brevissma Relacion (1542, trl 1583). 
121 Scott The Spanish Origin of International Law Francis de Vitoria and his law of nations (1934); Nys 
"Introduction" to Vitoria De Indis, trl ed 1917. 96-99; Muldoon 'The Contribution of the Medieval Canon 
Lawyers to the Fonnation of International Law" (1972). 28 Traditio 483; F Cohen 'The Spanish Origin of Indian 
Rights" in LK Cohen. ed The Legal Conscience (1960).230. esp at 248. 
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in character. Thus the refusal of the Indians to allow Spain to exercise its rights of trade and 
commerce in their territory presented the Spanish with a just and secular cause to engage 
them in a defensive war. Propogation of Christianity gave the Spanish another possible title 
over the Indians, a religious right of war which arose if the Indians prevented the Spaniard's 
exercise of their right (and, after Inter Caetera (1493), duty) to preach the Gospel in their 
lands: l22 
. " .. .if there is no other way to carry on the work of religion, this furnishes the 
Spaniards with another justification for seizing the lands and territory of the natives 
and for setting up new lords there and putting down the old lords and doing in right 
of war everything which is permitted in other just wars, but always with a regard for 
moderation and proportion, so as to go no further than necessity demands ... and with 
an intent directed more to the welfare of the aborigines than to their own gain". 
The argument of the Salamanca Divines was certainly known in Elizabethan England. m 
Las Casas' Brevissma Relacion (1542) was translated into English in 1583 with extracts 
being included in Hakluyt's Discourse of Western Planting (1584).1:1A Purchas included an 
account of the Valladolid Disputation in his Hakluytus Posthumus (1625)125 which like 
Hakluyt's work enjoyed great popularity in its day. The Spanish influence was evident in the 
work of Baconl26 and Gentili1Z7 as well as other tracts,l28 some admittedly propogandist in 
character, of the late Tudor and early Stuart period. 
iii) Elizabethan charters 
The argumentation of the Salamanca Divines had some bearing upon the interpretation of 
Elizabeth I's charters to Gilbert (1578) and Raleigh (1594) authorising adventure and 
settlement of the New World. These charters permitted the grantees "to discover, search, 
find out, and view such remote heathen and barbarous lands, Countries and territories, not 
actually possessed of any Christian Prince or people, as to him, his heirs and Assigns ... shall 
seem good".129 The charters went on to provide that the grantees: 
" ... shall have, hold, occupy, and enjoy, to him ... forever, all the soil of such lands, 
122 Id. 
123 Generally Porter The InconstanJ Savage. passim. 
124 Text in Taylor, ed The original writings and correspondence of the two Richard Hakluyts (1935), I, 257. 
125 Purchas HakJuytus Posthwnus or Purchas His Pilgrimes (1625), 1905-07 ed, vxm,80. 
126 Bacon "An Advertisement Touching an Holy War" (1622) in Spedding, Ellis and Heath, eds The Works of 
Francis Bacon (1859), vn, 10 and "Of Plantations", Works, VI,457. 
lZ7 De Jure Belli Libri Tres (1589). 
128 Keymis The Discoverie of the Large. Rich and Bewtiful Empyre of Guiana (1596); Anon "Nova Britannia : 
Offering Most Excellent Fruites By Planting in Virginia" (1609) in Force's Tracts, 1,#6; Councell of Virginia "A 
True Declaration of the Estate of the Colonie in Virginia" (1610); R Hakluyt The Discovery and Conquest of 
Terra Florida by Don Ferdinando de Soto translated out of Portuguese (1611). See generally Porter, The 
InconstanJ Savage, ch 8. 
129 CRNC, 1,6 (Gilbert's patent, 1578) and 13 (Raleigh's patent, 1584). 
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Countries, and Territories so to be discovered or possessed as aforesaid and of all 
Cities, Castles, Towns, villages, and places in the same ... to be had or used with full 
power to dispose thereof, and of every part thereof, in fee simple or otherwise 
according to the order of the laws of England, as near as the same conveniently may 
be ... to any person then being ... within the allegiance of us ... reserving always to us ... 
for all services, duties and demands, the fifth part of all the ore of gold and silver, 
that from time to time ... after such discovery, subduing and possessing, shall be there 
gotten ... "130 
On the face of it such provision would seem to indicate the Crown was asserting an 
extensive right of government over large areas of territory by simple act of discovery. Gone, 
it might appear, was the stipulation of Henry VI's charters that English rights of government 
over the Indian tribes derived from their conquest This, however, was not the case despite 
the rather large claims made by Elizabeth I. Such claims were directed against Spain rather 
than the Indian tribes. m The term "discovery or possession" was meant in a conjunctive 
sense. This left open the questions as to how that "possession" was actually to be made, 
much like Henry VI's charters had left unspecified the meaning of "conquest". The conquest 
or consent of the Indian tribes, probably along the lines given by the Salamanca Divines, 
was considered relevant to the question of "possession". In addition the power of 
government erected by these letters patent was defined wholly in personal terms from which 
the tribes were excluded. The grantees obtained132 
... full and mere power and authority to correct. punish, pardon, and rule, by their, 
and every or any of their, good discretions and policies, as well in causes Capitall or 
criminal as civil, both marine and other, all such, our subjects and others, as shall, 
from time to time hereafter, adventure themselves in the said journeys or voyages, 
habitative 'or possessive, or that shall, at any time hereafter, inhabit any such lands, 
Countries, or territories as aforesaid, or that shall abide within two hundred leagues ... 
In other words, the Crown established by charter a machinery of government limited to her 
wayfaring subjects. 
This interpretation is wholly borne out by a neglected but important True Reporte (1583) 
accredited to Sir George Peckham and published between the grants to Gilbert and Raleigh. 
The sophistication is absent but in general thrust this work, which Hakluyt subsequently 
included in his Principall Navigations,133 is identical to that of the Spanish school. The 
Reporte set out for Elizabeth I "her higeffe lawfull Tytle"l34 unto the New Founde Lands 
130 Id, 6 (1578) and 13 (1584). 
131 Juricek "English Territorial Claims in North America under Elizabeth and the Early Stuarts" (1975), 7 Terra 
Incognitae 7. 
132 CRNC, I, 8 (1578) and 15 (1584). 
133 PN, Vi, 42. Other materials relating to the 1578 and 1584 voyages are discussed by Porter The InconstanJ 
Savage, chs 11 and 12. 
134 Peckham A True Reporte of the late discouveries (1583), fol c i. 
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taken in her name by Gilbert under his charter of 1578. The writer alleged Elizabeth I's title 
to the lands discovered for her by Gilbert to be good as against other Christian nations by 
right of discovery soon to be supplemented by English settlement. As against the "Sauages", 
however, the English claimed the right to trade and plant in these lands. Peckham divided 
planting into "two so rtes " , the first "when Christians by the good likeing and willing assent 
of the Sauages, are admitted by them to quiet possession". The second fonn of planting 
arose "when Christians being unjustly repulsed, doo seeke to attain and maintaine the right 
for which they doo come", this being the conversion of the Indians and, Peckham implied, 
the conduct of "trade and traficke".m Although the purpose of this tract was primarily 
propogandist it indicated the general premises of the Spanish school, that Christian princes' 
. rights of government over tribal societies of America derived from the latter's consent or 
conquest on religious or secular grounds, were incorporated into British practice. These 
premises underlaid the Elizabethan charters for the New World. 
iv) The Stuart charters 
The subsequent royal charters for North America commencing with the first charter to 
the Virginia Company (1606) contained geographic limitations and declared fuller rights of 
government than those of previous times.136 The 1606 charter referred to "that parte of 
America commonly called Virginia, and other parts and territories in America either 
appertaining unto us or which are not nowe actually possessed by anie Christian prince or 
people ... "137 The charter avowed the purpose of English settlement to be "the furtherance of 
soe noble a worke... in propogating of Christian religion to suche people as yet live in 
darkness and miserable ignorance of the true knoweledge and worshippe of God".138 Such 
tenninology declaring the right and duty of all Christian nations to spread the word of God 
had two functions. First it rejected the papal authority to donate to the Iberian powers 
exclusive spiritual responsibility for the heathen soul.139 Secondly and implicitly, it took up 
the argument of the likes of Vitoria and the early seventeenth century publicists such as 
Grotius and Gentili who saw in the exercise of this religious duty some basis for the 
acquisition of rights of government over the tribes. The first Virginia chartergave the 
grantees title to all lands within fifty miles coastwards and one hundred miles inland of the 
first settlement. This still left the settlement to be established and the charter gave no 
indication if this was to be achieved by purchase or cession from the Indian tribes or mere 
usurpation. Neither did the charter make clear whether the Company's rights of government 
13S Id, fol c ii. 
136 Juricek, "English Territorial Claims in North America", 7. 
137 rcvc, 1. 
138 Id,2. 
139 Juricek, "English Territorial Claims in North America", 12. 
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within this 100 x 50 mile region were personal or tenitorial. Certainly the charter gave no 
more than personal rights of government outside the 100 x 50 mile area and within the 
specified degrees of latitude. l40 The indications are that the same applied to those lands 
within the settlements' boundaries. The instructions supplementary to this charter directed all 
persons of the settlement to "well entre ate those salvages in those parts and use all good 
means to draw the salvages and heathen people of the same several places and of the 
tenitories and countries adjoining to the true service and knowledge of God".141 The tribes 
within and without the 50 x 100 mile area were, therefore, not considered subject to British 
government. Given this, it cannot be said the first Virginia charter claimed a British 
jurisdiction over the Indian tribes. This would have been impossible to enforce- the de jure 
position under this charter was not so far removed from that which obtained de facto. The 
Crown used its constituent power not only to brush aside the claims of other Christian 
nations to tenitory over which they had not established prior rights by occupation but also 
to constitute judicial, legislative and executive authority over its subjects in these parts. 
There is no indication in the charters for the New World up to and including the first 
Virginia charter of an attempt to erect any right of government over the Indians by mere 
sweep of the royal pen. 
The Crown's tenitorial claims in North America became more comprehensive with the 
second Virginia charter (1609) which set the tone for most of those that followed over the 
next century. The charter opened with reference to "that parte of America comonlie called 
Virginia, and other part and tenitories in America either apprtyeyninge unto us or which are 
not actually possessed of anie Christian prince or people ... "142 The charter went on to 
" give, grannte and confirme unto the said Tresorer and Companie... under the 
reservations, limitacions and declaracions hereafter expressed, all those lands, 
countries and tenitories scituat, lieinge and beinge in that place of America called 
Virginia ... togeather with all the soiles, groundes, havens and portes, mynes, as well 
royal mines of gold and silver as other mineralls, pearles and precious stones, 
quanies, woods, rivers, waters, fishings, comodities, jurisdictions, royalties, 
priviledges, franchises and preheminences within the said tenitorie and the precincts 
there of whatsoever ... "143 
Unlike its predecessor which gave title (also as of the manor of East Greenwich at Kent) 
over lands within a 50 x 100 mile area of the prospective settlement, this charter purported 
to grant title over all land between the specified degrees north latitude. This grant of title 
was however only as full as that which "wee by our lettres patent maie or cann grante",I44 a 
140 TCVC, 5. 
141 "Articles, Instructions & Orders supplementary to the Virginia Charter" (1606), TCVC, 13 (issued under the royal 
Sign Manual). 
142 TCVC, 27. 
143 Id, 42-43. 
144 Id,43. 
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saving provIsion for Indian rights.14s Similarly no power of government over the tribes 
within the compass of the grant was erected for like previous charters the jurisdiction of the 
judicial, legislative and executive authorities was still formulated in personal tenns limited to 
British and the "entennedling" subjects of other Chtistian princes.l46 
Successive charters continued the practice of granting title to extensive areas of the New 
World, the "anie Christian prince" provision disappearing from those charters for regions 
over which the Crown considered its title as against other Chtistian nations to be settled.147 
These . charters contained no claim to a jurisdiction over the Indian tribes, the powers of 
government therein constituted being usually expressed in personal or at least tenns which 
by necessary implication excluded the independent tribes. An example of this implied 
exclusion may be found in the charters' constant references to "Barbarous Nations" as a 
class distinct to that of the "English subjects" amenable to the authorities constituted by 
charter. Where the Crown was intending to constitute any government over the natives of a 
particular region this was recognised in express tenns. Thus the charter of Rhode Island and 
Providence Plantations (1663) noted how the Narraganset Indians had agreed "of their own 
acorde, to subject themselves, theire people and landes, unto us ... 148 Similarly the letters 
patent to Merifield for the islands of St Christopher, Nevis, Barbadoes and Montserrat 
(1625) gave the grantees "full power and authority for us ... to order and dispose of any 
Lands or other things ... and to governe rule and order all and singular persons ... as well our 
natural borne subjects as the Natives and Savages of the said Islands ... "149 
v) The Marshall Court Judgments 
The royal charters for the New World claimed a territorial right for the Crown yet 
erected an imperium with a jurisdiction which might be tenned personal inasmuch as it 
excluded the indigenous tribes from the legislative and judicial powers therein given the 
colonial authorities. Unlike the imperium obtaining in the East these charters had no basis in 
145 Juricek "English Territorial Claims in North America", 18. 
146 The Crown conferred "full and absolute power and authority to correct, punishe, pardon, goveme and rule all 
such the Subjects of us ... as shall from time to time adventure themselves in anie voiadge thither or that shall at 
anie tyme hereafter inhabitt in the precincts and territorie of the said Colonie as aforesaid, according to such 
order, ordinaunces, constitution, directions, and instruccions as by oure said Councell, shall be established ... ", 
TCVC, 52. This class would excluded the Indian tribes. 
147 Letters patent to the Newfoundland Company (1610), SC, 51; New England charter (1620), CC, m, 1827; grant 
of the province of Maine (1622), CC, m, 1621; charter of Avalon in Prowse A History of Newfoundland from 
the English, Colonial and Foreign Records, 2nd ed, (1896), 131; charter for Carolina (1629) CRNC, 64; charter 
of Massachusetts Bay (1629), CC, m, 1846; charter of Maryland, CC, m, 1679; grant of the province of Maine 
(1639), CC, m, 1625; charter of Connecticut, CC, I, 529; charter for Carolina (1663), CRNC, 78; charter of the 
Hudson's Bay Company (1670), in Martin The Hudson's Bay Company's Land Tenures (1898), 163; commission 
for New Hampshire (1680), CC, IV, 2446; charter of Pennsylvania (1681), Minutes of the Provincial Council of 
Pennsylvania (reprint 1968), 17; commission for New England (1688), CC, m, 1863; charter for Georgia (1732), 
CC, n, 765 and see the opinion of A-G Ryder and S-G Strange (1737) which presupposes this interpretation of 
the 1732 charter: Chalmers Opinions, n, 298. The examples above are not exhaustive. 
148 CC, VI, 3211 at 3212. 
149 Text in Burns History of the British West lndies (1964), App E, 768. 
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the consent of the local non-Christian polities. It may be said then that the Crown claimed 
an inherent right to constitute an imperium in these parts unrelated to the consent of the 
local (tribal) authorities but limited to the Crown's own subjects (and 'entennedling' 
European nationals). 
These features of the American charters received consideration by Chief Justice Marshall 
in a series of celebrated cases in the Supreme Court of the United States during the early 
nineteenth century.l50 These cases provided the classic fonnulation of the legal status of the 
American Indian subsequent to the Crown's claim (through these charters) to the territorial 
sovereignty of large regions of the continent 
The competition amongst the European powers for the New World Marshall found to 
have been underpinned by a doctrine of discovery:I'1 
" ... as they were all in pursuit of nearly the same object, it was necessary in order to 
avoid conflicting settlements, and consequent war with each other, to establish a 
principle which all should acknowledge as the law by which the right of acquisition, 
which they all asserted, should be regulated as between themselves. The principle 
was that discovery gave title to the government by whose subjects, or by whose 
authority, it was made, against all other European governments, which title might be 
consummated by possession". 
Although this over-simplified European practice, MaI'Shall's basic premise that the European 
nations claimed rights over regions of America ,exclusive of fellow European nations was 
wholly accurate. The 'doctrine of discovery' one might say to have been relative rather than 
~ absolute in scope:I'2 The European nations' claims against one another did not affect the rights held bY ,the native tribes against the European state claiming sovereign title over their territory. The sovereign title assumed over North America by the Crown merely diminished 
/ 
tribal sovereignty to the extent it disallowed tribal relations with any other European power. 
Nonetheless the Crown's sovereignty became paramount leaving the Indian tribes as 
"domestic dependent nations".m This residual sovereignty left the Indians with the inherent 
right to internal self-government, a vital postulate from which American Indian law has 
developed.1.S4 Put another way, Marshall had found that the sovereignty over North America 
had been divided between the Crown (holding the paramount sovereignty) and the Indian 
tribes. 
150 fohnson v M'lmosh (1823), 8 Wheal.543; Cherokee Nation v State of Georgia (1831), 5 Peters 1; Worcester v 
State of Georgia (1832), 6 Peters 515; Mitchel v United States (1835),9 Peters 711. 
m fohnson v M'lmosh (1823), 8 Wheat 543 at 573. Also Hurley "Children or Brethren: Aboriginal Rights in 
Colonial Iroquoia" (ph D,1985), passim. 
IS2 Worcester v State of Georgia (1832), 6 Peters 515 at 543-544. 
IS3 Cherokee Nation v State of Georgia (1831), 5 Peters 1 at 17. 
154 Cherokee Nation v State of Georgia (1831), 5 Peters 1 at 16-17; Worcester v State of Georgia, (1832), 6 Peters 
515 at 556-559; also Prucha American Indian Policy in the Formative Years (1790-1834) (1962), esp at 211; 
Congress passed the Intercourse Acts (1790-1834) dealing with Indian-European relations but in all other matters 
the Indians were left with the power of self-government deriving from their internal sovereignty. 
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Eventually such a regime would become known to English law as a 'Protectorate', 
meaning an arrangement by which the Crown assumed the 'external' sovereignty of a region 
leaving the local authorities with the 'internal' sovereignty. m However, at the time Marshall 
assessed the legal status of the North American Indian the Protectorate was unknown to 
English law so to this extent his assessment broke new legal ground. His position, it may be 
added, was thoroughly consistent with the constitutional principles which had animated the 
founding fathers. The American Constitution enshrined the division of the sovereignty of the 
United States between the federal and state authorities: Marshall's recognition of residual 
tribal sovereignty simply added a third component to the equation. IS6 
Although Ma rsh all 's judgments quickly became known and admired across the Atlantic 
there was no real need during the early nineteenth century for the incorporation of such 
principles into the contemporary British practice governing the acquisition of an imperium 
\\ beyond the realm. By Marshall's time the distinction between the two forms of imperium, 
\\ extraterritorial jurisdiction and territorial sovereignty, had become the cornerstone of Bntlsh 
practice. At that time English lawyers were unable to conceive any departure from this 
practice even if only as an explanation of the Crown's earlier conduct. During the early 
nineteenth century Britain was entering into numerous treaties of protection with the native 
rulers of the East Indiesl57 but the practice was not producing any theoretical dilemma 
1/ requiring Marshall-like recognition of a third form of imperium intermediate between the 
I two types. Positivist theory increased the rigidity of this distinction during the mid-
nineteenth century when intensifying British activity in Africa and the Pacific was presenting 
a real need for acceptance of something resembling Marshall's approach. ls8 Austinian 
thoughtlS9 shunned any division of sovereignty which was the cornerstone of Marshall's 
formulation of tribal status and so hamstrung the Crown's imperial practice until the 1890s 
when finally English lawyers recognised the Protectorate as a distinct form of territorial 
imperium.l6O 
1
1 For present purposes the importance of Marshall's judgments was the finding that the 
Crown had not unilaterally erected an imperium over the American Indian tribes. Although 
ISS Roberts-Wray Commonwealth and Colonial Law, 112-115; Jenkyns British Rule and Jurisdiction Beyond the Seas 
(1902), ch IX; Hall International Law (1902), 50-51. 
156 Adams Political Ideas of the American Revolution (1939), ch VllI; McClosky "Introduction" to The Works of 
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157 For instance treaties of 10 November 1801 and 6 June 1802 in 56 crs 251 & 341; 27 September 1803 and 12 
June 1804 in 57 crs 211 & 273; 17 April 1805 in 58 crs 127; 5 December 1810 in 61 crs 3; 23 December 
1812,62 crS . l11; 1,9,12,17 November and 23 December 1817, 6,13 January, 26 February, 26 March in 68 
crs, 121,155,179,183,227,299 and 319: 31 July, 5 October, 11,12 and 25 December 1818, 10 January 1819 in 
69 crs 77,263,387,391,437 & 453. 
158 Generally Johnston Sovereignty and Protection, passim. 
IS9 Austin The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (1832), 237-241. 
160 Bramston, memorandum on Protectorates, 20 February 1891 C0417/69/4373 approved by Law Officers to 
Knutsford April 17, 1891 C0417/6917848; R v The Earl of Crewe, ex parte Sekgome [1910] 2 KB 576; Sobhuza 
Jl v Miller [1926] AC 518. Also Johnston Sovereignty and Protection, ch 7; Roberts-Wray Commonwealth and 
Colonial Law, 114-116; cf ~all Foreign Powers and Jurisdiction 221-222. 
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the charters established a sovereign title which the Crown's courts could hardly challenge161 
he found that the Crown had not purported to achieve the tribes' legal submission by simple 
sweep of the royal pen. The legal and acutal submission of the tribes were treated as 
virtually synonymous. Any British imperium over the Indian tribes Marshall held to have 
been (and so far as the United Stated was concerned was still being) obtained through their 
voluntary submission in treaties or, less usually, conquest. 
vi) colonial legislative and judicial practice 
The legislative and judicial practice within the British colonies in North America under 
the Crown's charters appears to have been mostly consistent with Marshall's assessment 
Although it is inappropriate 10 engage in a comprehensive survey it appears that generally 
the legislative162 and judicial practice affecting the Indians within the North American 
colonies distinguished amongst three groups: 163 The first group, occasionally termed the 
'foreign nations', were treated as independent political conununities under the Crown's 
subjection but over whom the colonial authorities had no jurisdiction. This group was 
equivalent to the 'domestic dependent nations' which Marshall recognised as retaining their 
internal sovereignty. The second group was the tributary tribes under the protection and 
varying degrees of dependence upon the nearby colonial authorities. It appears these 
'plantation Indians' were generally left to their own devices in civil and most criminal 
matters inter se but in disputes with Englishmen the colonial authorities were apt to 
intervene. In Massachusetts this intervention was agreed by treaty and nonnally entailed 
conference or "negotiation between the two races rather than formal submission to the 
ordinary colonial courts which, however, assumed jurisdiction over serious crimes involving 
Englishmen and plantation Indians. l64 The third group consisted of individual Indians living 
in white society as servants, slaves or freemen without tribal affiliation. 
This tripartite classification is wholly consistent with the terms of the Crown's charters. 
The plantation and individual Indians became amenable to the jurisdiction of the colonial 
authorities by reason of their submission (voluntarily or by force) . Not having submitted to 
the colonial authorities but establishing a relationship reminiscent of that between vassal 
161 Johnson v M'Inlosh, (1823), 8 Wheat 543; Cherokee Nation v State of Georgia (1831) 5 Peters 1 at 17-18; 
Worcester v State of Georgia (1832), 6 Peters 515. 
162 The best general account of pre-Revolutionary legislative practice in relation to the Indians remains C Thomas 
"Introduction" to Royce "Indian Land Cessions in the United States" (1899), 18th Annual Report of the Bureau of 
American Ethnology. 
163 Stitt Robinson 'The Legal Status of the Indian in Colonial Virginia" (1953), 61 Virg Mag Hist & Bio 247; 
Vaughan New England Fronlier : Puritans and Indians. 1620-1675 (1975), 188-190; Kawashirna "Jurisdiction of 
the Colonial Courts over the Indians in Massachusetts 1689-1763" (1969), 42 New Eng Qly 532; Springer 
"American Indians and the Law of Real Property in Colonial New England" (1986) 30 Am J L Hist 25 at 32-34. 
164 Kawashirna "Jurisdiction of the Colonial Courts", 536. Examples see Shurtleff. ed Records of the Governor and 
Company of the Massachusetts Bay in New England, 2:40-41,55,73; 3:198-99,299. 
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state and feudal overlord,16s the 'domestic dependent nations' were beyond the ordinary 
legislative and judicial reach of the colonial authorities. 
The Royal Proclamation of 1763 provided an emphatic confirmation of this general 
practice. l66 This famous Proclamation issued soon after the Treaty of Paris (1763) treated the 
legislative and judicial authority of the colonial authorities constituted under the various 
letters patent for North America as extending to "all Persons inhabiting in or resorting to 
Our said Colonies". This class of persons would cover all European persons, the plantation 
and individual Indians but was clearly intended to exclude "the several Nations or Tribes of 
Indians, with whom we are connected, and who live under Our Protection". The 
Proclamation treated these two classes as distinct. Moreover the Proclamation authorised the 
apprehension of all fugitive Europeans taking refuge in tribal territory, the military and 
officers charged with the administration of Indian affairs being expressly enjoined and 
required to go into tribal territory for this purpose. This was an indication that the Crown 
did not consider the ordinary legislative and judicial power of its constituted authorities to 
reach into tribal territory. Marshall confirmed this interpretation in Worcester v State of 
Georgia (1832).167 
vii) the influence of the early publicists 
Soon after the discovery of the New World the Salamanca Divines had begun theorising 
over the legality of Spain's subjection of the American Indian. The English were aware of 
this and, it has been seen, traces of the Salamanca's general argumentation underlaid the 
Elizabethan charters to Gilbert and Raleigh. This theme was carried over to the Stuart 
charters for the Americas in that they continued the theme of proselytization initiated by the 
Papal Bull Inter Caetera (1493) and developed by the Salamanca Divines. l68 Beyond this it 
would require much greater investigation than that necessary for present purposes to assess 
the precise extent to which the Crown actually conditioned its colonial activity in the New 
World to the general dictates of the early publicists of the law of nations. The work of such 
writers as Grotius, Gentili and Suarez was certainly known in Britain but it is doubtful 
whether it influenced the Crown beyond the charters' invariable token protestations of a duty 
165 The anology is drawn by Marshall in Worcester v State of Georgia (1832), 6 Peters 515 at 560-561; also Slaltcry 
"Land Rights of Indigenous Canadian Peoples" (1979) 108; Iennings The Invasion of America, ch 7. 
166 Text in Brigham, ed British Royal ProciamaJions Relating to America, 212-8. 
167 (1932),6 Peters 515 at 548-549. 
168 To give some representative examples: The charter of the Newfoundland Company (1610), SC 51, recited its 
purpose as "principally to increase the Knowledge of the Omnipotent God and the propogation of our Christian 
Faith"; the third Virginia charter (1612) TCVC 76 was granted "for the propagacion of Christian religion and 
reclayminge of people barbarous to civilitie and humanitie ... "; the New England charter (1620) speaks of "the 
reducing and Conversion of... Sauages", CC m, 1827 at 1829; the Connecticut Charter (1662) CC, I, 529 at 534 
stated conversion of the natives "is the only and principal End of this Plantation"; the charter of Pennsylvania 
(1681), Minutes of the Provincial Council, 17, spoke of the task "to reduce the Sauage natives by gentle and just 
manners to the love of civill Societie and Christian Religion". 
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to Christianise America. 169 The more sophisticated writers of the later times began to 
secularise the theory of international relations,170 a trend which matured with Vattel's Le 
droit de gens (1758), holding that a Christian power enjoyed no inherent right to proselytise 
in non-Christian territory. The British, however, were late incorporating this into their 
practice and throughout the seventeenth and into the eighteenth century maintained that the 
duty to convert the Indians of North America justified colonisation. m Still there was no 
general attempt by the Crown unilaterally to erect a government over the Indian tribes 
unrelated to their consent or conquest and to this extent British practice was consistent with 
the theorists who insisted that any right of imperium over the tribes emanated from their 
consent or just conquest. 
c) some observations on early British practice 
During the sixteenth to mid-eighteenth century the Crown's erection of the various rights 
of imperium in the non-Christian East and North America was made against a backdrop of 
treaty relations with the indigenous societies and an absence of any claim to an original 
jurisdiction over them. Two important principles were implicit in this practice: The first was 
a recognition of the capacity of these societies to enter into treaty relations with the Crown, 
in other words, a recognition of infidel sovereignty. The second principle, a corollary of this 
recognition, was an acknowledgement that any British imperium over these societies was 
derivative: To have claimed any original right would pretend to a similar power as that for 
which the Papal Bulls of 1454 and 1493 were villified. 
It is important to remember that these principles were no more than notional starting 
points and underlying predicates which acted as guidelines to manner and form rather than 
substantive constraints upon imperial designs. These principles had been identified and 
discussed by the various publicists and commentators from the sixteenth century onwards 
however the extent to which such theorizing determined British practice during this period 
remains moot. There was some apparent influence: The British charters for the East Indies 
and Africa stressed rights of trade and made no reference to Christianisation whereas those 
for the New World emphasized the mission, the same approach to the different regions 
taken by the publicists during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Nonetheless · the 
precise connection between British practice and any theory of international relations in the 
period prior to the mid eighteenth century is still largely a matter of speculation. For present 
purposes, the most that can be said is that to the extent British practice was predicated 
169 Brownlie 'The Consequences for the Law of nations" in Bull and Watson, eds. The Expansion of InJernalional 
Society (1984), 357 at 358-359. 
170 Notably Pufendorf De Jure NaJurae et GenJium Libri Octo (1688, trl ed 1934); Bynkershoek, Quaestionum Juris 
Publici (1737), esp lib 2 and Rachel De Jure Naturae et GenJium (1679) esp lib 2. 
171 The royal charters for North America, the last being the charter for Georgia (1732), consistently declared the 
duty to proselytise in this part of the world. Molloy argued similarly De Jure MariJinw (1682), lib 3, ch 5. 
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however unwittingly on the above two principles (which also were recognised by the various 
publicists) some harmony existed between the theory and practice. 
The instruments issued under the royal constituent power during the sixteenth to mid-
eighteenth century supposed that any British imperium over non-Christian societies was 
derivative in character, that is an emanation from the indigenous society's consent or 
conquest. In North America the 'plantation' Indians and individual Indians living in white 
society could be seen to have consented to British government as was the case with the 
native servants of the East Indian Company and those persons coming into or living under 
the protection of factory towns within which a territorial authority had been assumed. To the 
extent that the charters for the non-Christian parts of the globe did not attempt to establish 
any jurisdiction over the indigenous societies unrelated to their consent (or, much less 
desirably, forcible submission), it is possible to identify a consistent theme to British 
practice in vastly different regions and situations. 
The relevance of a non-Christian society's consent to the Crown's exercise of any 
government over them or their lands was consistent with the intellectual tradition flourishing 
in Europe and, more particularly England during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
During this period various English writers, most in reaction against Stuart excesses, had 
stressed the consensual origins of lawful government.172 The constitutional settlements of the 
late seventeenth century which produced the constitutional orthodoxy of the sovereignty of 
the Crown in Parliament were a tangible manifestation of this tradition. So far as the 
Crown's relations with non-Christian societies were concerned the prerequisite requirement 
of their consent to the Crown's exercise of any power of government over them can perhaps 
be seen as part of a more general theme of post-Reformation political and constitutional 
theory. 
The Crown's position in the period prior to the mid-eighteenth century relative to the 
exercise of an imperium within non-Christian territory was identified both by reference to 
the terms of the constituent instruments and British practice pursuant to these charters. The 
Crown's position regarding infidel societies was seen as more implicit than explicit in the 
terms of its charters. These charters were concerned primarily with, first, the Crown's 
assertion of its rights against other Christian nations and, secondly, the constitution of some 
form of government for its natural-born subjects as they established trading posts and/or 
permanent settlements beyond the realm. The position of the indigenous societies of the 
particular region affected by the royal grant was largely peripheral to the exercise. This dual 
function meant that the Crown was using its formal instruments to at once declare and 
constitute rights of imperium. In retrospect this was a rather messy way of proceeding for it 
blended what were really two separate processes, the one being the public iteration of some 
172 Notably Locke and Algemon Sidney. Grotius is often seen as an early proponent of the consensual basis of 
government. See Sommerville Politics and Ideology in England 1603-1640 (1986) esp ch 2. 
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right of government over foreign territory, an act not properly involving any exercise of a 
royal constituent power, the other being the constitution of these rights of government. This 
practice did not clearly differentiate a territorial from a personal form of imperium, a result 
acknowledged both by the Marshall Courts' judgments recognising an intermediate imperium 
between extraterritorial jurisdiction (wholly personal) and territorial sovereignty and the late-
eighteenth century arguments over the nature of the Crown's imperium in the Mofussil. It 
was not until the late-eighteenth and into the nineteenth century that the declaration of 
territorial sovereignty became seperated from the exercise of the constituent power. This 
facilitated the better identification of the character of the Crown's imperium over territory 
beyond the realm. 
2. British practice during the mid-eighteenth to early nineteenth centuries 
The mid-eighteenth to early-nineteenth century was an extremely formative period for 
British imperial practice. The political and intellectual climate of this period obtained an 
intensity which was to have a considerable impact upon the principles affecting British 
imperial activity. For present purposes two developments occurred during this period which 
were to have a bearing upon British pratice in relation to the acquisition of an imperium 
over non-Christian societies. 
First, the distinction between the two basic forms of imperium became established. m The 
British now recognised two exclusive forms of imperium over foreign territory these being 
either an extraterritorial jurisdiction or territorial sovereignty. This development was evident 
in the separation of the declaration of territorial sovereignty from the exercise of the 
constituent power. As seen, previously one had to infer the character of the Crown's 
imperium over territory beyond the realm from the terms of the exercise of the constituent 
power. From the late eighteenth century regions claimed by the Crown as territorial 
sovereign were normally, first, formally proclaimed British territory (annexation) before, 
secondly, the constitution through royal letters patent of the local government. m Such a two-
step procedure was not adopted for erection of an extraterritorial jurisdiction because this 
involved no claim to any right of sovereignty, the Crown's right deriving from a delegation 
173 This development may be linked to the synonyrnity of sovereignty with territorial jurisdiction, a postulate which 
had matured during the eighteenth century and which was stressed by virtually all the publicists of the nineteenth 
century: Maine Ancient Law (1861) 84 termed it a postulate lying "at the threshold of the International Code, and 
it is also one which could not possibly have been subscribed to during the first centuries of modem European 
history"; also, for example, Manning Commentaries on the Law of Nations (1875), 92; Creasy First Platform of 
International Law (1876), 113; Twiss The Law of Nations (1884), XV; Lawrence The Principles of International 
Law (1895), 48, 136; Hall Foreign Powers and Jurisdiction (1884), 2; Walker The Science of International Law 
(1893), 43. 
174 Although normal procedure by the nineteenth century Hertslet advised in 1884 that, "no generally recognized 
Form" was practiced in relation to an effective annexation: Memorandum, 18 October 1884 in FO 84/1813. 
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by the local sovereign exempting English persons from the lex loci.m During the late-
eighteenth to mid-nineteenth century examples of this two-step procedure of annexation 
followed by constitution occurred in Australia,176 West Africa177 and, significantly, New 
Zealand. 
The second important development affecting British practice in relation to the acquisition 
of an imperium beyond the realm, and one which was underlined by the adoption of the 
two-step procedure, was the emergence of the matured, secularised doctine of independent 
and equal state sovereignty. Previously the theory of international relations had been 
explicitly underpinned (albeit with diminishing intensity) by Christian doctrine. Once this 
ingredient was expunged or at least diluted so that Christian nations could no longer claim 
an inherent right over non-Christian societies (namely, the right of uninterupted 
proselytisation), in theory at least a more punctilious regard for the rights of non-Christian 
societies should have eventuated. This secularisation was, however, not enough of itself to 
bring the theory into a closer rein with the actual conduct of international relations. It was, 
nonetheless, an important sign that the study of the law of nations was losing its heavily 
philosophical and theological overtones and becoming (to use a clumsy word) more 
·practical'. The tidemark of this process was Vanel's Le droit de gens (1758) which 
although mostly a synthesis of Wolffs (vastly more philosphi cal) 178 work contained a 
descriptive exposition of the law of nations soon accepted in England as elsewhere as 
authoritative. More crucially, the secularisation of the theory of international relations 
matched a development in the actual state of European relations: The medieval notion of a 
single society of Christendom had finally broken down into that of the sovereign 
independent national state. l79 Vanel's work, "the first to adopt this view of the international 
system",lso became an invaluable handbook simply because it appeared to bring theory and 
practice together. 
The essence of Vanel's theory of international relations lay in the conception of 
independent and equal state sovereignty. Nations or states, the subjects of the Law of 
Nations ("the science of rights which exist between Nations or States"),181 Vanel defined as 
"political bodies, societies of men who have united together and combined their forces, in 
m Hope Scott "Report", 243; Papayanni v Russian Steam Company: The Laconia (1863), 2 Moo PC (NS) 161, 15 
ER 862; Forsyth Opinions, 232; Hall Foreign Powers and Jurisdiction, l35; Japanese Imperial Government v P. 
& O. Co. [1895] AC 644; Secretary of State v Charlesworth [1901] AC 373. PalIDceforte "Papers relating to 
Foreign or Ex-territorial Jurisdiction" (1892) in FO 97/497. 
176 HRA, I, I, 9 (New South Wales); III,6,600 (West Australia). 
177 (1821), 1 & 2 Geo 4 c 28 and Roberts-Wray Commonwealth and Colonial Law, 783 & 785 (Gambia and the 
Gold Coast). . 
1711 Wolff Jus naturae methodo scientifica pertractatum (1749). Vattel's debt to Wolff see de Lapradelle 
'1ntroduction" in Vattel Le droit de gens (1758, tr ed 1916), vii-viii; Mackintosh A Discourse on the Study of the 
Law of Nature and Nations (1799), 31; Hershey "History of International Law Since the Peace of Westphalia" 
(1912), 6 AJIL 30 at 37. 
179 Hinsley Sovereignty, 193-5. 
180 Id, 195. 
181 Le droit de gens (1758), Introduction. 
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order to procure their mutual welfare and security",I82 Clearly this definition was wide 
enough to encompass non-Christian and most tribal societies as well as the more 
sophisticated nations of Europe, Indeed, Vattel recognised the sovereignty of the dwarf state 
. as much as the "most powerful kingdom",183 He was not blind to international reality, 
however, and accepted that a weaker state might place itself under one stronger for purposes 
of protection "without, however, divesting itself of its right of self-government and of its 
sovereignty",I84 This right of self-government was "the most important"l85 right and hallmark 
of a state,I86 It meant a foreign nation had no inherent right of interference or government 
over another state, as by some claim to a right to send missionaries without the permission 
of the host sovereign,I87 The lawfulness of the exercise of any such right originated in the 
consent of the grantee state no matter how 'dwarf -like its international stature,I88 
Although Vattel was unequivocal in his position that no right of government, however 
partial, could be acquired other than with the consent of the local state (the right of war he 
limited to self-protection) he argued that no state could "lawfully appropriate an extent of 
territory entirely disproportionate to its needs",189 The Law of Nations, he said, "will only 
recognise the ownership and sovereignty of a Nation over unoccupied lands when the Nation 
is in actual occupation of them, when it forms a settlement upon them, or makes some 
actual use of them" ,190 Here he drew a distinction between states which laid claim to 
territory within which "certain districts" were left "wild and untilled" and those of the New 
World, "a vast territory in which are to be found only wandering tribes whose small 
numbers cannot populate the whole country" ,191 Accordingly he would exclude from the 
territory of the tribal states of America those "lands which the savages have no special need 
of' and of which they were making "no present and continuous use",191 These lands Vattel 
felt to be open to original acquisition by other nations, Other tribal territory, that within its 
actual occupation, he included in the general rules governing the acquisition of rights of 
government by one state over the territory of another, So far as this territory was concerned 
the new sovereign's rights could only be derivative, Ever an admirer of British colonial 
practice he noted, however, that the English had not dealt with the Indians of New England 
and Pennsylvannia as though their waste lands (hunting grounds) were open to original 
182 Id, I,l,para 1. 
183 Id, I,l,paras 5-6, Introduction,para 18. 
184 Id, L ch 16, 
185 Id, Il,4,para 54. 
186 "It clearly follows from the liberty and independence of Nations that each has the right to govern itself as it 
thinks proper, and that no one of them has the least right to interfere in the government of another": idem. 
187 Id, Il, 4, para 54. 
188 "It is therefore certain that no one may interfere, against a Nation's will, in its religious affairs, without violating 
its rights and doing it an injury": id, Il,4,para 59. 
189 Id, Il,7,para 86, 
190 Id, I,l8,para 208, 
191 Id, I,l8,para 209, 
192 Id. 
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order to procure their mutual welfare and security".\81 Clearly this definition was wide 
enough to encompass non-Christian and most tribal societies as well as the more 
sophisticated nations of Europe. Indeed, Vattel recognised the sovereignty of the dwarf state 
. as much as the "most powerful kingdom".18) He was not blind to international reality, 
however, and accepted that a weaker state might place itself under one stronger for purposes 
of protection "without, however, divesting itself of its right of self-government and of its 
sovereignty" .184 This right of self-govenunent was "the most important"l85 right and hallmark 
of a state.186 It meant a foreign nation had no inherent right of interference or government 
over another state, as by some claim to a right to send missionaries without the permission 
of the host sovereign.l87 The lawfulness of the exercise of any such right originated in the 
consent of the grantee state no matter how 'dwarf' -like its international stature. 188 
Although Vattel was unequivocal in his position that no right of government, however 
partial, could be acquired other than with the consent of the local state (the right of war he 
limited to self-protection) he argued that no state could "lawfully appropriate an extent of 
territory entirely disproportionate to its needs".189 The Law of Nations, he said, "will only 
recognise the ownership and sovereignty of a Nation over unoccupied lands when the Nation 
is in actual occupation of them, when it forms a settlement upon them, or makes some 
actual use of them" .190 Here he drew a distinction between states which laid claim to 
tenitory within which "certain districts" were left "wild and untilled" and those of the New 
World, "a vast tenitory in which are to be found only wandering tribes whose small 
numbers cannot populate the whole country" .191 Accordingly he would exclude from the 
tenitory of the tribal states of America those "lands which the savages have no special need 
of' and of which they were making "no present and continuous use".192 These lands Vattel 
felt to be open to original acquisition by other nations. Other tribal territory, that within its 
actual occupation, he included in the general rules governing the acquisition of rights of 
government by one state over the tenitory of another. So far as this tenitory was concerned 
the new sovereign's rights could only be derivative. Ever an admirer of British colonial 
practice he noted, however, that the English had not dealt with the Indians of New England 
and Pennsylvannia as though their waste lands (hunting grounds) were open to original 
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acquisition. Instead they had acted with "moderation'~193 and purchased these lands from the 
natives despite their possession of a charter from the King. 
Vattel's argument regarding the acquisition of waste lands appears to have been largely 
speculative for he gave no clarification of the means by which nations were to discern the 
reservation of "certain districts" "wild and untilled " , from the claim to a "disproportionate" 
territory. His praise of the English acquisition of (the full) territorial sovereignty over the 
"disproportionate" regions of Pennsylvannia by derivative rather than original means might 
indicate his preference for the former notwithstanding his recognition of the latter. Still the 
European nations were free to acquire as of right only the unused territory of North 
America. The territory legitimately occupied by the tribes was not open to the original 
acquisition. 
As Britain's imperial interests and activities spread during the second half of the 
eighteenth century and into the nineteenth the conduct of her relations with non-European 
polities took a format explicable on no basis other than subscription to something 
approaching Vattel's theory of independent and equal state sovereignty. This position is 
evidenced by the greatly increased regularity with which the Crown entered into treaty 
relations with non-European polities. Although the increased pace and growth in British 
imperial interests during this period inevitably meant more frequent contact between the 
Crown and non-European societies , the fact that this growth in relations took a certain 
formality signified the Crown's willingness to treat these societies as sovereign and 
independent. 
Britain's willingness to recognise and respect non-European sovereignty in its formal 
relations appears to have extended to any body enjoying a minimal degree of perceptible 
political organisation, the precondition for statehood set by Vattel. Thus treaty relations 
between the Crown and Indian tribes of North America became more frequent and regular 
following the re-organisation and consolidation of Indian policy subsequent to the Treaty of 
Paris and Royal Proclamation (1763).194 The United States continued this pattern of treaty 
relations with the independent tribes. 195 In Africa treaty-making with the tribes of the 
western coast commenced as Britain established trading posts along the coastal region. 196 In 
193 Id. 
194 lones License for Empire. Colonialism by Treaty in Early America (1981), passim; Hurley "Children or 
Brethren", passim (relations with the Six Nations). Also Simon v R [1985] 2 SCR 387 (SCC) at 400-1 per 
Dickson Cl (juridical capacity of Indian tribes recognized). 
195 Must of these post-Revolutionary treaties can be found in Kappler Indian Affairs, Laws and Trealies (1904), 2nd 
cd, vol 2 which' are often. in turn, reprinted from United States Statutes at Large. Significantly many such 
treaties were included in the various Martens' treaty series. an important indication from the early-nineteenth 
century of the contemporary acceptance of tribal sovereignty. The treaty-making practice was stopped by 
Congressional legislation in 1871. 
196 The first British treaty with an African tribe given by Hertslet is the treaty of cession by the United Chiefs of 
Sierra Leone. August 1788 (MAT. 3r<1,26). In the period 1788-1845 104 treaties or formal agreements were 
entered into by the British Crown with African tribes (SCI. 84-102). As to treaty-making practice in southern 
Africa and the recognition of tribal sovereignty see Merivale, Memorandum for Cabinet, April 1851, CO 
879/1 :XX. 
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the East the Crown entered into various treaties with the Asian powers.l97 The British had 
come to place such an emphasis upon the consent of the local sovereign to their exercise of 
rights of government over non-British subjects that a fonnal grant of diwani was obtained 
.from the Mughal Emperor (1765) notwithstanding the comprehensive British victory at the 
Battle of Plassey (1757). In other regions of the p.on-Christian globe the Crown concluded 
treaties with the loc'al states clearly acting on the basis of mutual capacity to enter into such 
relations. l98 The only significant departure from this treaty-making pattern, and this the 
proverbial exception which proved the rule, was with the Australian Aborigine whose social 
organisation appeared so primitive to the eighteenth century eye that the British had 
difficulty believing them hwnan let alone perceiving any semblance of political 
organisation. l99 
From the mid eighteenth century the Crown incorporated a principle of independent and 
equal state sovereignty into her formal relations with non-European polities. The 
subscription to this position acted not so much as a substantive restraint as guideline to the 
manner and fonn of these relations. The reality of such fonnalism may have revealed the 
gross imbalance of bargaining position and hence artificiality of the doctrine but it was one 
to which the Crown nonetheless subscribed. To take an example, King Burungai Sonko of 
Barra, reportedly a habitual drunkard, entered into 'the Ceded Mile Treaty' (1826)200 
surrendering a mile-wide band of land along the Gambia River after a convincing and 
sobering display of British gunboat diplomacy:2(lI If in the reality the sovereignty of the 
lesser, unpowerful 'states' was easily abused that does not alter the fact that the recognition 
of their sovereignty had been made. 
This result was too much for some commentators from the later school of thought which 
distinguished 'civilised' from 'uncivilised' nations. Butler and Macoby (1928), for example, 
found it "difficult to imagine a closer-packed bundle of fallacies" as Vattel's undiluted 
theory of state equality and commented that its application "was to go ludicrously far in the 
naturalistic direction".202 By the criteria of some late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
commentators that may have been so, nonetheless it was during the period when the theory 
197 Prior to the grant of diwani (1765; text in 43 crs 217,219) the Se/lists 22 British agreements or treaties with 
the Indian princely states and neighbouring polities, most of these falling in the period after the Battle of Plassey 
of 1757 (19 treaties). In the period 1765-1845 Britain entered into 301 treaties with the polities of this region ( 
Sel, 209-259). Further East, formal treaty relations date from 1786 (Cession of Prince of Wales Island or 
Penang, 49 crs, 447), 28 treaties being concluded with the Malayasian polities in the period 1786-1845 (Sel, 
306-310). 
198 The Crown entered into 40 treaties with the polities of Arabia and the Persian Gulf in the period 1798-1845 
(Sel, 178-186)., Three treaties were concluded in Borneo with Sulu ( Sel, 318). 
199 The Select Committee on Aborigines (1837) PP,7,#425 reported (at 82): "So destitute are they even of the rudest 
forms of civil polity, that their claims, whether as sovereigns or as proprietors of the soil, have been utterly 
disregarded. The land has been taken from them without the assertion of any other title than that of superior 
force, and by the commissions under which the Australian Colonies are governed Her Majesty's sovereignty over 
the whole of New Holland is asserted without reserve ..... 
200 Text in MAT, 367 and 76 crs 281. 
201 Gray, A History of the Gambia (1940), 341. 
202 The Development of International Law (1928), 253. 
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and practice of international relations stood astride its earlier Christian/non-Christian and 
later 'civilised'/'uncivilised' dichotomies that the Crown acquired the tenitorial sovereignty 
of New Zealand. Later in this Part the Crown will be seen to have expressly adopted Vattel-
like principles as it established its territorial sovereignty over the country. 
3. British Practice fro'm the mid nineteenth century 
a) The standard of civilisation 
Although Vattel's conception of independent and equal state sovereignty harnessed the 
theory to the Crown's formal conduct of its relations with non-European polities it did so in 
a manner which frequently reduced the supposition of equality to almost farcical levels. In 
many situations the notional equality between the Crown and the indigenous rulers was 
plainly contradicted by the disparity in bargaining postion. The imbalance was accentuated 
by the emergence from the early nineteenth century of the European states system203 which 
saw the European nations undertaking regular and sophisticated relations on matters such as 
extradition204 and postal services.20S Such relations lay beyond the reach of the less-
sophisticated states. Moreover, the European states increasingly required some guarantee 
from a state that it could protect the nationals of another who might be in its tenitory with 
laws regularly and impartially enforced. Schwarzenberger thus observed:W6 
"the test whether a state was civilised and, thus, entitled to full recognition as an 
international personality was, as a rule, merely whether its government was 
sufficiently ' stable to undertake binding commitments under international law, and 
whether it was able, and willing to protect adequately the life, liberty, and property 
of foreignors". 
As a result the European nations began to distinguish by means of a standard of civilisation 
those countries able to enter into such relations from those unable so to do. This standard, 
with its strong connotations of the old distinction between Christian and infidel nations,207 
became incorporated into European state practice during the second half of the nineteenth 
203 Manning Commentaries on the Law of Nations (1875), 92; Westlake International Law (1910), 44-45; 'Hinsley 
Sovereignty, ch 5; Watson "European International Society and its Expansion" and Bull 'The Emergence of a 
Universal International Society" in Bull and Watson, eds The Expansion of International Society, 13 and 117. 
204 Such treaties were limited to the 'civilised' states: Lewis On Foreign Jurisdiction (1859), 35 et seq. ; Gibbs 
Extradition Treaties (1868), passim. 
20S These treaties are listed chronologically in the SCI, II, pt 2, 123 et seq. These treaties became frequent from the 
second quarter of the nineteenth century, the 'uncivilized' states being largely excluded from this treaty-making 
activity. 
206 'The Standard of Civilisation in International Law" [1955] CLP 212 at 220. 
2ffI Many of the publicists indicated the standard had its origins in the requirements and practice of Christian 
civilisation; for example: Mackintosh Discourse (1799), 5 and 62; Wheaton Elements of International Law 
(1836), 50-51; Abdy, ed Kent's Commentaries (1866), 11; Woolsey Introduction to the Study of International 
Law, esp at 3-5; Lorirner The Institutes of the Law of Nations (1883), 113-126; Holland Studies in International 
Law (1898), 113-114; cfOppenheirn International Law (1905), 31-32. 
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century and was recognised by the major works on international law written and available in 
English during this period. Although it is possible to see the germination of the standard of 
civilisation in Anglo-American treatises of the early nineteenth century,2D8 its full effect dates 
from the second half of the nineteenth century, as European practice exampled by the 
admission of Turkey,209 Japan210 and China21l to full international ranks,212 and its emphatic 
presence in the texts 'of the period combined to give it an increasing juridical standard. 
The development of a standard of civilisation in international law by itself was not an 
abnegation of the sovereignty of the uncivilised states so much as a recognition drawn from 
the actual state of international relations that certain forms of regular sophisticated relations 
were not possible with these states. The standard was never founded upon a disqualification 
of all status in the uncivilised polities for it was generally recognised by the European 
nations that relations could be conducted with these people and that certain rights could 
accrue from engagements with them. These rights generally related to the establishment of 
an imperium within the non-European territory. A late nineteenth century tidemark of this 
position was the Conference of Berlin (1885) at which the various European powers used 
treaties with indigenous African polities as a basis for excluding other European nations 
from particular regions.m Although the circumstances behind the conclusion of such treaties 
may have left something to be desired, the European nations took the position at the 
Conference that the native polities were able to grant them an imperium over their territory, 
a stance necessarily recognising some juridical status in the uncivilised communities. 
la! Mackintosh Discourse (1799) at 61-62; Martens (trsl Cobbett) The Law of NaJions (1829), 5, and traI\Slator's 
note ibid; Wheaton, Elements (1836), 50-54. 
200 Traditionally dated from the Treaty of Paris 1856, article 7 crS: Wheaton Elements (1866, ed Dana), 19; 
Phillimore Commentaries (1879) 86-93; Twiss, The Law of Nations (1884), 88-92. Oppenheim International Law 
(1905), 32-33; Westlake International Law (1910), 47-48; Holland Lectures on International Law (1933), 38; cf 
Wood 'The Treaty of Paris and Turkey's Status in International Law" (1943), AJIL 64; Gong The Standard of 
'Civilization' in International Society (1984), 106-119; and Naff 'The Ottoman Empire and the European States 
System" in Bull and Watson, eds. Expansion of International Society, 143. 
210 Oppenheim International Law (1905), 33; Maller International Law in Peace and War (1931), 5; Holland Studies 
in International Law (1898) 113-114 (Japan's status doubtful) and Lectures (1933) 39 (Japan admitted to the 
"charmed circle"); and, generally, Gong Standard of 'Civilization', 164-200 and Suganam "Japan's Entry into 
International Society" in Bull and Watson, eds Expansion of International Society, 185. 
211 Oppenheim International Law (1905), 33-34 and Holland Lectures (1933), 39 (China's status still doubtful); 
Maller International Law, (1931), 5 and, generally, Gong Standard of 'Civilization', 130-163 and "China's Entry 
into International Society" in Bull and Watson, eds Expansion of International Society, 171. 
212 For the status of other states such as Persia, Siam, Abyssinia and Liberia, see, for example, Oppenheirn 
International Law (1905), 32-34; Westlake International Law (1910), 40 and Holland Lectures (1933),38-39 and 
generally, Gong Standard of 'Civilisation' and Bull and Watson, eds Expansion of International Society. 
213 The Final Act of the Berlin Conference (articles 34 and 35) created a notification system amongst the European 
powers in relation to their 'possessions' in Africa. Some writers argued that (as with the New World) Africa was 
considered res nullius: Westlake Chapters on International Law (1894), 144-155; Walker A Manual of Public 
International Law (1895), 27-31; Lawrence The Principles of International Law (1895), 143-156; Oppenheirn 
International Law (1905), 278-279; Westlake International Law (1910), 93-94; Smith International Law (1918), 
105. This position was contradicted by established European treaty-making practice in Africa: SCI 3 (Belgian 
treaties with African tribes); 5 (French treaties); 75 (German treaties); 83 (British treaties); 327 (Italian treaties); 
339 (Dutch Colonial Agreements) and see, generally, Alexandrowicz The European-African Cunfrontation (1973); 
Lindley The Acquisition and Government of Backward Territory in International Law (1926), 140-148 and Bull 
"European States and African Political Communities" in Bull and Watson, eds Expansion of International Society, 
99 esp at 111-112. 
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Most publicists of the period acknowledged if , but inferentially that the standard of 
civilisation had imported a two tier character of sovereignty into international relations, They 
did this either negatively by limiting their discussion to the European Law of Nations214 or, 
more positively, by acknowledging some status in uncivilised societies but excluding them 
from the club of civilised nations. Those writers adopting the more positive approach often 
expressed such sovereignty in terms of 'semi' or 'demi-sovereignty'215 and frequently used 
the feudal analogy of suzerain and vassal state to describe the relationship between 
European nations and those uncivilised societies who had placed themselves under European 
protection. These writers recognised that for all its other limitations an uncivilised nation's 
sovereignty extended at least to the capacity to confer an imperium upon a European or 
civilised nation. 216 Manning, for example, wrote of the acquisition of territorial sovereignty, 
the fulmost imperium, over uncivilised territory:217 
"The only two modes of acquiring territory in modern times are 'Occupation' and 
'Cession' by treaty, whether following upon a war or not. It would seem at the 
present day that a right by Occupation is strictly limited to the case of land 
absolutely uninhabited, and that in the case of colonising an already inhabited 
country, annexation of territory can only take place by interposing the fiction of a 
spontaneous cession on the part of persons representing the government of the native 
inhabitants" . 
Similarly Phi1limore distinguished the general principles of International law binding upon 
all nations from those of the positive "European Code" which bound only European 
(civilised) nations. Whilst uncivilised or 'infidel' nations were not subject to the latter code 
they were nonetheless valid subjects of international law to whom the former code applied. 
ThuS:218 
"The great point, however, to be established is, that the principles of international 
justice do govern, or ought to govern, the dealings of the Christian with the Infidel 
Community. They are binding, for instance, upon Great Britain, in her intercourse 
with the native powers of India; upon France, with those of Africa; upon Russia, in 
her relations with Persia or America; upon the United States of North America, in 
their intercourse with the Native Indians". 
214 Most writers, including lhose not expressly dealing wilh lhe status of uncivilised societies defined international 
law as lhe rules governing lhe conduct of European states at large (as opposed to inler se) for example: Martens 
The Law of NaJions (1829, Irsl Cobbett), 3-5; Wheaton Elemenls (1836), 54; Halleck Inlernational Law (1861), 
43-51; Abdy, ed Kenl's Commentaries (1866),6 and 11; Amos Lectures on InlernaJional Law (1874), 13; Twiss 
The Law of NaJions (1884), 145-149; Phillimore Commentaries (1879), 349; Maine InlernaJional Law (1894), 32-
35; Mackintosh Discourses (1799), 61-63. 
215 Levi Inlernational Law (1887), 83-84; Twiss The Law of Nations (1884) 27; Wharton A Digest of the 
InlernaJional Law of the United States (1887), n, 533, Maine Inlernational Law (1894), 58-59; Creasy First 
Platform (1876), 94-98. 
216 Also Twiss The Oregon Question (1846), 251-252; Lorimer Institues of the Law of Nations (1883), I, 101-103, 
216-18; Field Outlines of an InternaJional Code (1876), 2-3, 30 (cf his position at 18); Maine Inlernational Law 
(1894), 71-75; Fiore InlernaJional Law Codified (1918, trsl Borchard), 423-426. See Lilldlcy's review of the 
publicists' positions, Acquisition and Governmenl of Backward Territory 12-23. 
217 Commentaries (1875), Bk 3, ch 3. 
218 Commenlaries (1879), 22-23. 
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These writers are representative of the continued reccgnition of some juridical status in the 
uncivilised communities notwithstanding the development of a standard of civilisation. The 
exception to this continued recognition of some juridical status in uncivilised communities 
was a small group of late-nineteenth century English writers who took the position that 
international law was the law between (as opposed to the law governing) civilised nations. 
This group of writers, ' dismissed by Lindley as unrepresentative on the point,219 considered 
territory ccupied by uncivilised nations to be res nullius so demoting treaty relations with 
these polities to a moral rather than legal plane.220 The difficulty with this position, 
condemned by Phillimore as a "detestable" as well as erroneous doctrine,221 was that it 
misinterpreted long-standing European practice (not least that of the British Crown) which 
had always proceeded on the basis of some juridical capacity in such societies. This failing 
is surprising given the self-styled positivism of these writers who set their positive law of 
nations in the actual practice of the civilised states. More particularly, British practice, 
contemporary as well as historical, contradicted any view which treated uncivilised territory 
as res nullius. The development of a standard of civilisation in international law, much less 
the influence of the likes of Oppenheim, Walker, Lawrence and Westiake, did not disrupt 
the essential continuity in the Crown's recognition of the juridical status of uncivilised 
communities. We turn now to consider this practice as it developed during the second half 
of the nineteenth century. 
b) The Crown's acquisition of an imperium in uncivilised territory. 
The development of a standard of civilisation in international law disrupted neither the 
Crown's recognition of the juridical status of uncivilised communities nor its adherence to 
the long-established requirement of their voluntary consent to a British imperium over them. 
The essential continuity is evident from British practice during the second half of the 
nineteenth century in relation to the acquisition of what by then had become the two rigid 
forms of imperium over foreign territory, namely territorial sovereignty and extraterritorial 
jurisdiction. 
i) territorial sovereignty 
219 Acquisition and Governmenl of Backward Territory, 18·23,47. 
220 'To characterize any conduct whatever toward a barbarous people as a violation of the law of nations, only 
shows that he who so speaks has never considered the subject"; IS Mill "A Few Words on Non·lntervention" in 
Dissertations and Discussions (1875) m, 152; also Westlake Chapters (1894), 143·184; Walker Manual of Public 
Inlernational Law (1895), 26; Lawrence Principles of Inlernational Law (1895), 68·69 (American Indians and 
East Indian polities), 146·156 (barbarous communities); Oppenheirn Inlernational Law (1905) 33·34 (Persia, 
Siam, China etc), 268·269, 276·281 (treaties with tribal polities); Holland Lectures (1933), 101; Wilier, 
International Law (1931), 6·7. 
221 Commentaries (1879), 349. 
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During the second half of the nineteenth century the Crown entered into many treaties of 
cession with ostensibly 'uncivilised' societies.222 In 1892, to take but one year from the 
period when the standard of civilisation was at the height of its influence upon international 
law, the Crown entered into seven treaties of cession with various chiefs in Central Africa.223 
In Fiji the Crown accepted the cession of territorial sovereignty of the islands from King 
Cakombau in 1874.224 Clearly the Crown considered these uncivilised polities to have the 
capacity to cede such rights and used such treaties as the basis of its title at international 
law.225 
English courts were developing the theory of recognition during the nineteenth century in 
relation to claims brought before them by and against foreign governments and the Crown 
on matters arising from the conduct of its foreign relations. The most fundamental rule 
recognised during this period was that the recognition of the sovereign status of a foreign 
power was essentially a political act of the Crown.m Where no proof of the Crown's 
position was available the court would make its own inquiry227 but where it was, as by the 
Crown's entry into treaty or diplomatic relations with the foreign polity or the appropriate 
certification from the responsible Secretary of State, the court was obliged to give this 
recognition the appropriate effect in municipal law.22ll Thus, in those many instances where 
the Crown's territorial sovereignty over societies not recognized as civilized derived from a 
treaty of cession with the local authorities English courts were obliged to accept the 
sovereign status of the ceding party simply by virtue of the Crown's entry into such formal 
relations. It hardly lay within the judicial province to inform the Crown it had entered into a 
treaty with a legal nonentity bereft of any sovereignty. 
This position is evident in many cases of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
which proceeded on the basis that treaties of cession between the Crown and the uncivilised 
polities of the East Indies and Africa were arrangements concluded by two sovereign 
222 See British treaty-making practice in SCI 83-326 ("Colonial Practice"). 
223 Id, 170-171 and Herls Comm Tr XX 25-29. 
224 Instrument of Cession 10 October 1874, text in CO 881/4: #44, pp 9-10; Fiji Government Gazelle, October 1874 
Proclamation of British sovereignty by Sir Hercules Robinson dated the same day. 
225 Maine Internalional Law (1894), 71-75; Lindley Acquisilion and Government of Backward Territory, 24-44; 
Hertslet "Memorandum on formalities necessary for effective annexation", 18 October 1884 FO 84/1813:246-65, 
points 4 and 6. 
226 "The Pelican" - Burke (1809), Edw (App) iv (PC); In re Ihe Government of Peru (1823) BILC 12 (Ch); Jones v 
Garcia de Rio (1823) T & R 297 (Ch) at 299. 
227 As, for example, Yrisarri v Clement (1825) 2 Car & P 223 (CP); Foresler and olhers v Secrelary of Stale for 
India in Council (1872) LR Ind App Sup Vol 10 (PC); Rajah Salig Ram v Secrelary of Slate for India in 
Council, id, 119 (PC). 
22ll English law developed the distinction between de faCiO and de jure sovereignty during the early nineteenth 
century in response to the claims to statehood of the newly independent former European colonies in the 
Americas. Generally speaking de faCIO recognition developed as a form of tentative recognition given those 
governments (of the new American nations) whose political control was lacking in an established tradition and 
pattern of stability: Smith Great Brilain and Ihe Law of Nations. A state recognized de faciO could allow a 
British imperiwn over its territory. Thus Cakombau, recognized only as the de faCiO sovereign of Fiji, was 
considered able to make a cession of the sovereignty of the islands: Confidential Instructions to Layard, August 
1873 in CO 881/13 : #37. 
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powers. It can be seen in the 'act of state' cases of this period229 as well as such African 
cases as In Re Southern Rhodesia (1919) where Lord Sumner found the Crown had 
recognised the sovereignty of King Lobengula over the Mashona and Matabele tribes in 
1888:230 
"The British Government stated to the Portuguese Government that he was 'an 
independent King', 'undisputed ruler over Matabeleland and Mashonaland' who had 
not parted with his sovereignty, though his territory was under British influence; and 
. in 1889 the Colonial Secretary wrote to Lobengula himself, saying that he, 
Lobengula, 'is King of the country' (Le. of Matabeleland), 'and no one can exercise 
jurisdiction in it without his permission' . Lobengula's sovereignty over what is now 
Southern Rhodesia is therefore the starting point..." 
Therefore, during the second half of the nineteenth century the Crown, and in consequence 
its courts,231 continued to recognise the juridical capacity of uncivilised societies to make a 
valid cession of the territorial sovereignty over their lands. The development of a standard 
of civilisation in international law did not disrupt this long-established position. 
ii) Extraterritorial jurisdiction and the Protectorate 
Although generally irrelevant to English courts consideration of those situations where 
the Crown had entered into a treaty of cession with an uncivilised power, the standard of 
civilisation obtained a more direct presence in English law by virtue of the Foreign 
Jurisdiction Act 1843.232 This Act was necessitated by two developments. First, a Law 
Officers' opinion, of 1826 had cast doubt upon the lawfulness of · the exercise by consular 
authorities of some powers of fine and imprisonment over British subjects in the Ottoman 
Empire.233 These powers had gradually grown in excess of those formally granted by 
capitulation. 234 Secondly, one George Mac1ean had been exercising an extraterritorial 
jurisdiction amongst British subjects beyond the confines of the Gold Coast forts without the 
219 For instance: Nabob of Arcot v East India Co (1791) 1 Ves Jun 370, 2 Ves Jun 56; Doss and the Estate of the 
Ex-King of Delhi (1867) 11 Moo Ind App 277 (PC); Frith v The Queen (1872) LR 7 Ex 365; Mayor of the City 
of Lyons v East India Co (1836-37) 1 Moo PC 175 (sovereignty obtained gradually with Mughal pennission); 
Advocate-General of Bengal v Ranee Surnomoye Dossee (1863) 9 Moo Ind App 387 (PC); Doss v Secretary of 
State for India in Council (1875) LR 19 Eq 509; Damodar Gordhan v Deoram Kangi (1876) LR 1 App Cas 332 
(PC); Secretary of State for India in Concil v Bai Rajbai (1915) LR 42 Ind App 229 (PC); Vajesingji 
Joravasingji v Secretary of State for India in Council (1924) LR 51 Ind app 357 (PC); Rustomjee v R (1876) 1 
QBD 487, 2 QBD 69. 
230 Similar cases presupposing the juridical capacity of African tribes to enter into treaties of cession or Protection: 
Cook v Sprigg [1899] AC 572 (PC); West Rand Central Gold Mining Co v R [1905] 2 KB 391; R v Earl of 
Crewe, ex parte Sekgome [1910] 2 KB 576; 01 de Njogo v Attorney-General (1913) 5 EALR 70 (EA Protect, 
HC); Tshekedi Khama v High Commissioner (1936) 11 erR (Bech Spec Ct); R v Baganda Cotton Company 
(1930) 4 ULR 34 (Ug HC); Amodu Tijani v The Secretary, Southern Provinces [1921] 2 AC 399; Oyekan v 
Adele [1957) 2 All ER 785 (PC). 
231 Phillimore to Foreign Office, opinion, 31 March 1865 CO 885/10: 323A. 
232 6 & 7 Vict c 94. 
233 Hope Scott "Report", 250; Hall Foreign Powers and Jurisdiction, 9. 
234 Hall Foreign Powers and Jurisdiction 133, 149-50. 
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bother of any fonnal grant from the tribal authorities.235 James Stephen, the influential 
Under-Secretary of the Colonial Office, had despaired over finding any means of legalizing 
the latter situation thinking its retroactive legitimation by Parliament a usurpation of tribal 
sovereignty.236 The Hope Scott Report and consequential Foreign Jurisdiction Act provided 
the remedy which had escaped Stephen. Although declaratory in tone the Act was clearly 
innovatory in character. 237 The preamble of the Act declared that the Crown could acquire an 
extraterritorial jurisdiction in foreign territory by "treaty, capitulation, grant, usage, 
sufferance, and other lawful means". The Act empowered the Crown to constitute such 
rights of imperiwn by the new means of an Order in Council. The words "grant, usage, 
sufferance and other lawful means" were particularly significant for they recognised that an 
extraterritorial jurisdiction could be acquired other than by fonnal treaty with the local 
power. 
This implicitly laid a basis for the distinction between civilised and uncivilised nations to 
find its way into British practice in the acquisition of an extraterritorial imperiwn. This 
infiltration became evident in Papayanni v Russian Steam Company ("The Laconia") (1863) 
where Dr Lushington indicated that any extraterritorial jurisdiction in a civilised country 
constituted under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act was governed strictly by the tenns of the 
treaty whereas extraterritorial rights in uncivilised countries were not under the same 
limitation to the tenns of the fonnal grant.238 Nonetheless the predicate of the Foreign 
Jurisdiction Act was that any extraterritorial jurisdiction within foreign territory was still 
derivative in character notwithstanding the possibility of a less than perfect, infonnal 
acquisition in uncivilised countries. The Foreign Jurisdiction Acts became very important 
tools of British imperial activity during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as the 
frequency of Orders in Council under their authority would indicate.m The Acts empowered 
English courts to recognise the less fonnal acquisition of an imperium in uncivilised territory 
than in civilised countries. 
Despite this utility the Foreign Jurisdiction Act suffered from a number of defects which 
hampered British practice in relation to the acquisition and constitution of satisfactory rights 
of govenunent in uncivilised territory over which no claim to the territorial sovereignty was 
made. 
In the first place, the "treaty, capitulation, grant, usage, sufferance, and other lawful 
means" terminology of the Preamble presupposed some local authority from whom the 
2l.S Metcalfe Maclean of the Gold Coast (1962) 170-171,177; Johnston Sovereignty and Protection. 58-59. As to the 
legality of Mac1ean's jurisdiction Stanley to Hill. 16 December 1843 CO 96/5; Maclean argued (lIDsuccessfully) 
Britain held the sovereignty de facto of the region: Mac1ean to Stanley. 2 February 1844 (ibid). 
236 Stephen to Hope, 26 December 1842 CO 96/2. 
237 ct Papayanni v Russian Steam Company (1863) 2 Moo PC(NS) 161. 15 ER 862 at 870. 
238 Supra. 
239 For the many regions in respect of which Orders in Council under the Foreign Jurisdiction Acts had been issued 
by 1894 see Hall Foreign Powers and Jurisdiction. "Index of Orders in Council" at 298. See also Herts Comm 
Tr. XXII. 626-46 listing British treaties of jurisdiction and Orders in Council establishing such rights. 
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Crown's foreign jurisdiction might be obtained by fonnal or infonnal means. This 
supposition worked smoothly enough in European and Asian regions where the jurisdiction 
was designed to exempt English subjects from a regular lex loci'WJ however in Africa and 
the Pacific, the new, active theatres of British imperial activity during the second half of the 
nineteenth century, there was no mistaking the function of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act as a 
means of bringing some order to regions where none had previously existed (at least in 
British eyes). 
So far as the acquisition of an extraterritorial jurisdiction in African territory was 
concerned, the Crown's advisors proceeded on the basis that jurisdiction over British 
subjects and the native inhabitants could be derived from treaty, grant, usage or sufferance 
of the native rulers.241 The Crown had difficulty adopting such a position in the Pacific, not 
through any objection in principle to the recognition of some juridical status in the island 
societies242 - its practice in Africa precluded that, but because of doubts as to the stability of 
the native governments of the islands.243 The reports of its officers from the Pacific244 
depicted island communities in a constant state of warfare with no tribal ruler ever in a 
prolonged and stable ascendancy245 so as to facilitate relations with the Crown from which a 
jurisdiction by treaty, grant, usage or sufferance might be derived. Although the 
development of a standard of civilisation in international law when coupled with (in contrast 
'WJ The Crown's foreign jurisdiction in Eastern countries (such as Turkey, Persia, China and Japan) was usually 
distinguished from that obtaining in 'barbarous' (ie tribal) regions: Hall Foreign Powers and Jurisdiction, 122; 
Jen1cyns British Rule and Jurisdiction, ch vm and IX; Paunceforte "Papers relating to Foreign or Ex-territorial 
Jurisdiction" in FO 97/497:nf. 
241 Instructions to Lleu.-Gov.Hill, 16 December 1843 in CO 96/2:121-32. The Bond of 6 March 1844 with the Fanti 
Chiefs (96 CTS 235) was concluded to regularise British jurisdiction in the Gold Coast (Hill to Stanley 6 March 
1844 CO 96/4:98); Merivale, Memorandum for Cabinet, April 1851, CO 879/1: XX; Holland, minute 25 June 
1874 CO 96/113:416-27; Law Officers to Kimberley, 3 August 1880 in CO 48/498:81; Law Officers to 
Granville, 21 April 1886 FO 8412275:81. Also the following Orders in Council: Africa (1889 applying to "natives 
of Africa, being subjects of any native King or Chief, who, by Treaty or otherwise, consents to their being 
subject to the jurisdiction" and 1892); West Africa (1885); Gold Coast (1844, 1856, 1874 and 1887); Sierra 
Leone (1850,1853,1895); Gambia (1893); Lagos (1887); Niger Region (1872); Mashonaland and Matabeleland 
(1894); South Rhodesia (1898); Northwest Rhodesia (1899); Northeast Rhodesia (1900); Bechuanaland (1885 and 
1891); East Africa (1897 and 1899). 
242 The Crown was in theory quite prepared to recognise the sovereignty of the Pacific island communities for the 
purposes of the Foreign Jurisdiction Acts: Stanley to Jones, 14 September 1863 FO 58/124:31; Law Officers to 
Stanley, 30 October 1866 FO 83/2314:286-9; Reilly, note accompanying Draft Order in Council for Fiji, 16 
January 1868 FO 58/124:162-8; Law Officers to Granville, 11 January 1870 CO 881/4:#20,111-3; Law Officers 
to Granville, 17 February 1871 FO 83/2314:376-81; Draft Order in Council, 3 August 1874 CO 881/4:No 42; 
Camarvon to Law Officers, 10 April 1875 CO 83/8:33-6. 
243 Foreign Officer reference to Law Officers, 18 October 1866 FO 83/2314:282-4:302-5; Law Officers to Stanley, 
18 May 1868 FO 83/2314; Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 2 February 1869, FO 58/124:#20,28; Law Officers 
opinion. 22 July 1871 in FO 8312314; Law Officers to Camarvon, 10 April 1875 CO 83/8:33-6; Paunceforte 
"Memorandum on H.M. Jurisdiction in Western Polynesia", 1876 (nd) FO 97/497:nf. 
244 Two influential British officials in the Pacific, Jones and Thurston, determined the British position on the 
juridical standing of the island communities: Jones to Foreign Office, 6 October 1864, FO 58/124:35-8; Jones to 
Foreign Office, 24 November 1865, id,65-8; Jones "Report on the Present Social and Political Conditions of the 
Fiji Islands", enclosure in Jones to Foreign Office, 18 July 1867, id:80-9; Jones' influence noted in Law Officers 
to Stanley, 18 August 1868 FO 83/2314:308-11; Thurston to Belmore (NSW), 22 July 1868 CO 881/3:#20,38-9; 
Thurston to Colonial Office, 2 September 1892 and 22 December 1894 cited by Scarr FragmenJs of Empire, 255; 
Thurston to Colonial Office, 22 December 1894 CO 225/45. 
245 In as much as British doubts over the sovereignty of Pacific Island Chiefs turned on this question the position 
may be compared with British doubts during the early-nineteenth century over the sovereignty of the newly-
independent American states (on whlch see Smith Great Britain and the Law of Nations, I, 149 et seq). 
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to Africa)2A6 the relative novelty of British activity in the Pacific islands may have 
accentuated the apparent deficiencies in the island societies' systems of government it was 
not the cause of the Crown's doubts over their capacity to grant a jurisdiction for the 
purposes of the Foreign Jurisdiction Acts. Colonial officials insisted during the late 1870s 
that the Crown could unilaterally erect an imperium over the natives and its own subjects 
resorting to uncivilised territories. 247 By then only the latter aspect of this view had gradually 
come to be held.2A8 Special and innovatory249 legislation was passed, namely the Pacific 
Islanders Protection Act 1875230 and the Foreign Jurisdiction Act 1878251 modifying the 
system of 'jurisdiction by legislation' into a limited form of imperium. These Acts gave the 
Crown a local jurisdiction which might be established through special Order in Council for 
its own subjects in a particular uncivilised territory. This jurisdiction was limited to British 
subjects and those natives voluntarily submitting to its exercise.m These Acts are thus 
significant examples from the late nineteenth century of the Crown's continued refusal to 
claim or erect unilaterally an imperium over the native inhabitants of territory beyond the 
realm. 
2A6 British recognition of tribal sovereignty in Africa was recognised, it was seen earlier, from the earliest royal 
charters for Africa. 
247 Gorrie (Chief Justice of Fiji) to Hicks Beach, 16 September 1878 CO 225/1; Hicks Beach to Law Officers, 4 
January 1879, id:303,310; Law Officers to Hicks Beach (jurisdiction over natives requires Order in Council 
under Foreign Jurisdiction Act or territorial sovereignty), 20 March 1879 CO 225/4:23-5; Herbert, note regarding 
Sir A. Gordon's (Western Pacific High Commissioner) complaints re lack of jurisdiction over natives, 15 January 
1880 CO 225;3:213-4; Kimberley and Brarnston, Minutes (sympathising with the colonial authorities), 22 May 
1881 CO 225/9:303,310; Selborne Le, note stipulating any such legislation despite the "theoretical .. . difficulty" 
should ''be carefully limited to acts of murder or other violence ... in order to bring it, as distinctly as possible 
within recognised principles of jurisprudence", 30 May 1881, id,314; Draft Bill of 1881 giving Her Majesty 
power to erect courts to try natives for "any crimes of violence" with the proviso that this "Act shall not be 
deemed to confer on Her Majesty any dominion or sovereignty over the Pacific Islands or the inhabitants thereof' 
CO 225/11:19-20; Jenkyns to Herbert, note (agreeing with Law Officers opinion of 20 March 1879, condemning 
the Draft Bill which subsequently lapsed: Johnston Sovereignty and Protection, 138), 4 April 1882, id,21-6; Earl 
of Derby, note (the Draft Bill was "a complete innovation in regard to its theory"), 31 January 1883, id,18 . In 
1865 the Law Officers had condemned an American Act of Congress, similar to the Draft Bill of 1881, as 
incapable of conferring a jurisdiction upon American Consuls over natives who had not conceded or recognized 
American authority, Law Officers to Russell, 5 May 1865 FO 83/2314; Russell to Jones, 11 May 1865 FO 
58/124. 
2A8 Law Officers to Stanley, conceding for the first time that Imperial legislation might be used to give a 
Commissioner "limited jurisdiction in Civil and Criminal Cases over the British subjects" in the Pacific Islands 
where a jurisdiction could not be got from native authorities under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 18 August 1868 
FO 83/2314:308-11. Reilly's Draft Bill (encl in Memorandum, 1 January 1869 FO 58/124:227) to like effect 
eventually lapsed (Vivian to Holland, 4 April 1871, id,312-5) but the principle resurfaced in the Pacific Islanders 
Protection Act 1875. 
249 Paunceforte, "Memorandum on Her Majesty's Jurisdiction in Western Polynesia", 1876 (nd) FO 97/497:nf. 
230 38 & 39 Vict c 51; see pemlissive opinion of Law Officers to Camarvon, 10 April 1875 CO 83/8:33-6. 
251 41 & 42 Vict c 67; the 1875 Act was used as the precedent for this Act passed in response to problems in the 
Congo: Memoranda, Reilly (17 January 1878) and Jenkyns (3 July 1878) FO 97/489:nf. 
252 In the Pacific the Colonial Office insisted (note to Foreign Office, 26 August 1892 FO 58/273) and Law Officers 
(17 November 1892, id.) agreed that any jurisdiction held by the Western Pacific High Commissioner under the 
Pacific Orders in Council under the 1875 Act was "dependent on an explicit or implied grant by the protected 
Sovereign... in whom such jurisdiction was (in theory at any rate) originally vested". As to the High 
Commission's acquisition of such jurisdiction by treaties and Resident Commissioners see generally Scarr 
FragmenJs of Empire, 252-289. The Sel includes only the Tonga treaties (at 322: the sovereignty of the Tongan 
Kings, unlike that of other island communities, was recognised as early as 1864 when Jones urged a treaty be 
concluded with the reigning chief "King George", see Jones to Foreign Office, 6 October 1864 CO 58/124:35-8), 
excluding the treaties with the Gilbert and Ellice Island chiefs (see Scarr, supra, 255). 
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A more crucial shortcoming in British practice arose not so much from the actual terms 
of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act as in the legal theory underpinning its application. The Act 
was applied on the basis that the only forms of imperium which the Crown might constitute 
beyond the realm were an extraterritorial jurisdiction, the regime governed by the Act, or 
territorial sovereignty.253 The extraterritorial jurisdiction, it has been seen, was personal in 
that it might apply to British subjects and the indigenous inhabitants. This was well and 
good in the Levant, Middle and Far East where the personal restraint attending 
extraterritorial jurisdiction supplied the Crown with a jurisdiction adequate for British 
purposes, that is the exemption of British subjects from the lex loci, however as European 
competition grew during the second half of the nineteenth century in Africa and the Pacific 
these personal limitations came to be sorely tried. The Crown considered an uncivilised state 
equipped only to grant an imperium for the purposes of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act binding 
upon its own and British subjects.2S4 Short of the grant of territorial sovereignty (which the 
Crown recognised it was in uncivilised states to cede) the uncivilised states, not being 
members of the club of civilised nations, were unable to grant an imperium to a civilised 
state over the subjects of another in the uncivilised region. The rationale for this was 
expressed neatly in a minute of 1887 in which Davidson, then legal advisor to the Foreign 
Office, indicated that since uncivilised tribal nations lacked the ability (unlike the Eastern 
potentates) to enforce their criminal law nor was there any question of its enforcement 
amongst the European population of their territory, they could hardly grant the Crown a 
power over foreignors which they themselves lacked. A nation could grant jurisdiction to 
another whilst in many cases retaining its sovereignty, said Davidson, "it could part in 
theory either with all it possessed or with any portion of it but not with more than it 
possessed or had by showing itself able to enforce - reduced, so to say, into possession".m 
This position, one not shared with the other European nations,256 became particularly 
troublesome as Britain established Protectorates in Africa and the Pacific during the second 
half of the nineteenth century. Outright annexation of large regions of Africa and the Pacific 
253 Law Officers to Hicks Beach, 20 March 1879 CO 225/4:23-5; Hertslet, "Memorandum on Protectorates", 24 
April 1883 FO 84/2275:60-1; Law Officers Report on British Jurisdiction in Protectorates, 29 June 1887 FO 
64/1208:121-2; Davidson, note, nd (circa June/July 1887), id; Memoranda of Wright and Davidson, 19 December 
1887 FO 97/562:No.5736,#18,16-20. This position underpinned Papayanni v Russian Steam Compqny : The 
Laconia (1863), 2 Moo PC(NS)161, 15 ER 862. 
2S4 Law Officers to Russell, 5 May 1865 FO 83/2314:280-1; Law Officers' opinion, 12 March 1870 CO 
881/4:#20,82-3; Law Officers and Or Deane to Granville, 13 January 1874 FO 834/11:#113,84; Law Officers to 
Hicks Beach, 20 March 1879; Law Officers to Kimberley, 3 August 1880 CO 48/498:124-7; Law Officers to 
Salisbury, 8 August 1885 FO 84/2275:75-6; Law Officers to Stanley, 10 August 1885 CO 417/8:46-55; Law 
Officers to Salisbury, 30 September 1885 FO 85/2275:79-80; Law Officers to Granville, 21 April 1886 id,81; 
Law Officers Report on British Jurisdiction in Protectorates, 29 June 1887 FO 64/1208:121-2; Wright, 
Memorandum, 18 November 1888 CO 97/562:nf. 
m Note (nd circa June/July 1887) FO 64/1208:117-8; similarly Law Officers to Camarvon, 10 April 1875 CO 
83/8:33-6. 
2S6 In particular the Germans took the position during the late nineteenth century that a Protectorate gave jurisdiction 
over all foreignors: Hatzfeldt, notes verbale, 11 May and 29 August 1886 FO 64/1152; Law Officers Report 
(inter alia on the German Law), 29 June 1887 FO 64/1208:121-2; Salisbury to Hatzfeldt (draft), August (nd) 
1887 FO 97/562:nf. Scott "Memorandum on GermanLaws" 13 September 1887, id. 
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Islands was usually unpalatable (though a British Protectorate often became a precursor to 
eventual annexation)2.57 and inconsistent with the ostensible justification adopted by the 
European nations to explain the 'scramble' for Africa and the Pacific. The backward nations 
required protection, it was argued, and tutelage in the ways of civilisation - the so-called 
'sacred trust of civilisation'.258 The annexation of large areas of uncivilised territory by any 
European nation would have been inconsistent with this notion of temporary wardship and 
would have exacerbated European rivallry in Africa and the Pacific. This scramble thus 
became a race to obtain native agreement to European protection, a race in which Britain no 
less than the other European powers was an active participant Protection involved the 
assumption of control over an uncivilised country's external relations, effectively the right to 
exclude other European nations from the region, without the claim to the underlying 
territorial sovereignty. The rigorous distinction in English law throughout the nineteenth 
century between extraterritorial jurisdiction and territorial sovereignty as supplemented by 
the Crown's unwillingness to recognise the competence of uncivilised states to grant a 
personal imperium to the Crown over the subjects of other civilised nations meant, however, 
that English law was unable to accommodate effectively this notion of a Protectorate: The 
Crown could not constitute any form of government over European nationals without the 
consent of that government It was not until 1891 that the Crown became prepared to accept 
that a Protectorate over uncivilised territory involved an arrangement somewhere between 
extraterritorial jurisdiction and territorial sovereignty, a willingness which then produced a 
third, intermediate form of imperium. 
The distinguishing characteristic of this intermediate form of imperium, the Protectorate 
(as opposed to the 'Protected State' which remained a class of extraterritorial jurisdiction), 
was that it involved no claim to the underlying territorial sovereignty. This required the 
Protectorate to be formally constituted by Order in Council under the Foreign Jurisdiction 
Act. Nevertheless the Protectorate became recognised as conferring certain territorial rights 
upon the Crown, namely the right of government over all the subjects of civilised states 
(British and otherwise) within the region. Any imperium over native inhabitants and British 
subjects emanated, as before, from native consent (by "treaty, capitulation, grant, usage, 
sufferance and other lawful means") however the Crown's jurisdiction over European 
subjects was inferred from the proceedings at the Conference of Berlin (1890).259 
2.57 The following British territories were initially British Protectorates: Southern Rhodesia (annexed 1923) although 
British sovereignty arose earlier by conquest of Lobengula in 1894 : Re Southern Rhodesia [1919] AC 211; 
Kenya (annexed 1920); Basutoland (annexed 1871); Gold Coast or Ghana (annexation of areas under Her 
Majesty's protection but not part of Her dominions, 1901); New Guinea (annexed 1888); Gilbert and Ellice 
Islands (annexed 1915). 
2S8 Alexandrowicz 'The Juridical Expression of the Sacred Trust of Civilisation" (1971) 65 AJIL 149. 
259 Fairfield, minute, 9 January 1891 CO 417/48:249-55; Brarnston, minute, 11 February 1891 CO 417/72; Brarnston, 
Memorandum, 20 February 1891 CO 417/69:578-87; Law Officers to Knutsford, 17 April 1891, id,118-24; 
Salisbury to Knutsford, 5 March 1891 CO 417/70; Gray to Bergne, 4 December 1891 FO 84/2274; Law Officers 
to Rosebery, 16 November 1892 Fa 834/17; Law Officers to Ripon, 17 November 1892 CO 225/40; Ripon to 
Griffith, 11 March 1895 CO 96/264; and, generally, Johnston Sovereignty and Protection, 229-269. 
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When English courts came to assess the legal , status of the native inhabitants of a 
Protectorate during the early twentieth century they found that the Crown had acquired the 
'external' sovereignty of the region leaving them with the 'internal' sovercignty.260 This 
'internal' sovereignty left the indigenous institutions and laws intact and ensured the native 
polities' nominal retention of the status of territorial sovereign. The recognition of the 
'internal' sovereignty ' did not imply that in establishing a Protectorate the Crown had 
deprived the native state of its 'external' sovereignty. The 'uncivilised' status of these 
communities meant they had never possessed this attribute of sovereignty. In assuming the 
duties of protecting power the Crown had stepped into the breach and donned this external 
sovereignty until such time as by civilisation the native polities had grown into it 
themselves.261 In this way English law accommodated a third form of imperium. 
The recognition of a third form of imperium harmonised the Crown's long-standing 
recognition of the treaty-making capacity of non-European polities with the comparatively 
recent emergence of the standard of civilisation in international law. The capacity to confer 
an imperium over British subjects and themselves could be characterised as an emanation 
from the tribal societies' internal sovereignty whilst their lack of an external sovereignty was 
consistent with their non-compliance with the standard of civilisation. In this sense English 
law had qualified with the word 'internal' the sovereignty which Vattel had accorded 
"political bodies, societies of men who have united together and combined their forces, in 
order to procure their mutual welfare and security".261 This formulation was highly 
reminiscent of Marshall's formulation of the status of the American Indian tribes subsequent 
to the Crown's grant of charters laying claim to sovereign title over vast regions.263 However 
this new form of imperium differed from Marshall's formulation in one important respect: A 
native community could only retain an 'internal' sovereignty where the Crown did not claim 
the underlying territorial sovereignty. This prevented the application of Marshall's approach 
and the Protectorate analogy to the Canadian Indians, the Maori tribes and other native 
polities which retained an internal coherence notwithstanding the Crown's claim to the 
territorial sovereignty over their lands. 
c) the influence of Austinian theory 
260 R v The Earl of Crewe. ex parte Sekgome (1910) 2 KB 576; Sobhuza 1/ v Miller [1926) AC 518. 
261 Publicists stressed the seperation of internal from external sovereignty, the former not implying the latter, for 
example: Levi InJernational Law, (1887), 85; Lawrence Principles of InJernational Law (1895), 56-57 (both 
separate attributes required for international personality); Keith, ed Wheaton's ElemenJs (1929), 41-45 (both 
separate attributes required for international personality). 
261 Le droit de gens (1758), I,l,para 1. 
263 Some nineteenth century writers associated the Marshall formulation with British Protectorates over non-European 
territory: Dana, ed Wheaton's ElemenJs (1866) 48-50; Creasy First Platform (1876), 94; Levi InJernationa/ Law 
(1887), 83-84; Halleck InJernational Law (1893), 72; Jenkyns British Rule and Jurisdiction (1902), 167; Keith, 
ed Wheaton's Elements (1929), 101-105; cf Westlake Chapters (1894), 151; Lawrence, Principles (1895), 68-69. 
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It remains to be considered why it was that English law struggled during the second half 
of the nineteenth century to find a legal solution similar to that reached by the Marshall 
Court in the United States to explain the juridical status of native communities in Africa and 
the Pacific Islands in whose territory the Crown was seeking to establish an imperium 
adequate to its needs (yet short of annexation). The answer to this lies in the influence of 
Austinian theory during the second half of the nineteenth century. 
In a series of celebrated and highly influential lectures the English jurist John Austin 
(1790-1859) considered the character of sovereignty. Since his theory was not incorporated 
in a wholesale manner into the principles affecting the Crown's acquisition of an imperium 
in non-European territory it is important to distinguish the indivisible character Austin 
assigned sovereignty from the other characteristics he gave it. 
i) The Austinian conception of sovereignty 
Austin's theory of sovereignty flowed directly from his command theory of law. "Laws 
properly so called are a species of command" said Austin, but "being a command every law 
properly so called flows from a determinate source or emanates from a determinate 
author".264 This determinate authority was the sovereign of the society political and 
independent: 265 
" every positive law, or every law strictly so called, is a direct or circuitous 
command of a sovereign or sovereign number in the character of political superior: 
that is to say, a direct or circuitous command of a monarch or sovereign to a person 
or persons in a state of subjection to its author. And being a command (and therefore 
flowing from a determinate source), every positive law is a law proper, or a law 
properly so called". 
Since international law was neither the command of a sovereign nor capable of enforcement 
Austin refused to treat it as law proper so much as a kind of international morality, a view 
challenged by most Anglo-American writers over the following century.266 
The "sovereign portion" of a society was "that certain member of the society, or that 
certain body of its members, to whose commands, expressed or intimated, the generality or 
bulk of its members render habitual obedience".267 Austin held that the members of the 
society must either be dependent or subject to that sovereign: "By 'an independent political 
society', or 'an independent and sovereign nation', we mean a political society consisting of 
a sovereign and subjects, as opposed to a political society which is merely subordinate: that 
264 The Province 01 Jurisprudence Determined (1832, ed 1955), 133. 
us Id, 134. 
266 Virtually all nineteenth century writers on international law insisted it had the character of "law". Those writers 
included Wheaton, Manning, Phillimore, Kent, Amos, Woolsey, Twiss, Lawrence, Walker, Maine, Westlake, 
Lawrence, Oppenheim, Keith, cl Holland Lectures (1933), 6. 
2/j/ Province (1832), 194. 
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is to say, which is merely a limb or member of another political society, and which 
therefore consists entirely of persons in a state of subjection".268 The "distinguishing marks" 
of the sovereign were thus summarised:269 
"The generality of the given society must be in the habit of obedience to a 
determinate and common superior: whilst that determinate person or determinate 
body · of persons must not be habitually obedient to a determinate person or body. It 
is the union of that positive, with this negative mark, which renders that certain 
superior sovereign or supreme, and which renders that given society (including that 
. certain superior) a society political and independent". 
Tribal society did not fulfill these criteria for sovereignty, Austin argued:270 
Inasmuch as the given society lives in the savage condition, or in the extremely 
barbarous condition which closely approaches the savage, the generality or bulk of its 
members is not in a habit of obedience to one and the same superior. For the 
purpose of attacking an external enemy, or for the purpose of repelling an attack 
made by an external enemy, the generality or bulk of its members, who are capable 
of bearing arms, submits to one leader, or to one body of leaders. But so soon as 
that exigency passes, this transient submission ceases; and the society reverts to the 
state which may be deemed its ordinary state. The bulk of each of the families which 
compose the given society, renders habitual obedience to its own peculiar chief: but 
those domestic societies are themselves independent societies, or are not united or 
compacted into one political society by general and habitual obedience to a certain 
and common superior. And, as the bulk of the given society is not in a habit of 
obedience to one and the same superior, there is no law (simply or strictly so styled) 
which can be called the law of that given society or community. The so-called laws 
which are common to the bulk of the community, are purely and properly customary 
laws: that is to say, laws which are set or imposed by the general opinion of the 
community, but which are not enforced by legal or political sanctions. The state 
which I have briefly delineated, is the ordinary state of the savage and independent 
societies which live by hunting or fishing in the woods or on the coasts of New 
Holland. It is also the ordinary state of the savage and independent societies which 
range in the forests or plains of the North American continent. It was also the 
ordinary state of many of the German nations whose manners are described by 
Tacitus. 
The application of Austinian criteria denied sovereignty to tribal societies although the Asian 
polities might probably have met the above criteria. These criteria clearly favoured the 
'civilised' states with a post-customary system of law271 in which the institutions of 
government and law enforcement were able to meet the requirements of Austin's command 
theory of law. To this extent Austin's definition of sovereignty had something in common 
268 Id, 195. 
269 Id. 
270 Id, 208. Austin was following Bentham in finding an absence of a legislator and habitual obedience in tribal 
societies: Bentham A FragmenJ on GovernmenJ (1776, ed 1948), para 20; Bentham's position was probably, in 
turn, derived from Hobbes Leviathan (1651, reprint ed 1985), I,xii~63. 
271 Austin dismissed customary law as "general opinion" ( Province, 154) unless it was supported or recognised by 
the political superior's tribunals (id, 163). In this way he recognised the customary basis of the common law 
whilst also disqualifying most other and especially tribal systems of customary law. 
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with the development of a standard of civilisation in international law. Nonetheless the two 
were separate developments and the extent to which the Austinian forumulation of 
sovereignty affected the Crown's position towards uncivilised societies is moot 
For their part the English courts adhered to the position that the recognition of another 
society's sovereignty was above all a political act of the Crown to which they would attach 
the appropriate legal consequences. To the extent therefore that Austin's formulation of 
sovereignty could have had any effect it must be found primarily in the formal relations of 
the Crown. It certainly did not inhibit the Crown's practice in Asia and Africa where the 
treaty-making pattern of previous times continued unabated. It may be argued that Austin's 
views were applied during the second half of the nineteenth century to the problems in the 
Pacific where the Crown equivocated over the sovereignty of the island communities. 
However this would apply a theoretical determination where more practical reasons 
consistent with but not governed by the theory might be found. The Crown's reluctance to 
recognise the de jure sovereignty of Cakombau's government over Fiji, to take the most 
notable example, rested on the grounds of its youth and British doubt over the effectiveness 
of its control of the island group. These reasons tie in with an absence of the Austinian 
requirement of habitual obedience but equally the requirement that the so-called sovereign 
enjoy the actual and long-established control of his territory and people was as much 
dictated by common sense as resort to a theoretical checklist of the hallmarks of 
sovereignty. It does not follow that in stating the obvious Austin was determining British 
practice on the question of recognition of the sovereignty of other societies. 
The absolute, 'all or nothing' character which Austin gave sovereignty did, however, 
influence the late nineteenth century English writers such as Oppenheim, Westlake and 
Lawrence who saw the standard of civilisation as the absolute threshold of international 
personality. This rigidity which treated uncivilised states as bereft of any legal status 
whatsoever defied the subtleties of international practice and so required such qualification 
as to undernline these writers' distinction between the relations of civilised states inter se 
(governed by international law) and these states' relations with uncivilised nations (beyond 
the realm of international law).272 Even these writers were forced by the reality of state 
practice to resile if only implicitly from the position that states not meeting the standard of 
civilisation lacked any juridical status whatsoever. 
ii) the indivisibility of sovereignty 
272 Westlake Chapters (1894), 144 and 184 (native tribes incapable of allowing an imperium), 181 (no occupation 
found necessary for a Protectorate, implying treaty with native tribes was sufficient); Walker Manual (1895) 7 
(barbarous peoples "dehors the dictates of International Law" but formal relations possible with some nations 
nearing the standard); Lawrence Principles (1895), 154-156 (treaty-making practice with tribal societies dismissed 
as dictated by "moral considerations" only); Oppenheim InJernational Law, 33-34, 275-281 (international law 
limited to civilised states but some less civilised states can be partially within the ambit of international law); 
Holland Lectures (1933), 39-40,57 (international personality limited to civilised states but less civilised states 
may be considered as in "the outer courts of the charmed circle"). 
59 
Austin insisted that the sovereign was subordinate · to no one, stating that "no government 
is sovereign and subject at once".m Accordingly he rejected any concept of semi- or 
imperfectly sovereign states seeing this as a contradiction in terms. His position found 
widespread acceptance in England during the second half of the nineteenth century27. and 
prevented the incorporation into the principles affecting British imperial practice of 
something resembling 'the approach Marshall had taken to the status of the North American 
Indian tribes. It has been seen that by the early nineteenth century two forms of imperium, 
extraterritorial jurisdiction and territorial sovereignty, were recognised. This distinction 
worked adequately until the second half of the nineteenth century when the Crown began to 
establish Protectorates in Africa and the Pacific. Similar arrangements had been concluded in 
the East Indies from the late eighteenth century275 but the regime produced no crisis in the 
theory of English law until later. The Protectorate was initially treated as a form of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction importing no sovereign right over the territory276 (and hence 
jurisdiction over European nationals) since to have held otherwise would have fallen foul of 
Austin's injunction against the divisibility of sovereignty. In 1888 Maine had stated that 
sovereignty was a bundle of rights each of which may seperated from the other.m Others 
such as Jenkyns278 and Ilbert279 agreed but it was not until 1891 that this advice was 
accepted and the Austinian requirement of non-divisibility discarded so facilitating the 
recognition of the Protectorate as a third intermediate imperium. 
d) relevance to Maori claims at common law 
273 Province (1832), 241. The position was probably Hobbesian in origin: Leviathan (1651) II,xviii, & 12. 
27. Hall Foreign Powers and Jurisdiction (1894), 206; Jenkyns "Application of Principles of International Law to 
Foreign Subjects in British Protectorates", 26 November 1888 in FO 97/562; Lyall "Indian Protectorates, A Note 
by Sir Alfred Lyall", 28 January 1889, encl in Dbert to Pauncefort, 29 January 1889, id; and, generally, Johnston 
Sovereignty and Protection, 216-217. 
275 For the period 1800-1840 the Sellists 40 British treaties with Indian princely states which might be immediately 
identified as treaties of protection (221-259). Many others equivalent to the same arrangement were clearly 
concluded during this period. 
276 Some commentators insisted that the Crown's jurisdiction in the territory of the 'protected' Indian princes rested 
not on a foreign jurisdiction derived from their consent but on the fuller basis of territorial sovereignty: Creasy 
First Platform (1876),94; Lyall "Indian Protectorates", 28 January 1889 CO 97/562; Lawrence Principles (1895), 
68; Westlake International Law (1910), 41; Smith International Law (1918), 59-60; Keith, ed Wheaton's 
Elements (1929), 104-5; Holland Lectures (1933) 69; ct Levi International Law (1887), 83-84; Maine 
International Law (1894), 58-59; Twiss Law of Nations, 27-28; Dbert "Memorandum upon Indian and African 
Protectorates", 24 January 1889 in CO 97/562. The 'act of state' cases of the mid- to late- ninetecnth century 
proceeded upon the basis that the protected Indian princely states were generally not British territory. 
m International Law (1888), 58. The proposition was hardly novel. Many writers before Maine had recognized the 
divisibility and incompleteness of sovereignty in 'semi-sovereign' states. For instance: Wheaton Elements (1836), 
62; Halleck International Law (1861), 62; Dana, ed Wheaton's Elements (1866), 28; Woolsey Introduction to the 
Study of International law (1875),28; Creasy First Platform (1876), 7; Twiss International Law (1884), 25; Levi 
International Law (1887), 83. 
278 Jenkyns "Application of Principles of International Law to Foreign Subjects in British Protectorates", 26 
November 1888 in FO 97/562; British Rule and Jurisdiction (1902), 165-180. 
279 Dbert, "Memorandum upon Indian and African Protectorates", 24 January 1889 in CO 97/562. 
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It may seem curious that so much attention has been given to developments after the 
conclusion of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840. This observation would be correct to the 
extent that one need not appreciate subsequent developments in the principles affecting the 
Crown's acquisition of an imperium in non-European territory if the sole exercise is to 
understand why it was thought necessary to conclude an arrangement such as the Treaty of 
Waitangi in 1840. If this were the sole concern here this chapter would have stopped at the 
end of part 3, that is, some time in the early to mid-nineteenth century when the influence 
of the standard of civilisation and Austinian theory was slight. However the aim of this 
thesis is not only to isolate the intertemporal law which the Crown felt to govern its 
acquisition of an imperium in New Zealand during the 1830s but also to understand the 
common law status of the Maori tribes after British annexation. Subsequently the approach 
of New Zealand courts to questions of Maori rights at common law will be seen to be 
founded on misinterpretations of the relevant legal theory of the late nineteenth century and 
the unwitting adoption of unadulterated Austinian principles. The clarification of 
developments during this period is necessary, therefore, in order that the New Zealand 
judgments on the common law status of Maori (aboriginal) rights may be assessed. 
The relevant developments in the principles affecting the Crown's acquisition of an 
imperium in non-European territory during the second half of the nineteenth century may be 
summarised thus: 
1) English courts were required to look to the conduct of the Crown to see if it had 
recognised a foreign state. Evidence of recognition could derive from the entry into treaty 
relations with the foreign polity or, if needs required, the requisite certification from the 
responsible Secretary of State. The conduct of the Crown was treated as the primary 
determinant of the status of the foreign government. 
2) The Crown continued to act through the mid to late nineteenth century on the basis that 
tribal societies enjoyed some juridical status notwithstanding the development of a standard 
of civilisation in international law and the influence of Austinian theory. The Crown still 
treated the consent of the non-European societies as a pre-requisite to its formal erection of 
an imperium (by annexation or Order in Council under the Foreign Jurisdiction Acts) over 
their territory.280 This position was qualified by Imperial legislation of 1875 and 1878 which 
provided for a local jurisdiction over the British inhabitants of uncivilised territory. However 
any imperium over the native inhabitants of these regions still required their voluntary 
submission (or, one may add, most unusually, submission upon royal conquest). In British 
eyes the difficulty attending the standard of civilisation developed by international law was 
280 This conclusion coincides with O'ConneU's more general conclusion (International Law, 2nd ed, 1970, I, 80-2) 
that international personality is not an absolute quality but gives a state the capacity to enter into a set of 
specifice relations the range of which may vary from one state to another. 
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that short of the frequently unpalatable option of annexation the uncivilised societies were 
unable to grant the Crown jurisdiction over intermeddling European subjects. This problem 
was removed in 1891 when the Crown finally recognised the Protectorate as an intermediate 
form of imperium which was both personal and territorial. The limitation placed on the 
extraterritorial jurisdiction-conferring capacity of uncivilised societies hardly amounted to an 
abnegation of all juridical' capacity for any jurisdiction in the Crown over its own subjects 
and/or the indigenous inhabitants of uncivilised regions still emanated from the consent of 
the native rulers. 
3) The recognition of the third intermediate form of imperium (similar to that styled by 
the Supreme Court of the United States under Marshall CJ) was retarded by the Crown's 
subscription during the nineteenth century to the non-divisibility of sovereignty. When this 
obstinacy disappeared in 1891 the Protectorate came to be recognised as a distinct form of 
imperium wherein the Crown claimed no territorial sovereignty but assumed the vacant 
'external' sovereignty leaving the native polity with the 'internal' sovereignty. This notion of 
'internal' sovereignty gave the standard of civilisation a more tangible role in English law 
which until then had been unwilling to distinguish semi- from full sovereignty. 
4) Conclusion (2) above, Le. the recognition of tribal sovereignty, was contradicted by 
Austinian criteria for sovereign status. It must be concluded Austinian theory had little or no 
bearing upon the Crown's position towards the sovereign (or otherwise) status of foreign 
polities. 
5) The intermediate type of imperium noted in (3) above became recognised through the 
repudiation of Austinian notions of the indivisibility of sovereignty. If Austinian theory had 
any relevance to the Crown's practice during the second half of the nineteenth century in 
relation to the acquisition of an imperium in non-European territory it was on this count 
alone. Prior to its abandonment, this subscription to the non-divisibility of sovereignty 
hardly amounted to an abnegation of uncivilised states' sovereignty. 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
Two consistent principles underlaid the Crown's practice from the sixteenth century. The 
first was the recognition of some juridical status in the non-European societies or those 
described at various times as 'infidel' or 'uncivilised'. This recognition is evident in the 
Crown's tradition of treaty relations with these societies. Secondly the Crown acted on the 
basis that the acquisition of an imperium (be it personal or territorial) over non-European 
societies required their consent or, much less desirably, conquest 
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It is necessary to understand these two principles in order to place the Treaty of 
Waitangi in the historical context of British practice regarding the acquisition of an 
imperium over non-European societies. The conclusion of the Treaty was governed by and 
totally consistent with the principles that the Crown had followed elsewhere since the 
sixteenth century. These principles are also crucial to an assessment of the common law 
status of Maori rights upon British annexation. It will be seen New Zealand courts. with the 
early and honourable exception of R v Symonds (1847). have consistently overlooked these 
simple principles with a consequential deletorious effect upon Maori rights at law. In an 
eloquent passage in Symonds Chapman J. acknowledged the incorporation of these principles 
(together with others relating to tribal land rights. to which we will return) into the common 
law:2S1 
The intercourse of civilised nations. and especially of Great Britain. with the 
aboriginal Natives of America and other countries, during the last two centuries. has 
gradually led to the adoption and affirmation by the Colonial Courts of certain 
established principles of law applicable to such intercourse. Although these principles 
may at times have been lost sight of. yet animated by the humane spirit of modem 
times. our Colonial Courts. and the Courts of such of the United States of America 
as have adopted the common law of England. have invariably affirmed and supported 
them; so that at this day. a line of judicial decision. the current legal opinion. and 
above all. the settled practice of the colonial Governn1ents. have concurred to clothe 
with certainty and precision what would otherwise have remained vague and 
unsettled. These principles are not the new creation or invention of the Colonial 
Courts. They flow not from what an American writer has called the "vice of judicial 
legislation". They are in fact to be found among the earliest settled principles of our 
law; and they are in part deduced from those higher principles. from charters made 
in conformity with them. acquiesced in even down to the charter of our own Colony; 
and from the letter of treaties with Native tribes. wherein those principles have been 
asserted and acted upon. 
The rules applied by the Crown to the acquisition of an imperium in non-Christian territory 
were consistently underpinned by these two 'higher principles' notwithstanding the organic 
character of British practice. 
281 (1847). [1840-1932] N2PCC 387 (SC) at 388. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE CROWN'S ACQUISITION OF THE TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY 
OF NEW ZEALAND 
I. EARLY RESPONSES 
A. EARLY ATTEMPTS AT A BRITISH JURISDICfION 
From the closing years of the eighteenth and into the early nineteenth century the New 
Zealand islands were visited by the European. Beachhead communities were established by 
European traders in search of flax, naval spars and other supplies as well as British 
missionaries, such as Thomas Kendall and Samuel Marsden, anxious to convert and civilise 
the Maori. European land-buying and settlement did not become a feature of the New 
Zealand frontier until the years immediately preceding annexation (1840). These traders and 
missionaries as well as the escaped convicts from the British settlement of New South 
Wales across the Tasman, lived in lawless albeit not always unruly circumstances. This 
lawlessness was strongly underlined by such incidents during the early nineteenth century as 
the massacre of the crew of the Boyd (1810). 
So far as the British subjects in New Zealand were concerned, there was never any 
question of their submission to Maori customary law (except where forcibly visited upon 
them) nor was there any British authority to keep those of an ill-disposed character in order 
save through the occasional visit by a warship. Faced with the problem of the New Zealand 
frontier, not then particularly pressing but nonetheless one of growing magnitude, it was not 
surprising that the Governor of New South Wales frustrated by the unresponsiveness of the 
authorities in London took matters into his own hands. These early nineteenth century 
attempts to establish British authority were predicated upon the territorial sovereignty of the 
islands being in the Crown. 
Cook had landed at Poverty Bay in October 1769 and whilst circumnavigating and 
charting the North Island had taken formal possession of the lands around Mercury Bay 
(intending presumably the whole of the North Island) during November 1769.' Some weeks 
later he performed a similar act at Queen Charlotte Sound, taking fonnal possession of the 
Sound and adjacent lands (presumably the whole of the South Island).2 These symbolic acts 
were of themselves insufficient to vest any sovereignty over the islands in the Crown for the 
'inchoate' right claimed by Cook was not followed by effective occupation as required by 
Hight and Bamford Constitutional History and Law of New Zealand, 19. 
2 Id. 
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international 1aw.3 More crucially, and here is yet another example of the consistent British 
practice in relation to the acquisition of an imperium over tribal societies, Cook's 
instructions had stipulated that he was to take possession of certain parts of the countries he 
might discover with native consent. Thus:4 
l \ "You are also, with the consent of the natives, to take possession in the name of the King of Great Britain, of convenient situations in such countries as you may 
discover, that have not already been discovered or visited by any other European 
Power ... but if you fmd the countries so discovered are uninhabited, you are to take 
possession of them for His Majesty by setting up proper marks and inscriptions as 
first discoverers and possessors". 
Being in contravention of his instructions, in that Maori consent had not been obtained, and 
receiving no subsequent approval from the Crown, Cook's actions were precipitate and 
ineffective even were symbolic annexation of itself sufficient to establish the Crown's 
sovereignty. 
The earliest attempts to establish British authority in the New Zealand islands were made 
by Governor Macquarie of New South Wales. Relying upon the teJms of his Commission 
giving him jurisdiction over "adjacent islands" ,5 Macquarie appointed Kent as a justice of 
the peace in New Zealand (1810) but the appointment never became effective. In December 
1813 Macquarie proclaimed the Maori to be under British protection but (like Cook's 
Proclamations of sovereignty) this unilateral action was unauthorised by the Crown, thus 
making its legality doubtful. His actions received no subsequent approval. Macquarie 
declared: 6 
"And whereas the natives of all the said islands are under the protection of His 
Majesty, and entitled to the good offices of his subjects; all persons whatsoever 
charged by the oath of credible witnesses with any acts of rapine, plunder, robbery, 
piracy, murder, or other offences against the law of nature and of nations, against the 
persons and properties of any of the natives of the said islands, will, upon due 
conviction, be further punished with the utmost rigour of the law" . 
Macquarie followed this order with the appointment (1814Y of Thomas Kendall, a Church 
Missionary Society missionary in the Bay of Islands, as Resident Magistrate. An Order was 
4 
6 
7 
Mere discovery was not considered to confer a title to territory at international law: Vattel Le droit de gens 
(1758), I, 207; Phillimore Corrunentaries (1854), I, 247 and (1879) 349; Westlake Chapters on International Law 
(1895), 27; Smith Great Britain and the Law of Nations (1935), IT, 1; Evatt "Acquisition of Territory in Australia 
and New Zealand", 22-26; Foden New Zealand Legal History, Part I. The Crown's non-reliance on Cooks 
discovery as a source of sovereignty was authoritatively set out in Stephen, Memorandum, 18 March 1840, CO 
209/8: 69. On discovery as a source of title cf Keller, Lissitzyn and Marm Creation of Rights of Sovereignty 
through Symbolic Acts 1400-1800 esp., 150-151. 
HRNZ, I at 28. 
Tapp Early New Zealand, 4,66; Ad arns , Fatal Necessity, 52. Later argued as proof of British sovereignty over 
New Zealand: Petition of London Merchants, 22 May 1840, RSCNZ (1840) App 1. 
HRNZ, I at 317. 
Government and General Order, 12 November 1814, id,329-30. 
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also addressed to British seamen in the New Zealand islands. It stipulated:8 
l "His Excellency being equally solicitous to protect the natives of New Zealand and the Bay of Islands in all their just rights and privileges as those of every other 
dependency of the territory of New South Wales, hereby orders and directs that no 
master or seamen of any ship or vessel belonging to any British port, or to any of 
the colonies of Great Britain, resorting to the said islands of New Zealand, shall in 
future remove or carry therefrom any of the natives without first obtaining the 
permission of the chief or chiefs of the districts within which the natives so to be 
embarked may happen to reside, which pennission is to be certified in writing under 
the hand of Mr. Thomas Kendall, the Resident Magistrate of the Bay of Islands, or 
of the Magistrate for the time being in said districts". 
The Order went on to prohibit the landing of any British seamen in the islands without, 
again, the peooission of the local chief(s) and certificate of the Resident Magistrate. The 
Order warned that disobedience would "subject the offenders to be proceeded against with 
the utmost rigour of the law on their return hither". The Chiefs "Dewaterra, Shunger and 
Kora Kora" were "invested with power and authority" for the purpose of ensuring 
compliance with the Order. 
This Order had described New Zealand as a dependency of New South Wales, a strained 
interpretation of the jurisdiction over "adjacent islands" given the Governor in his 
commission as well as an unsound reliance upon Cook's symbolic acts. The Order did not, 
however, establish any imperium over the British subjects or Maori but simply advised the 
fornler of their vulnerability to the "utmost rigour of the law" on their return to New South 
Wales. To this extent the designation as 'Magistrate' given Kendall was misleading. There 
was certainly no legal basis upon which the British seamen's compliance with the Order 
could have been enforced in the New South Wales courts and so the Order which never 
became effective must be treated as mere blufU Nonetheless it contained one of the earliest 
signs of what was to become a consistent feature of British practice in the New Zealand 
islands and which culminated in the Treaty of Waitangi. The Order recognised the power 
and authority of the Maori chiefs and purported to establish some British authority over its 
seafaring subjects through use of the chiefs' authority. By the 1820s this recognition of 
I 
chiefly authority was quickly becoming the nooo. British officials insisted that any British 
trading posts (or factories) must be established with Maori peooission. lO 
In 1819 Macquarie appointed Butler as a justice of the peace in New Zealand. l1 In so 
doing he again described New Zealand as a dependency of New South Wales, a description 
which was clearly unfounded. Two years previously, imperial legislation, the Murders 
Government and General Order. 9 November 1814. id,328-9. 
Hight and Bamford Constitutional History. 42; Adams Fatal Necessity. 52. British seamen did not take the 
appointment seriously: Nicholas. evidence. Lords Committee (1838). 11. 
10 Macquarie to Bathurst. 24 June 1815. App no 2 in RSCNZ; Bathurst to Macquarie. 9 April 1816. id. 
11 Hight and Bamford Constitutional History. 42-43. 
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Abroad Act 1817,12 had expressly disavowed any sovereignty over New Zealand. 
Macquarie's successor, Brisbane, wrote to Bathurst, the Colonial Secretary, in February 
1825 asking whether his commission gave him jurisdiction over the islands of the South 
Pacific and the extent of the term 'the Islands adjacent' .13 Although Brisbane's recall 
rendered any reply unnecessary, as Tapp observes,'· by redefining the Governor of New 
South Wales jurisdiction within a latitude bisecting the North Island, the Instructions and 
Commission to Governor Darlingl~ strongly indicated a negative response to Brisbane's 
inquiry. If this were not enough, Imperial legislation of 182316 and 182817 (besides that of 
1817) was enacted on the clear basis of a lack of sovereignty over New Zealand. 
B. JURISDICfION BY LEGISLATION 
The problem of lawlessness amongst the British sean1en and traders in New Zealand 
becan1e particularly pressing during the 1830s. A series of Imperial Acts had been passed 
during previous years establishing what was earlier termed a 'jurisdiction by legislation' 
over New Zealand. The Murders Abroad Act 1817 rendered British subjects liable to trial on 
British soil for offences committed in "Otaheite, New Zealand, the Honduras and other 
places not within His Majesty's dominions".18 This jurisdiction received further provision 
through Imperial legislation of 182319 and 182820 enabling the Crown's courts in Australia to 
try British subjects for serious offences committed in New Zealand. These Acts were 
expressly founded upon a disavowal of any sovereignty over New Zealand and deliberately 
avoided the erection of an imperium in the islands. 
The crucial shortcoming with jurisdiction by legislation was that it established no local 
authority but simply rendered the British subject liable to trial for serious crimes upon his 
return to British soil. The practical difficulty and hence impotence of this form of 
jurisdiction was revealed in the 'Elizabeth affair' (1831) although similar protestations had 
been m ade earlier.21 
During early 1831 a Captain Stewart of the Elizabeth sailed Te Rauparaha, a Maori 
chief, and his war party to Akaroa to enable the slaughter of virtually all the Ngaitahu 
12 57 Geo 3 c 53. 
13 Brisbane to Bathurst, 8 February 1825 HRA, 1st ser,xi,296. 
14 Tapp Early New Zealand, 72. 
IS HRA, 1st ser,xii,496-7. 
16 4 Geo 4 c 96. 
17 9 Geo 4 c 83. 
18 57 Geo 3 c 53. 
19 4 Geo 4 c 96. 
20 9 Geo 4 c 53. 
21 For instance Rev Marsden to Darling, 2 August 1830 CO 209/1: 15-18; Darling to Murray, 12 August 1830 CO 
209/1: 11 -14. The Admiralty felt similarly, eg Laws (HMS Satellite) to Admiralty, 11 March 1829 CO 201/175: 
29; Barrow to Hay, 24 March 1832 CO 201/228: 27-31 (including abstract of Colonial Office correspondence on 
the topic); and, generally, Adarns Fatal Necessity, 59-60,66. 
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inhabitants and the capture of the chief Tamariharanui and his family (who were 
subsequently killed). In return Stewart obtained a cargo of flax. The British involvement was 
condemned by Governor Darling as "an Act of premeditated atrocity".22 He immediately set 
in train the machinery to prosecute the British participants under the Imperial Act 9 Geo 4 c 
83 (1828) giving New South Wales courts jurisdiction under the Murders Abroad Act 1817. 
Darling's attempt to invoke this Act successfully against Stewart and his crew met difficulty 
at every turn. The Crown Solicitor of New South Wales expressed doubts whether the 
depositions disclosed "a sufficient body of facts to warrant a committment by the 
Magistrates".23 In addition he doubted if Stewart and crew had even committed an offence 
recognised by the criminal law of England. The two tribes had been in a state of "legitimate 
warfare, according to the usages of their own country"24 and so could not be considered to 
have murdered the hapless Ngaitahu victims. Given that, Stewart and his crew could hardly 
have been charged as accessories to murder. Moreover by the time bench warrants were 
obtained only Stew art could be detained, the others "keeping out of the way".25 No 
prosecutions eventuated. 
This experience graphically underlined the argument then being made for some form of 
local British authority with power which might be exercised within the New Zealand islands 
over the Crown's miscreant subjects.26 The call for the exercise by the Crown of a 
constitutent power establishing such an authority faced two problems. On the one hand, it 
was clear that the Crown could not exercise a prerogative constituent power erecting such 
an imperium for it had recognised the Maori tribes as "the owners and sovereigns of the 
soil".27 Any such jurisdiction required Maori consent as by grant of 'capitulations'. It must 
be recalled that the possibility of an informally acquired extraterritorial jurisdiction by 
informal grant, sufferance, or usage was not to be recognised in British practice until 1843 
and was, therefore, an option unavailable for the New Zealand problem of the 1830s. In 
addition, it must also be recalled that the possibility of Imperial legislation unilaterally 
conferring a constituent power upon the Crown facilitating the creation of a local \ I jurisdiction over its own subjects in uncivilised territory was also excluded - such legislation 
\ was not first to eventuate until 1875. Indeed, an attempt in 1832 to pass an Act giving New 
South Wales power to legislate for serious crimes committed by British subjects in New 
22 Darling to Goderich, 13 April 1831 CO 209/1: 28-34 (with enclosures). 
23 Moore to Colonial Secretary (NSW) 7 February 1831, encl in Darling to Goderich, id, 51. 
24 So described in Goderich to Bourke, 31 January 1832 CO 209/1: 66 at 68. 
25 Moore to Colonial Secretary, 12 April 1831, encl in Bourke to Goderich, supra, 53. 
26 The same problems ' arose in 1836 regarding the prosecution of a Reverend Gate for sodomy: Busby to Colonial 
Secretary (NSW) 11 November 1836 CO 20912: 279. To avoid the need for a warrant from Sydney Busby later 
sought to obtain one from the native chiefs (as "a bar to any action for false imprisonment" by litigous British 
miscreants) Busby to Hobson (HMS Rattlesnake), 1 July 1837 CO 20912:356-7, 360 (chiefs' warrant). Hobson 
treated his transportation of the British CUlprits as being lawfully based on the chiefs' formal pennission: Hobson, 
Report, copy encl in Bourke to Glenelg 9 September 1837 CO 209/2:30-37, encl A. In evidence Flatt advised the 
Lords Committee (1838), evidence, 32, of two murders amongst the European population having gone unpunished 
because "Mr. Busby had not the power". 
27 Stephen, recorded opinion, 25 May 1830 CO 201/215: 696-7. 
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Zealand failed because of Westminster's refusal to legislate for foreign territory wherein the 
Crown through conduct of its foreign relations had not come to some arrangement with the 
local sovereign.28 
There was, then, a lack of a prerogative or statutorily-derived constituent power in the 
Crown but, at the same time, an obvious need for some local British authority to be 
established in New Zealand. This need was heightened by the worry, unfounded it 
transpired, amongst the British population of the antipodes during 1831 that the French were 
about to annex the country.29 So worried were the British missionaries that Yate dispatched 
a petition of thirteen chiefs for Governor Darling to forward to William IV requesting the 
British government protect them from "the tribe of Marion" as well as those "troublesome" 
British subjects who were "vicious towards us" .30 In April of that year Darling resolved31 and 
obtained pell11ission32 to send a British Resident to protect British interests in New Zealand 
but the lack of any constituent power meant the Resident could not be equipped with f0ll11al 
power over British subjects. Consequently Bourke, who had waited in vain for the Bill of 
1832 to be passed so that tl1e Resident might be given some fonnal autl10rity, was forced to 
instruct Busby:33 
"You are aware that you cannot be clothed with any legal power, or jurisdiction by 
virtue of which you might be enabled to arrest British subjects offending against 
British or Colonial Law in New Zealand". 
It had been intended to supply this defect by means of local legislation under authority of 
an Imperial Act, Bourke continued, but this had not eventuated:J.4 
You can, tl1erefore, rely but little on the force of Law, and must lay the foundation 
of your measures upon the influence which you shall obtain over the Native Chiefs. 
Something, however, may be effected under the Law as it stands at present". 
Bourke advised Busby he might invoke the Act 9 Geo IV c 83, however, his description of 
the procedure under an Act which had proven so wanting in the case of Stewart and the 
28 Bill of 7 June 1832, text in CO 209/1: 102; BPD 3rd ser, XLlll,505-6; Glenelg to Bourke, 28 October 1835 CO 
209/1: 163-8; Stephen to Russell, 16 November 1839 CO 209/5:51. 
29 Lindsey to Goderich, 4 November 1831 CO 201/221 :272-3, 274-9 (encl); generally, Adams FaJal Necessity, 75-8. 
30 Petition of Thirteen Chiefs to William IV signed in the presence of the Committee of Merchants, 5 October 1831 
encl in Yate to Colonial Secretary (NSW) 16 November 1831 CO 201/221 :384-8 and CO 209/1:96-98 . The 
French were so described after the visit of their explorer Marion du Fresne which brought disastrous 
consequences for both sides: Tapp Early New Zealand, 80 n 63 and 3. Goderich to Maori Chiefs, 14 June 1832 
CO 209/1:104-5. . 
31 Darling to Goderich, 13 April 1831 CO 209/1:28-34. 
32 Goderich to Bourke, 31 January 1832 CO 209/1:66. 
33 Bourke to Busby, instructions, 13 April 1833 CO 209/1:107-17 at 111. Busby had written a pamphlet 
recommending the appointment of an agent with Magisterial authority over British subjects to be exercised after 
treaties with the chiefs had been concluded: A Brief Memoir relative to the Islands of New Zealand, June 1831, 
CO 209/1:183,197-8. 
34 Id. 
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crew of the Elizabeth only highlighted its inadequacy:3s 
If, therefore, you should at any time have the means of sending to this Colony any 
one or more persons capable of lodging an infonnation before the proper authority 
here of an offence committed in New Zealand, you will if you think the case of 
sufficient magnitude and impoltance send a detailed report of the transaction to the 
Colonial Secretary by such persons who will be required to depose the facts 
sufficient to support an infonnation upon which a Bench Warrant may be obtained 
from the Supreme Court for the apprehension of the offender, and transmitted to you 
for execution. You will perceive at once that this process which is at best but a 
prolix and inconvenient operation... will be totally useless unless you should have 
some well founded expectation of securing the Offender upon or after the arrival of 
the Warrant. .. " 
\ 
Admitting the impotence of jurisdiction by legislation across a sea hundreds of miles from 
the nearest British court, Bourke was forced, therefore, into advising Busby to work through 
the Maori chiefs. 36 
These instructions, emanating as they did from the inability of the British authorities to 
give Busby any fOlmal authority because of the Crown's lack of a constituent power in 
relation to New Zealand, placed Busby in a delicate position. There was no question of the 
application of Maori law to the "troublesome" and "vicious" British subjects within New 
Zealand but, equally, it was clear that no British subject could lawfully exercise any judicial 
or legislative authority over another without formal constitution from the Crown. This, it 
was seen earlier,l7 was the ground for doubt over the legality of Maclean's jurisdiction along 
the Gold Coast during the 1830s and early 1840s. This was also the basis in 1870 for doubt 
over the legality of the 'courts of equity' in the Niger (Oil River) region wherein local 
British merchants and African representatives resolved disputes (mainly of trade) between 
United Kingdom subjects and the local population.38 Busby, then, had to keep a delicate 
balance between the recognition and judicious guiding of chiefly authority, this being 
permissible, and the assertion of an irregular, unlawful jurisdiction over British subjects. 
Recognising the fine line a Resident without formal authority would have to tread and the 
inevitability of its transgression, Goderich advised Bourke that given the absence of "any 
established system of Jurisprudence" among tJ1e tribes the Resident might take reasonable 
action against lawless Blitish subjects. He thought such "measures of coercion and 
restraint... may be vindicated on the ground of necessity, even if they cannot be strictly' 
defended as legal". Accordingly, he recommended the Resident be indemnified against "the 
risk of any litigation on such ground".39 
3S Id at 112. 
36 Admiralty powers were restricted to naval commanders and therefore these limited powers could not be given to 
Busby. 
37 Supra chapter two. Also, Wilde's opinion for the New Zealand Company, 14 November 1839 CO 209/4:641. 
38 Chalmers to Granville, 3 June 1870 CO 96/86:#6001; Law Officers to Granville, 12 July 1870 F() x.\.1/9:113660, 
No l,p 1. 
39 Goderich to Bourke, 31 January 1832 CO 209/1 :66. 
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It is doubtful whether the Resident's position, which at least from a legal point of view 
was precarious, might have been handled more effectively by a person of less officiousness 
and pettiness than Busby.40 Certainly Mac1ean of the Gold Coast, a man of greater ability 
and canniness as well as a contemporary of Busby, was unable an unwilling to control the 
Gold Coast by simple influence and reliance upon the indigenous authorities.41 Nonetheless 
the inability of the Crown to give the office of Resident formal constitution, and with it 
legal authority over British subjects in New Zealand, governed as it was by the recognition 
of Maori sovereignty, set the scene for the transformation of what was essentially a negative 
into a more positive recognition. Until the early 1830s the recognition of Maori sovereignty 
had been negative in that it was used as a restraint upon British involvement in the islands. 
However the need for some local and official British presence became too acute. The 
appointment in 1832 of a Resident without formal power over British subjects, placed in the 
delicate position described by Bourke in his instructions to Busby, inevitably meant that the 
recognition of Maori sovereignty would become more positive. The authority of the chiefs 
was the only means at hand (however impracticable it may appear in retrospect to have 
been) through which some order could possibly have been brought to the New Zealand 
frontier. 
C. THE BRITISH RESIDENT 
Having been delayed some months in Sydney as Bourke waited in vain for Imperial 
legislation authorising the grant to the Resident of some formal power over British subjects 
in New Zealand,42 Busby reached the Bay of Islands in mid-1833 convinced "how desirable 
it is that the chiefs of New Zeland, in any transaction which might considered of an 
international character, [be dealt with] in their collective capacity only" .43 Busby was already 
talking of a "Confederation"44 of the Chiefs as the basis of an established Government for 
the Maori tribes. This concern - it became a virtual obsession, with the collective rather than 
tribal sovereignty of the chiefs was to characterise his office as British Resident. 
One of Busby's first , steps as Resident was to give some tangible expression to this 
'Confederation'. After securing approval from New South Wales,45 he prevailed upon the 
chiefs in the vicinity of the Bay of Islands to adopt a national flag "for the Tribes of that 
40 See the assessment of Busby's character in Adams Fatal Necessity, 64-71. 
41 Maclean, it will be recalled (supra chapter two) had erected an irregular jurisdiction over British subjects and the 
native inhabitants of territory adjoining the Gold Coast forts. 
42 Bourke to Goderich 2 May 1833 CO 209/1:106; The Bill of 1832 failed, supra n 30, as did similar proposals in 
late 1835 (Bourke to G1enelg, 26 December 1835 CO 201/248 enclosing "an epitome of the Bill prepared by the 
Chief Justice of New South Wales", clause 35) and August 1836 (draft Punishment Act for New Zealand, 
Glenelg to Bourke, 23 August 1836 CO 201/248:318-319; see Adarns Fatal Necessity, 70). 
43 Busby to Bourke, 13 May 1833 CO 209/2:210 at 211. 
44 Id at 212. 
45 Bourke to Stanley, 29 April 1834 CO 209/1:121,123 (extracts from Minutes of the Proceedings of the executive 
Council on 7 September 1833). 
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Country in their Collective Capacity".46 This measure· was approved by the Colonial Office47 
and Lords of the Admiralty who instIUcted the Commander-in-Chief on the East India 
station to recognise the register of vessels flying under the flag as "valid instruments [to 
be] ... respected as such in the intercourse such vessels hold with the BJitish Possessions".48 
Soon after, however, the weakness of the Resident's position was revealed in the debacle 
surrounding . the whaling barque Harriet (1834). This ship was wrecked off the Taranaki 
coast on 29 April 1834, the ship's complement reaching the shore where they were attacked 
by Maoris. The survivors were taken prisoner. Eventually, amidst great slaughter, the 
pJisoners were rescued at Bourke's orders by HMS Alligator. No effort had been made to 
consult Busby or the missionaJies or even to consider the Maori side of the matter. In 
reporting the rescue to the Colonial Office Governor Bourke stressed the weakness of the 
Resident's position and the need either for a ship of war to be stationed pem1anently in 
New Zealand waters or for Busby to equipped with some real authoJity.49 Moral suasion 
alone was insufficient. Bourke had stressed this point constantly in his dispatches to London 
during the mid-1830sso although the long-awaited legislation establishing a constituent power 
over BJitish subjects in New Zealand was never to eventuate. 
During October 1835 Busby received a letter from a person styling himself the Baron de 
Thierry. This letter inforn1ed "His BJitannic Majesty's Consular Agent at the Bay of Islands" 
that he was about to establish a "Sovereign Government" upon his arrival in New Zealand.s1 
De Thierry's 'Address to the New Zealand settlers' described his plan to lift the Maori 
tribes through European settlement, trade, and religious education under his auspices into an 
"Independent Sovereignty" (as opposed to a colony of Great Britain).s2 Busby took 
immediate fright at de Thierry's designs. He circulated an address to British subjects in the 
New Zealand islands noting that "His Majesty, after having acknowledged the Sovereignty 
of the Chiefs of New Zealand in their collective capacity, by the Recognition of their Flag" 
would not "pelmit his Humble and Confiding Allies to be Deprived of their Independence 
upon such Pretensions". Busby announced his intention to convene the Chiefs of the region 
to tell them of "this proposed Attempt on their Independence, and to advise them of what is 
Due to Themselves and to their Country".53 The northern chiefs assembled and on 28 
October 1835 issued a 'Declaration of Independence'. The first three articles of this 
46 Busby to Hay 3 April 1834 CO 209/1:121-4,213-36 (enclosures). 
47 Aberdeen to Bourke, 21 December 1834 CO 209/1:129. 
48 Barrow (Admiralty) to Hay (Colonial Office 24 November 1834, enclosure 2 in Bourke to Stanley, 29 April 
1834, supra. 
49 Bourke to Rice, 6 December 1834 CO 209/1 :135-137. 
so Bourke to Stanley, 23 September 1834 CO 209/1: 132; Bourke to Rice 1 February 1835 CO 209/1: 139. 
51 De Thierry to Busby, 14 September 1835 CO 209/2:85 (copy). 
52 De Thierry "Address to the New Zealand Settlers" CO 209/2:87. 
53 Busby The British ResidenJ at New Zea/and to His Britannic Majesty's Subjects who are residing or trading in 
New Ze/and (10 October 1835), copy in CO 209/2:94. 
72 
Country in their Collective Capacity".46 This measure was approved by the Colonial Office47 
and Lords of the Admiralty who instructed the Commander-in-Chief on the East India 
station to recognise the register of vessels flying under the flag as "valid instruments [to 
be] ... respected as such in the intercourse such vessels hold with the British Possessions".48 
Soon after, however, the weakness of the Resident's position was revealed in the debacle 
sUITounding . the whaling barque Harrier (1834). This ship was wrecked off the Taranaki 
coast on 29 April 1834, the ship's complement reaching the shore where they were attacked 
by Maoris. The survivors were taken prisoner. Eventually, amidst great slaughter, the 
prisoners were rescued at Bourke's orders by HMS Alligator. No effort had been made to 
consult Busby or the missionaries or even to consider the Maori side of the matter. In 
reporting the rescue to the Colonial Office Governor Bourke stressed the weakness of the 
Resident's position and the need either for a ship of war to be stationed pelmanently in 
New Zealand waters or for Busby to equipped with some real authOIity.49 Moral suasion 
alone was insufficient. Bourke had stressed this point constantly in his dispatches to London 
during tl1e mid-1830s50 although the long-awaited legislation establishing a constituent power 
over British subjects in New Zealand was never to eventuate. 
During October 1835 Busby received a letter from a person styling himself the Baron de 
ThieITY. This letter inforn1ed "His Britannic Majesty's Consular Agent at the Bay of Islands" 
that he was about to establish a "Sovereign Government" upon his anival in New Zealand.51 
De Thieny's 'Address to the New Zealand settlers' described his plan to lift the Maori 
tribes through European settlement, trade, and religious education under his auspices into an 
"Independent Sovereignty" (as opposed to a colony of Great Britain).52 Busby took 
immediate fright at de Thieny's designs. He circulated an address to British subjects in the 
New Zealand islands noting that "His Majesty, after having acknowledged the Sovereignty 
of the Chiefs of New Zealand in their collective capacity, by the Recognition of their Flag" 
would not "pelmit his Humble and Confiding Allies to be Deprived of their Independence 
upon such Pretensions". Busby announced his intention to convene the Chiefs of the region 
to tell them of "this proposed Attempt on their Independence, and to advise them of what is 
Due to Themselves and to their Country".53 The northern chiefs assembled and on 28 
October 1835 issued a 'Declaration of Independence'. The first three articles of this 
46 Busby to Hay 3 April 1834 CO 209/1 :121 -4,213-36 (enclosures). 
47 Aberdeen to Bourke, 21 December 1834 CO 209/1: 129. 
48 Barrow (Admiralty) to Hay (Colonial Office 24 November 1834. enclosure 2 in Bourke to Stanley. 29 April 
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important Declaration stated:54 
"1. We the hereditary Chiefs and Heads of the Tribes of the Northern Parts of New 
Zealand, being assembled at Waitangi in the Bay of Islands on the 28th day of 
October 1835, declare the Independence of our Country, which is hereby constituted 
and declared to be an Independent State, under the designation of The United Tribes 
of New Zealand. . 
\ 
2. All Sovereign power and authority within the Territories of the United Tribes of 
New Zealand is hereby declared to reside, entirely and exclusively in the Hereditary 
Chiefs and Heads of Tribes in their Collective Capacity: Who also declare that they 
will not permit any legislative Authority separate from themselves in their Collective 
Capacity to exist, nor any functions of Government to be exercised within the Said 
Tenitories unless by persons appointed by them and acting under the Authority of 
Laws regularly enacted by them in Congress Assembled. 
3. The Hereditary Chiefs and Heads of Tribes agree to meet in Congress at 
Waitangi in the Autumn of each year, for the purpose of passing laws for the 
disposition of Justice, the preservation of peace and good order and the regulation of 
Trade; And they candidly invite the Southern Tribes to lay aside their private 
animosities, and to consult the Safety and Welfare of our Common Country by 
joining the Confederation of the United Tribes. 
This Declaration, to which Busby promised to secure the adhesion of southern tribes,55 
received wholehearted approval from the Governor of New South WalesS6 and the Colonial 
Office save in one respect to which we are about to come. Significantly, the assertion of 
Maori sovereignty over New Zealand embodied in the Declaration was accepted without 
qualification or equivocation: It was simply a logical, if somewhat dramatic, corollary of all 
that had gone before. The second article, however, was criticised as an attempt by Busby to 
manipulate the recognition of the authority of the chiefs in their collective capacity to his 
own ends. In July 1834 one McDonnell had secured his own appointment as additional 
British Resident at Hokianga, not far from Busby's seat in the Bay of Islands.57 This 
appointment had rankled Busby. Late in September 1835 McDonnell had persuaded the 
chiefs of the Hokianga neighbourhood to pass a law against the importation of ardent spirits 
into their district. Bourke approved this measure and notified the law in the colonial 
Gazette. 58 Busby, jealous of his own position and obsessed with the collective rather than 
tribal character of Maori sovereignty, took exception to the law on the grounds that the sole 
legislative authOlity in the northern region was the United Tribes. This view he justified as 
an attempt to use Maori sovereignty to establish some lawful authority in the islands capable 
of enacting laws for all inhabitants. Busby insisted that to concede the chiefs had legislative 
authority in their tribal (as opposed, always, to collective) capacity over British subjects 
54 Declaration of the United Tribes CO 209(2: 102-3 (duplicate copy). 
55 Busby to Bourke, 12 March 1836 CO 209(2:178-180; Busby to Bourke, 16 March 1836 CO 209(2:210; Busby to 
Bourke, 15 June 1836 CO 209(2:248. 
56 Colonial Secretary (NSW) to Busby, 12 February 1836 CO 209/2: 16. 
57 Rice to Bourke, 8 July 1834 CO 209/1:119. 
58 Bourke to Glenelg, 10 March 1836 CO 209(2:10. 
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would "be little better than authorised outrage, in which ... it would be derogatory to a 
civilised nation to participate". The only sound native legislative authority Busby argued, 
was one which was collective and over which the Resident exerted a strong guiding 
influence.~9 Although the authorities in New South Wales and Britain were not persuaded by 
this argument the recognition of the sovereignty of the Maori chiefs contained in the 
Declaration was thoroughly endorsed. 
Within a short while, events revealed the impossibility of an early convening of the 
Congress of the United Tribes. By early 1836 it was conceded that for the time being the 
use of the Confederation to establish more European-like authority over the islands was 
unlikely to succeed.60 On 18 January Busby wrote to Bourke advising him that the question 
of formal British interference could "no longer be deferred... that interference should be 
prompt, decided and effectual". 61 Nonetheless Busby still clung to the idea of the Congress 
of Chiefs despite its clear impracticability and at various subsequent moments used the 
Congress for suggestions as to future British policy in New Zealand.62 
The experience with the United Tribes during late 1835 to early 1836 highlighted both 
[; d~effiunql ~alifie~ recognition o~ ~ribal sovereignty ththen made .~y the Crown and the practical 
IICU ties with that recogmtlOn. Nonetheless e recogmtlOn had been made and was 
reaffimled with the Crown's approval of the Declaration of Independence. Events by this 
time, however, were moving to the stage that some formal British presence (that is, some 
autholity enjoying formal constitution from the Crown with, at least, jurisdiction over the 
British subjects) in New Zealand was becoming inevitable. Missionary efforts aside, British 
interests were moving swiftly from itinerant coastal trade to settlement. Land-purchasing 
from the Maori tribes had begun and was on the increase bringing with it disputes between 
and anlongst the settlers and tribes.63 The failure of the United Tribes was, in retrospect the 
last gasp of the attempt to establish order in New Zealand through the exclusive agency of 
Maori sovereignty. By 1836 and 1837, despite the Colonial Office's inaction, it was 
becoming clear that the Crown would have to establish some formal presence in New 
59 Busby to Bourke, 30 November 1835 CO 209/2: 111. Several dispatches were exchanged on the matter of the 
Hokianga laws, the controversy soon degenerating into a personal battle between Busby and McDonnell (sce, 
especially, Busby to Bourke, July 27 1836 CO 209/2:256-278). 
60 Busby to Bourke, 18 January 1836 CO 209/2:140; Busby to Bourke, 26 January 1836 CO 209/2:·152; Church 
Missionary Society clergy to Busby, 13 May 1836 CO 209/2:240; Busby to Bourke, 18 May 1836 CO 
209/2:232; Petition of British Missionaries, 20 April 1837 CO 209/2:321; Hobson, Report to Governor Bourke, 8 
August 1837 CO 209/2:30. 
61 Supra. 
62 Busby to Bouike, 20 February 1836 CO 209/2:160; Busby to Bourke, 12 March 1836 CO 209/2:178; Busby 
"Memorandum for the Missionaries of the Church Missionary Society", 18 May 1836 CO 209/2:238; Busby to 
Bourke, 15 June 1836, CO 209/2:248; Busby to Bourke, 22 March 1837 CO 209/2:311; and, especially, Busby to 
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law incident illustrated) the Colonial Office recognized Maori sovereignty as fundamentally tribal in character. 
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Zealand.64 Inevitably, the way in which this would occur was governed by what had gone 
before. That is to say, the Crown's firm commitment to Maori sovereignty dictated the 
means by which this formal authority would eventually be established. 
D. THE THREE PROPOSALS MADE DURING 1837 
The Colonial Office did not begin to move positively towards the establishment of 
fonnal British authority in New Zealand until 1838. The possibility of strengthening the 
jurisdiction by legislation still obtaining came and went. A draft Punislm1ent Act for New 
Zealand was prepared in August 183665 at the same time as the eventual Cape of Good 
Hope Punishment Act 183666 but was stillbom.67 In addition, legislation claiming and vesting 
a constituent power in the Crown over New Zealand territory (that is, the legislative erection 
of an imperium) unaccompanied by any Maori consent was considered out of the question, a 
position brought home to the Colonial Refoffi1 movement in November 1837. 
In June68 and November of 1837 the New Zealand Association with Edward Gibbon 
Wake field at the helm had submitted for Lord Glenelg's consideration the abstract of an Act 
of Parliament which would confer upon the Crown a constituent power to incorporate by 
charter the "Founders of Settlement" in New Zealand. Clause 5 of the draft Act of 
November presupposed the Crown held sovereignty over the land in New Zealand already 
acquired by purchase from the natives and authorised the Company to obtain further land by 
treaty with the sovereign chiefs:69 
"The Founders and the executive council to be appointed by them, shall enter into 
treaties with the natives, or other competent persons, for the acquisition of all or any 
parts of the Islands of New Zealand, and for the cession to Her Majesty of all 
sovereign rights; and the parts so acquired shall form part of Her Majesty's foreign 
possessions, and the Inhabitants thereof, shall be free, and thenceforth enjoy the same 
rights and privileges, as Her Majesty's free subjects in other foreign possessions; and 
they and all persons residing there, or trading thereto, shall be liable to all laws made 
under authority of this Act, Provided that nothing herein contained, shall prejudice 
the right already competent to the Crown, to the Sovereignty of New Zealand; nor 
affect the right of any aboriginal natives, to any lands at present occupied by them 
excepting in so far as voluntarily ceded". 
Glenelg reacted to this proposal by insisting that the Crown could not exercise a constituent 
power over New Zealand, that is establish an imperium whether territorial or extraterritorial, 
64 Petition by British missionaries, 20 April 1837 CO 209/2:321; Petition by British merchants to Glenelg, 18 
December 1837 CO 209/2:444. 
65 Draft Punishment Act for New Zealand, encl in Glenelg to Bourke, 23 August 1836 CO 201/248 :311, 318-9. 
66 6 & 7 Will 4 c 57. This Act was based upon the recognition of the sovereignty of the 'KaHr Nation' : Merivale, 
Memorandum for Cabinet, April 1851, CO 879/1 :XX. 
67 Glenelg to Bourke, 26 August 1836 CO 209/2:20; Adams Fatal Necessjty, 70. 
68 Outline of a Bill for New Zealand drafted by the New Zealand Association, 14 June 1837 CO 209/2:388. 
69 Abstract of an Act of Parliament for the British Colonization of New Zealand CO 209/2:402. 
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without Maori consent:70 
"1. It is difficult or impossible to find in the History of British Colonization an 
Example of a Colony having ever been founded in derogation of such Rights, 
whether of Sovereignty or of Property, as are those of the Chiefs and People of New 
Zealand. They are not Savages living by the Chase, but Tribes who have apportioned 
the country between them, having fixed Abodes, with an acknowledged Property in 
the Soil, and with some rude approaches to a regular System of internal Government. 
It may therefore be assumed as a basis for all Reasoning and all Conduct on this 
Subject, that Great Britain has no legal or moral right to establish a Colony in New 
Zealand, without the free consent of the Natives, deliberately given, without 
Compulsion, and without Fraud. To impart to any Individuals an Authority to 
establish such a Colony, without first ascertaining the consent of the New Zealanders, 
or without taking the most effectual security that the Contract which is to be made 
with them shall be freely and fairly made, would, as it should seem, be to make an 
unrighteous use of our superior Power". 
The New Zealand Association had used the seventeenth century grants to Penn as a 
precedent for their proposed charter?! but this had not impressed Glenelg, at least on the 
question of Maori rights. The charters for the New World, it may be recalled, whilst being 
issued on the basis that the Crown held some constituent power over North America had 
been justified in relation to the Indian tribes by emphasis upon the Christian duty to convert 
the heathen, a duty not declared in charters for other parts of the non-Christian globe (such 
as Africa and the East Indies), and had carefully delimited the 'sovereignty' therein claimed 
in a personal rather than territorial manner. This, it was seen, left the sovereignty of the 
Indian tribes intact. By the nineteenth century these predicates no longer existed: 
International personality had become secularised over the eighteenth century and the 
tenitorial character of sovereignty was established orthodoxy. In short, the Crown could not 
unilaterally claim a personal soverejgnty over New Zealand as it had done for North 
America during the seventeenth century. On this question at least the New World charters 
were unreliable precedents to lay before the Crown's Minister. A charter of colonisation 
could not be issued without some formal requirement of fOlmal Maori consent. 
Two other important suggestions regarding the establishment of formal British authority 
in New Zealand were made during 1837, altJlough one of these, the report of Captain 
Hobson of HMS Rattlesnake, did not reach London until early 1838. 
The first was 'the outline of a plan of Government' conceived by the British Resident, 
Busby, dated 16 June 1837. Busby's plan amplified and modified slightly his earlier position 
regarding the character of Maori sovereignty. Whereas previously he had tried to argue (and 
this lay at ilie heart of the controversy over McDonnell's laws) iliat Maori sovereignty 
resided only in the chiefs in their collective capacity he now conceded it vested in the chiefs 
in both their tribal and collective capacities. The latter he located, of course, in the United 
70 Memorandum from Glenelg, 15 December 1837 CO 209/2:409. 
7! Outline of a Bill, 14 June 1837 CO 209/2:388. 
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TIibes of the Declaration of Independence. Refening to the Declaration Busby stated:7l 
"The Articles of Confederation having centralised the powers of Sovereignty 
exercised both de jure and de facto by the Several Chiefs; and having established 
and declared the basis of a Constitution of Govenmlent founded upon the Union of 
those powers - I CalIDOt, I think, greatly err in assuming that the Congress of Chiefs, 
the Depositary of the powers of the State, as declared by its constitution, is 
competent to become a party to a treaty with a Foreign Power, and to avail itself of 
Foreign assistance in reducing the Country under its authority to order; and this 
principle being once admitted, all difficulty appears to me to vanish". 
He went on to propose that the Congress of the United Tribes should enact laws for all the 
population observing, contradictolily, that "in truth the present race of Chiefs could not be 
entrusted with ally discretion whatever, in the adoption or rejection of any measure"73 that 
the Resident might submit to them. Nonetheless he proceeded, albeit somewhat diffidently, 
to suggest the Chiefs might enact laws for the white as well as Maori inhabitants of New 
Zealand where the fOlm of the legislation was supervised and controlled by Her Majesty's 
Govenu11ent. Busby then discussed the COUlts of civil and criminal jurisdiction over the 
white population which might be established by legislation of the Congress approved by the 
Crown. This Congress would be protected by the Crown from foreign interference in exactly 
the same way as the Ionian Islands and East Indian plincely states. Should this option prove 
unfeasible Busby suggested the Crown should simply grant a charter to the settlers already 
established in New Zealand. Although not admitted by Busby, this last option presupposed 
the Crown had the sovereignty of the areas then in white settlement. 
The second proposal framed during 1837 was a report written by Captain Hobson of 
HMS Rattlesnake in August after a tour of duty in New Zealand seas. Hobson saw that the 
real problem with the julisdiction by legislation tJ1en obtaining over British subjects in New 
Zealand was the distance from the New South Wales courts. He therefore proposed the 
Crown establish its sovereignty over small pockets of New Zealand which he termed 
'factories'. These factoIies would be established with MaoIi consent. Having the sovereignty 
of these factoIies which would become dependencies of New South Wales, the Crown could 
then use a constituent power to erect local courts. Treaties would be concluded with the 
native chiefs of the regions surrounding the towns giving the factory courts' julisdiction 
over Blitish subjects beyond the confines of the towns. 74 
Busby and Hobson's proposals took as their starting point the Crown's recognition of 
Maoli sovereignty but differed radically in the use to be put to this recognition. Busby's 
proposals did nothing to give the Crown a constituent power over New Zealand territory and 
continuing the theme of the Declaration of Independence would have erected the Maori 
72 Busby to Bourke, 16 June 1837 CO 209/2:333,340. 
73 Id, 76. 
74 Hobson's Report, 8 August 1837. encJ in Bourke to Gieneig. 9 September 1837 CO 209/2:30. 
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chiefs into a European-styled system of federal govemment clearly at odds with the intense 
tribal character of their society. The weakness of the proposal was that it did not confront, 
indeed avoided, tl1e need for some fom1al BIitish authority, that is an imperium, within New 
Zealand. Busby's closing comments in which he suggested tl1e Crown's assumption of 
territoIial sovereignty as an altemative implicity conceded this weakness in his proposal. 
Nonetheless his 'outline' expressly recognised the treaty-making capacity of the United 
Tribes, a point of some significance for it was to form the basis of the Crown's formal 
method of proceeding when annexation was eventually sought. Hobson's proposal, on the 
other hand, was founded upon Blitish practice in the East Indies and used the Maori tribes' 
sovereign status, that is their capacity to enter into treaties with the Crown, as the 
foundation for the exercise by the Crown of a constituent power over limited portions of 
New Zealand tenitory. Glenelg's objections to the New Zealand Association's draft Bill 
very clearly illustrated the Crown's inability to exercise any such constituent power without 
the prior consent of the Maori inhabitants. 
Three important proposals were placed before the Colonial Office during late 1837 to 
early 1838 as to the means by which the Crown might bling order and further British 
interests in New Zealand. These proposals took two separate starting points, one predicated 
upon the recognition of Maori sovereignty, the other its neglect. The Colonial Office, 
considering the Crown bound to acknowledge Maori sovereignty, rejected tl1e latter approach 
altogether. This left the Blitish with adopting a mode of proceeding which respected Maori 
sovereignty; The proposals of Busby and Hobson were the major representative examples of 
the different uses to which tllis recognition could be put. By 1838 the route argued by 
Busby, the erection of a Native Govemment, was clearly too precarious a manner of 
proceeding. A marginal comment beside Busby's proposed tribal legislative assembly had 
commented sarcastically "a Pretty Govemment"75 and certainly Busby's account of the 
(temporary, he bluffed) inability of the Congress of the United Tribes to convene peaceably 
strongly undermined the credibility of his proposal. It was clear to the British authorities, 
therefore, and this they accepted as early as late 1837, some weeks before receipt of 
Hobson's repOlt, that an imperium would have to be obtained in the New Zealand islands. 
In December 1837, several days after a meeting on the question, Glenelg wrote to Durham 
offeJing the New ZeaJand Association a royal charter of incorporation similar to those issued 
in the seventeenth century for North America. Significantly, however, and this indicated 
there had been introduced no new qualification upon the previous recognition of Maori 
sovereignty, Glenelg insisted that any colonisation under the charter would have to be 
"effected, if at all, with the free consent of the existing Inhabitants, or of tl1eir Chiefs"76 and 
75 Busby to Bourke, 16 June 1837 CO 209(2:333,341. The draft instructions to Hnhson, 8 March 1839 CO 
209/4:221,228 termed the erection of a Native Government with legislative powers "" mere fiction at once 100 
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76 Glenelg to Durham, 29 December 1837 CO 209(2:423. 
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limited to a portion of the country. The recommendations of the Select Committee on 
Aborgines77 earlier that year advising against the conclusion of treaties with tribal societies 
were dismissed by Glenelg as "inadequate to meet the existing Evil".78 He further indicated 
that any charter would provide for a Crown-appointed officer to have the power to sanction 
or disallow any contract made by the prospective grantees with the Maori chiefs.79 The New 
Zealand Association did not accept the offer which soon after was withdrawn.8o 
During most of 1838 valious advice continued to flow into the Colonial Office from 
interested sources, mainly missionary and mercantile.81 This advice generally accepted Maori 
sovereignty then took a tack similar to that of Hobson or Busby. That is to say, it usually 
recommended either that the Crown obtain a formal grant of right from the Maori chiefs so 
facilitating the establishment of an imperium (Hobson's approach) or that it assist and 
elevate the Congress of the United Tribes or suchike to something resembling a European 
fOlm of goverm11ent. The Colonial Office inclined toward the former option and had hoped, 
in vain it transpired, for a green light from the Lords Committee's report of mid-1838. By 
the end of the year the Colonial Office, surrounded by pressure from the humanitarian and 
plaJU1ed colonisation movements and faced with increasing colonisation and the attendant 
lawlessness in New Zealand, was in a comer. Offical intervention in New Zealand, 
something more effective than the appointment of an impotent Resident, was unavoidable. 
E. PREPARATION FOR THE ACQUISITION OF AN IMPERIUM 
By the end of 1838 the Colonial Office had seen that it would be necessary to establish 
a British imperium in the New Zealand islands. Busby still clung to the possibility of 
elevating the Maori tribes to an advanced stlUcture of govemment82 and in doing so was at 
least consistent in the pursuit of an end necessitated by his instructions of 1835. Events, 
Busby's inadequacies as well as those of his office, had both superceded and highlighted the 
weakness of this option. By late 1838 it was apparent that some fOlmal British authority 
77 Conunons Committee on Aborigines (British Settlements) BPP (1837), Vrr,#425 . The conunittee had reluctantly 
conceded, however, that treaties obtaining extraterritorial rights from tribes might be condoned (at p 80). 
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would need to be established in the New Zealand islands. 
In December 1838 the Colonial Office sought the appointment of a Consul for New 
Zealand83 indicating, at least, an intention to obtain a consular jurisdiction in New Zealand. 
The Foreign Office approved 84 and the Colonial Office, impressed by Hobson's report of 
1837, recommended him for the position of Consu1.8S This recommendation and prospective 
appointment gave Hobson a formal input into the decision-making process at the Colonial 
Office. 
On 21 January Hobson wrote to Glenelg after "a long careful perusal of the documents 
respecting the affairs of New Zealand" .86 This letter was written "premising that Her Majesty 
recognises New Zealand as a free and independent state".87 Hobson repeated his plan for the 
establishment of British factories but recommended they be greater in area, a response to the 
great increase in land purchases from the Maori over the previous eighteen months, with 
greater power being vested in the 'Superintendent' of the factory town(s). He noted, 
however, that the acquisition from the Maori chiefs of the sovereignty of parts of the 
country would leave portions open to the intervention of foreign nations. Also, British 
subjects inevitably would buy land outside the factory limits without recognised title and 
these blocks would be bought and sold without any legal record, "creating confusion and 
strife" .88 In consequence he recommended the Crown "at once resolve to extend to that 
highly gifted Land the benefit of civilisation and liberty, and the protection of English Law, 
by assuming the Sovereignty of the whole Country ... "89 
The Colonial Office was thinking along similar lines.90 In a minute written the same day 
as Hobson's lengthy letter James Stephen noted that colonisation of New Zealand was 
reaching such a pitch that the choice was between "lawless Colonisation, and the 
establishment of a Colony placed under the authority of law" .91 He recommended the 
appointment of an agent "whether called Consul, or however else designated .. . authorised to 
acquire from the Chiefs, a Cession, on fair terms, of the Sovereignty of such palts of New 
Zealand as may be best adapted for the proposed Colony" .92 The Consul would become the 
Governor of New Zealand upon the acquisition by treaty of the sovereignty over portions of 
the country and would be granted a constituent power to erect judicial offices. A charter of 
incorporation would also be granted to the New Zealand Company under whose auspices 
83 Stephen to Backhouse, 12 December 1838 CO 209/3 :111 and CO 209/5:28 (early draft). 
84 Backhouse to Stephen, 31 December 1838 CO 209/3:107. 
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colonization might proceed. 
Soon after Stephen prepared the first draft instructions for Hobson. These were amended 
slightly and approved by Grey. The preamble of this draft refelTed to the problem of 
lawlessness and increasing purchases of New Zealand lands by British subjects and stated 
the basis upon which the Crown's reaction to the problem would rest:93 
"Her Majesty recognises the right of the Native Chiefs in New Zealand to the 
Sovereignty of those Islands. It is true indeed that amongst a people who have made 
. so few advances in the arts of civilised life, there cannot exist a lawful dominion in 
that full and absolute sense in which it is ascribed to the Sovereign and ruling 
Powers in the more civilised Parts of the World. But this is not a distinction on 
which we would justly ground any claim to disregard the rights, imperfect and 
unartificial as they may be, which the common consent of the Inhabitants of New 
Zealand concedes to their chiefs. In order to the exercise of a lawful authOlity in 
those Islands, it is necessary that some parts of them should be brought under the 
Sovereignty of the Queen, and a title to that dominion can be legitimately acquired 
in no other method than that of the voluntary cession of it by the Chiefs in whom it 
is at present vested". 
These words presaged the emergence of a standard of civilisation in international law but, 
significantly, rejected any such distinction as affecting the capacity of the Maori chiefs. 
Civilised or not, the sovereignty of the Maori chiefs was unqualified. 
A second and different draft of the instructions to Hobson, again by Stephen and Grey, 
was prepared early in March. This draft acknowledged the Crown's recognition of Maori 
sovereignty in tenns even more redolent of the late nineteenth century standard of 
civilisation:94 
Her Majesty's Government acknowledge in the Natives of New Zealand, an 
independent and national character as far as it is possible that such a character should 
be ascribed to a collection of separate Tribes of men occupying so extensive a 
Territory, without any definite union between the different Tribes or the possession 
by any of them of the Civil polity, or social Institutions of civilised Communities. 
With men in such a state of Society no international treaties can be fornled which 
will not differ very widely from those which subsist between Nations properly so 
called. Yet as far as it is possible to establish such connexion with them, it is right 
that their title to be regarded as one independent Community should be observed in 
fact as well as acknowledged in theory. The Queen disclaims any pretension to 
regard their lands as a vacant Territory open to the first future occupant, or to 
establish within any part of New Zealand a sovereignty to the erection of which the 
free consent of the Natives shall not have been previously given". 
This draft shows a movement towards the position taken more explicitly during the second 
half of the nineteenth century, namely the recognition of the inability of 'uncivilised' 
societies to enter into the sophisticated international relations of the European powers but 
93 Consular instructions, first draft, 24 January 1839 CO 209/4:203, 205-6. 
94 Consular instructions, second draft, 8 March 1839 CO 209/4:221, 226-7. 
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their capacity, nonetheless, to cede rights of sovereignty and/or jurisdiction to the Crown. 
These draft instlUctions proceeded to reject the line of formal policy advocated by Busby, 
the engagement of "the various Chiefs in a Confederation under Her Majesty's protection", 
as "impracticable or if practicable ... inadequate to the Occasion".95 The need was constantly 
stressed to obtain a cession "from the Chiefs in full to the Queen of some part of the 
Tenitory of New Zealand, in order that within that Territory there may be established a 
Government derived from Her Majesty's prerogative, and administered according to the 
Laws of England in the same manner as in other British Colonies" .96 The draft further 
noted: 97 
"In some views the most simple and effectual measure would be to obtain from the 
Chiefs the Cession to the Queen of the Sovereignty of the Whole Country. But for 
the present at least such a measure would be a needless encroaclunent on the rights 
of the Aborigines". 
By this time the New Zealand Association, Wake field and Durham's reorganised enterprise 
soon to become known as the New Zealand Company,98 was forcing the Crown's hand. A 
draft Bill prepared by the Association's secretary, William Hutt, declared that the 
sovereignty of New Zealand was already held by the Crown through the land purchases of 
its subjects99 but tl1is was diametrically opposed to the position of the Crown. 100 Nonetheless 
the Association was determined to press ahead with the organised colonisation of the 
country irrespective of the status of formal British right in the islands. By May 1839 it 
! became apparent to the Colonial Office that the ' iSIDatch of Hobson could be delayed no 
longer. 
As the Commission and instructions to Hobson were drawn up during late May to 
August "two Cardinal points"IOI were to guide the Crown. These were, first, the protection of 
the Maori and, secondly, provision of self-govenunent for the colonists. Since the Crown 
could only exercise a prerogative constituent power to erect representative legislative bodies 
once the sovereignty of parts of New Zeland had been acquired,Io2 Parliamentary legislation 
allowing the establishment of a non-representative legislative body was necessary. The 
remedy to this problem was sought in the temporary annexation to New South Wales of the 
95 Id. 
96 Id, 230. 
97 Id, 230-1. 
98 The New Zealand Colonization Association had started styling itself the New Zealand Company early in 1839 
before the issue of lhe prospectus of 2 May 1839: Adams Fatal Necessity, 279. 
99 Draft Bill for the Government of British Settlements in the Islands of New Zealand 12 March 1839 CO 
209/4:345. Similar position in Thompson to Russell, 11 March 1840 CO 209/8 :365. 
100 Stephen to Labouchere, 15 March 1839 CO 209/4:326; Labouchere to HUll, 1 May 1839 CO 209/4:546 (denying 
any sovereignty over the New Zealand islands); Stephen to Russell, 16 November 1839 CO 209/5:51; Stephen to 
Backhouse, Memorandum, 18 March 1840 CO 209/8:69 (end). 
101 Stephen to Labouchere, 15 March 1839 CO 209/4:326,327. 
102 Camp bell v Hall (1774) 1 Cowp 204; Stephen to Yemon Smith, 21 July 1840 CO 209/7:40. 
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ten-itory to be acquired in sovereignty in New Zealand. IO) Throughout the Colonial Office 
continued to stress that this sovereignty could only be acquired by fonnal cession from the 
Maori chiefs. 
At this stage the Colonial Office was still speaking of the acquisition of palts of New 
Zealand notwithstanding Hobson's opinion that the sovereignty of the whole country should 
be obtained, a view with which Stephen and Grey at least had some sympathy.l04 This 
indicates that the Crown was not only thinking in temlS of the acquisition of pockets of the 
country but also that it recognised the essentially tribal character of Maori sovereignty. This 
recognition was long-standing: Despite Busby's insistence that the sole legislative capacity 
resided in the chiefs in their collective capacity only, the British authorities had been 
prepared, for instance, to accept the legislative authority of the Hokianga chiefs within their 
locality and hence uphold the ardent spirits law enacted at McDonnell's importunity. 
The final instructions from Nonnanby to Hobson were dated 14 August 1839 having 
been drafted by Stephen and amended by Labouchere some weeks earlier. lo5 Hobson had 
perused the draft and recommended some distinction between the tribes of the North and 
South Island, the latter being "wild savages" with whom "it appears hardly possible to 
observe even the fonn of a Treaty".I06 This advice was not incorporated into the fomlal 
instruments although Nonnanby advised Hobson that whilst a formal cession from the 
southern chiefs was preferable, he was to use his own discretion as to the appropriate means 
by which sovereignty over the South Island was to be declared.un 
The instructions to Hobson stated: laI 
" ... we acknowledge New Zealand as a sovereign and independent state, so far at least 
as it is possible to make that acknowledgement in favour of a people composed of 
I numerous, dispersed and petty tribes, who possess few political relations to each 
other, and are incompetent to act, or even to deliberate, in concert. But the admission 
of their rights though inevitably qualified by this consideration, is binding on the 
faith of the British Crown. The Queen, in common with Her Majesty's immediate 
predecessor, disclaims, for herself and for Her subjects, every pretension to seize on 
the islands of New Zealand, or to govern them as a part of the dominion of Great 
Britain, unless the free and intelligent consent of the natives, expressed according to 
their established us~s, shall be first obtained. Believing, however, that their own 
welfare would, under the circwnstances I have mentioned, be best promoted by the 
surrender to Her Majesty of a right now so precarious and little more than nominal, 
and persuaded that the benefits of British protection, and of laws administered by 
British judges, would far more compensate for me sacrifice by the natives, of a . 
103 Stephen to Labouchere, 18 May 1839 CO 209/4:243; Normanby to the Attorney-General, 30 May 1839 CO 
209/5:76; Opinion of the Attorney- and Solicitor-General on the annexation of New Zealand as a dependency of 
New South Wales, CO 881/1:#25,7-8; Stephen to Normanby, 7 June 1839 CO 209/5:78; Stephen to Gairdner, 
Memorandum, 8 June 1839 CO 209/4:113. 
104 Stephen to Labouchere, 15 March 1839 CO 209/4:326,329-30. As did Hobson's eventual successor Fitzroy, 
evidence Lords Commillee (1838), 11 May 1838, 166. 
105 Handwritten draft instructions, 9 July 1839 CO 209/4:251. 
106 Hobson to Nonnanby, 1-2 August 1839 (circa) CO 209/4:151. 
107 Normanby to Hobson, 15 August 1839 CO 209/4:157. 
108 Normanby to Hobson, instructions, 14 August 1839 CO 881/1:#25,1-2; also in HRNZ,I,729. 
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national independence, which they are no longer able to maintain, Her Majesty's 
Government have resolved to authorize you to treat with the Aborigines of New 
Zealand for the recognition of Her Majesty's sovereign authority over the whole or 
any parts of those islands which they may be willing to place under Her Majesty's 
dominion ... Especially you will point out to them the dangers to which they may be 
exposed by the residence anlongst them of settlers anlenable to no law or tlibunals of 
their own; and ilie impossibility of Her Majesty's extending to them any effectual 
protection unless the Queen be acknowledged as the sovereign of their country, or at 
least of those districts within, or adjacent to which, Her Majesty's subjects may 
acquire lands or habitations". 
These instructions were embodied in the formal royal instruments accompanying Hobson. 
Some weeks earlier, almost as soon as the law officers had approved the scheme, letters 
patent (15 June 1839) had passed the Great Seal altering in futuro the boundaries of New 
South Wales as to include "any territory which is or may be acquired in sovereignty by Her 
Majesty" in New Zealand.109 Two commissions were issued fornlally appointing Hobson 
with the authority to obtain this sovereignty by the means (treaty with the Maori chiefs) 
described in Normanby's infonnal instructions. A Commission under the Great Seal (13 
August 1839) appointed Hobson Consul for the purpose of negotiating for the recognition of 
the Crown's sovereignty by the chiefs of New Zealand. 110 Anotller Commission (30 July 
1839), under the Royal Signet and Sign Manual appointed Hobson Lieutenant-Governor "in 
and over that part of Our Territory ... which is or may be acquired in Sovereignty in New 
Zealand".111 
The meaning of the phrase "is or may be acquired" has been the source of some 
curiousity.ll2 The interpretation of "is" as meaning 'has been' is clearly contradicted by the 
Crown's tllorough disavowal of any sovereignty over the New Zealand islands prior to 1840 
notwithstanding argument of the New Zealand Company otherwise. If the word is read in 
the future tense it becomes mere surplusage. Rutherford suggests the use of the present tense 
was chosen deliberately to pemlit a line of policy along either route; that is, to treat 
previous sales of land by the Maoris as cessions of sovereignty as well as property should 
difficulty arise with the conclusion of any treaty of cession with the chiefs.l13 The difficulty 
with this speculative explanation is that it challenges the strong distinction stressed by the 
Colonial Office throughout the late 1830s between sovereignty and property. 
By August 1839 the formal and informal documentation appointing and instructing 
Hobson had been completed. The machinery was now in train for the Crown's acquisitioJ1' of 
the sovereignty of parts or the whole of New Zealand. The royal instrumentation's use of 
109 CO 881/1:#25,8. 
110 Id. Also consular instructions from the Foreign Office accompanying Commission, 13 August 1839 CO 209/5 :44-
5. 
III Id, 9-10. 
112 Discussed by Rutherford The Treaty of Waitangi and the Acquisition of British Sovereignty on New Zealand 1840 
(1949), 14-15. 
113 Id. 
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the tenn "acquired" and the appointment of Hobson as Consul clearly indicated some 
positive act of acquisition other than the mere issue of the royal instruments was essential to 
the Crown's sovereignty over New Zealand. This prerequisite was the fonnal cession from 
the Maori chiefs of the sovereignty of such parts of their territory as they were willing to 
grant to the Crown. Although the consistent acknowledgment of Maori sovereignty by the 
Crown from at least the early 1830s spelt it out, the requirement of Maori consent embodied 
in these royal instruments clearly was considered more than some moral imperative. 
Throughout the 1830s the Crown treated fonnal Maori consent as a legal prerequisite to its 
erection of an imperium (be it territorial sovereignty, extraterritorial jurisdiction or both) 
within New Zealand. The royal documents of mid-1839 reflected this position. Although the 
draft and final instructions to Hobson intimated that Maori sovereignty might not enable the 
tribes' enjoyment of full international relations it was undoubtedly considered sufficient 
basis for a cession of territorial sovereignty and/or jurisdiction. 
II THE CROWN ACQUIRES THE TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY OF NEW 
ZEALAND 
A. INTRODUCTION 
It can be seen that prior to 1840 the British Crown unequivocally disavowed any 
imperium in New Zealand be it an extra-territorial jurisdiction or territorial sovereignty. In 
1839 Hobson was dispatched with the express purpose of obtaining the territorial 
sovereignty of such parts of the islands as the Chiefs might cede to the Crown. Attention is 
now turned to the events of 1840, the year in which the Crown obtained the sovereignty of 
New Zealand. Before this inquiry is made it is necessary to clarify the principles by which 
the Crown's courts detennine whether sovereignty has been acquired over territory. 
B. DETERMINING WHETHER TERRITORY HAS BEEN ACQUIRED BY THE 
CROWN 
According to English law the 'dominions '114 of the Crown comprehend all those 
territories which are authoritatively claimed by the Crown at a given time. Once the Crown 
has asserted its sovereignty over an area, or engaged in activity tantamount to its assertion, 
that territory will be treated as British for municipal purposes. The non-compliance by the 
Crown with international criteria for the acquisition of territory cannot restrain a municipal 
114 The tenn is not to be confused with the obsolete tenn "Dominion" once used to denote self-governing members 
of the Commonwealth: Halsbury's Laws of England (4th ed).VI.para 803.p 322. 
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court from giving effect to an authoritative Crown claim.m 
Most usually, the Crown will provide a definitive statement of its territorial sovereignty 
through the formal annexation of the region. 1l6 Formal annexation, however, is no more than 
evidence of the Crown's sovereigntyll7 and will net necessarily be the source of the Crown's 
title. It may be that the Crown has performed acts prior to the formal annexation from 
which the courts will 'find the territorial sovereignty to have been vested in the Crown. Thus 
in Attorney-General (British Honduras) v Bristowe (1881)118 the Privy Council found British 
sovereignty over the Honduras dated at least from 1817 when grants of land had been made 
by the Crown. The Honduras were not formally annexed until a royal proclamation of 12 
May 1862. This case illustrates the proposition, and it is one which has already been 
instanced by British practice in North America and the East Indies,119 that the acquisition of 
the territorial sovereignty of a region by the Crown might not be attributed to a single event. 
The question for British courts is not the moment of British sovereignty so much as the first 
authoritative claim by the Crown thereto. 
It has been seen that the Crown made no authoritative claim but expressly disavowed 
any sovereignty over New Zealand prior to 1840. Given this, two questions arise: At what 
stage during 1840 (for it was undoubtedly during this year that New Zealand became 
British) was the earliest authoritative claim by the Crown made to the sovereignty of the 
New Zealand islands? What does this claim say of the status of the Maori tribes? 
C. GIPPS' AND HOBSON'S PROCLAMATIONS (January 1840) 
Hobson arrived in Sydney in the New Year of 1840. Soon after, Governor Gipps issued 
three Proclan1ations (dated 14 January 1840r20 based upon the fonnal instrumentation which 
had accompanied Hobson from England. The first of these declared the boundaries of New 
South Wales to have been altered to include the islands of New Zealand. The second 
proclaimed Hobson to have entered into the office of Lieutenant-Governor "of such parts of 
liS Post Office v Estuary Radio Lld (1967) 3 All ER 663,680,682,(CA), The Fagernes (1927) P 311 (CA); Sayee v 
Ameer Ruler Sadig Mohammad Abbasi Bahawalpur State (1952) 2 QB 390 (CA); Ex parte Mwenya (1960) 1 QB 
241,289,303-4 (CA); Duff Development Co v Kelantan Government (1924) AC 797,808,816 (HL). 
116 The procedure of fonnally annexing territory acquired by settlement, conquest or cession dates from the late 
eighteenth century (above, chapter two) although this practice was frequent it was not invariable ' (Hertslct, 
"Memorandum on fonnalities necessary for effective annexation", 18 October 1884 FO 84/1813:246). Territory 
ceded by treaty or fonnal agreement requires no fonnal annexation (Roberts-Wray COIrunonwealth and Colonial 
Law, 104) although this frequently eventuated. cf Twiss The Oregon Question (1846), 288. 
117 Roberts-Wray Commonwealth and Colonial Law, 107-8 lists annexation as a distinct fonn of territorial 
acquisition in English law but limits it to that territory, such as Antartica, incapable of acquisition by conquest, 
cession or settlement. 
118 (1880) 6 App Cas 143 (PC). 
119 Above, chapter two. Also see Hemchand Devchand v Azam Sakar/al Chhotamlal [1906] AC 212 (PC) (territorial 
sovereignty of the Crown not proven) and Williams v Attorney-General for New South Wales (1913) 16 CLR 404 
(HCA) at 439 (British sovereignty proven by but pre-dated constituent instruments for New South Wales). 
120 Texts in CO 209/6:10-11. These proclamations were not published until 19 January 1840. Publication is a formal 
requirement for a valid proclamation although it need not be effected in any special manner or place: Chitty 
Prerogatives of the Crown, 106-7. 
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the said territory as is or may be acquired in sovereignty". The third Proclamation advised 
British subjects that the Crown would not thereafter recognise the title of any British subject 
to land purchased from the Maori chiefs. 
Williams suggests Gipps issued these Proclamations on the supposition of British 
sovereignty over New Zealand.12l This conclusion, reached largely by reliance on secondary 
sources, is extremely doubtful. Since a royal proclamation affecting territory beyond the 
realm can be as much a statement of royal intention as a substantive enactmentl22 it does not 
follow at all that Gipps' Proclamations were either the source or evidence of a sovereignty 
over New Zealand. It is equally consistent with the function of a royal proclamation that 
Gipps was doing no more than declaring the position to be taken by the Crown subsequent 
to the performance of certain conditions set as prerequisite to the annexation of the country. 
This prerequisite has been seen as formal Maori consent. Gipps' Proclamations were 
received in London without contrary remarkl23 and never became treated as the formal basis 
of British sovereignty over New Zealand. Shortly after the Proclamations, Gipps advised 
Hobson upon the appropriate treatment of foreignors (mostly the American and French 
traders) "until some portion of territory shall be acquired in sovereignty".I24 In short, Gipps' 
Proclamations were a public iteration to British subjects of the consequences which would 
result from the expected acquisition of sovereignty over (parts of) New Zealand: the 
boundaries of New South Wales would thereupon be extended, Hobson would become 
Lieutenant-Governor and land purchases from the Maori chiefs post-dating 14 January 1840 
..... 
would not be recognised. This interpretation of Gipps' Proclamations is consistent with the 
terms at least of the second Proclamation wherein the reference to territory which "is or may 
be acquired in soyereignty" appeared, Gipps own advice to Hobson, to Colonial Office non-
reaction and the pressing need to advertise the Crown's position in Sydney.l2$ Any 
characterisation of Gipps' Proclamations as the first authoritative declaration of British 
sovereignty would make them ultra vires instruments, a conclusion neither compelled by the 
instruments themselves nor consistent with the historical record. l211 
The day after his arrival in the Bay of Islands Hobson gathered the local British 
residents, in his own words, "to hear read Her Majesty's commission under the Great Seal, 
121 DV Williams 'The Annexation of New Zealand to New South Wales: Where did the Treaty of Waitangi fit in?" 
(1983).59 . 
122 A Proclamation within the realm can only legislate for matters within the recognised prerogative of the Crown: 
The Case of Proclamations (1611) 12 Co Rep 74. Proclamations affecting territory beyond the realm stand on 
wider ground, however, such proclamations derive their legality (in respect of territory over which the Crown 
claims no sovereignty) from the Crown's prerogative power to conduct its foreign relations or its prerogative 
legislative power in its colonies (according to the rules accredited to Camp bell v Hall (1774) 1 Cowp 204). 
123 Gipps to Russell, 9 February 1840 CO 209/6:5-6; Russell to Gipps, 17 July 1840 CO 209/8:335: "Her Majesty's 
Government entirely approve of the measures which you adopted". 
124 Gipps to Hobson, 25 January 1840 CO 209/6:30 (emphasis added). 
)2$ Gipps to Russell, 9 February 1840 CO 209/6:5 reported public auctions of New Zealand land in Sydney. 
1211 Underlining this interpretation of Gipp's Proclamations was his attempt some weeks later on 14 February 1840 to 
induce a number of South Island chiefs then in Sydney by arrangement of several speculators to enter into a 
treaty of cession. The attempt was abortive: McClintock Crown Colony Government, 55-6. 
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" 
extending the limits of the colony of New South Wales, and Her Majesty's commission 
under the Royal signet and sign manual, appointing me Lieutenant-Governor of such parts 
of the colony as may be acquired in sovereignty in New Zealand".I77 Hobson then read and 
published two Proclamations. l28 The first declared the boundaries of New South Wales to 
comprehend the islands of New Zealand and his assumption of the office of Lieutenant-
Governor. The second stated the Crown's intention not to recognise any titles in Her 
Majesty's subjects (that is, British settlers) not derived from the Crown itself. 
Doubt has been cast upon the legality of the first Proclamation in that it had not been 
preceded by the acquisition of formal Maori consent required by Hobson's Commissions and 
Instructions. 129 The general principle is that a Governor or royal functionary (other than a 
Viceroy) is a creature of the Crown whose actions derive their validity from the terms of 
the royal instrumentation. Acts in excess of any such authority or in violation of the 
Crown's express stipulation are void.\3O Hobson apparently considered himself Lieutenant-
Governor of a small portion of territory in the Bay of Islands "conveyed by parchment 
deed" by the local chiefs to William IV as compensation for an attack upon Busby's house 
in 1834.\31 Busby disagreed with the interpretation Hobson put upon this conveyance, 
stressing that it had been one of the property and not the sovereignty. This interpretation 
was underlined by Normanby's instructions to Hobson which had strongly distinguished the 
sovereignty of the islands from the title to land. This distinction was fundamental to the 
course of proceeding Hobson was about to adopt yet his first formal measure on New 
Zealand shores was one which fudged the question. Indeed, an early draft of his instructions 
had addressed this problem directly, noting that "it may be doubted whether the Aborigines 
are at all aware of the distinction so familiar amongst all Civilized Nations between 
proprietary and Sovereign Rights".\32 The draft noted133 that in the chiefs' estimate "the 
Lands which they have given up have probably ceased to be theirs for every purpose 
whether of Dominion or of ownership".I34 However, the draft instructions insisted against 
treating the chiefs' sale of land to Europeans as a concomitant cession of the sovereignty for 
177 Hobson to Gipps, 4 February 1840 CO 209/6:13. 
128 Texts enclosed id, 39-45; and CO 209f7:23-4. 
129 Rutherford Acquisition of British Sovereignty, 19; McClintock Crown Colony GovernmenJ, 57; Adams Fatal 
Necessity, 281 n 92; Buick The Treaty of Waitangi, 107. 
130 Acts exceeding prescription in a Governor's Commission see Cameron v Kyte (1835) 3 Knapp 332, 12 ER 678 
(PC); Hill v Bigge (1841) 3 Moo PC 465 (PC); Musgrave v Pulido (1879) 5 App Cas 102 (PC). It is less clear 
whether restrictions given in Instructions, considered alone, will nullify acts of a Governor falling within the 
general terms of his Commission: Smith Appeals to the Privy Council, 597ff; Swinfen 'The Legal Status of 
Royal Instructions to Colonial Governors" [1968) Jur Rev 21; Roberts-Wray Commonwealth and Colonial Law, 
149-9. The Imperial Act 3 & 4 Vict c 62, applying to New Zealand rendered the distinction amongst the 
Governor's cOmnUssion, letters patent and instructions unimportant in that all were deemed equally binding upon 
the Governor (section 3). 
\31 Buick The Treaty of Waitangi, 1(>4-5. 
\32 Second draft instructions to Hobson, 8 March 1839 CO 209/4:221,230-1. This advice was omined from the final 
instructions apparently on the grounds of surplus age. 
\33 Inaccurately, it seems. There is evidence to suggest that at least in the 1830s and 1840s the Chiefs considered 
'sale' to involve merely the grant of a licence to occupy tribal lands which could lapse upon failure to take it up. 
134 Supra. 
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"neither in this, nor in any other transaction, will .it be right to take advantage of their 
ignorance".m It may be noted that the other important British persons in New Zealand at the 
time, Captain Nias of HMS Herald and Busby, treated Hobson's declaration of his 
Lieutenant-Governorship as premature and deferred instead to his office as Consul. 136 Indeed, 
this office equipped Hobson with the requisite authority to discharge the condition precedent 
(the Maori cession of ' sovereignty) to his assumption of the Lieutenant-Governorship. 
Hobson, for reasons which remain unclear,137 opted instead and prematurely for the status of 
Lieutenant-Governor although, significantly, he signed the Treaty of Waitangi as Consul and 
Lieutenant-Governor.138 Whatever the basis for Hobson's Proclamation of 30 January 1840 
declaring himself Lieutenant-Governor of territory which according to his terms of office 
had not been then acquired in sovereignty for the Crown, the declaration if not invalid (as 
probably it was) were no more than a declaration of office which came into effect as and 
when the condition precedent to its effect were met. In other words, the extent of territory 
under Hobson's Lieutenant-Governorship grew commensurate with his acquisition of the 
consent of the various tribes to British sovereignty over their regions. 
D. THE TREATY OF WAITANGI 
Besides issuing the two Proclamations on 30 January 1840 Hobson also prevailed that 
day upon William Colenso to use the missionary press to print circular letters addressed to 
the northern chiefs.!39 Busby was still maintaining that the sovereignty of the country vested 
solely in the chiefs in their collective capacity as the Confederation of United Tribes under 
his Declaration of Independence. Hobson, however, as had his superiors, showed impatience 
with this argument and despite Busby's insistence that only those chiefs signatory to the 
Declaration should be invited,140 required the circular be sent to all northern chiefs 
irrespective of membership of the Confederation. 
On 5 February 1840 the chiefs gathered on the large lawn at the British Resident's house 
at Waitangi in the Bay of Islands. In the preceding days Hobson assisted by the 
missionaries, most notably the elder and younger Williams, and Busby,141 had prepared a 
draft of a treaty of cession to be placed before the chiefs. After a day's debate on 5 
135 Id. 
136 Buick The Treaty of Waitangi. 105. 
137 Busby had complained of Hobson's inexperience compared to his own (Busby to Gipps. 30 November 1838 CO 
209/4:43) and Nias had clashed with Hobson over seniority on the Herald's journey from Sydney (Buick Treaty 
of Waitangi, 98-9). Personal dignity may have been involved. 
138 McClintock Crown Colony Government, 56-9 and Buick The Treaty of Waitangi, 105-8 stress Hobson's failure to 
rely on his status as Consul. 
139 Colenso The Signing of the Treaty of Waitangi (1890), 11. Translated version of invitation sent to Tamati Waaka 
Nere in Buick Treaty of Waitangi, 101. 112 plate (photo-fascimile). 
140 Buick Treaty of Waitangi, 19-2. 
141 At least if Busby's account is to be believed, see otherwise Ross "Te Tiriti 0 Waitangi", 132-9. 
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February the chiefs were due to retire for a day to consider the Crown's invitiation to cede 
their sovereignty. However things had reached the stagel42 that early the next day a 
willingness to sign was indicated. Preparations were made forthwith and on 6 February 1840 
45 chiefs, 26 of whom had signed the Declaration of Independence, signed the Treaty of 
Waitangp43 as translated into the native language by the two Williams. The relevant articles 
of the Treaty provided: l44 
Article the First 
The Chiefs of the Confederation of the United Tribes of New Zealand, and the 
separate and independent Chiefs who have not become members of the 
Confederation, cede to Her Majesty the Queen of England, absolutely, and without 
reservation, all the rights and powers of sovereignty which the said Confederation or 
individual Chiefs respectively exercise or possess, or may be supposed to exercise or 
to possess, over their respective territories as the sole Sovereigns thereof... 
Article the Third 
In consideration thereof, Her Majesty the Queen of England extends to the 
Natives of New Zealand Her royal protection, and imparts to them all the rights and 
privileges of British subjects. 
Now, therefore, we, the Chiefs of the Confederation of the United Tribes of New 
Zealand, being assembled in Congress at Victoria, in Waitangi, and we, the separate 
and independent Chiefs of New Zealand, claiming authority over the tribes and 
territories which are specified after our respective names, having been made fully to 
understand the provisions of the foregoing Treaty, accept and enter into the same in 
the full spirit and meaning thereof; in witness of which we have attached our 
signatures or marks at the places and the dates respectively specified. 
Rain prevented commemorative celebration until 8 February when HMS HeraLd fired a 21 
gun salute. 145 
The proceedings at Waitangi complete, Hobson indicated an intention to obtain the 
adherence of the other chiefs of New Zealand to the Treaty.146 He proceeded to Hokianga 
where on 12 February 1840 in front of a large assembly he obtained further signatures from 
the local chiefs who had been unable to attend the Waitangi negotiations.147 Further 
signatures were also obtained at Waimate on 10 and 15 February.148 Hobson reported to 
Gipps on 17 February that he now considered the Crown's sovereignty of the "Northern 
districts" to be "complete". In consequence he proposed issuing a Proclamation (which never 
eventuated) "announcing that Her Majesty's dominion in New Zealand extends from the 
North Cape to the thirty-sixth degree of latitude". He added that he would "proceed 
142 The Maori chiefs' Willingness was assisted by dwindling food stocks: Buick Treaty of Waitangi, 149-50. 
143 Hobson reported . 46 signatures: Hobson to Gipps, 6 February 1840 CO 209/6:46. McClintock Crown Colony 
Government, 58 and Adams Fatal Necessity, 159 give the number as 45. 
144 Text in Hobson to Russell, 15 October 1840, enclosing "a certified copy of the Treaty ooth in English and the 
native Language" CO 209{7:102,114. 
145 Nias to Maitland (Adm), 26 March 1840 CO 209/8:37-39. 
146 Hobson to Gipps, 6 February 1840 CO 209/6:46; Hobson to Normanby, 17 February 1840 CO 209/7:38. 
147 Hobson to Gipps, 17 February 1840 CO 209/6:58. 
148 Buick Treaty of Wailangi, 258-59. 
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Southward, and obtain the consent of the Chiefs" so that he could "extend these limits by 
proclamation, until I can include the whole of the islands" .149 
On 1 March 1840 before he could commence this mission Hobson suffered a stroke and 
partial paralysis. Immediately upon learning this Govemor Gipps dispatched Major Bunbury 
to complete the acquisition of the sovereignty. Gipps considered the task urgent on two 
counts. l50 First, the New Zealand Company had established a settlement at Port Nicholson at 
the bottom of the North Island. Some months earlier the prospect of this settlement had 
raised anxiety in the Colonial Office and expedited Hobson's departure from England. By 
early 1840 the settlement had been established and the officers of the Company were 
purchasing land from the local chiefs and establishing their own forms of government 
beyond the pale of royal authority and English law. Secondly, Gipps also thought the 
acquisition of the sovereignty of the South Island a pressing matter. The reason for this 
concem is unclearlsl although he may have had secret intelligence or even some premonition 
of French designs.m 
By the time of Bunbury's arrival, Hobson had already deputed various officials and 
missionaries to obtain cessions of sovereignty from the various chiefs yet to sign the Treaty. 
These agents had each been given a copy of the Treaty signed at Waitangi on 6 February. 
"This instrument I consider to be de facto the treaty", said Hobson, "and all the signatures 
that are subsequently obtained are merely testimonials of adherence to the terms of that 
original document".1S3 These persons, the Reverends Brown, Maunsell, William and Henry 
Williams, with Shortland (Colonial Secretary) and Captain Symonds were sent throughout 
the North Island. lS4 Bunbury followed soon after, his destination the South Island, although 
Hobson requestedlss he put into Bay of Plenty to obtain the signatures of the local chiefs.ls6 
In early May reports began to reach Hobson of the acquisition of further signatures to 
the Treaty. Shortland had covered the Kaitaia region by late Apri1.1S7 Soon after Bunbury put 
into the Coromandel Harbour where on 4 May 1840 further chiefs signed the Treaty with 
the exception of "an old chief named Piko and another of inferior note", the former seeing 
"no necessity in placing himself under the dominions of any prince or queen, who might 
149 Supra. 
150 Gipps to Hobson, 4 April 1840 CO 209/6:93. 
ISI Adams Fatal Necessity, 159. Perhaps he was piqued by the refusal some months earlier of South Island chiefs to 
sign his treaty of cession. 
IS2 The French frigate L'Aube reached New Zealand on 10 July 1840: Buick Treaty of Waitangi, 200. There were 
scares throughout the 1830s, most especially the 'scare' of 1831, over French designs upon New Zealand: Adams 
Fatal Necessity, 74-81. 
IS) Hobson to Bunbury, 25 April 1840 CO 209/6:126. 
1S4 Captain Nias of HMS Herald and Henry Williams (CMS) had obtained some signatures at Waitemata, 4 March 
1840: Buick Treaty of Waitangi, 259. 
ISS Technically, Hobson was unable to require a military man to perform the service: Gipps to Hobson, 4 April 1840 
CO 209/6:93. 
156 Hobson to Bunbury, 25 April 1840 CO 209/6:126. 
IS) Shortland to Hobson, 6 May 1840 CO 209/6:132; Buick Treaty ofWaitangi, 181-7. 
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govern the white meI:l if she pleased, as he was desirous of continuing to govern his own 
tribe".158 William Williams, meanwhile, was successfully soliciting tribal agreement along the 
East Coast between Wairoa and East Cape. 159 On the other side of the North Island, 
Symonds, assisted by the Reverends Maunsell and Whiteley, sought the addition of the 
Manukau and Waikato tribes to the Treaty.l60 The refusal of the leading Waikato chief Te 
Wherowhero to sign 'the Treaty brought a hiccup to these proceedings but the missionaries' 
efforts continued notwithstanding this important failure. 161 In the Bay of Plenty difficulty 
was also being encountered. Although the Reverend Slack had eased Bunbury's task 
considerably by obtaining some local signatures in advance,t62 the missionaries were still 
unable to persuade the powerful chief Te Heuheu of Taupo. The influence of this chief was 
wide and extended to the Arawa uibe of the Rotorua region. One of Te Heuheu's brothers, 
Iwikau, and another lesser chief Te Korohiko had journeyed to Waitangi and to their 
overlord's rage signed the Treaty. The blankets given them as gifts were subsequently 
returned to the missionaries at Te Heuheu's command so bringing the formal meeting at 
Ohinemutu to an end.163 To the South in the Cook Strait region, Henry Williams l64 
eventually managed to obtain the cession of sovereignty from the local chiefsl65 despite 
Wakefield's obstructive tactics. He was unable to report general coverage of the lower North 
Island, however, until mid-June 1840.166 
Bunbury had proceeded to the South Island anchoring off Banks Peninsula on the 
evening of 24 May. The Ngaitahu population of the region were found in a rundown state, a 
direct legacy of Te Rauparaha's massacre which some years earlier had been assisted by the 
trading vessel Elizabeth. Signatures of two 'chiefs' were obtained. l67 Bunbury sailed on for 
Stewarts Island which he found apparently deserted. In consequence he proclaimed the 
Crown's sovereignty "in the right (by the discovery of the late lan1ented Captain Cook) for 
158 Bunbury to Hobson, 6 May 1840, CO 209/6:118; Buick, supra, 215-7, 
159 William WilIiams to Hobson, 8 May 1840 CO 209/7:122; Buick Treaty ofWaitangi, 207,266-7. 
160 Symonds to Whitely, 8 April 1840 CO 209/7:128; MaunseU to Hobson, 14 April 1840, CO 209/7:114; Symonds 
to Shortland, 12 May 1840 CO 209/7:124; Buick, supra, 187-92. 
161 Signatures added at Kawhia on 28 April, 25 May, 15 June, 27 August and 3 September 1840 under Whiteley's 
encouragement. Buick, supra, 262. 
162 Bunbury to Hobson, 15 May 1840 CO 209/7: 130. The small schooner Ariel had left copies with Slack in late-
March 1840, Buick, supra, 208. MaunseU had done likewise for Symonds: Symonds to Whiteley, 8 April 1840 
CO 209/7:128. 
163 Buick, supra, 222-9. 
164 Hobson to H Will i arns, letter of authorisation, 23 March 1840 CO 209/7:55. 
165 Signatures were obtained on 29 April (Wellington), 4 and 5 May (Queen Charlotte's Sound, South Island), 11 
May (Rangitoto, SI) 14 May (Kapiti, Otaki, Manawatu), 16 May (Waikanae), 23 and 31 May (Wanganui), 4 June 
(Motu Ngarara): Buick, supra, 264-6. 
166 H. Williarns to Hobson, 11 June 1840 CO 209/7: 140. Williams retained the services of the Arie/ to cover the 
whole of the South Island. He referred to Cloudy Bay, Bank's Peninsula and Otako as the localities wherein "the 
signature of the whole of the tribes of the Southern Island would have been obtained". News of HMS Herald's 
voyage with Bunbury aboard meant this mission was unnecessary. 
167 Bunbury to Hobson, 28 June 1840 CO 209/7:144. For the status of those 'chiefs' see Buick, supra, 230. 
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Her most Excellent Majesty" .168 B unbury proceeded northwards about the South Island 
obtaining signatures at Ruapuke and in the Otago. His coverage of the South Island had 
been far from complete when he obtained what were to be the final South Island signatures 
at Goudy Bay on 17 June 1840. 169 Immediately thereafter he consulted with Nias of HMS 
Herald who agreed sufficient signatures had been obtained from the southern tribes. Stating 
their commission "for that purpose", Bunbury and Nias fOlmally declared the Crown's 
sovereignty over "Tarai Poenammoo" (South Island) by right of cession on 17 June 1840.170 
The process of signature-gathering had continued in the North Island beyond May 1840. 
Bunbury continued to wend his way northwards securing re-agreement to the Treaty from 
Te Rauparaha (19 June 1840).171 Along the eastern rim of the Bay of Plenty, Fedarb, trading 
master of the schooner Mercury, working in cooperation with the missionaries obtained the 
agreement of several local chiefs.172 Whiteley's efforts in the Waikato-Manukau continued, 
further signatures being added as late as 27 August and 3 September 1840.173 During July 
and August George Clarke, by then officially appointed Protector of the Aborigines, 
successfully sought agreement from Maori chiefs at Tamaki and Russell.174 
Ross finds that there were up to five English versions of the Treaty forwarded by Hobson 
to Sydney or London.m The most material discrepancy amongst these versions arose in 
relation to the preamble used in two of the English versions. These were duplicates kept for 
local record of despatches sent to London on 17 February and 23 May 1840. This preamble 
was worded: 176 
"Her most Gracious Majesty Victoria Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Ireland regarding with deep solicitude the present State of New Zealand arising 
from the extensive consequences which must result both to the Natives of New 
Zealand and to Her Subjects from the absence of all necessary Laws and Institutions 
has been graciously pleased to empower and authorise me William Hobson a Captain 
in Her Majesty's Royal Navy, Consul and Lieutenant-Governor in New Zealand to 
invite the Confederated Chiefs to concur in the following alticIes and conditions". 
The preamble which has become the official text provided:1n 
168 "Declaration of Sovereignty of The Queen of England over Stewart's Island", 5 June 1840 CO 209(7:173, CO 
209/8:48; Buick, supra, 232. 
169 Buick, supra, 26l. 
170 "Declaration of Sovereignty over Tarai Poenammoo", 17 June 1840 CO 209(7:77, CO 209/8:46. Gipps reported 
this to Russell, 24 July 1840 stating Her Majesty's sovereignty over the South Island was established "either by 
the acknowledgement of the chiefs, or (in the Middle and Southern Islands) by declaration on the right of 
discovery": BPP (1841), #311, 59; Nias to Commander in Chief, July (nd) 1840 CO 209/8:41 reporting the 
declaration as made after "the cession of the Middle lie South] Island to Her Majesty was completed". 
171 Buick, supra, 262. Te Rauparaha had already signed the Treaty before Henry Williams on 14 May 1840, id at 
265. 
172 Stack to Shorlland, 23 May 1840 CO 209/7:137. 
173 Buick, supra, 262. These signatures were sent to London in Hobson to Russell, 26 May 1841 CO 209/9:95. 
174 Id, 260-l. 
175 Ross 'Te Tiriti 0 Waitangi", 134-5. 
176 Id, 134. 
In Text in the 'certified copy' Hobson to Russell, 15 October 1840 CO 209(7:102,114. 
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HER MAJESTY VICTORIA, Queen of the United Kingdon of Great Britain and 
Ireland, regarding with Her royal favour the native Chiefs and Tribes in New 
Zealand, and anxious to protect their just rights and property, and to secure to them 
the enjoyment of peace and good order, has deemed it necessary, in consequence of 
the great nwnber of Her Majesty's subjects who have already settled in New 
Zealand, and the rapid extension of emigration both from Europe and Australia 
which is still in progress, to constitute and appoint a functionary properly authorized 
to treat with the Aborigines of New Zealand for the recognition of Her Majesty's 
sovereign authority over the whole or any part of those Islands. Her Majesty, 
therefore, being desirous to establish a settled form of Civil Government with a view 
to avert the evil consequences which must result from the absence of necessary laws 
. and institutions, alike to the Native population and to Her subjects, has been 
graciously pleased to empower and authorize me, William Hobson, a Captain in Her 
Majesty's Royal Navy, Consul and Lieutenant-Governor of such parts of New 
Zealand as may be or hereafter shall be ceded to Her Majesty, to invite the 
confederate and independent Chiefs of New Zealand to concur in the following 
articles and conditions. 
The difference between the two versions of the preamble, at least for present purposes, 
would appear immaterial since the latter was but a more fulsome version of the fomler save 
that the former was addressed solely to the chiefs of Busby's Confederation. Nonetheless it 
is important also to remember that with the exception of the thirty-nine signatures made at 
the Waikato Heads in March-April 1840, the chiefs all signed the Maori version of the 
Treaty. 
In October 1840 Hobson sent a "certified copy of the Treaty in both English and the 
Native Language" to London, informing Russell that he had "received ample and full reports 
from all the Gentlemen" whom he had commissioned "to treat with the native Chiefs for 
their adherence to the Treaty of Waitangi" .178 The "long roll of parchment",179 listing 512 
signatures,lSO was received with commendation by the Colonial Office.l8l 
This, then, was the process by which Maori agreement to British sovereignty over New 
Zealand was obtained. The procedure could hardly be said to have been organised and 
methodical nor, more importantly, comprehensive in coverage.m Important chiefs of the 
central North Island refused to sign the Treaty and it is probable several chiefs of the 
interior regions of both islands were not reached. But, whatever, the Treaty represented the 
means employed by Hobson to execute formally the requirement that he acquire the 
sovereignty of New Zealand from the Maori chiefs. This requirement, it has been stressed, 
was stipulated in his fonnal instruments of office and, more generally, was the corollary .of 
the Crown's recognition of Maori sovereignty throughout the l820s and '30s. 
178 Id. 
179 So described by Stephen, note to Vemon Smith, 9 March 1841 CO 209{7:103. The appended signatures appear to 
be lost: Ross "Te Tiriti 0 Waitangi", 136. 
ISO Ross, op cif, 136. 
181 Stephen and Yemon Smith, notes, 9 March 1841 CO 209(7:103. 
182 Swainson to Shortland, 27 December 1842 CO 209/16:487. 
The labOlious process of signature-gathering was shortcircuited by formal measures 
adopted by Hobson on 21 May 1840. Hobson had been worried by reports from Port 
Nicholson that the New Zealand Company settlers had adopted their own frame of 
govemment under Articles of Agreement signed in London. British settlers, it has been seen, 
lack a judicial or legislative power over one another not derived from the Crown or, if the 
territory is not British, the local sovereign. Although the Company had gone through the 
farcical procedure of securing the local chiefs' approval of their constitution,183 a typically 
contradictory position taken by a mercantile body which blew hot and cold on the question 
of Maori (tlibal) sovereignty, Hobson considered the settlers' activities at Port Nicholson 
anlOunted "to high treason" .184 Upon receipt of the information regarding their activity, he 
followed Gipps' advicel85 and immediately issued two Proclamations declaring the Crown's 
sovereignty over the country. The prean1ble of the first announced the Crown's sovereignty 
over the North Island by right of cession: 186 
Whereas by a treaty, bearing date the 5th day of February, in the year of Our Lord 
1840, made and executed by me William Hobson, a Captain in the Royal Navy, 
Consul and Lieutenant-govemor in New Zealand, vested for this purpose with full 
powers by Her Britannic Majesty, of the one part, and the Chiefs of the 
Confederation of the United Tribes of New Zealand, and the several and independent 
Chiefs of New Zealand, not members of the Confederation, of the other, and further 
ratified and confirmed by the adherence of the principal Chiefs of this Island of New 
Zealand, commonly called "The Northem Island", all rights and powers of 
sovereignty over the said Northem Island were ceded to Her Majesty the Queen of 
Great Britain and Ireland, absolutely and without reservation". 
The second Proclamation simply declared the Crown's sovereignty over the South and 
Stewart Islands (as well, again and unneccessarily, the North Island "the same having been 
ceded in sovereignty to Her Majesty").187 Two days later he issued a Proclamation 
commanding the Port Nicholson settlers, who in violation of their "allegiance" as the 
Crown's "liege subjects in New Zealand" had "attempted to usurp the powers" vested in him 
by the Crown's formal authority, to withdraw from their "illegal association".188 
Hobson explained these Proclamations of sovereignty in a despatch to Russell: l89 
Availing myself of the universal adherence of the native chiefs to the Treaty of 
183 Adams Fatal Necessity, 160; Foden New Zealand Legal History, 64. 
184 Hobson to RusseIJ, 25 May 1840 CO 209/6:146,150 and CO 209{7:41. 
185 Gipps to Hobson, 4 April 1840 CO 209/6:93 informing him the activity of the settlers at Port Nicholson required 
"prompt measures ... very urgently" and advising him to declare HM sovereignty promptly, by right of discovery 
over the South Island if needs be. 
186 Text in CO 209/6:156 and CO 209{7:61. 
187 Text in CO 209/6:158 and CO 209{7:62. 
188 Proclamation to Port Nicholson settlers, 23 May 1840 CO 209{7:63. 
189 Hobson to RusseIJ, 25 May 1840 CO 209/6:146,150. RusseIJ to Hobson, 10 November 1840 CO 209{7:53. "As 
far as it has been possible to form a judgment, your proceedings appear to have entitled you to the entire 
approbation of Her Majesty's Government". 
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Waitangi, as testified by their signatures to the original document in my presence, or 
to copies signed by me in the hands of those gentlemen who were commissioned and 
authorised by me to treat with them, I yielded to the emergency of the case arising 
out of events at Port Nicholson, and without waiting for Major Bunbury's report 
proclaimed the sovereignty of Her Majesty over the Northern Island. Actuated by 
similar motives, and a perfect knowledge of the uncivilised state of the natives, and 
supported by the advice of Sir George Gipps previously given, I also proclaimed the 
authority of Her Majesty over the Southern Islands, on the grounds of discovery". 
Although Hobson acknowledged that signature-gathering was still in train in the North 
Island (those regions in the Coromandel and Bay of Plenty to which Bunbury had been 
directed) he still informed his superiors that the agreement of the North Island chiefs had 
been "universal". This advice was presumptuous and, it transpired, incorrect. His despatch 
also overlooked certain points in relation to the South Island. First, Bunbury had been sent 
primarily to obtain the cession of the South and Stewart Island not merely the remaining 
pockets of the North Island as hinted by Hobson. Bunbury's labours on this account, 
particularly his Proclamation of 17 June 1840 claiming the South Island for the Crown by 
right of cession, have been noted already. Secondly, although GippS,19O as Normanb/91 and 
Hobson192 himself, had distinguished the "wild savages in the Southern Islands" with whom 
it appeared "scarcely possible to observe even the form of a Treaty"193 from those of the 
north, both Gipps and Hobson made efforts to conclude treaties of cession with southern 
chiefs. In February 1840 Gipps had tried unsuccessfully to convince five South Island chiefs 
then visiting Sydney (courtesy of certain land speculators) to sign a treaty.194 Hobson, of 
course, had sent Bunbury on his southern mission. The real motive for Hobson's 
Proclamations of Sovereignty was his concern over the "assumption of sovereignty" by the 
"demagogues" of Port Nicholson.19$ 
The circumstances of Hobson's Proclamation of 21 May 1840 together with the 
continued acquisition of tribal signatures after this date might suggest the Proclamations 
were intended as no more than a claim of authority over British subjects and those tribes 
which had already ceded their sovereignty. The precedent for this would have been the 
Crown's charters for the New World which, it has been seen, left tribal sovereignty intact 
notwithstanding their claim to large areas of territory. By the nineteenth century, however, 
territorial sovereignty had taken its absolute, indivisible and tenitorial form and such 
qualification for unceded tribal sovereignty was theoretically and actually impossible. As a 
matter of English constitutional law, Hobson's Proclamations, being published within the 
190 Gipps to Hobson, 4 April 1840 CO 209/6:93,95. 
191 Normanby to Hobson, supplementary instructions, 15 August 1839 CO 209/4: 157. 
192 Hobson to Normanby, circa 1-2 August 1839 CO 209/4:151. 
193 The words belong to Hobson, id, 152. 
194 Sweetman The Unsigned New Zealand Treaty, 60-65; Hight and Bamford Constitutional History and Law of New 
Zealand. 208-9. 
19$ Hobson to Russell. 25 May 1840 CO 209/6:146,150-153. 
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Colony,t96 approved by the Crown and notified in the London Gazette (2 October 1840) 
established the sovereignty of the Crown over New Zealand. Although not the source these 
Proclamations were the first authoritative declaration of the Crown's sovereignty. 
III CONCLUSIONS 
A. INTRODUCfION 
In the previous chapter two general conclusions were reached. First it was found that the 
Crown consistently recognised the juridical status of non-Christian and, more specifically, 
tribal societies from the earliest time of contact with these societies. Secondly, it was found 
that the Crown had consistently adhered to the position that the exercise of a constituent 
power for these societies required their consent. These two principles of British practice 
were clearly evident in the procedure by which the Crown acquired the territorial 
sovereignty over New Zealand. Attention is now focussed upon the application of each 
principle to the New Zealand setting and, finally, the legal character of the Crown's 
sovereignty over New Zealand. 
B. THE TREATY OF WAITANGI AS AN INSTRUMENT OF CESSION 
Evidence has amassed throughout this chapter indicating the Crown's consistent 
recognition of the sovereignty of the Maori tribes. This recognition, to repeat notable 
instances, underlied the Acts of Parliament denying any British sovereignty over New 
Zealand, the approval of the national flag and Declaration of Independence as well, of 
course, in the formal procedure represented by the Treaty of Waitangi. This recognition of 
Maori sovereignty was wholly within a long-standing British tradition going back, the 
previous chapter saw, to the earliest moments of British contact with non-Christian societies. 
The influence of the humanitarian movement gave this recognition of Maori sovereignty 
added potency and urgency, to be sure, but in tl1e end it merely spotlighted an old and 
established principle of British practice. 
Any argument that the Treaty of Waitangi was not a valid instrument of cession due to a 
lack of juridical status in the tribal signatories faces two important difficulties. First, it must 
dismiss as mere pretence the Crown's relations with the Maori tribes in the period prior to 
Hobson's Proclamations of sovereignty on 21 May 1840. The historical record cannot 
sustain the cynical view that Maori sovereignty was treated by the Crown as a moral rather 
than legal principle. The Crown clearly felt Maori sovereignty inhibited its exercise of a 
196 The Proclamations were printed as handbills and posted throughout the country. For examples of this poster, see 
CO 209/6:156 and 158 and CO 2CI)(7:61 and 62. 
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constituent power (ie the establishment of an imperium) in New Zealand. 'Moral' 
considerations alone cannot account for this inability: Legal forces actuated by the 
recognition of Maori sovereignty were at play. Secondly, any denial of the Treaty as an 
instrument of cession must also dismiss the Crown's practice in other parts of the globe, 
particularly North America, Africa and the Pacific wherein the recognition of tribal 
sovereignty also occurred. Over four centuries of British relations were regulated on the 
basis that these tribal societies enjoyed some juridical status provided they had reached a 
semblance of apparent political organisation. It is inconceivable that throughout this period 
the Crown was working with a mere fiction, the illusion of tribal sovereignty. This, again, 
would take a cynical view of British relations with tribal societies at odds with the historical 
record. 
It is clear the Crown considered the Treaty of Waitangi to be a valid instrument of 
cession. Hobson had been formally required to treat with the Maori tribes to obtain the 
cession of sovereignty. The Treaty itself was in Stanley's words "officially promulgated and 
laid before Parliament".197 In a minute of 1842 James Stephen noted that it was "in virtue of 
the treaty, and on that basis alone that Her Majesty's title to sovereignty in New Zealand at 
this moment rests".198 In 1848 Louis Chamerovzow, Secretary to the Aborigines Protection 
Society, published his book The New Zealand Question. This book dealt specifically with 
the legal rights of the Maori. In an appendix to this important but stangely neglected work 
Chamerovzow included two lengthy opinions by Joseph Phillimore and Shirley F Woolmer, 
both eminent barristers with a reputation in the field of international and colonial law. Sofar 
as British sovereignty over New Zealand was concerned, all three were of no doubt the 
basis lay in the Treaty of Waitangi. Chamerovzow, who spent considerable effort on this 
question, found the Maori tribes had the capacity to enter into contractual relations with the 
Crown in virtue of both the Crown's recognition of their sovereignty and the tribe's 
compliance with Vattel's requirements for statehood. Quoting Vattel at length he insisted 
"savage tribes are not to be excepted from being considered as constituting part of that 
association of nations, recognized as forming the aggregate political not less than the natural 
world" .199 The Maori tribes enjoyed statehood notwithstanding "certain theorists of over-
diluted political sensibility", a thinly veiled reference to Dr Arnold who argued contrariwise 
in "eagerness to promote the advancement of the interests of the civilized nations" at cost to 
"the natural rights of Aborigines".200 Chamerovzow then cited Vattel's famous recognition201 
197 Stanley to Fitzroy, 13 August 1844 CO 209/32:375. 
198 Stephen to Hope, minute, 28 December 1842 CO 209/18:416; also Stephen to Vemon Smith, note, 9 July 1840 
CO 209/6:33; Hope to Somes, 10 January 1843 CO 209/18:388. 
199 Chamerovzow The New Zealand Question (1848),27. 
200 In fact Arnold had argued (1831) that property rights were a product of law in a civil society (Miscellaneous 
Works (1845), 155-8) but the Colonial Reform took his remarks as applying equally to sovereignty (an early, 
unwitting subscription to a standard of civilization and absolute character of territorial sovereignty). Hence the 
criticism of Arnold. 
201 Le droit de gens (1758), 18. 
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4 
of the dwalf so much as giant state.202 Phillimore also. referred to the same passage, agreeing 
that "[r]elative magnitude (of states) creates no distinction of rights".203 Woolmer took a 
similar position204 although his finding of original tribal sovereignty emphasized the Crown's 
recognition more than the tribes' actual compliance with Vattel's prescription for statehood. 
All three concluded the Maori had the indisputable capacity to enter into a treaty of cession. 
In consequence the Treaty of Waitangi was a valid compact for purposes of international 
and English law and was the substantive basis of British sovereignty over New Zealand. The 
requirement of Maori consent to British sovereignty embodied in the Treaty of Waitangi all 
three acknowledged as a logical and legally-compelled result of Maori statehood. These 
sources indicate that at the time of and immediately after its conclusion the Treaty of 
Waitangi was certainly considered a valid instrument of cession. 
Various commentators have either rejected that conclusion or undermined it with the 
qualification that the Treaty was born of moral rather than legal principle. The basis for this 
argument rests upon the supposition that the Maori tribes lacked any juridical status. Thus 
Adams observes:20S 
Yet the Treaty of Waitangi was a constitutional and legal nullity. The cession by a 
certain number of chiefs did not make New Zealand British; it merely removed the 
chief political obstacle to its becoming so. Rather it was the Proclamations of 21 
May 1840, issued by an authorised agent of the Crown, and the subsequent offical 
gazetting of these Proclamations on 2 October 1840, that made New Zealand British 
in terms of English constitutional procedure and international law. And since the 
Proclamations themselves were based on a legally invalid treaty of cession and a 
non-existent right of 'discovery', it follows that New Zealand became a colony by an 
Act of State of the British Crown and was confirmed so by occupation and 
settlement. 
Similarly McClintock in this ambivalent manner dismisses the Treaty as a valid instrument 
of cession:206 
In the final analysis, therefore, the fabric of British sovereignty over New Zealand 
vested, in the first instance, on the incontestable prerequisite that Hobson had secured 
from the natives a generous measure of support for the treaty. More pertinently, with 
respect to the South Island and Stewart Island, it vested in part upon native consent 
but more specifically upon rights of discovery together with the inescapable fact of 
settlement. As for the North Island, so far as native consent was withheld, it vested 
simply upon rights of settlement or occupation. On these grounds New Zealand 
passed to the Crown by an Act of State, as expressed by the publication of Hobson's 
May Proclamations in the London Gazette of 2 October 1840. New Zealand therefore 
lies within the category of colonies acquired by occupation. 
202 The New Zealand Question (1848), app, 6. 
203 Id, app, 26-8,40. 
204 Id,4O. 
20S Adams Fatal Necessity, 162. 
206 McClintock Crown Colony Government, 62-3. 
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Rutherford accepts the Treaty of Waitangi lacked any status as an instrument of cession 
although he adds that this leaves "its political or moral status unimpaired".207 Foden. having 
shown the Crown recognised the sovereignty of the Maori chiefs prior to annexation in 
1840. then argues that the Treaty of Waitangi was not a valid instrument of cession at 
international law because the Maori lacked international personality:2Q! 
.. .it could not possibly be given a place in this field of law. International law does 
not take cognisance of the dealings which a State belonging to the Family of Nations 
has with uncivilised tribes which are not members of that circle. because the subjects 
of international law are those States and those alone which the existing Family of 
Nations has recognised as such. No one would ever seriously suggest that the Maori 
tribes of New Zealand were qualified for admission to the family. 
He proceeds to justify this position by reference to the group of late nineteenth century 
British publicists such as Hall and Westlake.209 
The classic authority for the proposition that the Maori's lack of juridical status nullified 
- the Treaty of Waitangi as an instrument of cession is the judgment of Prendergast Cl in Wi 
Parata v The Bishop of Wellington (1877). Prendergast placed particular reliance upon 
Normanby's instructions to Hobson of 14 August 1839 which stated:210 
We acknowledge New Zealand as a sovereign and independent State. so far at least 
as it is possible to make such acknowledgment in favour of a people composed of 
numerous. dispersed and petty tribes. who possess few political relations to each 
other. and are incompetent to act. or even to deliberate in concert. 
This qualification. said Prendergast. "nullifies the proposition to which it is annexed".21l Thus 
he concluded that so far as the Treaty "purported to cede the sovereignty it must be 
regarded as a simple nullity".212 "No body politic existed". he added. "capable of making 
cession of sovereignty nor could the thing itself exist". 213 This assessment has become the 
orthodox view of the country's constitutional history214 despite a substantial body of 
207 Rutherford Acquisition of British Sovereignty, 47. 
2Q! Foden Constitutional Development of New Zealand, 170. 
200 Id, 180-1. 
210 HRNZ, I. 729. 
211 (1877) 3 NZ JUT (OS) 72 (SC) at 77. 
212 Id. 
213 Id. 
214 Besides the above writers see Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-General (1912) 32 NZLR per FR Chapman, 1. (this 
judge expressed as similar view extra-judicially "Acquisition of the Sovereignty" (1923),7); In re the Ninety Mile 
Beach [1963] NZLR 461 (CA) per North, J; Robson, ed New Zealand - The Development of its Laws and 
Constitutions (1967) 3; Keith AB The Dominions as Sovereign States, 154-5; Molloy 'The Non-Treaty of 
Waitangi" [1971] NZlJ 194; Haughey 'The Treaty of Waitangi - its legal status" [1984] NZlJ 392; Hooker 
Legal Pluralism, 332-3. 
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authority to the contrary.215 
By way of preliminary comment on the Wi Parata view of the juridical status of the 
Maori tribes, it is interesting to note that this retroactive abnegation of Maori sovereignty 
was made at the very moment when the Australasian colonies were challenging Britain's 
recognition of the sovereignty of the Pacific Island communities. A resolution passed at the 
Inter-Colonial Conference at Sydney, January 1881 expressed unhappiness with the Crown's 
unwillingness to erect unilaterally an imperium in the Pacific Islands.216 This unwillingness, 
it was seen in the previous chapter, emanated from the same principle which had earlier 
restrained the Crown's hand in New Zealand, namely, its lack of a constituent power over 
territory occupied by tribal societies from whom no right to erect an imperium had been 
obtained. 
More crucially, and fatally, the Wi Parata position adopted the late nineteenth century 
standard of civilisation as the exclusive and absolute test of international personality. The 
standard of civilisation, it was seen in the previous chapter, was not incorporated into 
international law and practice until the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The standard 
was certainly not part of the intertemporal law in 1840 when the Crown concluded the 
Treaty. At this time Vattel's secularised doctrine of independent and equal state sovereignty 
held sway. So far as the Maori were concerned the influence of the humanitarian movement 
simply gave the application of the doctrine to the Maori added potency. Throughout the 
1830s Britain's hands-off attitude towards the New Zealand frontier was justified (or, more 
aptly, excused) on the ground of Maori sovereignty unqualified by any 'uncivilised' standard 
of personality. Indeed, James Stephen, not the unquestioning disciple of the humanitarian 
movement as sQmetimes depicted, made explicit reference to this unqualified recognition of 
Maori sovereignty on several occasions. In one telling minute he referred to the judgments 
of the United States Supreme Court under Marshall CJ, decrying the doctrine of 'domestic 
dependent nations'. This notion of a limited tribal sovereignty was seen by Stephen as some 
kind of adjudication against the rights of the Indian tribeS: 217 
Whatever may be the ground occupied by international jurists they never forget the 
policy and interests of their own Country. Their business is to give to rapacity and 
injustice, the most decorous veil which legal ingenuity can weave. Selden, in the 
interest of England maintained the doctrine of what was called mare clausum. Vattel 
in the interest of Holland laid down the principle of open fisheries. Mr Marshall 
great as he was, was still an American, and adjudicated against the rights of the 
Indians. All such law is good, just as long as there is power to enforce it, and no 
215 Nireaha Tamakiv Baker [1901) AC 561 (the Privy Council asswnes the Treaty was a valid treaty of cession); 
Hoani Te Heuheu Tukino v Aotea District Maori Land Board [1941) AC 308 (PC) at 324; McKean ''The Treaty 
of Waitangi Revisited" in Wood and O'Connor, eds W.P. Morrell: A Tribute; Carter ''The Incorporation of the 
Treaty of Waitangi into Municipal Law" (1981) Auck LR 1. 
216 "Minutes of the Proceedings ... with subsequent Memoranda" in AJHR (1881), A 3, 12-3. See rejoinder of Sir AH 
Gordon, Western Pacific High Commissioner, 26 February 1881, id, 36 esp at 38. 
217 Stephen to Vemon Smith note, 28 July 1839, CO 209/4:343. Maine InJernational Law (1894), 74 expressed 
similar unhappiness with Marshall's doctrine of an original but limited tribal sovereignty (notwithstanding his 
belief in the divisibility of sovereignty). 
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longer. 
Besides what is this to the case of the New Zealander? The Dutch, not we, 
discovered it. Nearly a hundred years ago Captain Cook landed there, and claimed 
the Sovereignty for King George the Ill. Nothing has ever been done to maintain and 
keep alive that claim. The most solemn Acts have been done in repudiation and 
disavowal of it. Besides the New Zealanders are not wandering Tribes, but bodies of 
men, till lately, very populous, who have a settled fonn of Government, and who 
have divided and appropriated the whole Territory amongst them ... The two cases 
seem to me altogether dis-similar, and the decision of the Supreme Courts of the 
United States, though it may be very good American law, is not the law we 
recognise and act upon on the American Continent. 
The notion of semi-sovereignty implicit in the Marshall doctrine of discovery was not, 
therefore, for Stephen who, it must be admitted, failed signally to concede the historical 
reasons (ie the charters of his own monarch) which had conditioned Marshall's response. 218 
Stephen's view of the absolute character of Maori sovereignty was undoubtedly influenced 
by the London School of Bentham, Mills and Austin who, it has been seen, took an absolute 
view of sovereignty. This combined with Stephen's humanitarian sympathies in the 
unqualified recognition of Maori sovereignty. There was never any suggestion from the 
Colonial Office that the Maori tribes were other than the full sovereigns of New Zealand 
notwithstanding their primitive fonn of social organisation. 
The Crown, it has been seen, freely entered into a variety of treaties with uncivilised 
societies throughout the nineteenth and into the twentieth century. This practice surely 
presupposed some juridical status in the uncivilised party. The retroactive nullification of 
such transactions implicit in the Wi Parata approach, based as it is upon some supposed 
lack of juridical status, not only called the validity of the Crown's settled practice into 
question but more fundamentally, in point of English law, chiillenged the Crown's 
prerogative power to conduct foreign relations. The recognition of a foreign sovereign has 
always been treated by the courts as a political act of the Crown:219 Where the Crown has 
recognised the sovereignty of a foreign polity judicial inquiry into that society'S international 
personality must cease. The Crown's recognition of its sovereignty is a complete answer as 
a matter of English law. This position was certainly established law by 1840220 and indeed 
by 1877, the year in which Wi Parata was decided. Any denial of Maori sovereignty at the 
time of the Treaty of Waitangi therefore undercuts the basic proposition of English 
218 Curiously the American and British Claims Arbitration Tribunal took the identical position in 1929 when it found 
the Maori tribes held full sovereign status prior to British annexation (William Webster Claim, (1926), 20 AJIL 
391) but the Crown's charters for the New World left no room for a residual, limited sovereignty in the Indian 
tribes (Cayuga Indian Claims, id, 574). 
219 The Parlement Beige (1880) 5 PD 197; Mighel/ v Sultan of lohore [1894] 1 QB 149; Luther v Sagor [1921) 3 
KB 532; Duff Development v Government of Kelantan [1924] AC 797, esp at 815; Government of the Republic 
of Spain v S.s . "Arantzazu Mendi" [1939] AC 256. 
220 For instance "The Pelican" - Burke (1809) Edw (App) iv (PC); In re the Government of Peru (1823) BILC 12 
(Ch) at 13; lones v Garcia de Rio (1823) T & R 297 (Ch) at 299; Thomson v Byree (1824) BILe 20 (Ch); 
Thompson v Pow1es (1828) 2 Sim 194 (Ch) at 212-3; Taylor v Barclay (1828) 2 Sim 213 (Ch) at 220-1; 
Thompson v Barclay (1831) 9 U (OS) 215 (Ch) at 219-22; Rajah Salig Ram and others v Secretary of State for 
India in Council (1872) LR Ind App. Sup vol 119 (PC) at127. 
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constitutional law that recognition of a foreign state is a matter for the Crown to which the 
courts must give appropriate effect. Since the Crown solemnly and formally recognised the 
sovereignty of the Maori chiefs the New Zealand courts were bound to respond accordingly. 
Wi Parata signalled their failure on this account 
It should be added that international tribunals have recognised the legal personality of 
tribal societies: The Delagoa Bay Arbitration proceeded on the basis that native chiefs held 
the capacity to cede territory.221 Similarly the International Court of Justice considered state 
practice through the late nineteenth century, the period when the standard of civilisation (the 
basis of the Wi Parata approach) was at its most influential:222 
Whatever differences of opmlOn there may have been among jurists, the state 
practice of the relevant period indicated that territories inhabited by tribes or people 
having a social organisation were not regarded as territorium nullius. It shows that in 
the case of such territories the acquisition of sovereignty was not generally 
considered as effected unilaterally through 'occupation' of territorium nullius by 
original title, but through agreements concluded with local rulers . ... such agreements 
with local rulers, whether or not considered as actual 'cession' of the territory were 
regarded as derivative roots of title, and not original titles obtained by occupation of 
territorium nullius. 
More particularly, in the William Webster Claim the American and British Claims 
Arbitration Tribunal expressly recognised British sovereignty over New Zealand as deriving 
from the Treaty of Waitangi.223 On an earlier occasion the predecessor of this body, the 
Anglo-American Claims Tribunal, in an opinion circa early 1854 concerning "Rogers and 
Co", had observed without further comment that New Zealand had been acquired by cession 
from the native chiefs. 224 
Lindley has found no support for the view of some late nineteenth century British 
commentators that tribal societies lacked any legal personality at all.22.5 The Wi Parata 
approach to the status of the Maori tribes, which has nourished an orthodoxy in New 
Zealand's constitutional history, was part of this exceptional body of legal opinion. The 
evidence shows it difficult to sustain the argument that the Maori tribes lacked the juridical 
status to enter into a treaty of cession. 
C. THE REQUIREMENT OF MAORI CONSENT TO BRITISH SOVEREIGNTY 
221 Moore International Arbitrations, n, 1865. 
222 Western Sahara Advisory Opinion [1975] Icr 12 at 39, para 80. 
223 (1926), 20 AJIL 391. cf The Cayuga Indian Claim, id, at 574 and Island of Palmas Arbitration (1928), 22 AlIL 
867 (PCA) 
224 Report of Hornby BC in FO 97/32:125. I am grateful 10 Dr G Marston, Sidney Sussex College, for this 
reference. 
225 Lindley Acquisition and Government of Backward Territory, 24-47. 
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Throughout the history of its relations with tribal societies the Crown consistently 
recognised that any right of government over such societies was derivative in character. 
Conquest was possible but less preferable to the acquisition of their formal consent. This 
principle of British practice remained remarkably consistent notwithstanding the organic 
changes in the character of international law and relations, most especially the eighteenth 
century secularisation' of international society and the development of a standard of 
civilisation over the second half of the nineteenth century. The general pattern of the 
Crown's acquisition of an imperium in non-Christian territory has been shown to have been 
underpinned by this principle and by now its strict application to the New Zealand frontier 
during the 1830s has become clear. The Crown treated formal Maori consent as a legal 
prerequisite to the annexation of New Zealand. This position was inherent in the Crown's 
protestations during the 1830s of its inability to erect unilaterally an imperium in the 
country. The same position was formalised in the instruments of office appointing Hobson 
Consul to treat with the Maori tribes for the cession of the sovereignty of their territory over 
which subsequently he would become Lieutenant-Governor. The Crown approved Hobson's 
Proclamations of sovereignty on 21 May 1840 accepting his word that there had been 
'universal adherence' to the Treaty of Waitangi. These Proclamations, it must be stressed, 
although the first authoritative declaration were not the source of the Crown's sovereignty. 
The basis of British sovereignty was the consent of the Maori tribes. 
It may be argued that this source of British sovereignty was challenged by Hobson's 
Proclamations of sovereignty on 21 May 1840. These, recall, were made at a time when the 
process of signature-gathering was still in train. If Maori consent was some legal 
requirement, particularly in the light of its embodiment in Hobson's formal instruments of 
office, doeS not that make the Proclamations of 21 May 1840 invalid or, at best effective 
only as against those tribes who had then signed the Treaty? Or, put another way, does not 
the interuption of the process of signature-gathering by Hobson's Proclamations show Maori 
consent was being treated as a political rather than legal necessity capable of suspension at 
the Crown's pleasure? 
Such argumentation f!lils to grasp the subtleties of English constitutional law governing 
the Crown's conduct of its affairs beyond the realm. The Crown has the prerogative power 
to conduct the foreign affairs of the nation. Under this power it may authorise or approve 
the acquisition of foreign territory by its subjects and in consequence, exercise the separate 
prerogative constituent power. The exercise of the power to acquire territory is beyond the 
review of English courts. The courts cannot challenge the means adopted or which may 
prospectively be adopted by the Crown. 226 If the Crown choses to approve the unauthorised 
226 The courts will not presume to review the Crown's conduct of its international relations, including the acquisition 
of territory: Johnstone v Pedlar [1921] 2 AC 262 (HL), per Atkinson LJ at 278, Summer LJ at 290; Buron v 
Denman (1848) 6 St Tr (NS) 525 (Ex); Attorney-General v Nissan [1970] AC 179 (HL) per Reid LJ at 207; 
Nissan v Attorney-General [1968] 1 QB 286 (CA) per Denning MR at 338; Stephen History of Criminal Law, 
11,61-5. 
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acquisition of territory by one of its subjects its courts cannot subsequently challenge that 
acquisition on grounds of the subject's original lack of authority.m Nonetheless English 
courts will inevitably have to give effect to the fact of acquisition of territory by the Crown 
even though the • act of state' doctrine prohibits any judicial attempt to challenge or interfere 
with the process of acquisition.228 On such occasions judicial inquiry into the Crown's 
relations with the inhabitants of the territory before and during the process of acquisition 
will become necessary.229 The rules which the Crown has elected to observe in the 
acquisition of the territory, such as the recognition of the sovereignty of the local polities, 
then become judicially cognisable. Thus, for example, had a British subject been minded to 
sue a Maori chief refusing to observe the terms of a contract concluded prior to British 
annexation, English courts, noting the Crown's recognition of tribal sovereignty, would hold 
that the contracts of a former sovereign CaImot be enforced in the courts of the new.230 
English courts can, therefore, recognise the rules adopted by the Crown in the acquisition 
of new territory. As a matter of English law the adoption of these rules is a matter solely 
within the election of the Crown. Nonetheless it is clear that the Crown considered itself 
bound by certain rules in relation to the acquisition of an imperium in non-Christian territory 
notwithstanding the free hand given it by its own courts. The material presented in chapter 
two shows overwhelming evidence of the Crown's belief that native consent was an 
important precondition to the exercise of a constituent power over such societies. The 
Crown's subscription to this position was clearly actuated by more than a belief that such 
consent was morally desirable. It was felt to be as much a legal necessity as moral 
imperative. In the New Zealand context, the influence of the humanitarian movement served 
only to underline the legal character of this rule. English courts might have been unable to 
enforce the requirement against the Crown but in the Crown's eyes that did not diminish the 
necessity for native consent to British sovereignty. This requirement was, as Chapman J 
m It is accepted that acquisition of territory must be a State as opposed to private act Yattel Le droit de gens 
(1758),1, 207; Twiss The Oregon Question (1846),277; Porter "Opinion on Measures for the Government of 
Orange River and British Kaffiria", 25 March 1849 CO 879/1:1, 10 at 13; Westlake Chapters on International 
Law (1894) 162 and International Law (1910), 96 et seq; Jenkyns British Rule and Jurisdiction, 2-3; Jennings 
Acquisition of Territory in International Law, ch IT; Roberts-Wray Commonwealth and Colonial Law, 99-101. "r 
have never heard that you can force a Sovereign to take territory" per Halsbury LC in Staples v The Queen 
(unreported) quoted in R v The Earl of Crewe, ex parte Sekgome (1910) 2 KB 576 at 623 per Kennedy LJ. 
22S Courts cannot question the validity of an act of state: Secretary of State in Council v Kamachee Boye Sahaba 
(1859) 13 Moo PC 22; Nabob of Arcot v East India Co (1793) 2 Yes 56; Gibson v East India Co (1839) 5 Bing 
NC 262; Doss v Secretary of State for India in Council (1875) LR 19 Eq 509; Rustomjee v R (1876) 2 QBD 69; 
Rajah of Coorg v East India Co (1860) 29 Beav 300; Sirdar Bhagwan Singh v Secretary of State for India 
(1874) LR 2 Ind App 38; West Rand Central Gold Mining Co v R (1905) 2 KB 391 at 408-10; Salaman v 
Secretary of Stale for India (1906) 1 KB 613; Civilian War Claimants Association Ltd. v R (1932) AC 14; 
Oyekan v Adele (1957)2 All ER 785 (PC). 
229 For instance: Salaman v Secretary of State in Council for India (1906) 1 KB 613 (CA) at 639-40 per Fletcher 
Moulton LJ; Secretary of State in Council for India v Bai Rajbai (1915) LR 42 Ind App 229 (PC) at 237; Rajah 
Salig Ram and others v Secretary of State for India in Council (1872) LR Ind App, Sup vol 119 (PC); Forester 
and others v Secretary of State for India in Council (1872) LR Ind App, Sup vol 10 (PC); Hemchand Deuvhand 
v Azam Sakarlal ChhotamlaI (1906) AC 212 (PC) (territorial sovereignty of the Crown not established by proof 
of any act of state); Moore Act of State in English Law, 86-90; Walker v Baird (1892) AC 491. 
230 As per Cook v Sprigg (1899) AC 572 (PC). See discussion of this case in Moore Act of State in English Law 
(1906), 80. 
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styled it in R v Symonds (1847) one of those ."higher principles" embodied in the 
"intercourse of civilized nations, and more especially of Great Britain, with the aboriginal 
Natives of America and other Countries" which had become part of "the earliest settled 
principles of our law".231 
The material reviewed in this and the previous chapter indicates, therefore, that the 
Crown treated tribal consent as a legal prerequisite to the exercise of territorial sovereignty 
(or any other imperium) over their territory. This principle was applied, almost, one is 
tempted to say, par excellence by the Crown to the annexation of New Zealand. Hobson's 
Proclamations of 21 May 1840 coming as they did when tribal consent to British 
sovereignty had not been obtained throughout the country were no denial of the principle. 
So far as English courts are concerned these Proclamations were simply an authoritative 
statement that this formal requirement had been met. The fact that the courts cannot go 
behind this statement in no wise diminishes the recognition of the principle of tribal consent 
thereby proclaimed to have been met. 
Although the requirement of Maori consent to British sovereignty was the logical 
corollary of the Crown's recognition of Maori sovereignty the two aspects are in theory 
seperable. Some commentators have suggested that the Crown required Maori consent to 
British annexation independently of its position on Maori sovereignty. Thus Sutton argues 
"Maori sovereignty is not vital to an understanding of the Treaty'S place in New Zealand's 
constitutional and legal system".232 The Treaty, he suggests, was a quid pro quo for some 
root of legal accession to New Zealand. Similarly, commentators such as Roberts-Wray,233 
~cNair,234 Evatt23S and Foden236 accept the Treaty of Waitangi was not a treaty of cession at 
international law but nonetheless affirm Maori consent to British ahnexation to have been 
some legal prerequisite to the formal Proclamation of sovereignty. In other words, these 
writers accept the Maori tribes' lack of international personality but uphold the tribal 
capacity to approve British sovereignty over their territory. This position is to be 
congratulated for its implicit, albeit largely unwitting, recognition of some juridical status in 
the Maori tribes but the view of the law which it implicitly adopts belongs to the late 
nineteenth century. During this period, it has been seen, the Crown continued to enter into 
treaties and other arrangements with tribal societies facilitating the erection of an imperium 
(ie territorial sovereignty or extraterritorial rights under the Foreign Jurisdiction Acts) · 
notwithstanding these societies' exclusion from the 'Family of Nations'. The juridical 
capacity to permit such an imperium was not a function of some standard of civilisation but 
231 (1847), [1840-1932] NZPCC 387 (SC) at 388. 
232 Sutton 'The Treaty of Waitangi Today" (1981) 12 VUWLR 17. 
233 Commonwealth and Colonial Law, 101-04. 
234 The Law of Treaties, 54. 
23S "Acquisition of Territory in Australia and New Zealand", esp 44-5. 
236 Constitutional Development in the First Decade, 179-190; New Zealand Legal History, 77-93 and see Roberts-
Wray Commonwealth and Colonial Law, 104. 
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subject to compliance with Vattel's notion of an 'organised, political society'. The argument 
of Sutton, Foden, Roberts-Wray, and to a much lesser extent McNair, is, therefore, an 
implicit subscription to the late nineteenth century position but also presupposes some 
juridical status in the Maori tribes notwithstanding the attempt to seperate this question from 
that of the requirement of Maori consent to British annexation. One cannot recognise this 
requirement without iinplicitIy conceding some juridical status to the Maori tribes for how 
else was such consent to have been obtained if not through the tribes? Such argument leaves 
the proverbial cart without the horse. 
It is more possible that the Crown could have recognised Maori sovereignty whilst 
eventually choosing to dispense with the requirement of Maori consent before annexing the 
country. Only in tIlis sense was the question of Maori sovereignty seperable from the 
requirement of Maori consent to British sovereignty. Nonetheless this scenario in which one 
nation violates the sovereignty of another, common enough in the history of international 
relations, is absent from the process by which New Zealand became British. The Crown 
recognised Maori sovereignty and respected it by requiring tribal consent to British 
annexation. With annexation, the Crown's subscription to this position became a matter of 
judical cognisance. 
D. THE CHARACTER OF THE CROWN'S TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY 
Even were Hobson's Proclamations of sovereignty on 21 May 1840 in excess of his 
authority under his royal commissions (in that Maori consent had not been fully and 
properly obtained), their approval and formal publication on 2 October 1840 put the matter 
beyond doubt. Thereafter the Crown's sovereignty over New Zealand was fixed as a matter 
of English law. It is clear that prior to the formal annexation of New Zealand the Crown 
had recognised the sovereignty of the Maori tribes but, equally, it is certain that in point of 
English law this tribal sovereignty ceased with the Proclamation of British sovereignty. The 
principle of English law is that the Crown's sovereignty over its own territory is absolute 
and shared with no other, power.237 
The common law's view of territorial sovereignty matured during the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth century. Until then, sovereignty had not been associated with an exclusive 
power of government over a particular and fixed territory but had retained the feudal flavour 
of personal duty and right. 238 This particularly affected the North American colonies for 
which the Crown had freely issued charters constituting an imperium over the English 
m Coe v Commonwealth of Australia (1979), 53 AUR 403 (HCA) (Australian Aborigine); and see the cases 
concerning the status of the Six Nations who have consistently alleged separate nationhood: Sero v GauIJ (1921) 
64 DLR 327 (Ont SC); Logan v Styres (1959) 20 DLR (2d) 416 (Ont HC); Davey v lsaac (1977) 77 DLR (3d) 
481 (SCC) at 485 (allegation withdrawn). 
238 Above chapter 2, also Holdsworth, HEL, VI,39-50. 
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settlements and claiming title to massive areas of land. These charters had been granted 
without the delay of antecedent tribal consent. Faced with this, Marshall CJ had fonnulated 
his 'doctrine of discovery' which located an original but limited sovereignty in the Indian 
tribes: European powers could assert a sovereign title in the New World founded on 
discovery and occupation good against fellow European monarchs but as against the 
'domestic dependent' Indian nations any sovereign authority in the Crown required actual 
tribal submission. Curiously the Colonial Office overlooked the historical circumstances 
which had given birth to Marshall's doctrine of discovery and partial tribal sovereignty, 
most notably the seventeenth century fonnal activity of the Crown, and expressly repudiated 
any Marshall-like treatment of the Maori tribes as incomplete sovereigns.239 Had the 
Marshall approach, or something resembling it, been adopted the Crown could have 
exercised a constituent power for its subjects in New Zealand without reference to Maori 
I, consent. This, it has been laboured, was not done: The Crown recognised the full 
sovereignty of the Maori tribes. 
The Crown's renunciation of the doctrine of discovery's potential application to New 
Zealand was noted on several occasions during the 1840s.240 A notable example was an 
article in a colonial newspaper in 1842. Having made the recognition of full Maori 
sovereignty ("THE ACT HAS BEEN DONE", the article stressed),2A1 the Crown could not 
revert to Marshall's doctrine of discovery:242 
... whatever truth there may be in the doctrine of 'sovereign right' of a discovering 
power in other cases, it cannot now, by any law of England, or by any international 
law, reassert the right it has once so decidedly given up. 
In 1848 Chamerovzow, Joseph Phillimore and Woolmer gave legal opinions finding the 
Crown had renunciated any right of discovery it might have originally claimed over New 
Zealand. All stressed, particularly the first two, that no such right had ever existed even 
notionally given the existent of Maori sovereignty however 'dwarf-like' in stature. 2A3 
The application of Marshall's doctrine of discovery to the Crown's sovereignty over 
uncivilised territory was not, however, by the middle of the nineteenth century a simple 
matter for the Crown's election. By then the state of constitutional art meant that its value 
239 For instance: Glenelg, Memorandum, 15 December 1837 CO 209/2:409; Stcphen to Vemon Smith, note, 28 July 
1839 CO 209/4:343; Stephen, Memorandum, 18 March 1840 CO 209/8 :69; Hope to Somes, 10 January 1843 CO 
209/18:388; Stephen to Vemon Smith, note, 9 July 1840 CO 209/6:33. 
240 Lords Committee (1838), evidence: Hinds, 129-30; the Select Committee on New Zealand appeared to endorse 
the notional applicability of the 'doctrine of discovery' to New Zealand, RSCNZ (1840),iii; see also EO 
Wakefield, evidence, id, 47-9; Busby to Stanley, 17 May 1842 CO 209/19:141-2; Somes to Stanley 24 January 
1843, CO 209/26:35-92. 
241 Bay of Islands Observer, 17 March 1842. Busby enclosed the newspaper to Stanley, 30 March 1842 CO 
209/19: 1034. 
242 Id. The application of the 'doctrine of discovery' was also advocated in the Petition of London Merchants, 22 
May 1840 RSCNZ (1840), App I, and in Fitzroy's submissions to the Lords Committee (1838), 175-6. 
243 Chamerovww The New Zealand Question (1848), chap 2-3; Opinions of Phillimore, 23 March 1848, id, 
appendix, 3; opinion of Woolmer, 4 February 1848, id, appendix, 25-8. 
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was simply as Marshall had used it - a retrospeotive explanation of the inteltemporal 
principles which had obtained in the seventeenth century rather than a potential guideline to 
the future or present acquisition of territory inhabited by tribal societies. Secularised notions 
of independent and equal state sovereignty, Vattel's fOlm of international personality, 
prevented its application to British relations with the Maori tribes. 
Nonetheless one asp'ect of the Marshall position on Indian sovereignty did not occur to 
the Colonial Office (nor, indeed, the editors of colonial newspapers) and this indicated the 
way in which British constitutional theory had developed in the previous century as well as 
its divergence from the American. The limited sovereignty recognised by Marshall as vested 
in the Indian tribes subsisted until it had been extinquished by their conquest or submission 
notwithstanding the Crown's claim in its charters to their territory. This residual sovereignty 
left the tribes with their institutions of internal government and law undisturbed and placed 
them beyond the ordinary jurisdiction of the state and, especially, federal governments. By 
the Marshall forn1Ulation, the tribes' right of internal government arose not from the 
permission or sufferance of the Crown and, later, federal and state govemments organised 
under the Constitution but from the tribes' independent, residual sovereignty. This meant the 
sovereignty of the United States was divided amongst the federal, state and Indian 
governments, each responsible and independent within their own sphere. The state and 
federal sovereignty was contained within the Constitution, the Indian sovereignty was 
limited to their internal government. To nineteenth century English lawyers, however, 
territorial sovereignty was an absolute attribute held by one sovereign of a territory and 
incapable of division. As a result the Crown's Proclamations of sovereignty over New 
Zealand established its absolute sovereignty notwithstanding the non-adhesion of several 
tribes to the Treaty of Waitangi. 
During 1842 and 1843 the first Attorney-General of New Zealand, William Swainson, 
twice advanced an argument reminiscent of Marshall's doctrine of residual tribal 
sovereignty.244 
The first related to the applicability of English law to feuding tribes near Rotorua who 
had not signed the Treaty. The second occasion concerned Te Rauparaha and Te Rangihata, 
two southern chiefs who had participated in the Wairua massacre. Although both chiefs had 
signed the Treaty, Te Rauparaha twice in fact, Swainson insisted that neither could be said 
to have given "their intelligent consent to it, as it is now well known that, in common with 
many others, they had not the most remote intention of giving up their rights and powers of 
dealing, according to their own laws and customs, with the members of their own tribes, or 
of consenting to be dealt with in all cases according to our laws".245 Hobson's Proclamations 
244 Swainson to Shortland, 27 December 1847 CO 209/16:487; Opinion of 13 July 1843, enclosure in Shortland to 
Stanley, 13 July 1843 (No 2) CO 209/22:245 at 285-293; also hinted at in his Report on Wairau Affair, 7 August 
1843 CO 209/22:370. 
245 Opinion, 13 July 1843, supra. 
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of sovereignty on 21 May 1840 may have established . the Crown's authority over the British 
and European population, Swainson argued, but the non-signatory tribes and those who 
impelfectly understood the Treaty retained their own sovereignty:246 
I consider that the title of Great Britain to the sovereignty of New Zealand rests 
partly upon discovery, partly upon cession, partly upon assertion, and partly upon 
occupation; that from these sources conjointly, as against all other nations, and as to 
British subjects, I think Great Britain has a title to the sovereignty over the whole of 
New Zealand, and that she possesses the right of pre-emption of territory from the 
'natives, and has the power to regulate trade and commerce with other nations; but as 
to those tribes who have never ceded the sovereignty and who refuse to acknowledge 
the Queen's authority, I think that Great Britain has not the right, nor would it be 
consistent with good faith to impose upon them her penal code. 
Swainson did not base his opinion expressly upon the Marshall judgments although a 
virtually identical position was implicit in his finding that certain Maori tribes were not 
British subjects. Instead, Swainson located his justification in the Crown's unqualified 
recognition of Maori sovereignty and its formal commitment (embodied in the instruments 
of office given Hobson in 1839) not to acquire the sovereignty of any part of the country 
"unless the free and intelligent consent of the Natives, expressed according to their ancient 
usage, shall be first obtainecf'.'lA? Where this consent had not been so obtained Swainson 
concluded that the Crown could not treat the particular tribe as subjects of the Crown. 
This opinion received short shrift in London2A8 as contrary to the fundamental rule of 
English law vesting in the Crown the absolute power to acquire new territory and to declare 
authoritatively when that territory had become British. Such authoritative statements or any 
other act by the Crown indicative of its territorial sovereignty bind the Crown's courts and 
subjects. Thus, commented Stephen:'lA9 
... the local attorney Gen l wholly omits to notice that by three formal commissions 
under the Great Seal of the United Kingdom, and by every other formal and solemn 
act, the Queen has now publicly asserted Her Sovereignty over the whole of the New 
Zealand islands. Admit, if it must be so, that this was ill-advised - unjust - a breach 
of faith - and so on, yet who can gainsay that such are the claims of the Queen and 
of the Nation for whom H.M. acts. That a subordinate officer should attempt to set 
such claims aside on his private judgement of what is prudent, or of what is right, 
seems to me utterly indefensible. 
246 Quoted in Foden New Zealand Legal History, 97. 
'lA? The words are from Normanby's instructions to Hobson, 14 August 1839. The emphasis is Swainson's: CO 
209/16:487 at 488. 
2A8 Stephen to Vernon Smith, 19 May 1843, CO 209/16:454. Hope and StarIley initialled their agreement (id, 455); 
Stanley to Shortland, 21 June 1843 CO 209/16:456; Hope, note, 15 December 1843 CO 209/22:246; Stephen to 
Hope, note, 28 December 1843 CO 209/22:247; Hope to Stanley, note, 30 December 1843, Co 209/22:254; 
Stanley, note, 31 December 1843, id. Acting Governor Shortland declined to accept Swainson's opinion, 
preferring that of George Clarke then Protector of Aborigines and to wait for Stanley's advice: Shortland to 
Stanley, 31 December 1842 CO 209/16:446. 
'lA9 Stephen to May, 19 May 1843, supra. 
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This position was reaffinned in 1869250 and 1870251 by the colonial Attorney-General 
Prendergast (who as Chief Justice some years later handed down the judgment in Wi Parata 
v Bishop of Wellington (1877)). Prendergast considered the status of tribesmen who had 
been involved in the 'Maori Wars' and dismissed the argument that these individuals had 
been taken as prisoners of a foreign nation at war with the Crown. He insisted the 
imprisoned individu'als were no more than rebellious subjects of the Crown in breach of 
their duty of allegiance. The Crown had fonnally "assumed sovereignty over the whole of 
New Zealand, and none can be admitted to question her sovereignty".252 
As a matter of law such incidents illustrate the disappearance of Maori sovereignty with 
Hobson's Proclamations of 21 May 1840 and their subsequent approval by the Crown 
indicated by publication in the London Gazette (2 October 1840).253 This, it is re-
emphasized, did not diminish the recognition of Maori sovereignty which had gone before. 
Formal annexation was simply a declaration by the Crown to its subjects (and courts) that in 
its judgement the prerequisite to British sovereignty (Maori consent) had been met and that 
thereafter the Crown was the sole sovereign of New Zealand. As a matter of English law 
Maori sovereignty no longer existed nor could some residual sovereignty similar to that of 
the 'domestic dependent nations' of North America co-exist alongside that of the Crown. 
The Marshall formulation might have provided a constitutional means for the recognition of 
the rangatiratanga of the Maori tribes but by the mid-nineteenth century its application to 
the New Zealand frontier was incompatible with the contemporaneous state of constitutional 
theory. The chiefs could not claim a rangatiratanga independent of their subjection to the 
Crown. Any such right would have to arise within the franlework of the Crown's 
sovereignty. 
Unfortunately it lies beyond the scope of the present inquiry to consider the distinction in 
English constitutional theory between 'legal' and 'political' sovereignty.2S4 Legal sovereignty 
is the unqualified imperium or power of government vested in the Crown in its prerogative 
and Parliamentary capacities whilst political sovereignty is a right vested in the Crown's 
subjects. Often known as 'popular sovereignty', political sovereignty describes the on-going 
consensual relationship and hence constitutionality obtaining between the Crown and its 
subjects. The glory of the constitutional monarchy has traditionally been its accommodation 
of these competing views of sovereignty, the one seeing it as a devolution from above, the 
other as an emanation from below. In point of English law, however, political sovereignty is 
2SO "Opinion of Atiomey-General Prendergast as to the legal status of the Maoris now in anns" 30 June 1869 in 
Turton, ed Official Documenls Re/alive to the Native Affairs, part A, 191. 
251 "Opinion of Attorney-General Prendergast on legal questions raised in Earl Granville's despatch no 121, of 4th 
November, 1869", September 1870, in Turton, ed, supra, Pt A, P 206. 
252 Id. 
253 The status of unceded tribal sovereignty in the period 21 May to 2 October 1840 is speculative and purely 
academic in that whatever its status it disappeared upon the Crown's approval of Hobson's Proclamations. 
2S4 Dicey An Inlroduction to the Study of the Laws of the Constitution, 75-76. 
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a concept bereft of justiciability except to the extent, the will of the people is expressed in 
an Act of Parliament or through the electoral process. m So far as one can generalise, the 
Maori interpretation of the Treaty of Waitangi has consistently been to treat it as some sort 
of social contract between the tribes and the Crown by which the rangatiratanga (basically, 
tribal integrity) of Maori society was to be protected and respected by the Crown in return 
for the cession of sovereignty.256 It is submitted that this interpretation of the Treaty is a 
fOlm of political sovereignty in the assertion. The continued legitimacy and constitutionality 
of the Crown's government over the Maori tribes depends upon its adherence to the Treaty 
of Waitangi. This argument would bring Maori claims to a residual sovereignty into the 
mainstream of political and constitutional theory upon the lawful origins of government. 
This, strictly speaking, is extra-legal territory since the political sovereignty of the Maori is 
a matter beyond the justiciability of the Crown's COUltS under the country's present 
constitutional arrangements (unlike the American position where the Constitution treats legal 
and political sovereignty as synonymous).257 The English common law recognises no such 
thing as a residual tribal sovereignty unlike the common law of the United States. 
255 Id, 73. 
256 This interpretation was advanced by Swainson and George Clarke. Protector of the Aborigines. as early as 1842: 
Foden New Zealand Legal History. 96-101. For example also Kawharu "Sovereignty vs Rangatiratanga" (1984). 
passim; Finding of the Waitangi Tribunal on the Manukau Claim (1985). part 8. 
m More fully McHugh "The constitutional theory of Maori claims". The proposed constitutional entrenclunent of the 
Treaty of Waitangi (draft Bill of Rights. clause 4. A Bill of Rights for New Zealand (1985)) would give the 
rangatiratanga or political sovereignty of the Maori some justiciability. 
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· I 
PART II 
ENGLISH LAW AND MAORI CUSTOMARY LAW 
PART IT THE RECEPTION OF ENGLISH LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 
CHAPTER FOUR 
THE ACQUISITION OF COLONIES AT COMMON LAW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
With the annexation of New Zealand, English law and institutions were introduced. What 
was the extent of this introduction and to what extent did Maori institutions and customs 
survive as a matter of English law? 'This question, it is stressed, is posed in an entirely legal 
sense. The Maori belief, and it was one expressly fostered by Hobson and the missionaries, 
was that British sovereignty would give the Crown authority over her own subjects and in 
disputes between Europeans and Maori. 'This belief was embodied in the term kawanatanga, 
a transliteration into Maori of the English word 'governor', used in the Maori version of the 
Treaty. The chiefs believed that they would retain their authority under customary law over 
internal tribal affairs. That is, they understood Maori customary law was not to be affected 
by the Crown's sovereignty other than in the sense of kawanatanga. The omission of the 
word rangatiratanga from the Maori version of the Treaty, a word known to the 
\
. missionaries to describe the operation of Maori customary law amongst the tribe members, 
wholly encouraged this belief. The central inquiry of this Part concerns the extent to which 
J that belief was justified as a matter of English law. 
The starting point is the common law status given the colony of New Zealand upon 
atmexation. In 1840 the common law recognised two forms of colony: those acquired by 
'conquest or cession' and those got by 'settlement'. Despite its insistence upon the Treaty of 
Waitangi the Crown treated New Zealand as a colony of the 'settled' variety. 
'This constitutional classification has been used to make two closely related arguments. 
First, the status of New Zealand as a 'settled' colony is taken as a denial of the Treaty of 
Waitangi as a valid instrument of cession: If the Crown did not consider New Zealand a 
'conquered or ceded' colony in virtue of the Treaty does not that indicate, the argument 
runs, Maori sovereignty was at best fictional? 'This argument would characterise as pretence 
the conclusions already reached in Part I above. Secondly, it is argued that the Crown's 
classification of New Zealand as a 'settled' colony meant it was to be considered at 
common law as territorium nullius over which English law had thorough application as well 
to the Maori tribes as settlers. In short, the annexation of New Zealand is taken to have 
produced an ipso jure suspension of customary Maori law. This argument contradicts the 
interpretation of the Treaty held by the chiefs and encouraged by Hobson and the 
missionaries. 
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The conclusion reached by this Part is that neither argument can be sustained. Both turn 
upon the simplistic representation that the common law status of New Zealand as a 'settled' 
colony gave it the legal character of territorium nullius. It is difficult to sit such argument 
alongside the historical and legal record other than by recourse to conspiratorial and cynical 
interpretations of British behaviour. In point of law the above arguments are unsophisticated 
and ignore the subtleties of the common law principles affecting the Crown's acquisition of 
colonies. Once these are understood conclusions are reached wholly less cynical and more in 
accord with the historical record: As a matter of common law British sovereignty of itself 
did not produce a blanket introduction of English law but left Maori customary law with a 
substantial degree of continuity. 
This Part is divided into two chapters. The remainder of this considers the development 
of the common law principles affecting the acquisition of new territory. The development of 
the 'settled' colony is tracked. This chapter concludes that the designation of New Zealand 
as a 'settled' colony was never remotely considered as an abnegation of Maori sovereignty 
by the Crown but merely as an appropriate response to the position of the English settlers. 
The status of the Maori tribes was only indirectly relevant to the constitutional designation 
the Crown gave the colony. 
The subsequent chapter considers the extent to which the common law recognised the 
continuity of Maori customary law subsequent to British annexation. The conclusion reached 
is that enough Maori customary law survived to justify a belief that there was substantial 
recognition at English law of rangatiratanga. The argument that Maori customary law did 
not survive British annexation in point of English law has tended to focus upon matters of 
kawanatanga, which the chiefs did cede, rather than rangatiratanga. 
In chapter two it was seen that the Crown had granted charters to communities of 
Englishmen abroad from medieval times. Several important prerogative powers, most 
notably the power to licence foreign trade and the royal gift of incorporation,I combined to 
make royal charters a virtual necessity for the medieval merchant communities established 
by Englishmen in Europe. Thus Richard 11 issued letters patent for the English merchants in 
Prussia (1391) enabling them to meet and elect a governor who was to rule over the traders, 
do speedy justice, settle disputes and award compensation. All and singular the merchants 
were enjoined to be helpful and to obey reasonable ordinances pro meliore gubernatione 
made in proper form with the requisite assents and confirmation.2 Over the next few years 
similar privileges were given to the Hanse merchants (1404),3 merchants trading to the 
2 
The other prerogative powers included the Crown's right to forbid passage out of the Kingdom and the 
requirements of lawful assembly: generally, Carr se, xiii-xvii. 
Foedera, vii, 693. 
Id, viii,360. 
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Netherlands (1407)4 and Norway (1408).s Similarly by letters patent to Lorenzo Strozzi 
(1485) Richard III provided for the creation of a royal magistracy exercising jurisdiction 
over English merchants and subjects in Pisa.6 By and large the power of internal regulation 
formally constituted by the Crown for these merchant bodies and communities tended to 
emulate local charters giving similar powers to guilds or trade associations.' 
Such grants were the earliest exercise by the Crown of a constituent power affecting 
territory beyond the realm. By the late fifteenth century the Crown was using the same 
power for territory in the New World. The letters patent to the Cabots (14968 and 1498)9 
contained no specific grant of internal rule other than a stipulation that the grantees might 
"conquer, occupy and possess" the lands which they discovered "as our vassals and 
governors lieutenants and deputies therein acquiring for us the dominion, title and 
jurisdiction of the same towns, castles, cities, islands & mainlands so discovered". The 
vague character of this power of government was corrected in the letters patent to the joint 
Anglo-Portuguese enterprise of Richard Warde and others (1501). These letters patent gave 
the grantees power "to make, set up, ordain, and appoint laws, ordinances, statutes and 
proclamations for the good and peaceful rule and government of the said men, masters, 
sailors & other persons"IO resorting to the discovered land. The same words appeared in the 
letters patent of the following year to the reorganised enterprise. ll 
The above grants of internal rule to the (prospective) communities of Englishmen abroad 
were by later standards vague in their failure to specify the standard upon which internal 
government was to proceed. Generally speaking the sole limiting criterion was that the 
powers had to be exercised for the 'good government' of the English community abroad. 
This still rather indefinite criterion was replaced in 1505 by one which in some form or 
other would be consistently used in royal grants over the next two centuries. 12 The letters 
patent issued to the Merchant Adventurers in Calais (1505) authorised the Governor and his 
assembled Assistants to "make, Ordeyne, and establish all such Statutes, Ordinances, and 
customes .. . for the better Governance good condition and Rule of our Said Merchants ... [but 
that any which] shall be or may be contrary to us oure Crowne, Honour, Dignity Royall or 
6 
, 
8 
Id,464. 
Id, 511. 
Indenture between England and Florence with subsequent letters patent, id, xii, 389-93. 
Carr SC, xvi; Goebel Cases and Materials, 257-8; Madden "1066, 1766 and all that: the Relevance of English 
Medieval Experience of 'Empire' to later Imperial Constitutional Issues" in Flint and Williams, eds Perspectives 
of Empire, 9. 
Text in Biggar, ed Precursors of J. Cartier, 7. 
Id,22. 
10 Id, 41 at 50. 
11 Id,70. 
12 This change was a response to the question of royal control over corporate ordinance power at issue during the 
reign of Henry VI. A statute (15 Hen 6 c 6) of 1504 forbade the enactment by guilds, fraternities or companies 
of ordinances diminishing royal prerogative and agair1st the common profit. This statute was substantially re-
enacted as 19 Hen 7 c 7 and provided the formula subsequently adopted in the charters for subjects abroad. 
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Prerogative or to the deminution of the Commonweale of oure Reabne shall be of no force 
or effect" ,13 This provision for a system of internal regulation not repugnant to English law 
appeared in all the subsequent Tudor· and StuartU authorisations for English activity abroad. 
The system of law encompassed by this invariable standard was not English law proper but 
a flexible one which used English law as a yardstick against which the internal one was 
assessed. Prior to Calvin's Case (1608) this feature can be seen as no more than an attempt 
to reconcile the regularity of English law with the flexibility required for the circumstances 
of English enterprise and communities in a strange environment. 
The royal practice of granting internal rule to English communities beyond the realm had 
become so regular that Bacon in submissions in Calvin's Case spoke of the 'birthright' of 
Englishmen abroad to the benefit of English law in their dealings inter se.16 What the Crown 
considered a privilege in the royal gift was coming to be expressed in more absolute terms 
as a right which (potential) English communities abroad took with them. However the 
magnaninimity, indeed eagerness, of the Tudor and Stuart monarchs in granting charters of 
settlement for the New World effectively postponed isolation of the origin of the right to 
internal regulation therein contained. Did the right derive solely from royal grant or was it a 
right inherent in the community of subjects? Corporate theory of the time might have 
assisted the latter viewl7 but the point was not to become pressing until after the Restoration 
when the Crown's settlements in the New World began to flourish. In the meantime, the 
intensity of English activity in the New World saw the Tudor and Stuart charters obtaining 
features of a delegated jure regalia. The royal charters were taking the form of a grant of a 
palatinate or incorporation establishing extensive powers of government over a specified 
13 SC, 249 at 251-2. 
14 Notably: grant to merchants in Andalusia and Spain (1530), SC,l; first grant to Muscovy merchants (1555), PN, 
1,318; charter to the Merchant Adventurers (1564), ECC, 254 at 267-8; patent to Sir Humphrey Gilbert (1578), 
CRNC, I at 6; charter of the Eastland merchants (1579), Sellers, ed Acts and Ordinances of the Eastland 
Company, 142 at 145; grant to the Levant Company (1581), PN, m,64; patent to Sir Walter Raleigh (1584), 
CRNC, 13 at 18; patent to Barbary merchants (1585), PN, IV,268; fellowship for discovery of North West 
Passage (1585), id, V,276; patent for trade to Guinea, id, IV,291; charter to Levant merchants (1592), id, III,370; 
charter of Levant Company, SC, 30 at 34; charter of East India Company, Mukherji, ed Indian Constitutional 
Documents, L 1 at 9. 
IS For the New World charters see below note 20. Examples of Stuart charters for other regions included: grant to 
merchants trading to France, SC, 62 at 72; charter to Merchant Adventurers of the New Trade (1615), se, 78 at 
87; charter to "Gynney and Bynney" Company (1618), SC, 99 at 102-3; charter to the East India Company 
(1661), E I Co Tracts, np; charter to the English East India Company (1698), id; charter of Royal Adventurers 
into Africa (1660 and 1662), SC, 172; charter of Royal African Company (1672), SC, 186; charter for St Helena 
(1673), E I Co Tracts, np. 
16 In Spedding, Ellis and Heath, eds The Works of Francis Bacon, VII,637. 
17 Davenant v Hurdis (1597), Moo (KB) 576 (resiants of a leet can make a by-law relative to common interest); 
The Chamberlain of London's Case (1590-91), 5 Co Rep 626, 77 ER 150 (KB) (inhabitants of a town and 
corporation can make by-laws for common good without a custom or charter) and, similarly, Norris v Staps 
(1617), Hobart 211, 80 ER 357. The English traders in Barbary were an example from the Elizabethan period of 
British subjects abroad assuming the power of internal regulation without incorporation from the Crown. 
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region. IS Such features were clearly more than a grant of a power of internal regulation (that 
is, legislative and judicial capacities) incidental to incorporation. Not only was the Crown 
claiming territorial as well as personal rights in its charters but it was erecting sophisticated 
systems of government. 
B. CALVIN'S CASE AND THE ACQUISITION OF COLONIES 
Calvin's Case (1608), also known as The Case of the Post-Nati, presented the question 
whether a Robert Calvin born in Scotland after the accession of James I was an alien and 
hence unable to bring a real or personal action for lands in England. It was found that 
Calvin was not an alien and hence the comments in Coke's report concerning the status of 
aliens and the acquisition of territory were made obiter dicta. 
Although not directly concerned with the problem Calvin's Case provided the earliest 
authoritative expression of the legal principles affecting territorial acquisition by the Crown. 
These principles were applied by the Crown to the New World. 
At the beginning of the seventeenth century the common law conceived all territorial 
acquisition as derivative, that is in the sense of one sovereign acquiring territory from 
another. This derivative conception of territorial acquisition has been seen as manifest in the 
Tudor and Stuart charters for America. The report of Calvin's Case confirmed the failure of 
the common law to recognise a distinct original means of territorial acquisition by limiting 
these means to conquest and descent. The rules affecting such territorial possessions were 
summarised thuS: 19 
And upon this ground there is a diversity between a conquest of a kingdom of a 
Christian King, and the conquest of a kingdom of an infidel; for if a King come to a 
Christian kingdom by conquest, seeing that he hath vitae et necis potestatem, he may 
at his pleasure alter and change the laws of that kingdom: but until he doth make an 
alteration of those laws the ancient laws of that kingdom remain. But if a Christian 
King should conquer a kingdom of an infidel, and bring them under his subjection, 
there ipso facto the laws of the infidel are abrogated, for that they be not only 
against Christianity, but against the laws of God and of nature, contained in the 
decalogue; and in that case until certain laws be established amongst them, by the 
King hintself, and such Judges as he shall appoint, shall judge them and their causes 
according to natural equity, in such sort as Kings in ancient time did with their 
kingdoms, before any certain municipal laws were given, as before hath been said. 
But if a King hath a title of descent, there seeing that by the laws of that kingdom 
he doth inherit the kingdom, he cannot change those laws of himself, without consent 
of Parliament. Also if a King hath a Christian kingdom by conquest, as King Henry 
the Second had Ireland, after King John had given unto them, being under his 
18 Three types of colony were established in North America during the seventeenth century, viz proprietary, royal 
(later Crown) and charter colonies. Burke An Account of the European Settlements in America (1757), 290-2; 
Blackstone Commentaries (1765), I, 108; Stokes Constitution of the British Colonies in North America (1783), 
13-14; Chitty Prerogatives of the Crown (1820), 32; Clark, Colonial Law (1834), 16-18. Although the possibility 
of New Zealand becoming a charter colony was raised during the 1830s it eventually was acquired as a Crown 
colony. For present purposes nothing turns on the distinction. 
19 (1608), 7 Co Rep 1 a at 17b. 
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obedience and subjection, the laws of Englcmdfor the government of that country, no 
succeeding King could alter the same without Parliament". 
Coke's comments on the status of infidel laws and territory upon conquest will be 
considered in the subsequent chapter. At the moment the importance of the above lay in the 
recognition only of conquest and descent as valid forms of territorial acquisition at common 
law. In conquered colonies the Crown enjoyed extensive prerogative powers of legislation 
but where it had granted "the laws of England for the government of that country" these 
could riot be altered without Parliament. 
Two important consequences for the Crown's new colonies in the New World flowed 
from Coke's words. First, since the American settlements were hardly to be the Crown's by 
descent they would necessarily take the common law designation of conquered territory. 
Secondly, being conquered territory the American settlements held no right to English law 
other than by grant of the Crown and were amenable to prerogative legislation. The few 
charters for the New World prior to Calvin's Case had made no stipulation that English law 
was to govern the settlements planted there but had adopted the 1505 formula to grant a 
system of law not repugnant to English law. The doctrine in Calvin's Case gave this 
practice a most compelling raison d' etre for the grant of English law to a settlement would 
have removed the Crown's prerogative legislative power. The grant of a system of internal 
regulation not repugnant to English law, however, ensured the preservation of the royal 
power whilst also facilitating some recognition of the 'birthright' of Englishmen abroad. The 
Stuart charters for North America issued after Calvin's Case maintained the practice of 
setting up the laws of England as a standard for compliance. 2O As one commentator has 
observed, it was as if these charters had "been contrived with Coke's report of Calvin's 
Case at the royal elbow".21 
The view taken by the early Stuarts was that where no grant of English law had been 
made for an overseas conquest Parliament held no legislative competence whatsoever. As 
the House of Commons debated whether the letters patent for New England (1620) were an 
infringement of the right of free fishery guaranteed English fishermen since Edward VI, 
Secretary Calvert, a notable participant in colonizing schemes of the period, informed the 
20 Notably: second charter for Virginia (1609), TCVC, 27 at 52; charter for Newfoundland Company (1610), SC, 
51; third charter for Virginia, TCVC, 76 at 86; charter for New England (1620), CC, Ill, 1827 at 1832; charter 
for Nova Scotia, text in Slafter Sir William Alexander and American Colonization (1873), 127 at 132-2; charter 
of Avalon (1623) in Prowse A History of Newfoundland from the English, Colonial and Foreign Records (1896), 
131 at 132; charter for Carolina (1629), CRNC, 64 at 66; charter for Massachusetts Bay (1629). CC. m. 1846 at 
1853; charter for Connecticut (1662). CC,I.529 at 533; charter for Rhode Island and Providence Plantations. CC. 
VI.3211 at 3214; charter for Carolina (1663); Parker ed North Carolina Charters and Constitutions. 76 at 77; 
charter to Hudson Bay Company (1670). text in Martin Hudson's Bay Company Land Tenures (1893). 163 at 
168; commission for New Hampshire (1680). CC. IV. 2446 at 2447; charter for Pennsylvania. Minutes of the 
Provincial Council of Pennsylvania .... 17 at 20; commission for New England (1688). CC. m. 1863 at 1864; 
21 
charter for Georgia. CC. II, 765 at 771. 
JH Smith Appeals to the Privy Council. 468. Similar analysis was made by the same writer in 'The English 
Criminal Law in Early America" in Smith and Bames The English Legal System " Carryover to the Colonies 
(1975). 6-10. Also Goebel Jr. Cases and Materials. 243; Law Enforcement in Colonial New York. 4-5; 'The 
Courts and the Law in Colonial New York" in Flaherty. ed Essays in the History of Early American Law. 5-7. 
House thaf12 
... if the Regall Prerogative have power in any thing it is in this. Newe Conquests are 
to be ordered by the Will of the Conqueror. Virginia is not anex' d to the Crowne of 
England and therefore not subject to the Lawes of this House". 
In other words, since English law had not been granted to the Virginia plantation it was not 
under the legislative authority of Parliament. This view of the Crown's exclusive prerogative 
legislative power was weakened by the Commons during the 1620s and did not survive the 
Restoration.23 Thereafter the Crown had both a Parliamentary and prerogative legislative 
capacity for the American colonies. The latter began to fall into disuse during the second 
half of the seventeenth century although some commentators of the eighteenth century were 
to deny any prerogative legislative power had ever existed other than as an unlawful Stuart 
pretence.24 Still, whilst the Stuarts' claim to exclusive legislative power over North America 
did not survive infancy, Secretary Calvert's words represented an unmistakeable application 
of the principles in Calvin's Case to the Crown's new and growing colonies in the New 
World. 
Throughout most of the seventeenth century the North American colonies were 
technically treated as conquests of the Crown in which the law of England held no currency 
other than as a yardstick against which local legislation might be tested and if found 
wanting disallowed by the Crown. Chalmers recounts the presentation by Attorney General 
Noy to the Privy Council (1633) of a "complete code for Newfoundland, which he advised 
the Crown to approve, because, said he, 'the king may make laws for such newly-acquired 
dominions"'.25 More significantly the case of Process into Wales (circa 1668-74) indicated 
that the Western Islands, Barbados, St. Christophers, Nevis and New England as well as 
Ireland and the islands of Guernsey and Jersey might be bound by Acts of Parliament or by 
laws made by the King's letters patent (that is, prerogative legislation).26 Similarly a legal 
opinion circa 1675 signed by eight eminent counsel advised in relation to America that "the 
Prince of that People who make the Discovery hath the Right of Soil and Government of 
that Place".27 Charles Molloy's De Jure Maritimo et Navali (1682), the first major English 
treatise on colonial jurisprudence, indicated that plantations, that is the Crown's American 
22 Notestein, Relf and Simpson, eds 1621 Debates, IV, 256. This view held at least to the Interregnwn: Keith First 
British Empire, 3-6; Knollenberg Origin of the American Revolution 1759-1766 (1960), 157. 
23 In Process into Wales (circa 1668), Vaughan 395, 124 ER 1072 (CP) it was affirmed Parliament as well as the 
Crown could legislate for the Crown's dominions. Also KnoIlenberg, op cif, 157. 
24 Chalmers Political Annals (1780), 17,20,44,48,49,83-84,11 0-111,681; Anon An Essay upon the Government of the 
English Plantations on the Continent of America (1701), 18-19; Douglass A Summary, Historical and Political .. . 
of the British Settlements in North America (1749) L 491; Hamilton The Farmer Refuted in Syrett, ed The 
Papers of Alexander Hamilton (1961),L112-13. 
25 Chalrners History of the Revolt of the American Colonies (circa 1782), 1,68. 
26 Vaughan 395, 124 ER 1072 (CP). 
27 DHNY, XIll,486. 
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r 
colonies, were ruled as conquests like Ireland.28 A private legal opinion (1683) by William 
Fitzhugh, a distinguished Virgina lawyer, also took the view that the North American 
colonies were classified as conquests. 29 Sir Matthew Hale's posthumously published History 
of the Common Law (1713) treated colonies, plantations and conquests as synonymous, a 
further indication of the seventeenth century position that whilst plantation might be a form 
of territorial acquisition distinct to conquest by arms it was nonetheless subject to the same 
rules at common law. 30 In Smith v Brown (circa 1702-5) Holt CJ held that "the laws of 
England do not extend to Virginia, being a conquered country their law is what the King 
pleases".31 
C. THE COMMON LAW AS THE BIRTHRIGHT OF THE SUBJECT 
The American colonists revealed their hostility towards designation as the inhabitants of 
conquered territory as early as 1651 when the colony of Virginia capitulated to the 
Commissioners of the Puritan government in England. The capitulation revealed the 
colonists considered themselves to have lost any status as 'conquests' given them years 
earlier by Secretary Calvert and their concern that capitulation to the Commonwealth would 
not revive such status.32 Not long after William Fitzhugh conceded the conquered status of 
the colony of Virginia (1683) but doubted its appropriateness. 33 A more significant rejection 
of the North American colonies' status as conquests occurred during a debate (1684) 
between the Houses of Assembly in the Province of Maryland over the right of the Speaker 
to issue warrants for elections to vacancies. Arguing in favour of his own prerogative, the 
Proprietor stated that "the King had power to dispose of his conquests as he pleased". This 
incensed the Lower House which rejected the word 'conquest' as sinister and claimed, 
instead, that the rights of the members of the Assembly were based up::m their full rights 
and privileges as Englishmen. These rights inhered in them as their bilthright and, also, had 
been granted to them by the words of the charter to the Lord Proprietor.34 
These examples of the American settlers' unhappiness with the doctrine from Calvin's 
Case classifying their colonies as conquests preceded the Glorious Revolution and 
highlighted the emerging belief amongst the colonists that they enjoyed English law as of 
right. This right they located either in the tem1inology of their colonial charters capable, 
28 Molloy De Jure Maritimo et Navali (1682), 432. 
29 Text in Davis WiIliam Fitzhugh and His Chesapeake World 1676·1701 (1963), 152 at 158. 
30 Hale A History of the Common Law (1713), 42; also Prerogatives of the King, cap ill 8 (English law has no 
currency in plantations until granted by King). 
31 (Circa 1702·5), 2 Salk 666, 91 ER 566; Holt 495, 90 ER 1172 (KB). 
32 Text in Hening, ed Statues at Large ... of Virginia (1823), I, 363·4. See the account in Sioussat The English 
Statues in Maryland (1903), 24. 
33 Text in Davis Wi/liam Fitzhugh, 152. 
34 Browne et ai, eds Archives of Maryland (1883·92), vrr, 87; see the accounts in Sioussat, English Statues in 
Maryland, 24 and Lovejoy The Glorious Revolution in America (1972), 89·97. 
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with some strain, of interpretation as a gift of , English law or, more usually and 
emphatically, in the simple argument that English law belonged to them as their birthright. 
What, it may be asked, did the North American colonists mean by the 'English law' 
which they claimed as a birthright? It has been shown their early practice distinguished 
'public' from 'private' law. In matters of private law, that is their affairs inter se, the 
seventeenth century colonists apparently considered themselves able to construct a legal 
system appropriate to their own circumstances. The common law was largely marginal to 
this activity. The rules legislated and applied by the courts amongst the colonists were 
usually a blend of the customary manorial and borough law experienced in England with 
Mosaic and scriptural influences.35 This was wholly consistent with the doctrine in Ca/vin's 
Case for it showed the colonists felt no obligation to apply the strict law of England.36 In 
questions of public law, however, the colonists insisted the common law governed their 
relations with the Crown. The common law was seen by them as the source of the rights 
and liberties of the subject against the monarch declared in Magna Carta. To the extent the 
seventeenth century colonists argued the common law crossed the Atlantic with them they 
thus limited it to the public sphere. An important example was the influential Declaration of 
the colony of Massachusetts (1646) which was accompanied by the "Parallels". The 
"Parallels" set out in one column "the fundamental and common lawes and customes of 
England, beginning with Magna carta", listing the laws and customs of the colony in the 
other.31 The intention was to show the laws of Massachusetts to be consistent with English 
law. Howe observes:38 
It should be noted that all of the provISions of English law summarized in the 
Declaration~ came from what may fairly be called the public, rather than private 
sector of that law. Whether the declarants were lifting provisions from Magna Carta 
or summarizing principles of the common and customary law of England their 
concern was, almost exclusively, with the English law's ordering of public affairs 
rather than its delineation of private relations. One would not be unfair in describing 
35 This was evident, for example, in 'The Lawes Divine, Morall, and Martiall for the Colony in Virginea Britania" 
(1612), Force's Tracts,m,#2 and "An Abstract of the Lawes of New-England as they are now established", id, 
#9. See Reinsch The English Common Law in the Early American Colonies (1899); Chafee Ir "Colonial Courts 
and the Common Law" ih Flaherty, ed Essays on the History of Early American Law, 53-82; Sioussat English 
Statutes in Maryland, passim; Goebel Ir "King's Law and Local Custom in Seventeenth Century New England" 
and the essays on particular colonies in Flaherty, op cit, and Billias, ed Selected Essays, Law and Authority in 
Colonial America (1965). 
36 On questions of private law, however, the common law was not without some influence: Woodbine 'The Suffolk 
County Court, 1671-1680", (1936), 43 Yale U 1036; Haskins "A Problem in the Reception of the Common Law 
in the Colonial Period" (1949), V Penn L Rev 842; JH Smith 'The Foundations of Law in Maryland: 1634-1715" 
in Billias ed, op cit, 92. 
37 Text in Hutchinson Collection of Papers Relating to Massachusells Bay (1769), 1,214. 
38 Howe 'The Sources and Nature of Law in Colonial Massachusetts" in Billias, ed, op cif, 1; also, Morris 
"Massachusetts and the Common Law: The Declaration of 1646" (1925-26), 31 Am Hist Rev 443. This 
Declaration and Paral1els was the basis for the influential Declaration of Laws and Liberties of Massachusetts 
Bay (1648), text in Farrand, ed The Laws and Liberties of MassachusellS (1929). See generally Plucknett "A 
Review of the Laws and Liberties of Massachusetts" (1930), 3 New Eng Q'ly 156, Wolford "The Laws and 
Liberties of 1648" (1948) 28 Boston V Law Rev 426; Haskins "Law and Colonial Society" (1957), 9 Am Q'ly 
354, Haskins and Ewing 'The Spread of Massachusetts Law in the Seventeenth Century" (1957-58), 106 V Penn 
Law Rev 413. 
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the factor of selectivity as one directed towards the specification of constitutional 
principles... when the declarants endeavor to summarize those principles of the 
common law which they consider in force in the colony they limit the list of 
applicable principles to the broadest of constitutional generalities". 
Thus Goebel comments:39 
When we say the people desired the common law, however, we do not mean that 
they thought of it in the bald terms of an action in trespass, a plea in abatement, a 
special traverse, a writ of entry in the cui or any of the other constitutents that went 
to make up the lawyer's idea of what this law was. It was to them a sanctuary which 
beckoned when there threatened some black evil from which they suffered, whether .. . 
a governor's ordinance, or a royal disallowance of a provincial act. Reduced to its 
lowest terms, we may say the colonists' desire was to enjoy the same privileges and 
rights with reference to the Crown that were enjoyed by the residents of England. 
That these rights and privileges seemed from the American colonies more delectable 
than they were in fact is comprehensible". 
During the close of the seventeenth and into the early eighteenth century the common 
law came to exert an ever-increasing influence in the American colonies upon matters of 
private law. This process is usually associated with the growing professionalisation of the 
colonial bar and the increasingly pluralistic character of colonial society.4O Thus Richard 
West could advise in his well known opinion of 1720 that the "common law of England, is 
the common law of the plantations".4! By the period immediately before the American 
Revolution where Imperial or local statute was silent the English common law was taken as 
the subsidiary system of law"2 subject to the important gloss that it was only applicable to 
the extent it met the circumstances of the colony.43 This congruence strengthened the 
argument of the colonists that the common law was their birthright and fostered the post-
Revolutionary orthodoxy that the common law had always had thorough application in the 
American colonies.44 Nonetheless, by the beginning of the eighteenth century the American 
39 J Goebel Jr "The Courts and the Law in Colonial New York", 33. 
40 Reinsch English Common Law in the American Colonies, 54; Goebel Jr "An Introduction" in Goebel and 
Naughton Law EnforcemenJ in Colonial New York 1664-1776, ix; R Pound The Spirit of Common Law (1921), 
113-6; Morris "Legalism versus Revolutionary Doctrine in New England" (1931) 4 New Eng Q'Zy 195-215. 
4! Text in Chalmers Opinions, L 194-5 (edited); ll,200-215 (full text). 
42 Opinion of Sir William Keith (1728), text in Goebel Cases and Materials, 278; Jury charge of James de Lancey, 
Chief Justice of New York (1733) cited in Smith "English Criminal Law", 45,n 25; Opinions of Smith and 
Murray (1734), text in Goebel, op cit, 272-7; Roberdeau v Rous (1738), 1 Atk 543, 26 ER 343 (Ch); Sir WilIiam 
Keith The History of the British Planatations in North America (1738); Douglass A Summary, Historical and 
Political... of the British SettlemenJs in North America (1749), passim; W Smith, Jr The History of the Province 
of New York (1756, reprint ed 1972),1,259; Burke An AccounJ of the European Settlements (1757), n,295-7. 
43 Blackstone included this gloss in the second edition of his Commentaries (1766), 107 at the suggestion of 
Mansfield (Waterman, 'Thomas Jefferson and Blackstone's Commentaries" (1933) 27 III Law Rev 629, n 120) 
who had referred to it in R v Vaughan (1769) 4 Burr 2494 (KB). The gloss appears to have become recognized 
during the 1750s: Smith Jr History of New York (1756), L259; Opinion of Henley A-G and Yorke S-G (1757), 
text in Chalmers Opinions, 1,197 at 198. cfBurke AccounJ of the European Settlements (1757), II,295-7. 
44 Chalmers Political Annals (1780), 367 et seq; Wilson "Lectures on Law" in McGloskey, ed Works of lames 
Wilson (1967), n, 582; Van Ness v Packard (1829), 2 Pet 137 (USSC) at 147; Wheaton v Peters (1834), 8 Pet 
591 (USSC) at 658-9; Commonwealth v Chapman (1847), 13 Metcalf (Mass Rep) 69 at 73-4; Story 
CommenJaries on the Constitution of the United States (1851), 103. 
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the factor of selectivity as one directed towards the specification of constitutional 
principles.. . when the declarants endeavor to summarize those principles of the 
common law which they consider in force in the colony they limit the list of 
applicable principles to the broadest of constitutional generalities". 
Thus Goebel comments:39 
When we say 'the people desired the common law, however, we do not mean that 
they thought of it in the bald terms of an action in trespass, a plea in abatement, a 
special traverse, a writ of entry in the cui or any of the other constitutents that went 
to make up the lawyer's idea of what this law was. It was to them a sanctuary which 
, beckoned when there threatened some black evil from which they suffered, whether ... 
a governor's ordinance, or a royal disallowance of a provincial act. Reduced to its 
lowest terms, we may say the colonists' desire was to enjoy the same privileges and 
rights with reference to the Crown that were enjoyed by the residents of England. 
That these rights and privileges seemed from the American colonies more delectable 
than they were in fact is comprehensible". 
During the close of the seventeenth and into the early eighteenth century the common 
law came to exert an ever-increasing influence in the American colonies upon matters of 
private law. This process is usually associated with the growing professionalisation of the 
colonial bar and the increasingly pluralistic character of colonial society.4O Thus Richard 
West could advise in his well known opinion of 1720 that the "common law of England, is 
the common law of the plantations".41 By the period immediately before the American 
Revolution where Imperial or local statute was silent the English common law was taken as 
the subsidiary system of la~2 subject to the important gloss that it was only applicable to 
the extent it met the circumstances of the colony.43 This congruence strengthened the 
argument of the colonists that the common law was their birthright and fostered the post-
Revolutionary orthodoxy that the common law had always had thorough application in the 
American colonies.'" Nonetheless, by the beginning of the eighteenth century the American 
39 J Goebel Jr "The Courts and the Law in Colonial New York", 33. 
40 Reinsch English Comnwn Law in the American Colonies, 54; Goebel Jr "An Introduction" in Goebel and 
Naughton Law Enforcement in Colonial New York 1664-1776, ix; R Pound The Spirit of Common Law (1921), 
113-6; Morris "Legalism versus Revolutionary Doctrine in New England" (1931) 4 New Eng Q'ly 195-215. 
41 Text in Chalmers Opinions, I, 194-5 (edited); IL200-215 (full text). 
42 Opinion of Sir William Keith (1728), text in Goebel Cases and Materials, 278; Jury charge of James de Lancey, 
Chief Justice of New York (1733) cited in Smith "English Criminal Law", 45,n 25; Opinions of Smith and 
Murray (1734), text in Goebel, op cit, 272-7; Roberdeau v Rous (1738), 1 Atk 543, 26 ER 343 (Ch); Sir William 
Keith The History of the British Planatations in North America (1738); Douglass A Summary, Historical and 
Political... of the British Settlements in North America (1749), passim; W Smith, Jr The History of the Province 
of New York (1756, reprint ed 1972), 1,259; Burke An Account of the European Settlements (1757), 11,295-7. 
43 Blackstone included this gloss in the second edition of his Commenlaries (1766), 107 at the suggestion of 
Mansfield (Waterman, 'Thomas Jefferson and Blackstone's Commentaries" (1933) 27 1/1 Law Rev 629, n 120) 
who had referred to it in R v Vaughan (1769) 4 Burr 2494 (KB). The gloss appears to have become recognized 
during the 1750s: Smith Jr History of New York (1756),1,259; Opinion of Henley A-G and Yorke S-G (1757), 
text in Chalmers Opinions, I, 197 at 198. cfBurke Account of the European SettiemenlS (1757), 11,295-7. 
44 Chalmers Political Annals (1780), 367 et seq; Wilson "Lectures on Law" in McGloskey, ed Works of James 
Wilson (1967), 11, 582; Van Ness v Packard (1829), 2 Pet 137 (USSC) at 147; Wheaton v Peters (1834), 8 Pet 
591 (USSC) at 658-9; Commonwealth v Chapman (1847), 13 Metcalf (Mass Rep) 69 at 73-4; Story 
Commenlaries on the Constitution of the United States (1851), 103. 
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colonists were insisting the common law wa<; their birthright and hence source of 
constitutional right. The doctrine in Calvin's Case, starkly re-emphasized by Holt CJ in 
Smith v Brown (circa 1702-05), contradicted this argument. 
D. BlANKARD V GALDY (1693): THE C0M1v10N LAW RECOGNISES 'SETrLED' 
COLONIES 
Although the Glorious Revolution was as much a colonial as English event the colonists 
were disappointed to learn afterwards that "they were dominions of the Crown to be dealt 
with as the King wished with no assurance of Englishmen's rights on a permanent basis".45 
Their agitation for what they perceived to be the inherent constitutional rights of Englishmen 
grew throughout the eighteenth century and culminated in the American Revolution. One of 
the major constitutional issues in debate prior to the American Revolution was the colonists' 
claim to as full rights and liberties as those held by the subject within the realm. This 
benefit, which acted as a springboard to their arguments concerning taxation, representation 
and parliament's legislative authority, they claimed as their birthright under the common 
law. To make out the constitutionality of this claim the colonists' advocates had to confront 
the doctrine in Calvin's Case which characterised the American colonies as conquests 
wherein the inhabitants enjoyed no inherent right to the common law of England.46 In 
claiming the benefit of the common law the colonists were assisted by Blankard v Galdy 
(1693), a case barely five years after the Glorious Revolution. 
In Blankard v Galdy (1693) Holt CJ held obiter that English laws were in force in the 
"case of an uninhabited country newly found out by English subjects". However, he 
proceeded, as Jamaica was a conquered colony the laws of England "did not take place 
there until declared by the conqueror or his successors".47 This decision was reinforced a 
few months later by Dutton v Howell where it was indicated that if subjects of the Crown 
went and possessed "uninhabited desert Country" with the Crown's consent the Common 
45 Lovejoy Glorious RevolUlion in America, 378. For contemporary accounts see Anon A Brief Relation of the State 
of New England from the beginning of that Plantation to the PresenJ Year, 1689 (1689) in Force's Tracts, IV, 
#11; Byfield An AccounJ of the LaJe Revolution in New England (1689), id, IV,#10 esp at 8; 'The Inhabitants of 
Boston and the Country Adjacent' The RevolUlion in New England Justified and the People There Vindicated 
(1691), id, IV,#9,esp 13-14; Dummer A Defence of the New England Charters (1721), 48-50; Otis The Rights of 
the British Colonies Asserted and Proved (1764), 24, 32. 
46 The American colonists' repudiated this aspect of Calvin's Case ("the bastard child of the bastard mother", 
Wilson "Lectures" (1790-91) in Workr of James Will'on, 1,582) but upon occasions invoked it in much the same 
way as Secretary Calvert in 1622 to argue Parliament lacked legislative power over the North American colonies: 
Otis Rights of the British Colonies asserted and Proved (1764), 43 et seq; 1. Wilson Considerations on the 
Nature and ExtenJ of the Legislative AUlhority of the British ParliamenJ (1774) in Workr, n,729 at 739-44; J. 
Adams Novanglus (1774) in The Workr of John Adams (1851), IV,ll at 131-50. Mcllwain supported such 
argumentation The American RevolUlion: A Constitutional InJerpretation (1923). The authority of Ca/vin's Case 
for this proposition has been thoroughly refuted: Schuyler ParliamenJ and the British Empire (1929), passim; 
HEL, XI,122-4; Keith First British Empire 380-83; and see Mullet "Coke and the American Revolution" [1932) 
Economica 457. The aspect of Calvin's Case of present roncern is the designation of the North American 
possessions as 'conquered' colonies. 
47 (1693), Holt 341, 90 ER 1089; 2 Salk 411, 91 ER 356; 4 Mod 222, 87 ER 359; Comb 228, 90 ER 445 (KB). 
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Law must be supposed their Rule, as 'twas their , Birthright" ,48 The distinction between 
unoccupied territory settled by British subjects and that got by conquest or cession was 
strengthened by the publication in the reputable Peere Williams Reports of a Memorandum 
(1722) issued by the Privy Council. The Master of the Rolls stated in this Memorandum that 
the Lords had determined:49 
1 st That if there be a new and uninhabited country found out by English subjects, as 
the law is the birthright of every subject, so, wherever they go, they carry their laws 
. with them, and therefore such new found country is to be governed by the laws of 
England .. .2ndly, Where the King of England conquers a country, it is a different 
consideration: for the conqueror, by saving the lives of the people conquered, gains a 
right and property in such people; in consequence of which he may impose upon 
them what laws he pleases, .. 
By 1722, then, the common law recognised a type of colony which was to become 
known as 'settled '. The cases made a clear distinction between conquered and settled 
colonies, limiting the latter to desert and uninhabited country. The cases did not consider, 
however, the effects which flowed from the ipso jure introduction of English law to a 
settled colony. In particular they failed to clarify whether the Crown enjoyed a prerogative 
power to legislate for such colonies. Hindsight might tell one that the response to this 
question clearly lay in the negative however this response was not so apparent at the time. 
Shower had made this point in his detailed submissions in Dutton v Howellso but whilst the 
House of Lords appreciated the distinction between the two forms of colony they were 
unable to take it to its logical conclusion. An opinion by law officers Yorke and Wearg 
(1724)51 was predicated on this basis, however, and the question appears to have been 
resolved conclusi.vely by Campbell v Hall (1774).52 
Not surprisingly Blankard v Galdy was used by the American colonists anxious to 
establish a constitutional basis to their claims for the full measure of rights and liberties held 
by the subject within the realm. They grasped such comments as those in Dutton v Howell, 
"'tis the People, not the Soil, that is ... said to be conquered", claiming that the Crown could 
hardly claim a conquest over its own subjects. s3 Such sentiments, it was seen, had been 
expressed earlier but now they held some judicial backing despite Holt's clear opinion in 
Blankard v Galdy and strong inference from Smith v Brown that settled colonies were 
limited to 'desert, uncultivated lands'. Charles Davenant very early saw the debate a.nd 
48 (1693), Shower PC 24, 1 ER 17 at 21. The case was argued afler the decision in Blanlwrd v Galdy: Slallcry, 
"Land Rights of Indigenous Canadian Peoples", 40. 
49 (1722), 2 P Wrns 75, 24 ER 646 (PC). 
so (1693), 1 ER 17 at 18a. 
51 Chalmers, Opinions, 1,222-3. 
52 (1774), Lofft 655, 98 ER 848; 1 Cowp 204, 98 ER 1045; 20 St Tr 239. This point appears to have found general 
acceptance by the mid-eighteenth century: Douglass A Summary, Historical and Political... (1749), 491; Bland 
The Colonel DismounJed (1764),25. 
53 (1693), 1 ER 17 at 22. 
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ensuing confusion which Blankard v Galdy would- assist and in 1701 recommended a 
declaratory statute stating that "Englishmen have right to all the laws of England, while they 
remain in countries subject to the dominion of this kingdom".S4 The call went unheeded and 
as a result from the begiIming of the eighteenth century the birthright theory of the reception 
of the common law was constantly invoked. One finds its presence, for example, in the 
dispute in Pennsylvania over the commissions of judges (1717-18)'.' It was applied by 
Richard West in his well known opinion as counsel to the Board of Trade (1720):'6 
The common law of England, is the common law of the plantations, and all statutes 
in affirmance of the common law, passed in England, antecedent to the settlement of 
a colony, are in force in that colony, unless there is some private act to the contrary, 
though no statutes made since those settlements, are there in force, unless the 
colonies are particularly mentioned. Let an Englishman go where he will, he carries 
as much of the law and liberty with him, as the nature of things will bear. 
A more explicit application of Blankard v Galdy to the North American colonies arose in 
the dispute in Maryland (1722-32) over the extension of general English statutes to the 
Province. During the course of this debate the Lower House, arguing for the extension of all 
general statutes of England in affinnance of the common law (such as the Habeas Corpus 
Act 1679), drew up a list of Seven Resolutions (1722). The third, fourth and fifth of these 
drew direct inspiration from Blankard v Galdy insisting that Maryland had not the status of 
a conquered but, by unmistakeable implication, settled colony:'7 
That the Province is not under the Circumstances of a Conquered Country; that if it 
were the present Christian Inhabitants thereof would be in the Circumstance, not of 
the Conquered, but of the Conquerors, it being a Colony of the English nation, 
encouraged by the Crown to transport themselves hither for the sake of improving 
and enlarging its dominions ... And 'tis unanimously Resolved that whosoever shall 
advance That His Majesties Subjects by such their Endeavours and Success, have 
forfeited Any Part of their English Liberties are ill Wishers to the Country and 
mistake its happy Constitution... Resolved also, that if there be any Pretense of 
Conquest, it can only be supposed against the native Indian Infidels, which 
Supposition cannot be admitted, because the Christian Inhabitants purchased great 
part of the land they at first took up from the Indians, as well as from the Lord 
Proprietary .. . " 
The Proprietor's Manifesto (1725) attempted a sensitive response. On the one hand he 
disclaimed any intention to assert that Maryland was a conquered country yet, on the other, 
he sought to dismiss the applicability of Blankard v Ga/dy on the narrow ground that the 
court had found in that case that Jamaica was a conquered colony. The rejoinder of the 
S4 Davenant "On the Plantation Trade" (1701) in Whitworth, ed The Political and Commercial Works of Charles 
DavenanJ (1771), rn, 1 at 35-6. 
ss State of Pennsylvania Minutes of the Provincial Council, rn, 33. See the account in Sioussat English Statues in 
Maryland, 26-7. 
'6 Chalmers Opinions, I, 194-5 and IT, 200-15 (full text). 
'7 Sioussat English Statutes in Maryland, App 1, 73 at 73-74. 
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Committee of Laws for the Lower House made the colonists' position clear: Maryland had 
been established by occupation and settlement and not by conquest notional or otherwise. 
The Committee rebutted the Proprietor's dismissal of Blankard v Galdy. Salkeld's report 
indicated that the proposition had not been argued by counsel for one side as the Proprietor 
had claimed but had been accepted and resolved by the court The Committee went on to 
suggest that a country inhabited by savages was like an uninhabited country with respect to 
the law of the newcomers. As a result they claimed Maryland was a settled colony of the 
I variety recognised in Blankard v Galdy.51 
During the course of the Maryland controversy Daniel Dulany Sr produced his tract The 
Right of the Inhabitants of Maryland to the Benefit of the English Laws (1728). For over 
thirty years this pamphlet remained the leading exposition of the colonists' claims to the 
common law as a birthright, being less conciliatory and more analytical than the well known 
anonymous pamphlet of 170159 and Dummer's celebrated Defence of the New England 
Charters (1721).60 Dulany rejected the equation of Maryland with conquered territory:61 
I have heard it asserted, that Maryland is a Conquered Country; which, by the By, is 
false, and that the Conquered, must submit, to whatever Terms the Victor thinks fit 
to impose on him,: Were the case really so, the Indians, must be the vanquished, and 
the English the Victors; and consequently the Indians, would be liable to the 
Miseries, in which a Conquered People are involved: Otherwise, the Conquerors 
themselves, must be Losers by their Courage, and Success; which would be but a 
poor Reward of their Valour, However gross, and absurd, these Notions appear to 
be... they have been insisted on, with great Confidence, by Men, that have more 
Knowledge than Honesty. 
Dulany also rejected the recognition in Calvin's Case of the continuity of the local law of 
conquered territory absent some act of suspension by the Crown. The application of this 
proposition to North America meant that in theory tribal law could govern the British 
communities. The possibility was, however, never more than notional and invariably 
deflected by the Crown's exercise of its constituent power for these communities. Still, even 
the theoretical applicability of tribal law to British subjects was too much to contemplate 
and reinforced the claim to the benefit of English law as the birthright of the subject. 
On questions of private law the claim that the common law accompanied the American 
colonists from England had hardened into orthodoxy during the 1720s and '30S.62 Prior to 
the enactment of the Stamp Act (1765)63 the colonists' claims to the birthright of the 
58 Id. 45-50. 
59 Anon An Essay upon the Government of the English Plantations (1701). 
60 Dummer A Defence of the New England Charters (1721). The constitutional argument of this tract was examined 
and explained by Otis Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved (1764). 61-2. 
61 Text in Sioussat English Statutes in Maryland. App 2. 98. Bailyn. Ideological Origins of the American 
Revolution (1967); 43 termed it "a protypical American treatise in defence of English liberties overseas, a tract 
indistinguishable from any number of publications that would appear in the Revolutionary crisis fifty years later". 
62 Supra n 42. 
63 5 Geo 3 c 12. 
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common law as a source of constitutional protection and liberty had been directed largely 
towards the executive activities of the Crown through its various colonial representatives. 
Significant instances of such claims besides the Maryland controversy and those already 
mentioned included the debate in New York over the Crown's right to erect courts of equity 
(1734)64 and the controversy over the tenure of colonial judges,65 writs of assistance66 and 
the criticism of the royal disallowance of colonial legislation.67 Such problems presented 
issues essentially concerned with the executive aspect of the Crown's government and 
though sources of irritation were of themselves insufficient to bring the American colonists 
to rebellion. 
The most important cause of the American Revolution lay in the colonies' confrontation 
with the doctrine of the sovereignty of Parliament. Until the enactment of the Sugar Act 
(1764) and, more importantly, the Stamp Act (1765), the thitherto ineffectual Molasses Act 
(1733) excepted, Parliament had only lightly touched upon the colonists' domestic affairs68 
and then in a manner which had been accepted if at times begrudgingly.69 From 1764 
onwards the colonists' advocates attempted to pit the common law, or at least their 
interpretation of it, against the sovereignty of Parliament. In terms of the strict legal theory 
then obtaining this approach was ill-conceived from the start in that it sought to find a 
limitation on the legislative competence of Parliament in a common law which had come to 
recognise its supreme power.70 Nevertheless the belletrists lof the American Revolution 
argued that the common law was the subject's birthright and that it recognised certain rights 
and liberties which neither the Crown nor Parliament could violate. For instance, they 
maintained that the common law recognised a subject could not be taxed other than by his 
elected representatives and since the colonies had no representation at Westminster 
Parliament's attempts to tax them were unlawful. The significance of such argumentation lay 
in its and violent repudiation of the suggestion emanating from Calvin's Case that the 
64 Opinion of Smith and Murray relating to courts of equity (1734) in Goebel Cases and Materials, 272-7. 
65 Bailyn Pamphlets of the American Revolution 1750-1776 (1965), 249-55; Labaree Royal Government in America 
(1930), 388-401. A contemporary pamphlet was Galloway A Letter to the People of Pennsylvania (1760) text in 
Bailyn Pamphlets, 257-72. 
66 These were writs empowering customs officers accompanied by a local peace officer to enter premises during 
daylight hours, by force if necessary, to search upon mere suspicion for smuggled goods: Knollenberg Origins of 
the American Revolution, 67-8. Although referred to in the Act of Frauds 1662, 13 & 14 Car 2 c 11, Coke (3 Co 
Inst 162) 162 stated "And here is a secret in law, that upon any statute made for the common peace, or good of 
the realm, a writ may be devised for the better execution of the same, according to the force and effect of that 
Act". Writs of assistance were treated, however, as a species of general warrant: for example, Otis Rights of the 
British Colonies Asserted and Proved (1764) and generally Mann "A Great Case Makes Law Not Revolution" in 
67 
68 
Hartog, ed Law in the American Revolution (1981) 3 at 6-7. 
Knollenberg, supra, 44-64. The issue arose in the dispute (1758-63) over Virginia's Twopenny Act and led to 
Bland's pamphlet The Colonel Dismounted (1764). 
Knollenberg, supra, 158-60 describes this legislation; also Christie Crisis of Empire, 13. 
69 The colonists conceded Parliament had some power to legislate at least for colonial trade: Dickinson Letters of a 
Farmer in Pennsylvania in Ford, ed The Writings of John Dickinson (1895), I, 312; Adams Novanglus (1774) in 
Works, IV, 100 at 150; Hamilton The Farmer Refuted in Papers,l,122-5. 
70 M Howard Jr A Letter from a Gentleman at Halifax (1765), text in Bailyn Pamphlets, 531 at 537 summarized 
the belletrists' conundrum succinctly: "Can we claim the common law as a inheritance, and at the same time be 
at liberty to adopt one part of it and reject the other?". 
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common law had not accompanied the colonists to ' the • conquered' colonies of the New 
World. 
Of these numerous pamphlets71 one might take Richard Bland's The Colonel Dismounted 
(1764) as a typical and leading example. During the course of this tract occasioned by the 
Parson's Cause of the early 1760s, Bland, a lawyer respected in colonial America for his 
knowledge of constitutional law,12 emphatically rejected any classification of the American 
colonies as conquests:73 
I do not suppose, Sir, that you look upon the present inhabitants of Virginia as a 
people conquered by the British arms. If indeed we are to be considered only as the 
savage ABORIGINES of this part of America, we cannot pretend to the rights of 
English subjects; but if we are the descendants of Englishmen, who by their own 
consent and at the expense of their own blood and treasure undertook to settle this 
new region for the benefit and aggrandizement of the parent kingdom, the native 
privileges our progenitors enjoyed must be derived to us from them, as they could 
not be forfeited by their migration to America. 
After reference to Calvin's Case and Smith v Brown Bland continued to insist the error of 
labelling the American colonies conquests:74 
It must be emmeous with respect to the original inhabitants because they were never 
fully conquered, but submitted to the English government upon terms of peace and 
friendship fixed and settled by treaties; and they now possess their native laws and 
customs, savage as they are, in as full an extent as they did before the English 
settled upon this continent. It must be erroneous with respect to the present 
inhabitants because upon a supposition that their ancestors were conquerors of this 
country, they could not lose their native privileges by their conquests. They were as 
much freemen, and had as good a right to the liberties of Englishmen after their 
conquest as they had before; if they had not, few of them, I believe, would have 
been induced by so inadequate a reward to endeavour an extension of the English 
dominions, and by making conquests to become slaves. 
Another rejection of the technical position that the American colonies were conquests of the 
Crown was made by James Wilson, an important constitutionalist of the Revolutionary 
period,75 in his widely distributed pamphlet Considerations on the Nature and Extent of the 
Legislative Authority of the British Parliament (1774). Wilson located the souce of the 
fiction of conquest in Calvin's Case and proceeded to reject in forceful terms its 
71 In addition to the examples in the text see, notably, Galloway Letter to ... Pennsylvania in Bailyn Pamphlets, 256 
at 270-1; Otis Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved (1764), 43-7 (this pamphlet was widely 
distributed being reprinted four times during the Stamp Act crisis and referred to by Lord Mansfield in the Lords: 
Bailyn Pamphlets, 409-11); "Substance of a Memorial Presented by the Assembly of Massachusetts" in Otis, op 
cit, App 2, 70 at 74; Dickinson Farmer's Letters (1768) in Writings, L 360; Adams Novanglus (1774) in Works, 
125-6. 
7Z Bailyn Pamphlets, 293. 
73 Bland The Colonel Dismounted (1764), 20-21. 
74 Id, 21. 
75 On Wilson's importance, McGloskey "Introduction" to Works of lames Wilson, L 2-10 and Adams Political 
Ideas of the Revolution, chap 7. 
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applicability to the American colonies:76 
In my Lord Coke's Report, it is said, "that albeit Ireland is a distinct dominion, yet, 
the title thereto being conquest, the same, by judgment of law, may be, by express 
words, bound by the parliaments of England". In this instance, the obligatory 
authority of the parliament is plainly referred to a title by conquest as its foundation 
and original. In the instances relating to the colonies, this authority seems to be 
referred to the same source: for anyone who compares what is said of Ireland, and 
other conquered countries, in Calvin's case, with what is said of America, in the 
adjudications concerning it, will find that the judges in detennining the latter, have 
. grounded their opinions in the resolutions given in the fonner ... This is unreasonable, 
and injurious to the colonies, to extend that title to them. How came the colonies to 
be a conquered people? By whom was the conquest over them obtained? .. The 
original colonists never suspected that their descendants would be treated as a 
conquered people; and therefore they never taught them the submission and abject 
behaviour suited to that character. 
Those writers who took a position less sympathetic to the colonists for the most part felt 
unable to state that the common law enjoyed no status as such in the colonies. In his Letter 
From ... Halifax (1765) Howard distinguished between the personal and political rights of the 
subjects, a distinction corresponding with that between private and public law. In matters of 
personal right the common law belonged to the subject by birthright, he found, but the 
political rights of the subject abroad were defined by the grant from the Crown in the 
exercise of its constituent power. Since the common law recognised this constituent power 
and also subjected the Crown to itself in Pariament it followed that Parliament held 
legislative authority over the American colonies.77 Nonetheless the pamphlet had conceded 
some currency to the common law in the colonies as the birthright of the subject. Similarly 
Pownall's widely read tract The Administration of the Colonies (3rd ed, 1766) declined to 
affinn the legal status of the American colonies as conquests. He conceded that this might 
be theoretically the case but stressed its incompatibility with the rights and liberties of the 
colonists as Englishmen.78 
Taken to its logical and fullest extent the argument that British colonists took English 
law with them as a birthright would have severely undermined the distinction between 
conquered or ceded and settled colonies. It would have created a class of persons in 
conquered or ceded colonies, the Crown's natural-born subjects, who enjoyed privileges as 
against the Crown not held by the vanquished population. Could, for example, prerogative 
legislation apply to the English as well as non-English inhabitants of the territory? 
It is not surprising, then, to find no less authorities than Blackstone and Lord Mansfield 
attempting to curb the inordinate extension of the birthright principle. These efforts were not 
76 Text in Works of lames Wilson, n, 739-40. 
77 Text in Bailyn Pamphlets, 531 at 535-6. Otis replied that Howard had mixed Blackstone's distinction between 
the rights of natural persons and bodies corporate: A Vindication of the British Colonies (1765) text in Bailyn 
Pamphlets, 553 at 559. 
78 Pownall The Administration of the Colonies (3rd ed, 1766), 30-33. 
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to be wholly successful. Their thrust was an insistence upon the purity of the rules affecting 
settled and conquered or ceded colonies. Both Mansfield and Blackstone tried to keep 
birthright theory from the rules affecting the latter variety. Thus Blackstone after 
distinguishing between the two types of colony stated in his Commentaries (1765):79 
Our American plantations are principally of this latter [ie conquered] sort, being 
obtained in the last century either by right of conquest and driving out the natives 
(with · what natural justice I shall not at present enquire) or by treaties. And therefore 
the common law of England, as such, has no allowance or authority; they being no 
part of the mother country, but distinct (though dependent) dominions. 
These comments were approved by Stokes (1783),80 Chitty (1820)81 and in Attorney-General 
v Stewart (1817l 2 but by the end of the eighteenth century this view of the legal status of 
the American colonies had become that of a minority. Mansfield concurred with the strict 
exclusion of the birthright principle from the rules affecting this variety of colony. In 
Campbell v Hall (1774) he provided a list of propositions concerning conquered or ceded 
territory which he found "too clear to be controverted". The fourth of these insisted:83 
that the law and legislative government of every dominion affects all persons and 
property within the limits thereof; and is the rule of decision for all questions which 
arise there. Whoever purchases, lives, or sues there, puts himself under the law of the 
place. An Englishman in Ireland, Minorca, the Isle of Man, or the plantations, has no 
privilege distinct from the natives. 
Though Mansfield's opinion was clear it may be added that his classification of Jamaica as a 
11 settled colony (which contradicted its classification as a conquest in Blankard v Galdy) may 
have contributed unwittingly to the very confusion he was anxious · to avoid. It should also 
be noted that Blackstone based his designation upon the circumstances of the indigenous 
tribes. By this time he must have felt unable to maintain the fiction derived from Calvin's 
Case which equated the conquest with one over the Crown's own subjects in the colony. 
Blackstone and Mans field 's efforts were not particularly successful. Even those writers of 
the post-Revolutionary period who disputed the constitutional claims the colonists had made 
against the sovereignty of ,Parliament, Stokes (1783) and Chitty (1820) who blindly followed 
Blackstone excepted, were unable to accept that the American colonies had the designation 
of conquests. Chalmers, to take a notable example, considered the early Stuarts claims to a 
prerogative legislative power in the American colonies, a claim directly supported by 
Calvin's Case, to be an unlawful pretence. The American colonies, he stated, had been 
79 Bla Comm (1765). I at 107. 
80 Stokes Constitution of the British Colonies (1783). 11-13. 
81 Chitty Prerogatives of the Crown (1820). 29. 
82 (1817).2 Mer 143. 35 ER 895 (Ch). 
83 (1774), 1 Cowp 204 at 208. 
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acquired by settlement: 84 
No conquest was ever attempted over the aboriginal tribes of America: Their country 
was only considered as waste, because it was uncultivated, and therefore open to the 
occupancy and use of other nations. Upon principles which the enlightened 
communities of the world deemed wise and just, and satisfactory, England deemed a 
large part of America a desert territory of her empire, because she had first 
discovered and occupied it; and thence inferred, that she might there form settlements 
of her subjects, in the same manner as if the surrounding sea had delivered back the 
lands which had been formerly ravished from her coasts. Whether Virginia was 
planted, in order to gratify the ambition of a king, to satisfy the avidity of a 
commercial company, or to promote the national interests by the extension of trade, 
the emigrants departed with the consent of the whole, on condition that they should 
be considered as subjects, though they intended to settle in a distant dominion of the 
state. As Englishmen, they carried with them their former rights: As Englishmen, 
they owed obedience to their ancient legislature. For, it is a principle of universal 
equity that he who enjoys the benefit shall submit patiently to all its inconveniences". 
Chalmer's views upon the original constitutional status of the Amelican colonies were 
shared by the influential American writers of the post-Revolutionary period. These writers 
took the position that the common law had arrived in the American colonies as the 
birthright of the emigrating subject.85 This position soon became the established doctrine of 
the American courts86 so that the American colonies became viewed retrospectively as 
having had the original status of settled colonies. 
The shift in thought over the legal status of the American colonies had a significant 
effect upon colonial law and practice. It indicated the extent to which the birthright theory 
had come to underlie colonial law in the century after Blankard v Galdy. Blackstone and 
Mansfield had tried to limit the birthright principle to desert, uncultivated lands (as had Holt 
in Blankard v Galdy and Smith v Brown) but once it became accepted that the American 
colonies had the status of settled colonies confusion was bound to eventuate. The 
constitutional status of a colony was now to be determined by reference not only to the 
physical state of the country but to the situation of the English colonists at the time of 
settlement. In the absence of a pre-existing civilized legal system to which they might 
properly be amenable, the colonists had the birthright to the benefit of the common law. In 
this way uncivilised as well as uninhabited territory became apt to classification as a settled 
colony of the Crown. This result had been forecast by Dulany Sr as early as 1728 when he 
stated that conquered or ceded colonies should be limited to tenitory in which there already 
84 Chalmers Political Annals (1780), 28. 
85 Wilson "Lectures" (1790-91) in Works, I, 363-4, 582; St. Geo Tucker, ed Commentaries on the Laws of England 
by Sir W. Blackstone (American ed, 1803), I, 382-4; Kent, Commentaries (1823), I, 473, n (b); Story, 
Commentaries, (2nd ed, 1851), 103-4. cfThomas Jefferson's position in letter of 13 June 1822 in Washington, ed 
The Writings of Thomas lefferson (1851), VID, 251 and VI, 65. 
86 Van Ness v Packard (1829), 2 Pet 137 (USSC) at 144; Wheaton v Peters (1834), 8 Pet 591 (USSC) at 658. The 
Jeffersonian position appeared in some early post-Revolutionary cases (eg Fitch v Brainerd (1805), 2 Day (Conn) 
163 (Conn SC) at 188; Town of Pawlet v Clark and others (1815), 9 Cranch 292 at 334, 3 Law Ed 735 at 750) 
but did not prevail. 
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existed a Christian lex loci: 87 
... when it is considered, that those Countries, were inhabited, by civilized, sociable 
People, conversant with Art, Learning and Commerce; that had laws suited, and 
adapted to the Order, and Engagements of Society; by which, themselves and others 
that went to live among them, might be peaceably, and happily governed: That cause 
was wanting here, and so must the Effect be; for Maryland, before it was settled by 
the English, was to Law and Government in the same Condition, with an uninhabited 
Wilderness: And in Case of an Uninhabited Country newly found out, by the English 
Subjects: All Laws in Force in England, are in force there. 
Prior to the colonists' application of Blankard v Galdy to the American colonies, as above, 
the earliest distinction between settled and conquered or ceded territory had simply been one 
distinguishing desert, uncultivated from inhabited land, an objective criterion unpolluted by 
the less objective distinction between civilised and uncivilised territory. If the basis of the 
distinction between the two types of colony recognised at common law was the amenability 
of British subjects to the lex loci, if any, what of those countries acquired from non-
Christian {XlIi ties whose sovereignty the Crown had fonnally recognised? Should the 
constitutional status of a colony at common law reflect the Crown's recognition of non-
Christian sovereignty or should it focus exclusively upon the amenability of British subjects 
to the indigenous law? This question, it will be seen, was constantly to perplex British 
practice in the years after the American Revolution. 
So far as colonial law was concerned an im{Xlrtant result of the American Revolution 
was the enlargement of the range of territory apt to classification as a settled colony. 
Although taking account of the character of native society and law (that is, the impossibility 
of its application to natural-born subjects of the Crown), this trend was never a development 
aimed towards establishing a fiction against the American Indian. The colonists' invocation 
of Blankard v Galdy and its eventual acceptance was always tied to claims against the 
mother country. The American Indians were only marginally relevant to the claim of the 
colonists that the common law was their birthright in that any conquered status could only 
be explained (as Blackstone had done) by reference to the Indian tribes. In a moment the 
confusion in colonial practice eventuating from this complication will be seen. Before then it 
is necessary to consider the effect of Lord Mans field 's important judgment in Campbel/ v 
Hall (1774). 
E. CAMPBELL V HALL (1774) 
This important case quickly became the leading statement of the Crown's powers in its 
colonies. Lord Mansfield's judgment was soon taken as clarifying the distinction between 
87 The Right of the InhabitanJs of Maryland to the Benefit of England Laws (1728), 20. 
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conquered or ceded and settled colonies although his position regarding the latter was by no 
means explicit in the text. 
The action in this famous case was brought by James Campbell against William Hall, a 
tax collector, for the return of duty paid upon goods exported from Grenada, a colony taken 
from the French by British forces and formally ceded to the Crown by the Treaty of Paris 
(1763). A Proclamation of 7 October 1763 and letters patent of 9 April 1764 had authorised 
the Governor to establish a representative legislature. Before the legislature came into being 
the King imposed a duty upon certain exports from the colony by letters patent of 26 July 
1764. At issue was the Crown's prerogative power to impose a duty upon the colony 
subsequent to the grant of a representative assembly. 
Mansfield agreed the Crown initially held a prerogative power of legislation in conquered 
or ceded colonies but found that the power to enact ordinary legislation disappeared upon 
the undertaking an assembly would be convened. Mansfield relied on two authorities. First, 
he referred to Coke's report of Calvin's Case in which it was stated that the King enjoyed 
no prerogative legislative power subsequent to the grant of English law to a colony. 
Mansfield clearly considered the grant of a representative assembly to put the Crown in the 
same constitutional position it would hold under English law. Secondly, Mansfield referred 
to a legal opinion of 1724 by law officers Yorke and Wearg in which they considered the 
power of the King to impose duties in Jamaica, the local assembly "being refractory". The 
existence of this power, they had advised, depended upon88 
... whether Jamaica is now to be considered merely as a colony of English subjects, 
or as a conquered country; if, we apprehend, as a colony of English subjects, they 
calmot be taxed, but by the Parliament of Great Britain, or by and with the consent 
of some representative body of the people of the island, properly assembled, by the 
authority of the Crown; but, it it can now be considered, as a conquered country, in 
that case, we conceive, they may be taxed, by the authority of the Crown. 
The opinion did not make it clear what was meant by the term a "colony of English 
subjects" although this presumably was a reference to the type recognized some years earlier 
in Blankard v Galdy (1693) and the Privy Council's Memorandum (1722). Although the 
opinion had been talking of settled colonies Mansfield still took it as authority for his ruling 
that once a conquered colony was promised a representative assembly the Crown's 
prerogative legislative power disappeared or, at least, was suspended. 
Campbell v Hall was concerned with the ordinary legislative power of the Crown in its 
overseas possessions. Mansfield did not turn his attention directly to the consequences which 
flowed from the introduction of English law into a conquered or ceded colony other than 
indicate the consequential loss of the prerogative legislative power although he did cite these 
88 Text in Chalmers Opinions. I, 204 at 222-3. 
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propositions which he found "too clear to be controverted":89 
A country conquered by the British arnlS becomes a dominion of the King in the 
right of his Crown; and, therefore, necessarily subject to the legislature, the 
Parliament of Great Britain. 
The 2d is, that the conquered inhabitants once received under the King's 
protection, become subjects, and are to be universally considered in that light, not as 
enemies or aliens. 
The 3d, that the articles of capitulation upon which the country is surrendered, 
and the articles of peace by which it is ceded, are sacred and inviolable according to 
their true intent and meaning. 
The 4th, that the law and legislative govemment of every dominion affects all 
persons and all property within the limits thereof; and is the rule of decision for all 
questions which arise there. Whoever purchases, lives, or sues there, puts himself 
under the law of the place. An Englishman in Ireland, Minorca, the Isle of Man, or 
the plantations has no privilege distinct from the natives. 
The 5th, that the laws of a conquered country continue in force, until they are 
altered by the conquerer: the absurd exception as to pagans in Calvin's Case shows 
the universality and antiquity of the maxim. 
The 6th, and last proposition is, that if the King (and when I say the King, I 
always mean the King without the concurrence of Parliament,) has a power to alter 
the old and to introduce new laws in a conquered country, this legislation being 
subordinate, that is subordinate to his own authority in Parliament, he cannot make 
any new change contrary to fundamental principles: he cannot exempt an inhabitant 
from that particular dominion; as for instance, from the laws of trade, or from the 
power of Parliament, or give him privileges exclusive of his other subjects; and so in 
many other instances that might be put. 
\ These propositions recognized the continuity of the lex loci in a conquered or ceded colony 
\ but gave the Crown the power to alter these laws by prerogative legislation. The Crown's 
t\ powers in its conquered or ceded colonies was recognised as plenary even with regard to 
any community Qf natural-born subjects who could not claim the birthright to English law as 
1 • a "privilege distinct from the natives". In addition Mansfield apparently considered the tenns 
of any treaty of capitulation binding on the Crown in the exercise of its prerogative 
legislative powers. This was the interpretation put upon his judgment in the East Indies 
during the late eighteenth to early nineteenth century.90 Where the Crown had granted 
English law to the conquered colony or promised a representative assembly under the Great 
Seal the ordinary legislative power was lost. Thereafter the Crown retained a prerogative 
constituent power but this could not be exercised inconsistent with the laws of England or 
the tenns of a formal treaty of capitulation. Mansfield's recognition of the Crown's lack of 
an ordinary prerogative power of legislation in a conquered or ceded colony subsequent to 
its introduction of English law or fonnal promise of a representative assembly was taken as 
89 1 Cowp 204 at 208-9. 
90 It appears the supposition was made that the Crown could not alter treaty rights without Parliament. For instance 
Amerchund Burdeechund v United East India Co (1826) 4 Ind Dec (OS) 547 at 554 per West CJ (reversed on 
other grounds on appeal 1 Knapp 316 (PC»; letter from the Judges of the Supreme Court (Bengal), September 
1830, pp (1831), VI, Pt 5,#26, encl 4, 117 at paras 14 and 29; letter from Grey and Ryan H, 16 December 
1830, id,#33, para 4. 
having as its corollary the absence of an ordinary legislative power in settled colonies and 
the limitation of the constituent power to the convening of a representative assembly. This 
followed from Mansfield's approval of the 1724 opinion. 
Unlike Blackstone, Mansfield expressed no clear view on the constitutional status of the 
American colonies but, it has been seen, he finnly rejected the attempt to implant the 
birthright principle int9 the rules affecting conquered or ceded tenitory. Although he was 
unequivocal on this point one aspect of his judgment together with that given some years 
earlier . in R v Vaughan (1769) hinted some flexibility in the process by which a colony 
received its designation at common law. In R v Vaughan91 and Campbell v Hall Mansfield 
indicated the colonists in Jamaica might have received the full rights and liberties of 
Englishmen not in virtue of the grant of a representative assembly but by reasons of an 
original settled status. Jamaica had been taken from the indigenous Arawak Indians by the 
Spanish who, in turn, were expelled by the English in 1655. Mansfield found that all the 
Spaniards having left the island or been driven out, Jamaica was from its first settling as an 
English colony established by British subjects "who under the authority of the King planted 
a vacant island, belonging to him in right of his Crown".92 Although Mansfield treated 
Jamaica as uninhabited tenitory his finding hinted that the mode of acquisition given a 
colony at common law could take account not of the formalities of acquisition (conquest 
from Spain) but the actual position of the inhabitants. This position was expressed more 
strongly by Cockbum LCJ in R v Eyre (1867) when he described Jamaica as a settled 
colony for the reason that "the land was conquered, but the inhabitants by whom it was 
, settled were not" .93 Both judges clearly felt the notional subjection of the British population 
to Spanish law to be absurd. Although these opinions about the . constitutional status of 
Jamaica were not to prevail94 they were symptomatic of the growing confusion over the 
identification of a colony's constitutional status. 
F. THE BIRTHRIGHT PRINCIPLE AFfER THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
The orthodoxy developed during the eighteenth century that the common law had 
accompanied the American colonists as their birthright confounded the earliest constitutional 
designation of the American colonies which had seen them as conquests in which the 
inhabitants held no inherent right to law other than that prescribed by the Crown. This 
development could be explained upon one of two theoretical grounds: Either the American 
colonies had always been of the settled variety despite the tardiness of the common law's 
91 (1769) 4 Burr 2494 at 25()(), 98 ER 308 at 311 (KB). 
92 1 Cowp 204 at 211. In fact this was not totally correct. Some Spanish colonists had taken to the hills from 
where they waged guerilla warfare: Roberts-Wray Commonwealth and Colonial Law, 852. 
93 (1867) quoted in Forsyth Opinions, 15. 
94 lacquet v Edwards (1867), Stephens SC 414 (Jam SC); Phi/lips v Eyre (1870), LR 6 QB 1 at 18; Roberts-Wray 
Commonwealth and Colonial Law, 46-7. 
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recognition of such colonies or, alternatively, the c;olonies kept the conquered or ceded 
status but the birthright principle extended to give the Crown's subjects within the region 
certain inherent rights. The fonner explanation was the preferred one and its underlying 
corollary, that territory inhabited by tribal peoples could as well be settled territory as that 
desert and uncultivated, became incorporated into colonial law. The latter explanation, one 
expressly dismissed by Mansfield in Campbell v Hall, obtained partial recognition in the 
colonial law of the post-Revolutionary period. 
1. birthright principles in the rules affecting conquered or ceded territory 
Although the assertion of the birthright principle was strongest and the most influential in 
North America it was not without its recognition elsewhere in the pre-Revolutionary period. 
The most notable example would be the three Presidency towns of the East India Company. 
In an opinion of 1757 of law officers advised that these towns could be treated as colonies 
to which English persons "carry with them your Majesty's Law".95 Although these towns 
had been acquired by cession from the Mughal authorities or, in the case of Bombay, 
Portugal and were treated as having this constitutional status, the law officers found letters 
patent granting English law to the English inhabitants were not necessary. The opinion 
implicitly admitted that English law had accompanied the English subjects into the ceded 
colonies as a birthright independent of the grant from the Crown. It should be noted that the 
scope of this finding was limited to the affairs of the English population inter se and was 
not meant to facilitate the argument that the common law gave the subject constitutional 
privileges agains~ the Crown. The only notable example from the East Indies during the 
mid-eighteenth of the use of the common law for a claim against the Crown located was the 
trial of James Creassy in Bombay for alleged assault and battery of two servants. During the 
course of his trial (1778) Creassy demanded civil trial by jury despite the non-provision for 
this in the royal charter of the Bombay Supreme Court granted pursuant to the Regulating 
Act. When, inevitably, judgment was given against him, a public committee was fonned and 
a petition drawn up for presentation to the Supreme Court and, eventually, the authorities in 
I 
England.96 Chief Justice Impey, who had counselled the petitioners otherwise, described this 
petition (1779) as a pretence by which the English inhabitants affected "to have learnt, from 
the Decisions in Creassy's Cause, for the first time, that the Civil Causes of British Subjects 
were not triable by Jury; and they demanded such Trial 'as the unalienable Right of British 
Subjects, residing in any Country where the Laws of Great Britain are in force, however far 
removed from their ' native land'''. In a letter of the same day Impey scorned the English 
inhabitants of Bombay who "talk of their rights being indefeasible like the Americans and in 
95 Text in E I Co Tracts, np. Also an abbreviated version in Chalmers Opinions, I, 195. 
96 J Fitzjames Stephen Numcomar and lmpey, IT, 205-7. 
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case of want of success to follow their example". 97 
An illustration of the infiltration of birthright theory into the rules affecting conquered or 
ceded territory in the period after the American Revolution was given in Ruding v Smith 
(1821). In this case Lord Stowell had occasion to consider whether English or Dutch laws 
of marriage applied to an English couple married in the Cape Colony subsequent to the 
British acquisition by . cession from the Dutch. If the principle of continuity was applied 
unqualifiedly Dutch law would have prevailed, however in the course of judgment the 
following observation was made:98 
I am perfectly aware that it is laid down generally, in the authorities referred to, 'that 
the laws of a conquered country remain till altered by the new authority'. I have to 
observe, first, that the word 'remain' has, ex vi termini, a reference to its obligation 
upon those in whose usage it already existed, and not to those who are entire 
strangers to it. 
Accordingly it was held the English law of marriage applied to the couple despite the 
absence of any postive act by the Crown introducing English law to the Cape. So far as the 
internal dealings of the English population of the Cape were concerned no such positive act 
was considered necessary as a matter of law. 
During the nineteenth century some courts took an approach to the introduction of 
English law to conquered colonies similar to that in Ruding v Smith. 99 It should be stressed, 
however, that the ipso jure introduction of English law to a conquered or ceded colony 
recognised by these cases was always limited to the dealings of the English subjects inter 
se. The claim to English law was never to reach the extent it had in North America some 
years earlier where it was used to justify constitutional claims a~ainst the Crown. To this 
extent Lord Mansfield's fear in Campbell v Hall (1774) that the successful invocation of the 
birthright principle by the English population of a conquered or ceded colony would give 
them "privileges distinct from the natives" was not realized. But, equally, by the early 
nineteenth century the proposition was established that the English population of a 
conquered or ceded colony had the right to English law in their relations inter se 
independent of grant from the Crown. 
I 
2. settled colonies in uncivilised territory 
97 Jmpey to Weymouth, 26 March 1779, text in "Reports on the Administration of Justice &c. in the East Indies", 
Reports from Committees of the House of Commons, 1st ser, V, Gen app 31, 182-3. 
98 (1821), 2 Hag Con 371, 161 ER 774 at 778. 
99 The Indian Chief (1800) 3 Rob Admir Rep 17 at 28; R v Brampton (1808), 10 East 283, 103 ER 782 (KE) at 
784; Attorney·General v Stewart (1817) 2 Mer 143, 35 ER 895; Donegani v Donegani (1834), 3 Knapp 63 (PC); 
and, especially, Freeman v Fairlie (1828) 1 Moo Ind App 306, 18 ER 117 (Ch) at 128 and 130 and "Report of 
the Indian Law Commission on the Lex Loci" (1840) in "Special Reports of the Indian Law Commissioners" pp 
(1843), XXXVI, #7, 370 et seq, also extracts in Beramji v Rogers (1867), 4 Bomb HCR 1 at 17 and Rankin 
Background to Indian Law, 22; and Advocate·General of Bengal v Ranee Surnomoye Dossee (1863) 9 Moo Ind 
App 427, 19 ER 786. 
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After the AmeIican Revolution it became accepted that territory held by the Crown in 
which the native inhabitants were of an uncivilized nature could be properly designated a 
settled colony. This principle was well established by the time Britain annexed New Zealand 
in 1840. Several examples from British practice of the early nineteenth century illustrate the 
character of this development. 
In 1819 law officers Shepherd and Gifford considered the prerogative right of the King 
to levy taxes in the colony of New South Wales. loo They found that such taxes could only 
be imposed by Parliament in the absence of a local representative assembly. Similarly an 
opinion of James Stephen (1822) confirmed that New South Wales had not been acquired by 
conquest or cession from the aboriginal population but had been appropriated by 
settlement. 101 The basis of this was made explicit by Lord Watson for the Privy Council in 
Cooper v Stuart (1889):102 
The extent of which English law is introduced into a British Colony, and the manner 
of its introduction, must necessarily vary according to circumstances. There is a great 
difference between the case of a Colony acquired by conquest or cession, in which 
there is an established system of law, and that of a Colony which consisted of a tract 
of territory practically unoccupied, without settled inhabitants or settled law, at the 
time when it was peacefully annexed to the British dominions. The Colony of New 
South Wales belongs to the latter class. 
Although the advice conceded the aboriginal presence their status was not at issue and the 
report proceeded on the basis that there was no law other than English which might have 
applied to the English inhabitants. On that basis New South Wales was considered a settled 
colony. 
For much the same reason Newfoundland was identified as a settled colony in 1820. 
Although the exact date of British sovereignty over this colony is uncertain, it is clear that it 
had been established by the early to mid-eighteenth century. For the most part the region 
had been treated more as a fishery than a colony and on the supposition that the Crown 
enjoyed wide powers similar to those it had for conquered or ceded territory. This belief 
was shaken in Jennings v Hunt (1820) which decided that Newfoundland was a settled 
colony and so not subject to prerogative legislation. I03 As with the Australian colonies this 
classification was not an abnegation of the aboriginal presence so much as a realization of 
the absence of a pre-existing legal system to which English people could be expected to 
conform. This realization had appeared much earlier as obiter dicta in Mostyn v Fabrigas 
lOO Text in O'Connell and Riordan, eds Opinions on Imperial Constitutional Law, 4. 
101 Text in Harlow and Madden, eds British Colonial Developments 1774 - 1834 Select Documents, 161. 
102 (1889) 14 App Cas 286, 291 (PC) (emphasis added). And, generally, Castles An Introduction to Australian Legal 
History, 1-25. 
103 (1820), 1 Newf LR 220 (Newf SC) at 225. Also Yonge v Blaikie (1822), 1 Newf LR 277 (Newf SC); Kei/ly v 
Carson (1841-42), 4 Moo PC 63, 13 ER 225. This position had been first postulated by Reeves History of the 
Law of Shipping (1792), 125. 
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(1774-75) where Lord Mansfield delivering judgment barely six weeks after Campbell v 
Hall, held English law to apply as amongst European persons along the Labrador coast. He 
observed that there were "no local Courts among the Esquimax Indians upon that part of the 
Labrador coast; and therefore whatever injury had been done there by the King's officers 
would have been altogether without redress" 104 were English law held not to apply. As with 
New South Wales the original constitutional status of Newfoundland was being defined not 
by reference to the aboriginal population so much as the position of the English 
communities in uncivilised territory without a suitable lex loci. 
The Crown's colonies in West Africa are other and probably more important examples of 
colonies with an aboriginal population which were treated as settlements at common law. 
During the late eighteenth to early nineteenth century the constitutional status of the British 
West African possessions was undetermined as they were initially limited to forts and 
factories controlled by chartered companies established under Act of Parliament. Hence one 
might explain Clark's reluctance in 1834 to clarify the constitutional status of these 
colonies.105 When the Crown resumed control of these forts and factories it was on the basis 
that these territorial possessions were settled colonieslO6 despite its consistent recognition of 
the sovereignty of the chiefs of the region. This position was taken in the British 
Settlements (West Africa and Falklands Islands) Act 1843107 which recognised the British 
forts and factories along the coast of West Africa as settled colonies. The exception to this 
(although not one recognised in the Act) was the Gold Coast possessions which for reasons 
which remain unclear were considered by the Colonial Office to have been got by conquest 
or cession.la! 
Further south the Boers of the Cape Colony had been establishing themselves during the 
1820s in the territory of the Griqua tribes across the Orange River. The Griquas were not 
the aboriginal inhabitants of the region but relative newcomers. On 3 February 1848 
Governor Smith of Cape Colony declared the Crown's sovereignty over the Orange River 
region. Subsequently the colonial Attorney-General Porter gave his opinion that the Orange 
River had been acquired in sovereignty by occupation of British subjects: 109 
Is the Orange River Sovereignty a colony by conquest? At first sight it scarcely 
seems to be so. There are within it chiefs with whom we have entered into treaties, 
recognizing if not guaranteeing certain lands, and it seems absurd to say these lands 
104 (1774-75) Cowp 161, 98 ER 1021 at 1032. Mansfield did not advert to the constitutional status of the territory. 
105 Clark Colonial Law (1834), 20. 
106 Stephen to Hope, 26 December 1842 CO 9612:111,113; Hope to Stanley, 30 January 1843 CO 9612:117. Also 
Palmer v Stooke (1953) Sel Judg WACA 333; Buck v Attorney-General (1965) Ch 745 at 756 (Sierra Leone); 
Sabally v Attorney-General (1964) 3 WLR 732 at 737,741,745; Forsyth Opinions (1869), 27. 
lOO 6 & 7 Vict c 13. 
la! Hope to Stephen, minute 3 December 1842, CO 9612:108. cl Roberts-Wray Commonwealth and Colonial Law, 
110-112,789 and Rv Kojo Thompson (1944) 10 WACA 201. 
109 "Opinion of the Attorney-General on Measures for the Government of Orange River and British Kaffraria", 25 
March 1849 CO 879/1:1,10-23 at 14-15. 
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have been acquired by the occupancy of the ,very emigrants whom we laboured to 
exclude from them. All this is true. But it is also true that British subjects have 
settled down in a country where the feeble natives, so far from being in a position to 
maintain their vague, unsettled claims to vast tracts, could not defend their very 
kraals against those who have long ceased to view themselves as sojoumers, and 
have for some time been the real masters of the land. As real powers the native 
chiefs exist no longer. Everything that could be tried was tried by the British 
Government to retain that theoretical supremacy. When, under such circumstances, 
and mainly for the protection of those who cannot protect themselves, sovereignty is 
asserted over those extended regions, it appears to me not to be unreasonable to call 
the colony so created a colony by occupancy. I avoid all attempt to define the sort of 
native occupation, which, when it exists, makes European intrusion, robbery, and 
when it does not exist, makes European intrusion rightful. But when, as a matter of 
fact, British subjects have got, in large numbers, amongst barbarous or semi-
barbarous people, and brought about such a state of things, that if our support were 
once withdrawn, the natives would sink into serfs upon the face of the land, I regard 
the occupancy of the British subjects as being in the nature of almost every 
occupancy of which we have the history, and am disposed to view the colony created 
by the declaration of British sovereignty, as a colony by occupancy, instead of by 
conquest or by cession. If the Orange River Sovereignty be a colony of this 
description, provision for its future [i.e. any non-representative] government ought, it 
would seem, to be made by Parliament. 
A treaty of cession from the Griqua chiefs had been out of the question, Porter noted: llo 
Another Waitangi treaty would have been another mockery, and, even if it were 
otherwise, there was in fact no such treaty; nor had there been any such previous 
powers to make a treaty as existed, if I mistake not, in the instance of Waitangi. 
Merivale of the Colonial Office disagreed thinking the Orange River shared the Cape 
Colony's status of a conquered or ceded colony.lll He based this on what Roberts-Wray 
later called the 'doctrine of absorption'Il2 rather than the previous recognition of the 
sovereignty of the Griquas. He explained that "when British subjects ... proceeded from a 
Crown colony under Roman Dutch law, they carried with them no greater rights than they 
enjoyed in their former place of residence".ll3 As the Boers had left the Cape Colony and 
not England for the Orange River their 'birthright' was limited to the constitutional 
privileges they had enjoyed at the Cape. 
These African examples show the confusion that had crept into British practice during 
the early nineteenth century as to the appropriate constitutional status for a new colony: In 
some cases the position of the English inhabitants was treated as paramount, an emphasi$ 
which suggested the settled designation, but in other cases the formalities of territorial 
acquisition (treaty with an uncivilised ruler) could prevail. As Porter's opinion revealed, 
either emphasis could be preferred. No guidance to selection of the appropriate emphasis 
110 Id, 13. 
111 Merivale, minute, 5 June 1849 CO 879/1:1,27-30. 
112 Commonwealth and Colonial Law, 110-112. Roberts-Wray does not refer to this example. 
113 Supra. 
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was ever forthcoming. The most that can be said , is that those colonies acquired from 
aboriginal tribes and treated as settlements must have presented occasions upon which the 
Crown felt the birthright argument to be particularly strong. Certainly by the mid-nineteenth 
century the public (as opposed to private) law aspect of the British subject's birthright to 
English law was being characterised by Under-Secretaries Stephen114 and MerivaleIU of the 
Colonial Office in terms of a right to representative government. This aspect was one 
immediately associable with the common law designation as a settled colony. It suggests 
that the designation was apt to arise for those colonies where a preponderantly British 
population would be the primary beneficiaries of the constitutional arrangements which the 
Crown in exercise of its constituent power would be called upon to provide. This explains 
why colonies in Africa and New Zealand acquired by the Crown by treaty with the tribal 
rulers whose sovereignty it had solemnly and consistently recognised were treated as settled 
colonies. This, however, was no guidance to selection of a colony's constitutional status so 
much as an indication of the inherent uncertainty. Thus in 1834 Clark drew a list of thirty-
two British possessions of which he found three (Newfoundland, New South Wales and 
Tasmania) were settled colonies. 116 By 1869 the number of British possessions had grown to 
forty yet Forsyth found twenty-five to have been acquired by settlement.117 
3. the distinction between conquered or ceded and settled colonies during the nineteenth 
century 
By the 1820s the distinction between the two forms of colony was beginning to break 
down in as much as it was recognised that the English communities in either had the 
inherent entitlement (birthright they called it) to English law in their relations inter se 
independent of formal grant from the Crown. The sole function of the constitutional 
classification of a colony lay in its prescription of the legislative and constituent power of 
the Crown: According to the rules in Campbell v Hall the Crown could grant a non-
representative assembly and enact ordinary legislation for a conquered or ceded colony until 
such time as it granted either English law or a representative assembly. The Crown held no 
ordinary legislative power in a settled colony and its constituent power was limited to the 
establishment of a representative assembly. 
In practical terms this meant the erection by the Crown of a non-representative assembly 
in a settled colony required Parliamentary permission. Thus one finds in respect of virtually 
all the Crown's settled colonies of the late eighteenth to mid-nineteenth century special 
114 Stephen, "Report on Australian Legislatures", 21 February 1849, CO 881/1 :#2,3-6. See Wakefield debunking 
Stephen's position in "The Art of Colonization" (1849) in Collected Works, 914. 
115 Merivale Lectures on Colonization and Colonies (1839-41), N, 103-105. 
116 Clark Colonial Law (1834), 18-27. 
117 Forsyth Opinions (1869), 26-7. 
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legislation enlarging the Crown's constituent power.ll~ This practice became so common that 
eventually general empowering legislation, the British Settlements Act 1887,119 gave the 
Crown as full constituent power in its settled colonies as that held in its conquered or ceded 
possessions. The practice of extending the Crown's constituent power in settled colonies by 
statute was reviewed and explained by James Stephen in an important report to Cabinet on 
the Australian legislatures (1849). Although he fully admitted, indeed advocated, the 
'birthright' . of the English communities to the same constitutional privileges as those of the 
subject in England the "indispensable condition" to the grant of representative institutions 
was "we think, that the colonists should sustain the whole expense of their own civil 
government" . 120 Since special and in the end general empowering legislation assimilated the 
Crown's constituent power in settled colonies to those it held in conquered or ceded 
territory by the end of the nineteenth century there was diminishing point to the old 
common law distinction between the two types.12I By the mid-nineteenth century a colony's 
constitutional status had no bearing upon the common law's recognition of the continuity of 
the lex loci, nor did it disqualify (as once it had) the English community from the benefit of 
English law in their relations inter se. We will discuss this last aspect more fully in the next 
chapter. 
G. THE ORIGINAL CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF THE COLONY OF NEW 
ZEALAND 
From as early as January 1839 the Colonial Office was treating the prospective colony of 
New Zealand as having the common law status of a settled colony. That month in a minute 
on policy for New Zealand James Stephen adverted to the need for the Parliamentary 
enlargement of the Crown's constituent power in the prospective colony. He advised that 
since "the Royal prerogative of creating Legislative Bodies extends only to such Legislatures 
as are constituted on the Representative principle, application should be made to Parliament 
as in the case of Western Australia, to confer this power on a Governor + Council without 
an Assembly" .I22 This initial designation of New Zealand as a settled colony was never 
controverted by the Colonial Office and provided the basis for the constitutional 
arrangements thenceforth made for the country. 
118 4 Geo 4 e 96 (1823) and 9 Geo 4 e 83 (1829) (New South Wales); 10 Geo 4 e 22 (1830) (Western Australi a); 4 
& 5 Will 4 e 95 (South Australia); 5 & 6 Viet e 120 (Newfoundland); 6 & 7 Viet e 13 (1843) (West Africa and 
Falkland Islands); 3 & 4 Viet e 62 (1840) and 9 & 10 Viet e 103 (New Zealand); 29 & 30 Vict e 115 (Straits 
Settlements ). 
119 50 & 51 Vict e 54 (1887) consolidating the 1843 (supra) and 1860 (23 & 24 Vict c 121) Acts. The Act did not 
give the Crown any ordinary legislative but simply enlarged the constituent power. 
120 "Report on Australian Legislatures", 21 February 1849 CO 881/1;2,5. 
121 It was still necessary to distinguish "settlements" under the British Settlements Act from the 'settled' colonies 
acquired before and hence not subject to the Acts: Roberts-Wray Comnumwealth and Colonial Law, 184. 
122 Stephen, minute, 21 January 1839 CO 209/4:193,196. 
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A few days after writing the minute Stephen prepared the first draft instructions for 
Hobson. These draft instructions noted the prerogative constituent power in relation to any 
territory acquired in sovereignty in New Zealand was limited to the grant of a representative 
assembly but commented that "such a body would be wholly unsuited to the infancy of such 
a Settlement" .123 The second draft instructions of early March 1839 made a similar point, as 
did the eventual instructions of August that year, tenning a representative assembly "unripe" 
for the "particular exigencies of the Colony" .124 A few days later Stephen reiterated his 
inability to conceive of any mode of colonizing New Zealand other than by the grant of a 
representative assembly. He found inescapable the designation of New Zealand as a 
prospective settled colony:l25 
Notwithstanding all that is said of the dangers of that [Le. representative] system of 
Colonial Polity, all my infonnation compels me to think it is the best possible 
scheme for any Colonial Society of the Anglo-Saxon Race who are exempt from the 
disaste of caste. It is only because in New Zealand that calamity would prevail 
between the European and the Aboriginal Colonist that I should hestitate in at once 
convening an assembly, if I had any voice in such a decision. 
Since the Maori population would have some fonnal representation in any assembly 
convened simply by means of the royal prerogative, Stephen felt that the Crown's 
constitutent power would have to be enlarged under Parliamentary authority. He repeated 
this view a year later when he commented that without "the authority of Parliament the 
Crown can create no Legislature in New Zealand, except by establishing there a 
Representative Assembly which I suppose everyone would agree in pronouncing an 
absurdity". 126 
To solve the problems emanating from the annexation of the 'settled' colony, the 
Colonial Office returned to the tenns of the constitutional instruments for New South Wales 
giving the Governor and his Legislative Council authority over "adjacent" islands. The 
Continuance of New South Wales Act 183 had empowered the Crown to constitute a non-
representative assembly for the colony.m This meant that with the annexation of the 
"adjacent" islands of New Zealand as a dependency of New South Wales the Crown's 
legislative and constituent power over New Zealand would derive from statutory as opposed 
to prerogative right. In this way the limitations on its consitutent and legislative power under 
the prerogative would be circumvented and the hazard of obtaining Parliamentary legislation · 
for territory not then held in sovereignty by the Crown would be avoided. l28 This 
123 First draft (by Stephen) of consular instructions to Hobson, 24 January 1839 CO 209/4;203, 212-3. 
124 Second draft (by Stephen) of consular instructions to Hobson, 8 March (circa) 1839 CO 209/4:221,232. 
125 Stephen to Labouchere, 15 March 1839, CO 209/4:326, 329. 
126 Stephen to Vemon Smith, note, 21 July 1840, CO 209n:40. Similar observations were made Stanley to Gray, 27 
June 1845, pp (1846), #337,72,74. 
171 3 & 4 Vict c 62, section 2. 
128 Stephen to Labouchere, 18 May 1839 CO 209/4:243, 245-6. 
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arrangeinent, one wholly predicated upon the presumption that New Zealand would be a 
settled colony at common law, received the blessing of the law officers. l29 It became the 
formal means through which British government over New Zealand was first conducted. The 
instructions to Hobson (14 August 1839)130 as well as the charter of the colony, 13l the first 
constitution by the Crown of a local legislative power and issued under the authority of the 
Imperial Act 3 & 4 Vic .c 62 also proceeded on the basis that New Zealand was a settled 
colony at common law. 
The Colonial Office did not treat the classification of New Zealand as a settled colony as 
an abnegation of Maori sovereignty. No link was ever made between the constitutional 
status taken by the colony at common law and the Crown's recognition of Maori 
sovereignty. The internal memoranda of the Colonial Office as well as the instructions sent 
to Hobson emphatically recognised Maori consent as the basis of the Crown's sovereignty as 
well as the islands' constitutional status as a settled colony. To take an important example, 
Russell's despatch accompanying the colony's first charter, Hobson's commission as 
Governor and formal Instructions, informed Hobson that the introduction of representative 
institutions had been postponed by the Crown with Parliamentary pennission: 132 
Proceeding upon the well-established principle of law, that Her Majesty's subjects, 
settled in a country acquired as New Zealand has been acquired, carry with them as 
their birthright so much of the law of England as is applicable to their altered 
circumstances; that fundamental rule has been qualified in the infancy of the colony 
by constituting a legislature nominated by the Crown in New Zealand, as in other 
Australian colonies. 
Elsewhere in this d,espatch Russell emphasized that the Maori tribes had "been formerly 
recognized by Great Britain as an independent state; and even in assuming the dominion of 
the country, this principle was acknowledged, for it is on the deliberate act and cession of 
the chiefs, on behalf of the people at large, that our title rests".133 These two features of 
British annexation, one the recognition of tribal sovereignty, the other the classification of 
New Zealand as a settled colony, were never regarded by the Colonial Office as 
irreconcilable or contradictory. Plainly the Colonial Office did not consider designation as a 
settled colony set up the legal fiction that New Zealand was 'desert, uncultivated territory'. 
The Colonial Office regarded New Zealand as a settled colony in response to the postion 
of the English settlers. In March 1839 Stephen had noted the two cardinal principles were, 
first, the protection of the Maori, and secondly. "the introduction among the Colonists of the 
129 Nonnanby to Law Officers, 30 May 1839 CO 209/5:76; Law Officers to Normanby, 4 June 1839 CO 
881/1:#25,7-8. 
130 Text in CO 881/1:#25,1-7. 
13l Charter for erecting the Colony of New Zealand, 16 November 1840. Text in pp (1841), #311,31-33. 
132 Russell to Hobson, 9 December 1840, CO 209/8:460,465. 
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principle of self Govenunent, to the utmost extent in' which that principle can be reconciled 
with allegiance to the Crown, and with the Colony moving in the same political orbit with 
the parent state" .134 If the recognition of Maori sovereignty was part of the first principle 
then the classification of New Zealand as a settled colony reflected the second. By the 
beginning of 1839 there were upwards of 2000 British subjects in New Zealand clamouring 
if not petitioning for the Crown to establish over them regular government based upon 
English law.m This was precisely the situation in which the birthright principle was apt to 
flourish and one which counselled against the application to New Zealand of the pre-
Revolutionary approach to the constitutional status of the North American colonies. 
By 1840 the birthright principle had been asserted by English settlers in New Zealand on 
two important occasions. In May 1838 the English settlers at Kororareka in the Bay of 
Islands formed themselves into an Association and enacted a series of 'Resolutions' styled 
after English law and designed to protect their persons and property. For example, Rule 5 of 
the Resolutions provided that persons found guilty of robbery were to be presented to the 
British Resident and should he refuse to deal with the offender the Association reserved the 
right to punish the offender as it thought fit. l36 On the other occasion, the settlers bound for 
New Zealand under the New Zealand Company had agreed to certain 'Articles of 
Agreement'137 by which they submitted themselves to the judicial and legislative authority of 
the Company in the prospective Port Nicholson settlement. A lawyer's opinion of late 1839 
found the Articles were unlawful,138 a conclusion which the Colonial Office had reached 
even before sighting them. m Stephen excoriated the Articles as "apparently... an 
infringement of the Rights of Her Majesty and a Foreign [i.e. Maori] State of which the 
Queen has recognised the independence".14O Under English law the exercise by any British 
subject of any judicial or coercive power over another must have the authority of law and 
since the constitution of judicial tribunals and legislative bodies lay solely within the royal 
grant, both the Kororareka Association and the Port Nicholson Articlesl41 were unlawful. 
They were, however, important examples of the association of the Crown's exercise of its 
constituent power with the birthright of the subject. Although the subject took his birthright 
134 Stephen to Labouchere, 15 March 1839 CO 209/4:326,327. 
135 Stephen, minute, 21 January 1839 CO 209/4:193. 
136 Foden New Zealand Legal History, 53-61, esp at 56-7. Busby refused to countenance the measure. 
137 "Articles of Agreement", early September 1839, copy in CO 209/4:621-8. 
138 Thomas Wilde (femple Bar), Opinion for New Zealand Company, 14 November 1839 CO 209/4:641-2. 
139 Stephen to Young, 19 September 1839 CO 209/4:573-6; Stephen, note, 28 September 1839, id, 590; Vemon 
Smith to Young, 5 October 1839, id, 591-2. The New Zealand Company relayed submission of a copy of the 
Articles to the Colonial Office, fearing legal proceedings might be commenced against the parties: Young to 
Russell, 7 November 1839, id, 599-603. 
140 Stephen, memorandum, 24 October 1839 CO 209/4:577-8. 
141 The New Zealand Company obtained the consent of the local chiefs to the Articles (Foden New Zealand Legal 
History, 64) and so could justify the form of government as a delegation from tribal sovereignty (as, for 
example, the East India Company's zemindary in the Calcutta region). It was the discovery of this form of 
Government which Hobson characterised as "treasonable" and led immediately to his proclamations of 
sovereignty on 21 May 1840. 
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to English law with him ultimately the lawfulness of its exercise depended upon constitution 
from the Crown. By the mid-nineteenth century colonial law was approaching the stage of 
recognizing some capacity in English settlers to exercise their own constituent power in 
default of the Crown,142 the British Hondurasl43 and Pitcaim Islandsl« being the 
contemporary precedents. However the proposition was one inapplicable to New Zealand 
since any supposed inherent constituent power in the community presupposed British 
sovereignty over the territory.145 In 1839 the Crown expressly disavowed any sovereignty 
over New Zealand - a case of inability rather than refusal to exercise a constituent power for 
the settlers. In any event, the Kororareka Association and Port Nicholson Articles were in 
1839 powerful reminders for the Crown of the constitutional claims the settlers might be 
expected to make and the link such claims had with the common law status of a colony. 
This link is apparent in the first indication of New Zealand's prospective constitutional 
status, a minute of James Stephen in January 1839, where he adverted to the colonists at 
Kororareka "living under a Conventional fonn of Government established by themselves".146 
The link between the colony's status at common law and the constitutional relations between 
Crown and English subject were further underlined by the Address and Petition of the Port 
Nicholson settlers of November 1841. This petition quoted Pratt and Yorke's opinion 
(1757)141 and expressly invoked the birthright principle as the source of right to municipal 
institutions. ThuS: I48 
It was solemnly reported to one of Your Majesty's predecessors by two of the 
greatest luminaries of the law, then speaking officially, that 'English subjects carry 
with them Your Majesty's laws wherever they fonn colonies', and we pray only that 
effectual means may be provided for securing to us, on the spot, those sacred and 
inalienable rights ... we pray only for the power of managing our own local affairs, by 
means of... municipal institutions. 
142 Merivale Lectures on ColonizaJion (1839-41), IV, 103-5; Ramsay, History of the American Revolution (1791), 17; 
Wilson "Lectures" in Works of James Wilson, I, 363-4; Roberdeau v Rous (1738) 1 Atk 543. Generally Roberts-
Wray Commonwealth and Colonial Law, 153-7. 
143 British settlers in the Honduras erected their own form of government, known as 'Bumaby's Laws' (1765) (text 
in Burdon, ed Archives of British Honduras, I, 100). The settlers constantly petitioned the Crown for a regularly-
constituted form of government and the local magistrates appointed under Bumaby's Laws and visiting naval 
commanders frequently complained during during the late eighteenth to mid-nineteenth century of their lack of 
formal authority. A Law Officers' opinion of 27 July 1812 (abstracted CO 323i91a:96) held Bumaby's Laws 
illegal (local reaction was to petition, unsuccessfully, for the Crown's exercise of its constituent power: Petition 
of Baymen to the Prince Regent, 10 August 1818, Archives of British Honduras, 11,209), however . the Privy 
Council did not express a similar position in Attorney-General (British Honduras) v Bristowe (1880), 6 App Cas 
143. This case found British sovereignty in the Honduras to date at least from 1817 notwithstanding formal 
annexation in 1842. Presumably their Lordships considered Bumaby's Laws to have had some legal effect until 
the Crown eventually exercised its constituent power. 
144 Laws of Pitcairn's Island enacted with the assistance of Cmmdr R Elliot (HMS Ply), November 1838. Text in 
Brodie Pitcairn's Island and the Islanders in 1850 (1851), 84-91. These laws were adapted throughout the 
nineteenth century (Roberts-Wray Commonwealth and Colonial Law, 907-8) until the Pacific Order in Council, 
1893, article 6 put the local government on a sound constitutional footing. 
145 Stephen, minute, 16 November 1839 CO 209/5:51; Roberts Wray Commonwealth and Colonial Law, 156. 
146 Stephen, minute, 21 January 1839 CO 209/4:193. 
141 The petitioner's had doubtless seen the abbreviated version of this opinion in Chalmers Opinions, 1,195. 
148 Enclosure in Hobson to Stanley, 13 November 1841 CO 209/10:158, 
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This was a replay of the North American scenario albeit in a New Zealand and radically 
diluted format. 
Given the needs of the New Zealand settlers and the post-Revolutionary development in 
the classification of a colony at common law, it was small wonder the Colonial Office 
thought New Zealand a settled colony. This designation was simply a response to the 
situation of the English settlers. The status of the Maori tribes was never central to the 
Colonial Office's classification of New Zealand as a settled colony. The crucial ingredient 
was the relation of the Crown with the English settlers, or, more specifically, their birthright 
to English law not only upon matters inter se but in their constitutional relations with the 
Crown. The lesson of the American Revolution had been learnt. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE COMMON LAW STATUS OF MAORI CUSTOMARY LAW 
A. INTRODUCfION 
It has been seen that the rangatiratanga of the Maori chiefs was diminished if not lost 
upon the Crown's assumption of the territorial sovereignty of New Zealand to the extent the 
sole lawful source of imperium or government became the Crown. It was clear as a matter 
of British constitutional law that the tribal sovereignty had gone and with it any source of 
and right to self-government independent of formal royal permission but it did not follow 
that the customary laws affecting the civil and criminal relations of the Maori inter se or 
even with the Pakeha had also gone. The loss of tribal sovereignty might simply have 
indicated the transformation of the tribal code from a territorial to personal character. the 
exact reverse of the situation previously obtaining so far as the British settlers' right to 
English law had been concerned. 
To what extent, then, did Maori customary law survive the British annexation? Were the 
disputes of the Maori inter se still regulated by the unwritten customary rules? On what 
" basis, if at all, were these superceded de jure by English law? 
B. BRITISH SOVEREIGNTY, ENGLISH LAW AND CUSTOMARY LAW 
1. The common law presumption of continuity 
By 1840 the common law principles relating to the effect of British sovereignty upon the 
pre-colonial legal system had been long established. The judicial identification of the 
relevant principles dated from the beginning of the seventeenth century. From this time and 
throughout the subsequent history of British imperial activity, the colonial and British courts 
consistently recognised a presumption of continuity.l That is to say, the common law 
presumed that British sovereignty of itself did not disrupt the pre-existing legal system of 
the newly-acquired territory. This presumption, it will be seen, was subject to a number of , 
qualifications as well as modification by the Crown. It was certainly settled by the time 
Britain acquired the sovereignty of New Zealand in 1840. 
Blankard v Galdy (1693) 4 Mod 222; Memorandum (1722) 2 P Wrns 75 (PC); Campbell v Hall (1774) 1 Cowp 
204 (KB); Forbes v Cochrane (1824) 2 B & C 448. 463 per Holroyd J; Mayor of Lyons v East India Company 
(1836-37) 1 Moo PC Ind App 175; Hirabae v Sonabae (1847) 4 Ind Dec (OS) 100. 113 (Bomb SC); Fewsoll v 
Phayre (1848) 2 Ind Dec (OS) 242 (Beng SC); Advocate-General (Bengal) v Ranee Surnomoye Dossee (1863) 9 
Moo PC Ind App 387. 426 per Lord Kingsdown. 
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The presumption of continuity embodied a fundamental theme of the British imperial 
experience, both as victim and protagonist, which had arisen long before the first 
authoritative judicial recognition in the first decade of the seventeenth century. Sir Matthew 
Hale had stressed the Roman policy of leaving conquered peoples with their own laws the 
better to ensure their voluntary submission to Roman govemment.2 The Romans had applied 
this policy in Britain . . Similarly Coke and Hale went to lengths to prove the Norman 
Conquest was in law no conquest but that William I had assumed the English throne in 
accordance with English law.] The common law's own experience therefore had been one of 
continuity and it was a principle which it extended to the legal systems of the Crown's 
medieval possessions. The Isle of Man, which after some dispute between England and 
Scotland came to the former by cession from the King of Norway (1266), retained its 
customary laws dating from the days of Scandinavian domination.4 The same was also true 
of Wales which lost its customary law not by the fact of English conquest but the Statute of 
Rutland. S A similar pattern of continuity prevailed in the Channel Islands6 and, as The Case 
of Tanistry indicated, Ireland.7 The medieval precedents were expressly adopted by the 
courts in their consideration of the principles governing the Crown's acquisition of territory 
in the New World and India, a notable example being Lord Mansfield's judgment in 
Campbell v Hall (1774).8 
An inherent distinction between the Crown's acquisition of the territorial sovereignty and 
the introduction of English law was fundamental to the common law's presumption of the 
continuity of the pre-colonial legal system. Whilst it was clear that English law was 
introduced ipso jure to a new colony to the extent it defined the character of the Crown's 
sovereignty, it did not follow from this that the whole of English law was also introduced. It 
was recognised that certain rules of English law were inevitably introduced as incidents of 
the Crown's sovereignty,9 necessarily supplanting contrary local law. During the early 
nineteenth century it was held that the English law defining a person's status as alien or 
subject of the Crown was introduced into a colony as part of the sovereignty of the Crown 
but the consequences flowing from alien status, such as the capacity to maintain an action 
2 
4 
6 
8 
History of the Common Law (posthwnous pub 1713), 40; similar observations were made in The Case of Tanistry 
(1608) Davies 28, 41 (KB). 
3 Co Inst iii; Hale History of the Common Law, cap 5 and Prerogatives of the King, cap ILL 
Roberts-Wray Commonwealth and Colonial Law, 672-3, 675-7; Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th ed Vol 6, paras 
879, 1205. 
The Case ofTanistry (1608) Davies 28, 41 (KB). 
Roberts-Wray Commonwealth and Colonial Law, 673-5; Ha/sbury's Laws of England, 6th ed, Vol. 6, para 1203. 
(1608) Davies 28 (KB). In submissions during Ca/vin's Case Bacon stated that "the reason why Ireland is subject 
to the laws of England is not ipso jure upon conquest, but grew by a charter of King John", Works, vn, 660. 
Also Blankard v Galdy (1693) 2 Salk 411 per Holt CJ; Campbell v Hall (1774) Lo Ft 655,742 per Mansfield U 
(KB). 
Supra. Another important example was Blankard v Galdy, supra. 
Ruding v Smith (1821) 2 Hag Con 371. 382 (Con Ct); Advocate-General (Bengal) v Ranee Surnomoye Dossee 
(1863) 9 Moo PC. Ind App 387. 392 at 405 per Peacock CJ (Beng SC); Union Government (Minister of Lands) 
v Estate of Whittaker [1916] AD 194. 203 per Innes CJ (SCSA); Madzimbamuto v Lardner Burke [1968] AC 
721 (PC); Kodeeswaran v Attorney-General (Ceylon) [1970] AC, 1118 (PC). 
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for real property, were to be detennined according to the lex 10ci. 10 
It should be added that the Crown's fonnal acquisition of the territorial sovereignty 
immediately gave the local inhabitants the status of British subjects.1I As with the simple 
fact of British sovereignty, the mere status of British subject did not entail the 
comprehensive applicability of English law to all inhabitants of the territory. The status of 
British subject protected . the original inhabitants from an 'act of state' by the Crownl2 but 
did not affect. the presumption of continuity. This point is of some importance since the 
third article of the Treaty of Waitangi gave the Maori tribes "all the rights and privileges of 
British subjects". The tribes' acceptance of British subjecthood, status which regardless of 
the Treaty was obtained at common law with the fonnal annexation of the country in 1840, 
did not have as any corollary the acceptance of English law as the new basis for all their 
relations both as amongst themselves and with the settlers. Any such interpretation was 
contradicted by the protection of rangatiratanga in the Maori text of the Treaty of Waitangi. 
The common law rules regarding the acquisition of territory also negated any such intention: 
Were the status of British subject to have brought the ipso jure amenability of the native 
inhabitants to English law in all relations the common law presumption of the continuity of 
pre-colonial law could never have been made. When the Maori people became British 
subjects in 1840 they did not in consequence become amenable to the whole or any part of 
English law other than those rules incidental to the sovereignty of the Crown. 
2. Qualifications upon the presumption of continuity 
a) The Case of Tanistry (1608) 
The Case of Tanistry provided the earliest authoritative guide to the status of aboriginal 
laws subsequent to British sovereignty. During the course of judgment the Court drew a 
distinction between a conquest "Monarchy Royall" and "Monarchy Seignoriall, ou tyranny".13 
With the fonner, the local inhabitants "ont property en lour biens & frantenement & 
inheritance en lour terres" .14 This was contrasted with a conquest "Monarchy Seignoriall" 
whereby all the local inhabitants "son touts come villeins ou esclaves, and proprietors de 
rein ... come en Turkey & Muscovie ... ".IS The Court commented that the English Crown's 
10 Donegani v Donegani (1835) 3 Knapp 63 (PC); In re Henry Adam (1837-38) 1 Moo PC 460. 
11 Opinion of Solicitor-General Yorke, 13 August 1759, Chalmers Opinions, n, 359, 360; Campbell v Hall (1774) 1 
Cowp 204, 208 (KB); Mayor of Lyons v East India Company (1836-7) 1 Moo PC, Ind App 175, 286-7 (PC); 
Forsyth. Opinions (1869), 334-5. 
12 Entick v Carrington (1765) 19 St Tr 1029; Campbell v Hall (1774) 1 Cowp 204,208-10; Walker v Baird (1892) 
AC 491, 496-7 (PC); lohnstone v Pedlar (1921) 2 AC 202, 272 per Viscount Finlay (HL); Attorney-General v 
Nissan (1970) AC 179. 207 and 203 per Reid LJ. Also Moore Act of State (1875), 75-83; Stephen History of 
Criminal Law (1883), n, 65. 
13 (1608) Davies 28. 40 (KB). 
14 Id. 
IS Id. 
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conquests were inevitably made "Monarchy Royall" and proceeded to clarify the principles 
governing such a conquest. 
The Case of Tanistry concerned the custom known as tanistry. Long part of the 
indigenous law of Ireland, this custom provided for the descent of land upon the eldest and 
worthiest male relative of the blood and name of the deceased. The criterion of "worth" was 
particularly significant since it often required and resulted in potential male heirs 
establishing their worth in a forceful and bloody manner. The Court found that the custom 
of tanistry was void and abolished when the common law was established in Ireland. The 
introduction of the common law was characterised as a gradual process rather than a 
pronounced act of the Crown but by the time the Court came to consider the custom of 
tanistry it found the introduction of English law into Ireland had been complete. The Court 
proceeded, however, to give judgment on the basis that the general introduction of English 
law had spared certain parts of brehon law affecting real property.16 
The Court found customary law should have four "unseperable propertys".17 It should be 
reasonable, unambiguous, have continued without intenuption from a time beyond the 
memory of the court and, finally, it ought not lift itself above or challenge but submit to the 
Crown's prerogative. The Court found that the inherent characteristics of tanistry challenged 
at least three of these criteria and, further, even were that not so, it had not been 
continuously applied in respect of the land in question whereover English rules of descent 
had frequently been adopted. The Court indicated that the custom's requirement of proof of 
worth was the "veray cause del barbarisme & desolation".18 It was a law of force and the 
cause of great bloodletting and other associated mischiefs. This made it both unreasonable 
and disruptive of the royal peace or, in other words, "prejudicall al profit & del Roy".19 
Tanistry was also void for uncertainty since by its nature the identity of the person who as 
heir was to succeed to an estate was uncertain.20 
The Case of Tanistry recognised the continued enjoyment by the native inhabitants of 
Ireland of their own customary laws subsequent to British sovereignty and the general 
introduction of English law, at least on the questions of land tenure and succession with 
which the case was directly concerned. The pre-colonial laws of the country survived the 
Crown's sovereignty provided they met the requirements of reasonableness, certainty, 
immemorial usage and compatibility with the prerogative (that is, sovereignty) of the Crown. 
" That part of the aboriginal brehon law known as tanistry failed to meet these requirements. 
16 See the discussion of this case in Yale "Hobbes and Hale on law. legislation and the sovereign" [1972Bl 
Cambridge Law Journal 121. 
17 Davies 28. 80 ER 516. 
18 1d,520. 
19 Id, 522-4. 
20 Id, 523-4. 
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We will return to The Case of Tanistry at the close of this chapter. In the meantime it 
can stand as an early and important autholity on two matters. First, it recognised that certain 
customary laws, those relating to title to property, survived a general introduction of English 
law. Secondly, where some continuity of the local law was acknowledged, it gave the 
criteria for the assessment of particular laws. The clitelia adopted were substantially the 
same as those applied in English courts to questions of customary light. 
b) Calvin's Case (1608) and the status of infidel laws 
Even before The Case of Tanistry had provided the general test of the continuity of the 
pre-coloniallaw, Coke had limited the presumption in Calvin's Case. 
It has been seen that Calvin's Case (1608) recognised two forms of terlitorial acquisition 
at common law, namely title by conquest and descent. Coke distinguished the conquest of 
the temtory of a Chlistian king from that of an infidel finding that the ancient laws of the 
Christian kingdom were presumed to survive English conquest absent any act of suspension 
by the Crown. Coke indicated this presumption could not apply to the laws of an infidel 
power. Upon conquest these laws were abrogated ipso jure for "they be not only against 
Christianity, but against the laws of God and of nature contained in the decalogue".21 The 
newly-acquired tenitory was to be ruled by natural equity until provision was made for new 
laws. In addition, Coke distinguished between the different forms of aliens stating that an 
alien mend would be a subject of Christian sovereigns in league with the Crown. Other 
aliens were enemies of the Crown. This was a category into which Coke placed all infidels 
as "in law perpetui inimici, perpetual enemies (for the law presumes not that they will be 
converted, that being remota potentia, a remote possibility) for between them, as with the 
devils, whose subjects they be, and the Christian, there is perpetual hostility, and can be no 
peace."22 Unlike alien enemies, the common law permitted alien fliends to acquire and 
maintain actions for personal goods within the realm although it did not allow them to bling 
real actions or acquire real property other than for habitation. 
There were a number of immediate difficulties with Coke's dicta in Calvin's Case. First, 
Slattery has desclibed the autholities Coke used for his rule that infidels were perpetual 
enemies as "surplisingly weak".23 The scliptural passage Coke cited was a reference to 
spiritual rather than temporal discord between Christian and infidel. His excerpt from the . 
Register stemmed from a writ of protection granted to the hospital of Saint John at 
Jerusalem. In reality the writ simply stated that the hospital was founded for the defence of 
the Church against enemies, hardly an affirmation, Slattery observes, that infidels were 
21 (1608) 7 Co Rep 1 a, 17b. 
22 Id. 
23 "Land Rights of Indigenous Canadian Peoples", 13-14. 
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perpetual enemies. Coke's third source was an opinion of Justice Brooke (1520) during 
which it was commented that if a lord beat his villein or a man his wife, an outlaw, traitor, 
or pagan, the victim would have no action in trespass being unable to sue.24 The opinion did 
not address the status of pagans and the reference to tl1em, Slattery comments, was 
incidental and cursory.2j A second difficulty with Coke's dicta was that he contradicted 
elsewhere the position he had taken in Ca/vin's Case on infidel status.26 In his Institutes he 
affirmed iliat a Christian prince could conclude treaties of peace, consolation and commerce 
wiili infidel rulers. He also found that alien Christians and infidels occupied the same 
position so far as their ability to acquire real property witl1in ilie realm was concerned.Z7 
Coke confirmed the treaty-making capacity between Christian prince and infidel ruler in 
Michelborne v Miche/borne (1609)28 soon after Ca/vin's Case. Thirdly and most fatally, 
Coke's views were challenged by the established practice of the time. By the beginning of 
ilie seventeenili century ilie Crown had been conducting fOlmal relations by treaty with non-
Christian societies for some decades. By Coke's time me most outstanding example would 
have been ilie Capitulations of the Porte (1580) with the Ottoman Empire whereby consular 
jurisdiction was obtained over English merchants in the Turkish territory. These 
capitulations, as indeed other treaties with non-Christian societies, were considered a 
thoroughly sound basis for the extra-territorial exercise of English law amongst the English 
merchants of the region. To have obtained overwhelming evidence of ilie contemporary 
assumption iliat the Crown was able to enter into treaty relations with infidel as well as 
Christian rulers Coke need only have perused ilie immensely popular editions of Hakluyt's 
Principall Navigations wherein numerous instances of engagements between the Crown and 
non-Christian rulers would have been found. If infidels were perpetual enemies ilie Crown's 
prerogative power to enter into such treaty relations would have been limited to Christian 
princes - ilie proposition was inconceivable. It may be added iliat although the question of 
the status of infidel laws upon British conquest was a question distinct to that of the 
Crown's prerogative power to enter into treaties wiili non-Christian powers boili related to 
the perpetui inimici status Coke had given these societies. 
Coke's dicta found some support during ilie seventeenili century. His views were 
reported by Callis in Reading ... Upon the Statute .. of Sewers (1622).29 The point was made 
again before a Parliamentary Committee in 164730 and Wingfield's Maxims (1658).31 Coke's 
24 (1520) YB, Trinity Term, 12 Henry 8, fol. iii at iiii. 
2j Supra, 14. 
26 For a fuller analysis see Slattery, supra, 15. 
Z7 4 Institutes 155. 
28 (1609) 2 Brownl & Golds 296 (CB). 
29 Callis The Reading of That Famous and Learned Gentleman .. . Upon the Statute of 23 H 8. Cap. 5 of Sewers 
(1622), 23. 
30 Referred to by Slattery "Land Rights of Indigenous Canadian Peoples", 16. 
31 Cited in Goebel The Struggle for the Falkland Islands, 104. 
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view was also manifest in the polemic surrounding Bacon's Rebellion in Virginia (1675),32 
Fitzhugh's opinion (1683)33 , the submissions by counsel in East India Company v Sandys 
(1683 - 85)34 and implicit in the opinion of Francis Fane in 1730 as counsel to the Board of 
Trade.35 
It is clear Coke's views on infidel status did not become the common law orthodoxy. 
The distinction between Christian and non-Christian systems of law received not even a 
passing mention in The Case of Tanistry, the nearest allusion being the reference to 
'Conquest Seignoriall' and the barbaric aspect of the custom of tanistry. Barbaric law, it 
seems, was not considered as limited to the heathen. In an Anonymous case (1640) Littleton 
disapproved Coke's dicta as based upon a groundless opinion of Justice Brooke and as 
contrary to Christian principle. Infidels, he said, "are creatures of God, and of the same kind 
as we are, and it would be a sin in us to hurt their persons" .36 In Blankard v Galdy (1693) 
Holt CJ commented that "in the case of an infidel country, their laws by conquest do not 
entirely cease, but only such as are against the law of God; and that in such cases where the 
laws are rejected or silent, the conquered country shall be governed according to the rule of 
natural equity".31 This position was reiterated in the Privy Council Memorandum (1722).38 In 
Omichund v Barker (1744) Coke's dicta was derided by Willes CJ as contrary to scripture 
as well as common sense and humanity. Even the devils, he added colourfully, whose 
subjects Coke had said the heathen were, could not have worse principles.39 Lord Mansfield 
provided an authoritative dismissal of Coke's view in Campbell v Hall (1774) where he 
rejected the "strange, extrajudicial opinion"4O as the product of some residual crusading zeal. 
It was, he said, an "absurd exception"·1 better left unmentioned for the honour of Coke. 
The application of Calvin's Case to the New World settlements and the constitutional 
argumentation this produced during the eighteenth century was shown in the previous 
chapter. One problem with the removal of Coke's exception of the infidel laws from the 
presumption of continuity was that it rendered the British settlers in the New World 
notionally subject to Indian customary law. This, however, was nothing more than a 
theoretical result for the Crown had invariably pre-empted any such possibility by the grant 
of a charter to the English settlements. Nonetheless the very statement of it was enough to 
32 See the account in Washbum Red Man's LandlWhite Man's Law (1971),43. 
33 Epitomized in Smith, "English Criminal Law in Early America", 9-11. Fitzhugh was an eminent Virginia lawyer. 
34 (1683-85) 10 St Tr 371 (KB). leffries Cl agreed (at 546) but inferred the Crown could remove this status by 
entering into relations with the tribes. 
35 Referred to in Slattery "Land Rights of Indigenous Canadian Peoples", 18. 
36 (1640), 1 Salk 46 (CP). 
31 (1693), 2 Salk 411, 412. 
38 (1722), 2 P Wrns 75. 
39 (1744) WilIes 538, 542 (Ch). A like position was taken by Parker, CB reported in 1 Atk 21, 42. 
40 (1774) Lo Ft 655, 744 (KB) . 
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arouse the indignation of the American colonists and so assist their argument that English 
law had accompanied them across the Atlantic as their birthright. The criticism of the 
presumption of continuity as it applied to tribal law was, therefore, tendentious in that it 
encouraged the designation of the colonies as settled rather than conquered or ceded 
colonies. A forthright and early statement of the inherent exception of the British subject 
from non-Christian law42 was made by Daniel Dulany Sr (1728). He insisted the medieval 
precedents which recognised the continuity of the laws of conquered peoples could not 
apply without qualification in North America. These precedents involved territory inhabited 
"by civilised, sociable People, conversant with Arts, Learning and Commerce; that had Laws 
suited, and adapted to the Order, and Engagements of Society; by which, themselves, and 
others that went to live among them might be peaceably, and happily governed":3 He 
sarcastically dismissed the applicability of Indian law to the English settlers:44 
The native Indians, were rude, savage, and ignorant; destitute of Letters, Arts, or 
Commerce; and almost, of the common Notions of Right, and Wrong : A People, 
thus qualified, must make excellent Preceptors, for Englishmen ! and shew (without 
doubt,) worthy Examples, for their Imitation ! 
The American belletrists' arguments found acceptance after the American Revolution, it has 
been seen, to the extent the designation as a settled colony became applicable to colonies 
with a non-Christian indigenous population as well as those originally desert and 
uncultivated. Equally, however, it became accepted that British colonists in conquered or 
ceded colonies held a birthright to the benefit of English law in their dealings inter se, the 
recognition of which did not require the charter of the Crown. In short, the common law 
recognised that English law applied to the British inhabitants of the Crown's colonies in 
their internal relations irrespective of the original constitutional status. The test was the 
suitability with which the pre-colonial law might be applied to the natural-born subjects and 
European population of the newly-acquired territory. Where its application was unsuitable 
the English law applied amongst the Christian population automatically and regardless of the 
constitutional status of the colony. Thus Stephen, Master in Chancery and the father of 
James Stephen, commented in Freeman v Fairlie (1828) that so far as the status of the pre-
colonial law and the position of the non-indigenous inhabitants were concerned:45 
I apprehend the true general distinction to be, in effect, between Countries in which 
there are not, and Countries in which there are, at the time of their acquisition, any 
existing civil institutions and laws, it being, in the first of those cases, matter of 
42 William Fitzhugh had argued similarly in 1683, opinion epitomized by Smith, "English CriminalLaw in Early 
America", 9-11. 
43 'The Right of the Inhabitants of Maryland" (1728) reprinted in Sioussat The English Statutes in Maryland, App 
IT, 82, 95-96. 
44 Id. 
45 (1828) 1 Moo PC, Ind App 306, 324-25 (Ch). 
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necessity that the British settlers should use their native laws, as having no others to 
resort to; whereas, in the other case there is an established lex loci which it might be 
highly inconvenient all at once to abrogate; and, therefore, it remains till changed by 
the deliberate wisdom of the new legislative power. In the fonner case, also, there 
are not, but in the latter case there are, new subjects to be governed, ignorant of the 
English laws, and unprepared, perhaps, in civil and political character, to receive 
them. The reason why the rules are laid in Books of authority, with the reference to 
the distinction between newly-discovered Countries, on the one hand, and ceded or 
Conquered Countries, on the other, may be found, I conceive, in the fact, that this 
distinction always, or almost always, practically corresponded with that, between the 
absence and the existence of a lex loci, by which the British settlers might, without 
inconvenience for a time be governed; for the powers from whom we had wrested 
Colonies by conquest, or had obtained them by Treaties of cession, had ordinarily, if 
not always, been civilised and Christian States, whose institutions, therefore, were not 
wholly dissimilar to our own. But, in the Settlements forn1ed by the East India 
Company in Bengal, the case was very different, and one to which neither of the 
rules [regarding the law applicable in settled and conquered or ceded colonies] could 
possibly have entire application. The acquired territory was not newly discovered or 
uninhabited, but well peopled, and by a civilised race, governed by long-established 
laws, to which they were much attached, and which it would have been highly 
inconvenient and dangerous immediately to change. On the other hand, those laws 
were so interwoven with, and dependent on, their religious institutions, as 
Mahommedans or Pagans, that a great part of them could not possibly be applied to 
the Government of a Christian people. 
The Law Commissioners of India came to a similar finding in their Lex Loci Report (1840) 
when they found English law had come to the Crown's possessions in India as the birthright 
of the English subjects establishing pennanent communities in non-Christian territory.46 The 
Commissioners adverted to Coke's dicta on infidel status in Calvin's Case and its outright 
dismissal by Lord Mansfield in Campbell v Hall. They indicated, however, that the principle 
of unqualified continuity of the native law recognised by Mansfield could hardly apply in 
the case of the Christian inhabitants of non-Christian territory. To that extent, therefore, they 
restored Coke's dicta shorn of its more extreme aspect: The infidel laws enjoyed the 
common law presumption of continuity but the extent of their applicability was limited to 
the indigenous community. This meant the non-Christian pre-colonial law had acquired a 
personal character, the lex loci of the newly-acquired territory becoming English law. 
Although the non-indigenous inhabitants of the Mofussil such as the Ann enians, Parsis, 
Christian Indians and Jews became subject to English law the indigenous people had their 
own laws to their dealings amongst themselves:7 
A recent Australian case Milirrpum v Nabalco Property Ltd has found that the . 
application of the common law presumption of the continuity of the pre-colonial law 
46 Extracted in Bera'mji v Rogers (1867) 4 Bomb HCR 1 (Bomb HC), and see the response to this report, item 3, 
"Copies of the Special Reports of the Indian Law Commissioners" pp (1847), XLIII, 1, 607 et seq. 
47 Similarly: Fewson v Phayre (1848) 2 Ind Dec (OS) 242, 246 per Peel CJ (Beng SC); Maclean v Cristall (1849) 
4 Ind Dcc (OS) 69, 77 per Perry CJ (Born SC); R v Willans (1858) 3 Ky (MC) 16, 19 per Maxwell R (Ct Jud 
Pen); Minute of Sir E. Perry on the draft Act for a Lex Loci, 27 March 1845 (1847) PP, 3, 655; Secretary of 
State v Administrator-General for Bengal (1868) 1 BLR 87 (Beng HC). 
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depended upon the constitutional status of a colony.48, Blackburn J held that if a colony was 
settled rather than conquered or ceded it was to be equated with desert uncultivated land in 
which the sole law was English. The same reason underpinned the New Zealand judgments 
which held the Maori lacked sovereignty at the time they signed the Treaty of Waitangi,49 a 
conclusion already challenged. Since the Maori lacked the sovereignty to make a valid treaty 
of cession, the reasoning held, the colony was acquired by settlement and hence the only 
law which governed all inhabitants in their relations inter se was English. Maori customary 
law may have survived the Crown's sovereignty de facto but the reasoning concluded that it 
had not continued de jure. A recent commentator on New Zealand's constitutional history 
has accepted this view. so 
This position is misconceived on two counts. First, it overlooks the true basis for the 
application of the • settled' classification to non-Christian territory. This practice was 
reviewed in the previous chapter. Secondly, it is clear that the presumption that non-
Christian law would continue to govern the relations of the indigenous population inter se 
was applied without any reference to the constitutional status of the colony. Stephen 
intimated in Freeman v Fairlie that the same result would have eventuated were the 
territory technically treated as a settled colony:sl the native population would have had their 
own law, the non-indigenous inhabitants would have had English law. In Attorney-General 
(British Columbia) v Calder Hall J found that Mansfield's propositions in Campbell v Hall, 
particularly those recognising the continuity of the pre-colonial laws and property rights, had 
applied a fortiori in settled colonies.s2 Were this not the case an indigenous population 
which had not exerted any forcible resistance to British colonisation would have been placed 
in a less advantageous position than those populations which had. 
In summary, English persons inhabiting non-Christian territory held the birthright to 
English law in their relations inter se independent of the grant of the Crown (which was 
essential nonetheless for the fornlal constitution of the courts wherein the birthright could be 
exercised). This did not displace the common law presumption of the continuity of the pre-
colonial law so much as limit its applicability to the indigenous population. This result was 
not a function of the constitutional status of the colony but a response to the non-Christian 
character of the pre-colonial law. The exemption of the non-indigenous population from the 
aboriginal law (that is, the transformation of the customary code from a territorial to 
personal character) was, therefore, a qualification upon the common law presumption of the 
48 (1971) 17 FLR 141 (Aust NTSC) 
49 Wi ParaJa v Bishop of Wellington (1877) 3 NZ Jur (NS) SC 72; Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-General (1912) 
32 NZLR 321 (CA) 354 per Chapman J; Waipapakura v Hempton (1914) 33 NZLR 1065 (SC) 1070 per Stout 
CJ; In re the Ninety Mile Beach [1963] NZLR 461 (CA) per TA Gresson J. cf the Privy Council's position on 
original Maori sovereignty: Nireaha Tamaki v Baker (1901) [1840-1932] NZPCC 371; Hoani Te Heu Heu 
Tukino v Aotea District Maori Land Board [1941] AC 308. 
so Williams 'The Use of Law in the Process of Colonization", ch 2. 
SI (1828) 2 Moo PC, Ind App 306; 18 ER 117 at 130. 
52 (1973) 34 DLR (3d) 145 (SCC) at 199. 
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continuity of the pre-colonial law. 
3. the introduction of English law 
The common law presumed the continuity of the tribal law but also acknowledged that 
the indigenous inhabitants could have lost the customary code de jure in either of two ways: 
First, the tribal . law might have been suspended by an act of state during the process of 
acquisition of the sovereignty. Secondly, and presupposing no such disruption, the tribal law 
might have been superceded subsequent to the Crown's sovereignty by a general 
introduction of English law. 
a) the introduction of English law by an 'act of state' 
The act of state doctrine recognises the plenary power of the Crown in the conduct of 
the foreign affairs of the nation to perform certain actions unreviewable in her courtS.53 In 
particular, the courts have refused to locate any source of right in an act of state made by 
the Crown.54 For example, special promises made in a treaty could not be enforced55 nor 
could the arbitrary seizure of an alien's property outside the Crown's dominions be 
challenged.56 Under this recognised power the Crown could announce the introduction of 
English law to territory then being acquired and the courts would be bound to give any such 
stipulation unquestioned effect. 
The Crown made no act of state as it acquired the sovereignty over New Zealand by 
which it indicated an intention to make the Maori tribes amenable to English law. Indeed 
the recognition of rangatiratanga in the Maori text of the Treaty of Waitangi was an 
express stipulation otherwise. Maori customary law was not suspended by an act of state of 
the Crown during its acquisition of the sovereignty. 
b) the introduction of English law by charter of the Crown 
53 An 'act of state' has been defined as an "act of the executive as a matter of policy performed in the course of its 
relations with another state, including its relations with the subjects of that state, unless they are temporarily 
within the allegiance of the Crown": Wade "Act of State in English Law: Its Relations with International Law" 
(1934) 15 BYIL 98, 103. 
54 Secretary of State in Council of India v Kamachee Boye Sahaba (1859) 13 Moo PC, Ind App 22; Nabob of 
Arcot v East India Company (1793) 2 Yes 56; Gibson v East India Company (1839) 5 Bing N C 262; Doss v 
Secretary of State for India in Council (1875) LR 19 Eq 509; Rustomjee v R (1876) 2 QB 69 (CA); Rajah of 
Coorg v East India Company (1860) 29 Beav 300; Sirdar Bhagwan Singh v Secretary of Stale for India (1874) 
LR 2 Ind App 38; Cook v Sprigg [1899) AC 572 (PC); West Rand Central Gold Mining Co v R [1905) 2 KB 
391, 408-10; Salaman v Secretary of State for India [1906) 1 KB 613; Oyekan v Adele [1957) 2 All ER 785 
(PC). 
55 Nabob of Arcot v East India Company (1793) 2 Yes Jun 56 (Ch); Vajesingji loravasingji v Secretary of State for 
India in Council (1924) LR 51 Ind App 357, 360 (PC); Hoani Te Heu Heu Tukino v Aotea District Maori Land 
Board [1941) AC 308 (PC). 
56 Buron v Denman (1848) 2 Exch 167; lohnstone v Pedlar [1921] 2 AC 262, 271 per Lord Finlay (HL). 
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The common law recognised the prerogative power of the Crown to introduce English law 
to her colonies.57 In conquered or ceded colonies this introduction could be completed by 
prerogative legislation or the exercise of the constituent power whilst in settled colonies any 
general introduction of English law58 was normally performed through the exercise of the 
prerogative constituent power to erect courts of judicature for the colony. The most 
important guide to the introduction of English law, therefore, was usually the charter of the 
Crown. Since the Crown invariably exercised a constituent power for its overseas 
possessions, the British Honduras and Pitcaim Island were the exceptions which proved the 
rule, the common law presumption of the continuity of the pre-colonial law needed to be 
read in tandem with the charter of the colony. 
It was an established rule by the early nineteenth century that where the Crown 
established courts with a territorial jurisdiction, that is jurisdiction over all the inhabitants of 
its territory, these courts were to dispense English law.59 The establishment of courts with a 
territorial jurisdiction therefore amounted to a general introduction of English law. In 
consequence, the applicability of English law extended to the indigenous inhabitants unless 
they could establish some exemption from its application. The subsequent restoration of 
native law by statute aside, some such exemption could be expressly recognised in the 
Crown's constituent instruments or implied by the courts from the circumstances of the 
colony. The exemption from English law could be partial or it could be virtually complete 
in that it left the indigenous tribunals and legal institutions, in particular their system of 
criminal justice, substantially intact notwithstanding the general application of English law to 
the non-indigenous population. 
Prior to the annexation of New Zealand in the mid-nineteenth century there were two 
important examples of non-Christian legal systems which had survived the Crown's 
sovereignty and exercise of its constituent power. The legal system of the American Indian 
and the Mughal machinery of justice in the Mofussil both enjoyed de jure status. What, it 
may be asked, was the basis of this status? The short answer is that it may have originated 
from the presumption of the continuity of the indigenous law but was more closely tied to 
the terms of the Crown's exercise of its constituent power over its territory. This position is 
confirmed by a brief analysis of the basis upon which the American Indian and Mofussil's 
Mughal systems of justice remained substantially intact. 
57 eg: Blankard v Galdy (1693) 2 Salk 411; Memorandum (1722) 2 P Wrns 75; Campbe// v Hall (1774) 1 Cowp 
204; Jephson v Riera (1835) 3 Knapp 130 (PC); (1836-37) Mayor of Lyons v East India Company 1 Moo PC, 
Ind App 175; Perozeboye v Ardaseer Cursetjee (1843) 2 Mor Dig 336, 4 Ind Dec (OS) 614 (Born SC); Fewson 
v Phayre (1848) 2 Ind Dec (OS) 242 (Beng SC); Secretary of State v Administrator-General for Bengal (1868) 1 
BLR 87 (Beng HC). 
58 The English inhabitants already had English law, of course, as their birthright. The Crown's exercise of the 
constituent power, unless provision was or had been made elsewhere (as by legislation), was usually taken as 
providing the date from which the reception of English law was timed. 
59 Attorney-General (ex parte Magistrates of Banff) v Stewart (1817) 2 Mer 143 (Ch); Mayor of Lyons v East India 
Company (1836-37) 1 Moo PC, Ind App 175; R v Wi//ans (1858) 3 Ky (MC) 16 (Ct Jud Pen); Advocate-General 
(Bengal) v Ranee Surnomoye Dossee (1863) 9 Moo PC, Ind App 387. 
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i) the legal status of the AmeIican Indian legal system 
The Stuart charters for the New World were issued at a time when the orthodox doctIine 
of territoIial sovereignty had yet to emerge. These charters combined claims to a tenitoIial 
title as well as personal jurisdiction, a feature which led to Marshall Cl's early nineteenth 
century fonnulation of . tribal status. Typically, the charters constituted a government and 
judicial institutions enforcing the English-styled law over the white settlers of the colony. 
The unmistakeable negative inference of this was the non-disruption de jure (for it could 
hardly have been accomplished de facto by sweep of the royal pen) of the Indian lex loci as 
amongst themselves. To take an example, the New England charter (1620) granted the 
Plymouth Company6O 
... full and absolute Power and Authority to correct, punish, pardon, goveme, and 
rule all such the Subjects of Us ... as shall from time to time adventure themselves in 
any Voyage thither, or that shall at any Time heerafter inhabit in the Precincts of 
TerIitories of the said Collony, as aforesaid, according to such laws, Ordinances, 
Directions, and Instructions as by the said Council aforesaid be established. 
The charter limited the exercise of the legislative and judicial power to English settlers and 
those living within the precincts of the settlements notwithstanding its claims elsewhere to 
the sovereign title of vast areas of terIitory much of which was inhabited by Indian tribes. 
Colonial practice, both legislative and judicial, generally confonned with this personal 
limitation. 61 When Marshall CJ crone to assess the status of the Indian tribes he could speak 
of the 'domestic, dependent nations' who retained their laws and self-government within 
their own lands. He found the Indian tribes were not subjects of the Crown or its successor 
the United States government until they had been subdued or voluntarily submitted by 
treaty. The continuity of the Indian law, in particular their system of criminal justice, was 
thus associated with their residual sovereignty acknowledged and observed by the Crown 
and United States government.62 As a result, during the early nineteenth century most tribes 
retained the power to deal with offenders on Indian land and intra-Indian matters regardless 
of 10cation.63 Later treaties required the Indians to surrender non-Indians who committed 
crimes on Indian land to federal authoIities at the reservation border. No tribes surrendered 
the power to deal with Indians committing serious crimes against one another,64 their 
60 cc, rn, 1827, 1833. 
61 The Canadian courts also observed the personal limitation of the courts' jurisdiction under royal charter. Conno/ly 
v Woo/rich (1867), 11 LeJ 197, 213-4 (Que SC). The charter of the Hudson's Bay Company (1670) introduced 
English law "but did not, at the same time, make it applicable generally or indiscriminately - it did not abrogate 
the Indian laws and usage" per Monk J, approved on appeal sub nom Johnslone v Conno/ly (1869), 1 RLOS 253, 
270-2 per Loranger J (dissenting), 355-8 per Bagley J, 376-7 per Mackay J, 396 per Caron and Duval, H. 
62 The Marshall cases are discussed above, chapter 2... Also Uru'led Slales v Wheeler (1978), 435 US 313, 55 L Ed 
2d 303, esp 312-3 (SC) for a full, recent analysis. 
63 Cohen, Fed,eral Indian Law, 2nd ed 44. 
64 Mason "Canadian and United States Approaches to Indian Sovereignty" (1983), 21 Osg HU 421, 454. 
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retention of this power being confirmed by the Supreme Court in ex parte Crow Dog 
(1883).65 Some years earlier, however, the Supreme Court had qualified its recognition of 
Indian sovereignty by holding that Congressional legislation could diminish incidents of this 
sovereignty.66 This important judgment recognised for the first time the tribes' subordination 
to the legislative authority of the United States.67 Previously the Marshall doctrine had 
recognised them as woolly independent nations subject to the United States only in that it 
was the exclusive government with which the tribes could have 'foreign' relations. 
Congress' response to the Crow Dog decision, therefore, was to assert ultimate sovereignty 
by giving federal courts jurisdiction over serious crimes on reservations. The judicial 
reduction of the jurisdiction of the tribal authorities on criminal matters was underlined by 
the holding that relations between tribal members and non-members were without the tribal 
jurisdiction.68 
Despite this reduction of Indian sovereignty by judicial and Congressional inroad, it is 
clear that unlike the tribal criminal jurisdiction the continuity of the Indian customary law 
on most civil matters was not linked to any residual sovereignty. The American courts 
constantly recognised the validity of Indian marriages, laws of descent and property 
ownership without characterising these customs as an emanation from their residual 
sovereignty.69 
ii) the status of the Mughal legal system in the Mofussil 
The Crown's first exercise of a constituent power for the Mofussil subsequent to the 
victory at Plassey (1757) and subsequent grant of diwani (1765) were letters patent 
establishing a Supreme Court for the Bengal (1773) which, like the Regulating Act,70 limited 
the Court's jurisdiction to British subjects and servants of the East India Company.7! The 
intention of the Act and letters patent was to except the indigenous Hindu and Muslim 
communities from the Court's jurisdiction and hence amenability to English law. The 
indigenous population were to be left to the jurisdiction of the courts of the diwan 
administered by the East India Company. The problem with this approach was that the 
65 (1883), 109 US 556 (SC). 
66 Cherokee Tobacco v United Stales (1871) 78 US 619 (SC); also United States v Kagama (1886) 118 US 375 
(SC); The doctrine of Congressional legislative supremacy found its fullest expression in Lone Wolf v Hitchcock 
(1903) 187 US 553 (SC) and has become known as 'The Lone Wolf Doctrine'. 
67 The same year Congress passed an important law (3 March 1871, 16 Slat 566) stipulating the Indians were no 
longer treated as .independent nations, and compacts with them were styled "agreements" instead of "treaties". 
This year was, therefore, significant for its impairment of tribal sovereignty. 
68 Oliphant v Suquamish Indian Tribe (1978), 435 US 191; United Stales v Wheeler (1978) 435 US 313; UNC 
Resources,lne v Benally (1981) 514 F Supp 358 (DNM) 
69 Cohen. Federal Indian Law, passim. 
70 13 Geo 3 c 63. 
71 Text in "Reports on the Administration of Justice, & c, in the East Indies" (1781), Gen App I, in Reports from 
Committees of the House of Commons (1st ser), V. 
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preamble of the Regulating Act spoke of the "Territorial Acquisitions" of the Crown. If the 
Mofussil had been acquired in sovereignty by the Crown then all the inhabitants, Hindu, 
Muslim or otherwise, were subjects of the Crown and hence under the jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court erected in 1774.72 The contrary explanation, and it was one initially 
preferred, was that the Crown had no sovereignty over the Muslim inhabitants but merely 
the status of diwan l,l11der and subject to the Mughal law.73 In this sense the East India 
Company was no more than an agent of the Mughal dispensing his justice to the Hindu and 
Muslim population of the MofussiL Thus Hastings' Regulations (1772), issued the year 
before the Crown constituted any legislative authority in the region,7. were based on their 
lawfulness under Mughal rather than English law.75 By the end of the eighteenth century, 
however, it was impossible to maintain the fiction of Mughal sovereignty. Once this became 
apparent the exercise of a legislative power over the indigenous inhabitants of the Mofussil 
by the East India Company derived validity from English rather than Mughal law.76 The 
Mughal system of criminal justice survived subject to rather than independently of the 
Crown's sovereignty, its continued viability resulting from the personal jurisdiction given the 
Supreme Court for the Bengal. 
North America and the Mofussil provided important examples of the legal survival of the 
indigenous, non-Christian system of criminal justice amongst the native inhabitants 
subsequent to the Crown's sovereignty. It is significant, however, that in both cases the 
continuity of these systems was linked to the perceived absence of British sovereignty over 
these people. In the United States the tribes were termed 'domestic, dependent nations' 
whilst the East India Company initially styled itself as diwan under Mughal authority rather 
than the full sovereign of the MofussiL The exclusion of the Indian tribes and Hindu and 
Muslim communities from the English criminal law was thus associated with their lack of 
the status of British subject When it became clear that the Crown had sovereignty over 
these people the continuity of the native tribunals and system of criminal justice became 
incorporated into the domestic law and resulted not from any independent sovereignty, as 
before, but the sufferance of the Crown or, in the case of the American 
72 The problem with the interpretation of the phrase "British subjects" was discussed in the letter of the Judges of 
the Supreme Court, September 1830, App in "Report on the affairs of the East India Company" (1831) PP, VI, 
Pt 5; Stephen Nuncomar and Impey, n, 126-7; Archbold Outlines of Indian Constitutional History, 63-78. The 
phraseology was continued in the Settlement Act, 1781, 21 Geo 3 c 65. In Bombay, however, 'British subject' 
was interpreted to include Hindus and Muslims because the town had been acquired by cession from Portugal, 
there being no native courts: Perozeboye v Ardaseer Cursetjee (1843) 4 Ind Dec (OS) 614 (Bomb SC). 
73 This was Warren Hastings' position: Archbold Outlines of Indian Constitutional History, 53-59; also Cowell 
History and Constitution, 19; Firminger Fifth Report, vii - xiii. 
7. 13 Geo 3 c 63, section 7. 
75 IIbert Government of India, 43-44; Firminger Fifth Report, xii; R v Shaik Boodin (1846) 4 Ind Dec (OS) 397, 
423 (Bomb SC). 
76 13 Geo 3 c 63, section 7 and 21 Geo 3 c 65, section 23. Numerous regulations for the administration of justice 
amongst the natives of the Mofussil were enacted under this power, eg Regulations of 11 April, 1780 (Archbold 
Outlines of Indian Constitutional History, 76-78) and the Comwallis Regulations (1793). See Secretary of Slale v 
Administrator-General for Bengal (1868) 1 BLR 87 (Beng HC). 
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Indian, . United States. The allowance of the indigenous system of criminal justice was 
indicated by the personal jurisdiction the Crown had given its courts of the territory. 
The principles which underlay the continuity of the American Indian and Mughal 
(Mofussil) criminal justice systems were further illustrated by the early to mid-nineteenth 
century inquiries into the applicability of English law to the Australian Aborigine. During 
the first half of the nineteenth century English persons had committed various atrocities 
against native individuals. The colonial authorities insisted that the Aborigines as subjects of 
the Crown were under the full protection of British law,77 a position confirmed by the Select 
Committee on Aborigines (1837).78 This meant not only protection by but also Aboriginal 
amenability to English law, a result explained on two bases: First, the common law 
presumption of the continuity of the pre-colonial law was held inapplicable to the 
Aborigines who to the British eye were far and away the most primitive, scarcely human 
some influential commentators of the time felt, aboriginal race they had encountered. 
Secondly, even were the presumption of continuity to have applied, the Crown had 
introduced English law to Australia not only by statute but in its constituent instruments for 
the colony and continent. On either basis, the Australian Aborigines were amenable to 
English law. Speaking for Govenor Gipps, the Colonial Secretary put it this way (1842):79 
... even if the Aborigines be looked upon as a conquered people, and it be even 
further admitted that a conquered People are entitled to preserve their own Laws 
until a different law be proclaimed by the Conqueror, still no argument in favor of a 
separate Code of Laws for the Aborigines of New South Wales can be drawn 
there from , first, because the Aborigines never have been in possession of any Code 
of Laws intelligible to a Civilized People, and secondly, because their Conquerors (if 
the Sovereigns of Great Britain are so to be considered) have declared that British 
Law shall prevail throughout the whole Territory of New South Wales. 
Gipps recommended, however, the adoption of a policy which forebore the rigorous 
application of English law to the Aborigines. He realised their technical amenability but 
advised a policy of lenient enforcement.80 In South Australia, however, George Grey, later 
Governor of New Zealand, was recommending the immediate and strict rather than gradual 
application of English law to the criminal relations of the Aborigines both with one another 
and the colonists. He felt any other policy would frustrate their assimilation into white 
77 Hunter to Portland, 2 January 1800 HRA, 1st ser, il: 401-2; Atkins to King, 8 July 1805 HRNSW, 653-4 (but 
observing that bringing an Aboriginal before a Criminal Court "would be a mockery of judicial proceedings, and 
a solecism in law"); Glenelg to Bourke, HRA, 1st ser, XIX: 48-9; Gipps to Gienelg, 19 December 1838, id, 700-
4 (reporting execution of whites tried for the 'Myall Creek massacre' of Aboriginal women and children); R v 
Congo Murrell (1836) 1 Legge 72 (NSWSC); Gipps to Stanley, 24 January 1842 HRA, 1st ser., XXI: 653-4 
(enclosing views of Willis J, controverted in Stanley to Gipps, 2 July 1842, id, XXII: 133). 
78 pp (1837), 7, #425, 80-84. 
79 Thomson to Dowling, 4 January 1842 HRA, 1st ser, XXI: 655-6. 
80 Similarly, Select Committee on Aborigines Report, supra, 80, 84; Dowling J. to Gipps, 8 January 1842 HRA, 1st 
ser, XXI: 656 (reporting courts have Jurisdiction over Aboriginal crimes inter se but noting the policy of lenient 
enforcement and "great infrequency of such cases"). 
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society.sl 
It must be stressed that the position taken in North America, the Mofussil and Australia82 
all related to the applicability or otherwise of the English criminal law to the native 
population. The relevant documentary evidence often did not make this clear speaking in 
terms which divorced from the context might suggest the aboriginal amenability to the 
English law included the · whole of its aspects civil as well criminal. The circumstances of 
each colony, however, made it clear that in either exempting or subjecting the aboriginal 
population from the jurisdiction of its courts, the Crown was stating its position on the 
amenability of the indigenous communities to the English criminal law. So far as the civil 
aspect of English law was concerned there is no evidence of an attempt to apply or even a 
belief that it did so apply to the aboriginal population except, perhaps, in civil disputes with 
non-indigenous persons. We will see shortly the basis up on which the continuity of the 
native 'civil' law rested notwithstanding the general introduction of English law to the 
colony. 
c) qualifications upon the general introduction of English law 
The general introduction of English law by charter of the Crown did not import the total 
suspension de jure of the pre-colonial law. Neither the Crown and its representatives nor the 
judiciary were so inflexible as to dissociate the situation de jure from that obtaining de 
facto. It would have been an impossible result were the general introduction of English law 
to have supplanted completely all the customary laws of the indigenous inhabitants. In Doe 
dem Silveira v Texeira (1845) Anstruther R thought "such a proposition to have been, in the 
very statement of it, sufficient to carry its own refutation. "83 Although the general 
introduction of English law might have ousted the customary laws of criminal justice the 
courts still recognised some viability of the customary law in the 'civil' relations of the 
indigenous inhabitants. The basis of this was the important qualification upon the 
introduction of English law to a colony that it was only imported to the extent it suited local 
circumstances. This rule was enforced by the courts irrespective of the way in which 
English law had come to the colony whether by 'birthright' (in which case its application 
was limited to the British inhabitants) or charter of the Crown. The rule was used by the 
courts, particularly in the East Indies' Presidency towns, to recognise the continuity of ' 
native laws, especially those concerning title to property. 
81 Grey to Russell, 4 June 1840 CO 201/304: 245-63 (report enclosed). 
82 At least initially, in the late nineteenth century it was held the Aboriginal law on civil matters inter se (marriage, 
adoption. etc) was not cognisable: R v Neddy Monkey (1861) 1 W & W (L) 40 at 41 (per Barry, 1) (customary 
marriage an evidentiary matter); R v Cobby (1883) 4 LR (NSW) 355 at 356 (per Martin C1) (Aborigines "have 
no laws of which we can take cognisance"). Also Law Reform Commission Recognition of Aboriginal Customary 
Law (1986), paras 39-48, 237, 899-900. 
83 (1845), 4 Ind Dec (OS) 529 (Bomb R Ct). 
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This qualification upon the introduction of English law had developed during the early 
eighteenth century as the applicability of particular aspects of the English common and 
statute law to the American colonies was assessed.84 In 1724 the law officers advised that 
the colony of Jamaica was bound by "such acts of parliament as have been made in 
England, to bind the plantations in general, or Jamaica in particular, and also such parts of 
the common, or statute law or England, as have, by long usage, and general acquiesence, 
been received, and acted under, there, though without any particular law of the country for 
that purpose". 85 In 1757 the law officers considered the applicability to Nova Scotia of 
English statutes prohibiting the counterfeiting of coins. They advised that "the proposition 
adopted by the judges there, that the inhabitants of the colonies carry with them the statute 
law of this realm, is not true, as a general proposition, but depends upon circumstances, the 
effect of their charter, usage, and acts of their legislature; and it would be both 
inconvenient, and dangerous, to take it in so large an extent" .86 Blackstone omitted the rule 
from the first edition of the Commentaries but corrected this, evidently at the suggestion of 
Mans field ,87 in the second edition.88 Mansfield himself recognised the rule in R v Vaughan 
(1769)89 and Campbell v Hall (1774).90 The rule was certainly well-established by the last 
qualter of the eighteenth century and by the middle of the nineteenth was being invoked by 
the colonial bench as a matter of course. For instance, the rule was used to assess the 
introduction of the feudal doctrine of tenures into the colonies - an example to which we 
will return in the next Part,91 the usury laws of England92 and the Statute of Mortrnain.93 
The qualification upon the introduction of English law to a colony left the "insoluble 
difficulty"94 of deciding the extent to which the various aspects of English law were 
introduced. Judicial determination as well as local legislation resolved the uncertainty and to 
that extent the former amounted to quasi- if not legislative activity. Nonetheless in reaching 
84 eg Anon GovernmenJ of the English Plantations (1701), 23; Smith Jr History of the Province of New York 
(1756), 259; Burke European SettlemenJs in America (1757), Il, 295-7. 
85 Chalmers Opinions, I, 203, 220. 
86 Id, 198. 
87 Wilson Works, ed Andrews, 1895, I, 19, nn 1 and 2. 
88 Bla Comm (2nd ed), 107. 
89 4 Burr 2494 98 ER 308, 311. 
90 1 Cowp 204. 
91 R v Steel (1834) 1 Legge 65, 68 (NSWSC); Attorney-General v Brown (1847) 1 Legge 312 (NSWSC); Doe dem 
de Si/veira v Texeira (1845) 4 Ind Dec (OS) 529 (Bom SC); Bera'mji v Rogers (1867) 4 Bomb HCR I(HC 
Bomb). 
92 Macdonald v Levy (1833) 1 Legge 39 (NSWSC) 
93 Attorney-General (ex parte Magistrates of Banff) v Stewart (1817) 2 Mer 143 (Ch); Mayor of Lyons v East India 
Company (1836-37) 1. Moo PC, Ind App 175, 276; Doe d. Anderson v Todd (1846) 2 UCQB 82 (QB Upper 
Can). 
94 Keith First British Empire, 186. As early as 1701, -Anon GovernmenJ of the English Plantations, had spoken of 
"the Crooked Cord of a Judge's Discretion" (at p 23) on the extent to which English law applied in a colony. Sir 
J. Grant, minute to Governor-General of India in Council, 17 April 1845, "Special Reports of Indian Law 
Commissioners" PP (1847), vol 43, 664, 675 termed the courts' power "quasi-legislative". Stephen, minute, 29 
September 1842 CO 209/14: 360, 362 noted the rule required the "arbitrament of a Judge - often a prejudicial, 
and I should say, invariably an ignorant or ill-informed Arbiter in such Matters". The task was better suited, he 
felt, to Legislators. 
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this detennination the judges took account of the .practice within the colony, variously 
described as "usage" and "general acquiescence". This meant that the general indeed any 
introduction of English law to a colony was qualified by the way in which the inhabitants 
had subsequently ordered their affairs. Where a local practice was inconsistent with the 
application of a particular English rule judges would decline to enforce it unless it could be 
proven the rule had been specially introduced. 
This was the basis upon which the courts of the Presidency Towns of the East Indies 
exempted the indigenous inhabitants from the rules of English law governing such matters 
as title to property, succession, marriage and even the inessential rules of the criminal law. 
The application of these rules of English law to the Hindu and Muslim population was 
inconsistent both with the means by which the Crown had acquired the sovereignty of the 
towns as well as local practice subsequent to the acquisition of the sovereignty and 
introduction of English law. A leading account of the relevant principles was given by the 
Privy Council in Mayor of Lyons v East India Company (1836-37). Having found no special 
introduction of the English law incapacitating aliens from holding real property,9S Lord 
Brougham proceeded to discuss the extent to which the general introduction of English law 
into Calcutta (by the charters of 1726 and 1753) had brought with it this particular law:96 
.. , it might have been said that the general application of the English laws implied 
that of the portion in question. But the acts of the power which alone could introduce 
this portion, and which alone introduced the English laws generally, show that it was 
introduced not in all its branches, but with the exception of this portion at least. This 
must be admitted, unless it can be maintained that there is no possibility of 
introducing the English laws at all, without introducing every part of them, which 
clearly cannot be asserted; for notwithstanding the extent to which these laws have 
been introduced, it is allowed on all hands that many parts of tllem are still unknown 
in our Indian dominions. 
In other words, though the general applicability of English law in Calcutta was admitted, the 
extent to which a particular rule or branch would apply depended upon the proof of its 
actual adoption. Where some other rule was proven to have been applied to the affairs of 
the indigenous inhabitants by "usage" the applicability of English law would be qualified to 
that extent. In Advocate-General (Bengal) v Ranee Surnomoye Dossee (1869) the Privy 
Council held that although English law had been generally introduced to Calcutta by the 
charter of the Crown, the application of the rule of English law of felo de se with · 
consequent forfeiture did not apply to the Hindu community. Lord Kingsdown noted that 
"the application of the criminal law of England to natives not Christian, to Mahomedans and 
Hindoos, has been treated as subject to qualifications without which the execution of the law 
95 (1836.37) 1 Moo PC, Ind App 175,274. 
96 Id, 284. This method was followed AdvocaJe·Generai v Ranee Surnomoye Dossee (1863), 9 Moo PC, Ind App 
392 (Ben SC); Sarkies v Prosonomoyee Dossee (1881) 6 ILR (Ca\) 794, 796 (Cal HC). 
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would have been attended with intolerable injustice and cruelty" .97 Certain rules of the 
English criminal law associated with what might be termed 'victimless crimes' were thus 
held not to have been wholly introduced into Calcutta on the grounds of the unsuitability of 
their application to the circumstances of the natives. A caveat was made in R v Willans 
(1858) when Maxwell R warned that the rule that English law was only introduced to the 
extent suitable to local circumstances could not be used as a basis for the complete 
exception of the non-European population from English law.98 He stressed the primary test 
was the situation obtaining de facto, the actual usage of the colony, rather than the mere 
non-Christian status of those inhabitants seeking the exemption from a particular rule of 
English law. Since Penang had a variety of inhabitants, European, Malay, Hindu and 
Chinese, none of whom were aboriginal, he found that the rule could only be narrowly 
invoked otherwise these people "would all be living on the same soil, each according to 
their own law. "99 
The continuity of the indigenous 'civil' law on the basis that the application of English 
law was unsuitable to their circumstances was implicitly a transitional arrangement. Once 
the natives had adopted the English practice in matters such as marriage, descent and 
suchlike, the English law would apply to their civil relations inter se as fully as it did their 
criminal. This premise was not one applied by the judicial assessment of the state of 
'civilisation' attained by the native community at large, so much as a function of the 
situation of the indigenous litigants before the court. In Re Noah Estate (1961) Sissons J 
considered the applicability of Inuit customary law to the deceased Noah's estate: IOO 
Noah had left his father's house and community and Eskimo society and had become 
part of another society and economy where different laws and customs prevailed. He 
accepted those laws and customs. He trained for a job, and he worked for wages and 
saved a fair part of his wages and deposited this money in a bank to his credit for 
the use of himself and his own family. He did not make this money available to his 
father and the Eskimo community at Broughton Island. 
Accordingly, English rather than customary law applied to Noah's estate. IOI 
Far from taking an inflexible approach to the interpretation of the introduction of English 
law by the Crown the common law conceded an approach which was flexible and 
pragmatic. It recognised that any importation of English law into a colony as regarded both 
the British and indigenous inhabitants could not result in the unqualified application of the 
97 (1863) 9 Moo pc; Ind App 387, 427. 
98 (1858) 3 Ky (MC) 16 (Ct Jud Pen); similar warning was made by Sir J Grant, minute to Governor-General of 
India in Council, 17 April 1845, supra, 667. 
99 Id,28 . 
100 (1961) 32 DLR (2d) 184, 206 (NWITC). 
101 Similarly: The Case of Tanistry (1608) Davies 28 (English rules of descent had been used for the particular 
land); Adegbola v Folaranmi and others (1921) 3 Nig LR 81 (FC) (natives had converted to Christianity and 
given up customary laws). 
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rules of English law. This meant, however, that the status of a particular rule of English law 
was subject to the accident of litigation or clarification by local legislation. Until then, the 
"usage" of the colony could affect the applicability given it by the colonial courts. The 
relations of the indigenous community inter se and with the British inhabitants were a prime 
example of this process. The "usage" adopted in a colony where there had been a general 
introduction of English ·law did not undermine the general applicability of English law so 
much as amplify the extent to which the Crown intended it should govern a particular aspect 
of colonial life. 
Apart from the review given above it is difficult to produce a sophisticated summary of 
the common law principles governing the relation of native law to English law subsequent 
to the Crown's general introduction of the latter. There was not a great deal of reported 
litigation other than from the East Indies. The cases from that region as well as several 
North American cases recognised the continuity of native customary laws of succession, 
adoption, marriage, and, importantly, land tenure, subsequent to the Crown's sovereignty and 
the general introduction of English law. Even the early Australian position which held the 
Aborigine subject to the English criminal law in their criminal relations inter se did not go 
so far as to hold all Aboriginal law suspended with the general introduction of English law, 
a position taken, however, towards the end of the nineteenth century. It is clear that the 
common law cushioned the application of English law to non-Christian societies at least to 
the extent of their civil relations. Although this was a position upon which the common law 
developed but the most general of principles it nonetheless highlighted the deepseated 
character of the presumption of the continuity of the pre-colonial laws. The common law 
was not so insensible as to act as though the general introduction of English law should be 
comprehensive and take little account of the peculiarities of the community which in the 
application it was meant to serve. The common law recognised that the indigenous 
population was to be weaned onto English law as much as that was consistent with the 
terms of the Crown's charter and other formal conduct. Usage exempting the indigenous 
community from English law could become a matter of judicial cognisance, and, in turn, the 
natives could by their conduct adopt rules of English law from which their circumstances 
had previously excepted them. 
C. THE STATUS OF MAORI CUSTOMARY LAW 
The application of the relevant principles to the status of Maori customary law upon British 
armexation is straightforward: Maori customary law survived the Crown's sovereignty over 
New Zealand. English law superceded the tribal code on matters incidental to the 
sovereignty of the Crown and where the latter included customs repugnant to 'fundamental 
principles' of English law. The tribe members' acquisition of the status of British subjects 
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occurred with the annexation and did not affect this continuity. No act of state was 
performed by the Crown as it acquired the territorial sovereignty disrupting this continuity. 
Indeed, the Maori text of the Treaty of Waitangi recognised the rangatiratanga of the chiefs 
and so was probably an express saving of the customary code. Moreover, the English text of 
the Treaty provided for the Maori to have the "undisturbed" enjoyment of their property 
including their forests ,and fisheries. This provision presupposed the continued viability of 
customary law at least in its definition of the traditional (real and personal) property rights. 
Nonetheless English law was introduced with the Crown's sovereignty as the law governing 
the relations of the settlers inter se. This law might have arrived in New Zealand earlier by 
virtue of the 'birthright' of the British settlers but, even were this the case, its formal 
establishment required the Crown's exercise of a constituent power (which it would not 
undertake until the Maori had signified their formal consent). English law could only have 
become applicable to the Maori tribes by formal extension of the Crown. 
The major determinant of the status of Maori customary law subsequent to British 
sovereignty therefore was the manner in which the Crown had exercised its constituent 
power for the colony. The first constituent instruments for New Zealand were drafted 
towards the end of 1840 once the Colonial Office had been informed of Hobson's formal 
annexation of the country. Strictly speaking, the first constituent instruments for New 
Zealand were the charters and commissions for the colony of New South Wales to which it 
had been initially annexed.102 This, however, was never more than an interim measure 
calculated to give the Crown the breathing space in which to draft and promulgate proper 
and particular constitutional instruments for the colony. These documents rather than the 
constituent instruments for New South Wales represented the Crown's formal position on 
the status of Maori customary law. 
The first charter for the colony was issued under the authority of the New South Wales 
Continuance Act 1840.103 The charter authorised the establishment of local courts and the 
appointment of the requisite personnel: I04 
And we do hereby authorize and empower the governor of our said colony of New 
Zealand for the time being, to constitute and appoint judges, and in cases requisite, 
commissioners of oyer and terminer, justices of the peace, and other necessary 
officers and ministers in our said colony, for the due and impartial administration of 
justice, and for putting the laws into execution, and to administer or cause to be 
administered unto them such oath or oaths as are usually given for the due execution 
and performance of these offices and places, and for the clearing of truth in judicial 
102 Stephen to Labouchere, 18 May 1839 CO 209/4: 243; Stephen to Nonnanby, 7 June 1839 CO 209/5: 78. Act 
declaring the laws of New South Wales extend to Her Majesty's Dominions in New Zealand (NSW). 16 June 
184{), 3 Vict No 28 "so far as the same can be applied in the administration of justice therein" (section 1). These 
laws were never applicable in New Zealand, it becoming a separate colony before the Act took effect: opinion of 
Fisher, 11 May 1841 CO 209/9: 190, so the colonial assembly passed an Ordinance similar to the NSW Act: 
Ordinance No I, 1841, 4 Vict sess 1. 
lOO 3 & 4 Vict c 62, section 2. 
104 pp (1841), #311; 32. 
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matters. 
The charter did not stipulate that English law was to govern the relations of the tribes 
however the judicial officers were to be given a territorial jurisdiction from which the Maori 
were not excepted. The charter represented the general introduction of English law to New 
Zealand. The status, if any, of Maori customary law during early colonial history turned, 
therefore, upon the rules governing the effect of such a general introduction of English law. 
In making such an inquiry it is necessary to distinguish the 'civil' from the 'criminal' 
aspects of English and tribal law. 
1. the criminal relations of the Maori 
It is clear that in signing the Treaty of Waitangi the Maori chiefs were under the impression 
they would retain their traditional authority over the tribe. They felt that the resolution of 
internal disputes and the regulation of tribal life would still follow the customary pattern. 
They were to be mistaken in this belief at least as a matter of law. The general introduction 
of English law by charter of the Crown without modification for Maori customary law 
meant that legally speaking the customary criminal code no longer obtained. Of course, it 
would be absurd to conceive this as a de facto result - the promulgation of the Crown's 
charter and erection of courts thereunder, mere legal ceremony, could hardly of itself be 
supposed to have produced the Maoris' abandonment overnight of the customary means of 
social control. Nor did the general introduction of English law mean that whenever the 
Maori inhabitants transgressed the penal law of England, even where their activity had been 
in harmony with' their own customs, prosecution in Her Majesty's courts would inevitably 
eventuate. It was one thing to have made the Maori technically amenable to the English 
criminal law, another actually to enforce that amenability rigorously. 
From the start the Colonial Office advocated the same policy of moderation and leniency 
in dealing with Maori offences against English law as had been applied in the case of the 
Australian Aborigine. Lord Russell's despatch of late 1840 accompanying the first charter 
and other constituent instruments for the colony advised Hobson to interpose a 'Protector' 
between aboriginal and white society. As, again, in the case of the Australian Aborigine,l°S 
the Protector was essentially a means to wean the indigenous inhabitants onto the English 
criminal law in preference to the sudden imposition of an alien code of social control.l<)6 
105 Glenelg to Gipps, instructions for an Aboriginal Protectorate, 31 January 1838 HRA, 1st ser, XIX, 252-5. The 
Protectorates were not a success: Gipps to Russell, 3 February 1841, id, XXI, 8-11; Gipps to Stanley, 16 May 
1842, id, xxn. 54-5; "Report from the New South Wales Committee on the Aborigines and Protectorate" New 
South Wales Legislative Council Voles and Proceedings (1849), 1-2. 
106 The idea derived from the recommendations of the Select Committee on Aborigines (British Settlements), pp 
(1837), 7, 83-4. Note especially the recommendation that Protectors be commissioned as magistrates to act on the 
natives' behalf both in prosecuting their crime inter se and superintending their defence in criminal actions by or 
against settlers. 
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Russell advised Hobson: I07 
The general duty of the protector would be to watch over the execution of the laws, 
in whatever concerned immediately the rights and interests of the natives; and, to 
reduce this general principle into a definite fOIm and practical usefulness, it would be 
necessary that laws should be framed, investing the principal protector and his 
officers with every power of prompt and decisive interference which it may be found 
convenient and practicable to confer. In such a case, the analogies of the law of 
England, as administered amongst Englishmen, whether at home or abroad, will, in 
many respects, be found to fail. A magisterial authority, more prompt than that of 
our justices of the peace, and less fettered with technical forms and strict legal 
responsibilities, will probably be indispensable. I should also anticipate the necessity 
of providing some method by which the protector might, under proper legal advice, 
have at all times immediate access to a court of criminal justice, the duty of which 
should be to give immediate attention to all prosecutions instituted under his orders. 
In the protector should also be vested a summary jurisdiction, for arbitrating on all 
questions controverted between the European and the native settlers, with, perhaps, a 
right of appeal in the more weighty cases to the ordinary tribunals of the colony. In 
the same way, questions disputed among the natives themselves should fall under the 
cognisance of the protector, - so far as this might be compatible with a due regard to 
any native customs, not in themselves immoral, or unworthy of being respected. 
Having advised the appointment of a Protector and the constitution of his office by colonial 
legislation, Russell then clarified his reference to the native customs to which the Protector 
would pay 'due regard':IOS 
Amongst the native customs there are some which it will be the duty of the 
Government not to respect. Of these, the chief are cannibalism, human sacrifice and 
infanticide. With such violations of the external and universal laws of morality no 
compromise can be made, under whatever pretext of religious or superstitious opinion 
they may have grown up. On the other hand, there are customs, which, however 
pernicious in themselves, should rather be gradually overcome by the benignant 
influence of example, instruction, and encouragement than by legal penalties. And, 
finally, there are customs which, being rather absurd and impolitic, than directly 
injurious, may be borne with, until they shall be voluntarily laid aside by a more 
enlightened generation. It is important to advert distinctly to this topic, because, 
without some positive declaratory law, authorizing the executive to tolerate such 
customs, the law of England would prevail over them, and subject the natives to 
much distress, and many unprofitable hardships. 
The Colonial Office appreciated that the Maori had been rendered amenable to the English 
criminal law and certain parts of the civil in their disputes with the settlers but sought ~ 
means of enforcement which cushioned the tribes from the sudden and strict enforcement of 
the Pakeha code. The beneficient interposition of a Protector with an office constituted under 
local legislation permitting his departure from the strict rule and procedure of English law 
was that means. 
107 Russell to Hobson, infonnal instructions accompanying charter commission and fonnal instructions erecting 
separate colony of New Zealand, 9 December 1840 CO 209/8: 460, 487. 
108 Id. 
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Under this policy, Protectors were appointed and commissioned as Justices of the Peace 
with jurisdiction in Maori cases from which the settlers' Justices had been excluded. The 
commissions of the Protectors and Sub-Protectors instructedlO9 
In your magisterial capacity, where natives are concerned, there are many minor 
offences or disputes which you may compromise or adjust in accordance with their 
custom, which, if brought before a court of justice, and judged according to the strict 
and rigid interpretation of the law, might subject them to grievous punishments. 
This, however, did not give the Protectors any legal basis upon which they could resolve 
criminal matters and other disputes between Maori and settler in a manner sensitive to 
Maori custom because there was no colonial legislation authorising their application of the 
customary law. The charter of 1840 had suspended this law in virtue of its general 
introduction of English law and so the partial re-establishment of the customary law de jure 
required legislation. 110 George Oarke, the Chief Protector, referred to the instructions in his 
commission and complained of his "loss to conceive how such a principle can be carried out 
until native customs have been legalized, or an enactment made to meet the case.'tlll 
An attempt to put Maori customary law on a legal footing was made in 1844. The 
Native Exemption Ordinance of that year aimed at the "gradual" rather than "immediate and 
indiscriminate enforcement" of the English criminal law among the Maori. Prosecutions for 
crimes committed by the Maori inter se were not to be initiated without an information 
being laid by "two principal chiefs of the tribe to which the injured party" might belong. 
Any warrants laid as a result of such an information were to be directed for execution to 
two principal chiefs of the offenders' tribes with no further proceedings to be taken unless 
the alleged offender was delivered up by the two chiefs. Mixed offences required an 
information to be directed to two principal chiefs of the offender's tribe (where he was 
without the town limits).1l2 
The Ordinance had been passed at the initiative of Governor Fitzroy who had taken 
office determined to take account of the Maori position. The settlers were not sympathetic 
with this goal, except where it suited their own purposes. From the start, whilst its 
confirmation by London was awaited, the Ordinance proved difficult to enforce.113 The 
Protector George Clarke reported that when the Ordinance was passed "it was so ill 
received, and so opposed to the prejudices of the unthinking community, that even the 
magistrates in some instances wanted the moral courage to put it into effect."1l4 
109 Wards A Show of Justice. 46. 
110 Campbell v Hall (1774) 1 Cowp 204; Danwdhar Gordhan v Deoram Kanji (1876) LR 1 App Cas 332 (PC). 
III Clarke to Colonial Secretary. 31 July 1843. pp (1844). #556. App, 349. 
112 Native Exemption Ordinance 1844. 8 Vict Sess 3. No 18. sections 1-3. 
113 Wards. A Show of Justice, 66-8. 
114 Clarke to Colonial Secretary. final report as Protector of Aborigines. 30 March 1846. enc1 in Grey to Stanley. 12 
June 1846. pp (1847). #837. 13. 17. 
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One might have expected Lord Stanley to react, favourably to this law. Two months 
before its arrival in the Colonial Office for allowance, he had instructed George Grey as the 
latter set off on his New Zealand appointment to show "every possible respect ... both in the 
structure of the law and in the administration of it" for Maori customs "of which they may 
be possessed and from which they cannot be rudely or abruptly divorced."115 Upon looking 
at the Native Exemption Ordinance soon after, however, Stanley characterized it as "too 
unequal in favor of the weaker party".116 He termed the Ordinance "an experiment of a 
difficult and doubtful nature":1I7 
To the general principle of exempting the natives, in their relations with each other, 
from the operation of a code of laws utterly unintelligible to them and wholly 
unsuited to their condition, I fully assent; but in carrying that principle into effect, 
several rules have been framed of which may give birth to well-founded complaints 
on the part of their fellow subjects of the European race ... I fear that the zeal, 
however laudable, for the welfare of the aborigines, which has dictated these 
enactments, has rather outrun discretion, and that laws so unequal in favor of the 
weaker party, will, by the sure operation of familiar causes, defeat their own end. 
In making these comments Stanley had in mind the recent recommendations of the Select 
Committee on New Zealand (1844) which had expressly adopted the policy taken by the 
same George Grey in his report on the Australian Aborigine: 118 The lenient enforcement of 
the English criminal law amongst the Maori population was thought to hinder rather than 
encourage their assimilation into white society. Although James Stephen did not agree with 
this viewl19 the fate of the Native Exemption Ordinance showed that any attempt to put the 
customary law on a legal footing in matters of criminal law was bound to encounter 
difficulty and resistance from the British settlers. Stanley instructed Grey to revise the 
Ordinance. 
Whilst these attempts were being made to establish a legally-based equilibrium between 
Maori customary law and the English penal code, the suggestion was put that certain 
portions of the Maori population were not amenable to the jurisdiction of the colonial 
courts. In making this proposition in late 1842120 and again early in 1843121 Attorney-General 
Swainson was implicitly drawing upon the precepts by which the indigenous legal systems 
of the North American Indian and Mofussil were initially treated as separate codes 
independent of English law. Swainson argued that the Crown lacked sovereignty over the 
115 Stanley to Grey, notification of appointment, 13 June 1845, pp (1847), #337: 68, 70. 
116 Stanley to Grey, 13 August 1845, id, 83, 84. 
1\1 Id, 84-5. 
118 Report from the Select Committee on New Zealand (1844), pp (1844), #556: x-xi. 
119 Stephen to Hope, note, 28 December 1843, CO 209/22: 247-254; Stephen to Hope, note, 19 May 1843, CO 
209/16: 454r - 455; Ward, A Show of Justice, 71. 
120 Swainson to Shortland, 27 December 1842, CO 209/16: 487-94. George Clarke and Shortland took the contrary 
view, Shortland to Stanley, 31 December 1842, id,446-455. 
121 Swainson, opinion, 13 July 1843, CO 209/22: 285-93. 
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I 
tribes which had not signed the Treaty of Waitangi or had but in the imperfect knowledge 
of the consequences. This was the same equation of British subjecthood with amenability to 
the jurisdiction of the Crown's courts that had obtained in North America and the Mofussil. 
Swainson's fatal error, however, was to go behind the solemn assertion of the sovereignty of 
the Crown over New Zealand. His opinion was repudiated on this basis.lll James Stephen 
also queried Swainson's belief that the sovereignty of the Crown and formal establishments 
of courts with jurisdiction over all inhabitants had completely superceded the tribal law: l23 
But the assumption [of Swainson] is itself confounded. All this legal pedantry (for it 
is nothing better) about arson, & warrants, - & the Queen's book, & so on, in our 
intercourse with savages is just as needless as it is unrneaning. I know of no reason 
why in all matters purely inter se - their marriages, inheritances, contracts, & so on, 
& even in the definition and punishment of crimes - they should not live under their 
own law or customs: such customs only excepted, as are abhorrent from the universal 
laws of God -; As for example infanticide & cannibalism. And even in questions, 
between the State & the Natives, I know not why they should not be governed by 
their own laws & customs to the utmost possible extent: gradually of course 
superceding them by our own law, as the natives may learn to understand & 
appreciate it. At this moment this is the case in Ceylon in many respects. It is the 
custom throughout the whole of British India. Even in Canada, the Indian is at once 
subject to the British Crown, & exempt from subjection to very much of the laws of 
the province. Establish this distinction, & the Queen's sovereignty would in no 
exercisable manner injure the native chiefs or their people. But, to be sure, if these 
black men are, in respect of their own allegiance, to be brought under the yoke of 
Blackstone's commentaries, it would be as good a reductio ad absurdum, as could be 
proposed. 
Stephen had stressed that any introduction of English law to New Zealand only reached as 
far "as circumstances will allow" ,124 and indicated that the application of the strict rule of 
English law was to be qualified by the circumstances of the Maori. Certainly the above 
passage indicated his belief this was the position with the Maoris' civil relations inter se and 
he even seemed to take the position, identical to that soon afterwards recognised by the 
Privy CounciI,115 that the same rule governed the applicability of the English criminal law to 
Maori relations inter se. Nonetheless Stephen's subscription to the position that the Maori 
customary law had not been extinguished by the formal constitution of the colony 
underlined rather than obviated the need for a legislative determination of the formal status 
of Maori customary law, at least as far as it might affect Maori - Pakeha relations in the 
122 Stephen to Hope, 19 May 1843, CO 209/16: 454r:455; Stanley to Shortland, id, 456-9; Stephen to Hope, 28 
December 1843, CO 209/22: 247-54, Hope to Stanley, 30 December 1843, id 254; Stanley, note, 31 December, 
id; Hope, note, 15 December 1843, id, 246r. 
123 Stephen to Hope, 28 December 1843, CO 209/22: 247, 253-4. 
1:24 Id, 247 (the emphasis belongs to Stephen: "In our relations with such people it is necessary to be circumspect, 
and just, & to keep as close to the law as circumstances will allow. A complete observance of it is out of the 
question"). Also Stephen to Vemon Smith, 21 July 1840 CO 209(7: 40r (saying it "is almost the universal error 
to regard as illegal all deviations from the rules of law in force in England, however plainly the difference of 
circumstances may point out the inapplicability of such rules") and minute 29 September 1842 CO 209/14: 360-7 
(the introduction of every detail of English law would produce "utter confusion") . . 
115 Advocate-General (Bengal) v Ranee Surnomoye Dossee (1863), 1 Moo PC, Ind App 387, esp. at 427. 
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colony. 
Since the colonial legislature's efforts were unsatisfactory the Colonial Office took the 
matter in hand and gave a positive lead. The Instructions for the colony issued in 1846 
under the authority of the New Zealand Constitution Act (UK) 1846126 made provision 
which in retrospect the first charter ought to have done six years previously. The 
Instructions followed the parent statute127 and provided for the setting aside by proclamation 
of "Aboriginal Districts" within which the "laws, customs, and usages of the aboriginal 
inhabitants so far as they are not repugnant to the general principles of humanity, shall for 
the present be maintained."I28 Within the districts "such native chiefs or others as shall be 
appointed or approved by the Governor-General for that purpose, shall interpret and carry 
into execution such laws, customs, and usages as aforesaid, in all cases in which the 
aboriginal inhabitants themselves are exclusively concerned" .129 White persons in such 
districts were to observe the native law and any violations by them were to be tried by the 
magistrate of the province wherein the district was situated. This provision for Aboriginal 
Districts was modelled almost exactly on the American principles by which the whole of the 
customary law took effect within the Indian territory (save where legislation intervened 
otherwise). As his report on the Australian Aborigine had indicated, the new Governor, 
George Grey, was not sympathetic with what essentially was a laissez jaire policy toward 
the indigenous laws and so the provision for Aboriginal Districts was neglected. Nonetheless 
the Instructions, like the parent Act, contained an important provision which took effect 
irrespective of Grey's proclamation, or rather non-proclamation. of Aboriginal Districts:130 
In cases arising between the aboriginal inhabitants of New Zealand alone, beyond the 
limits of the said aboriginal districts, and in whatever relates to the relations to and 
the dealings of such aboriginal inhabitants with each other beyond the same limits, 
the courts and magistrates of the entire province ... shall enforce such native laws, 
customs, and usages as aforesaid. 
This was a restoration de jure to the Maori of their customary law on those matters inter se 
where previously English law was technically applicable. The crucial aspect, however, was 
the replacement of the traditional jurisdiction of the chief and elders with the jurisdiction of 
Pakeha courts. This was no laissez jaire system but an incorporation of the customary law 
into the ordinary judicial system of the · colony. Grey gave this stipulation more detailed 
126 9 & 10 Vict c 103, section 1. Those parts of the Act dealing with the Maori were unaffected by the New 
Zealand Constituiion Act 1848, 11 Vict c 5, section 1. 
127 id, section 10. 
128 Text in pp (1847), #763, 76-87, chap xiv, 82. 
129 id, 83 . 
130 id, 6. Earl Grey did not share this interpretation: Earl Grey to Grey, 8 June 1847, pp (1847), #837, 87 but 
deferred to Grey's opinion. Ct Rira Peti v Ngaraihi te Paku (1888) 7 NZLR 235 (SC). 
131 Grey to Gladstone, 14 November 1846, pp (1847), #837, 79-81. 
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expression131 in his Resident Magistrates' Courts Ordinance 1846132 which continued and 
adapted, although he protested otheIWise,133 elements of the Native Exemption Ordinance he 
had been instructed to revise. l34 
It is beyond the scope of the present inquiry to chart the status of Maori customary law 
in New Zealand beyond its restoration de jure in 1846. The Resident Magistrates were 
empowered to take stock of Maori customary law both on criminal and civil matters as it 
affected Maori relations inter se and with the Pakeha. The Maori may have been rendered 
amenable to the English criminal law by virtue of the general introduction of English law in 
1840 however this was ameliorated informally by the policy of lenient enforcement and 
corrected formally in 1846. 
2. the civil relations of the Maori. 
Although the general introduction of English law with the first charter of the colony 
made the Maori liable to the English criminal law, the same did not hold for their civil 
relations. Whilst civil disputes with the Pakeha fell to be decided by English law should 
such matters end in the colonial Court of Requests established in 1841, important parts of 
the customary law were unaffected by the general introduction of English law. At the 
Colonial Office Stephen and Russell considered the civil relations of the Maori inter se to 
remain ordered by the customary code. When Russell advised Hobson to enact a law 
recognising the customary law he was referring to its status in the Maoris' civil disputes 
with the settlers as well as their criminal relations at large. m Stephen made exactly the same 
point when he characterised any attempt to treat the Maori as technically amenable to the 
yoke of Blackstone's Commentaries as "as good a reduction ad absurdum as could be 
proposed" .136 
The relations between the Maori and colonial authorities on questions relating to land 
were based on the supposition that the Maoris title to their land was defined according to 
their own law. The 1840 charter had contained the proviso that137 
132 Resident Magistrates' Courts Ordinance. 10 Vict sess 7. No 16. Pt ill dealt with treatment of natives in criminal 
cases. Pt IV with civil cases between Maori and European, Pt V established Arbitration Courts for Maori civil 
disputes inter se with tribal assessors "men of the greatest authority and best repute in their respective tribes" 
(section 20). 
133 Ward A Show of Justice. 73-91. describes and assesses the Resident Magistrate scheme and its incorporation of 
aspects of the Native Exemption Ordinance which Governor Grey had pilloried. The Governor stressed the early 
success of his scheme: Governor Grey to Grey. 25 January 1847. pp (1847). #837. 86-7; Grey to Grey. 2 
February 1847. id. 90-1; Grey to Grey. 4 February 1847. id. 92-4. 
134 Grey disbanded the Protectorate. Wards supra. 73 when he repealed the Native Exemption Ordinance. Grey to 
Gladstone. 27 November 1846. pp (1847). #837. 85 and Police Magistrates' and Native Exemption Ordinances 
Repeal Ordinance. 1846. 10 Vict sess 7. No 15. 
m Russell to Hobson. 9 December 1840 CO 209/8:460,487. 
136 Stephen to Hope. 28 December 1843 CO 209(22: 247.254. 
137 Text in pp (1841).#311.31.33. 
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... nothing in these our letters patent contained shall affect or be construed to affect 
the rights of any aboriginal natives ... to ... any lands in the said colony now actually 
occupied or enjoyed by such natives. 
Since the title of the Maori to their land derived from their customary rules it followed from 
the charter that at least this aspect of the customary law survived. Similarly Stephen 
considered the enforcement of criminal charges against Maori chiefs whom he noted were 
acting in defence of their own property, and hence not in technical breach of the criminal 
law. 138 .A further example concerned the question of the trespass by European-owned cattle 
onto Maori cultivations. Encouraged by the English concept of rights of common, white 
farmers depastured their stock to let them roam. Unlike the European, and similar to the 
North American Indian, the Maori did not fence their cultivations and kept their stock 
tethered. The Maori like their North American brethren did not regard wandering cattle 
happily. The Cattle Trespass Ordinance 1844139 protected unfenced cultivations from roaming 
stock and in a test case some years later judgment was given for Maori landowners whose 
crops had been damaged by Pakeha-owned beasts. 14o During the 1840s Maoris were also 
bringing actions in trespass before local courts founded on their aboriginal title. 141 These are 
examples wherein a supposition of the existence de jure of a body of customary law 
regarding title to land was made, for how else could the title recognised as held by the 
tribal owners be defined if not by reference to that customary law? 
The precise extent to which the colonial courts recognised other aspects of the Maori 
customary law in their civil relations is an inquiry the writer has eschewed. Such an 
investigation would require access to the records of the colonial courts which remain in an 
archival state (unlike those of colonial America which have mostly been put into published 
form). The only important secondary account of the post-annexation status of Maori 
customary law mainly dwells upon the criminal relations of the Maori and questions of land 
rights. 142 In the absence of such a study into the behaviour of the colonial courts, there is no 
precise indication of the extent to and regularity with which the colonial courts were called 
upon to recognise, say, the customary laws of marriage, descent or title to personal property. 
In large part such silence was doubtless a function of the very continuity of the customary 
law and consequential absence of litigation in Pakeha courts. 
The judgment of Prendergast CJ in Rira Peti v Ngaraihi te Paku (1888) is the leading 
reported assessment by local courts of the status of Maori customary law subsequent to 
138 Stephen to Hope. 28 December 1843 CO 209(22: 247. Similar observation by Swainson, 7 August 1843, id, 370-
5. 
139 Cattle Trespass Ordinance, 1844, 7 Vict sess 3, No 14. 
140 Ward, A Show of Justice, 134.As to the problem see, generally Ward, id, 50; Adams Fatal Necessity, 222-3. 
141 Ward, supra, 51. George Clarke observed, however, the frequent Maori inability to bring civil actions in defence 
of their land (as by actions in trespass) because, unlike the European, "the native is ignorant of even the first 
steps to be taken", Clarke to Hobson, 18 June 1842, CO 209/16: 109-18. Similarly Clarke to Grey, 30 March 
1846, pp (1847), #837, 13. 
142 Ward, supra, passim. 
177 
British annexation. In this case Prendergast had to consider the legal status of a customary 
marriage. He noted that the Marriage Ordinances of 1842 and 1843 implicitly declared 
marriages in the colony were to be governed by the common law. These Ordinances had 
been passed to clarify doubts within the colony over the status of marriages solemnised by 
someone other than a minister episcopally ordained. The Ordinances declared local 
marriages were valid only if solemnised by an ordained minister. It is clear the doubts 
prompting the Ordinance had attached only to marriages amongst the European segment of 
the colony yet Prendergast inferred from the Ordinances that the common law rules 
regarding solemnisation applied to all marriages, Maori as well as European.143 In addition, 
the Marriage Ordinance 1847 (section 44) as well as subsequent legislationl44 had expressly 
excepted native marriages, he noted, but all that could do was leave the Maori under the 
status quo ante. Since by that they were "British subjects, [whose] relations to each other 
[were] governed by the laws of the land, and not by their usages", the Maori were subject to 
the common law rules of marriage. The premise behind this position was acceptance of a 
general suspension of Maori customary law upon the Crown's assumption of territorial 
sovereignty.145 This reasoning made the crucial and important error of blending two distinct 
processes, namely the Crown's assumption of the sovereignty and the general introduction of 
English law to the colony. Mistaken both as to the scope of the Marriage Ordinances and 
the rules in Campbel/ v Hall, Prendergast proceeded to consider the extent, if at all, to 
which the Crown had restored the Maori customary law de jure. His attention focused upon 
the New Zealand Government Act of 1846 (UK) and the Royal Instructions issued 
thereunder. Whereas it was concluded earlier that this Imperial Act and the constituent 
instruments under its authority made a limited but significant restoration de jure of Maori 
customary law, Prendergast held any such restoration only was to occur in Native Districts 
set aside under the relevant provisions of the Act These "Aboriginal Districts", he noted, 
"were never appointed".I46 This ruling ignored the provisions of both the Act and 
Instructions indicating Maori customary law was intended to have some cognisability in the 
courts irrespective of the establishment of Native Districts. The ruling was doubtless drawn 
by way of inference from the local Marriage Act 1880 which exempted Maori partners from 
the formalities therein specified where they were living in Districts set aside by proclamation 
under authority of the imperial Acts. 147 Being imperial legislation the 1846 Act and the 
instruments under its authority should have been given priority over the narrow, local 
statute. Instead Prendergast read both the imperial and local legislation as taking an identical 
position towards the status of Maori customary law when plainly they had not. Prendergast's 
143 (1888) 7 NZLR 235, 238 (Se). 
144 Smith Maor; Land Law, 35-9. 
145 Id,239. 
146 Id. 
147 The Marriage Act 1880, No 21, section 2. 
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ruling against any de jure status for Maori customary .1aw was completed by reference to the 
English Laws Act 1858 (NZ). This local statute declared that "the laws of England as 
existing on the 14th day of January, 1840, shall so far as applicable to the circumstances of 
the colony, be deemed and taken to have been in force therein as, and after that day, and 
shall continue to be therein applied in the administration of justice according1y."148 This Act, 
he observed, was "without any exception with regard to natives."149 He thus failed to use the 
'circumstances of the colony' exception to the general introduction of English law in order 
to spare, even if but partially, Maori customary law. This unwillingness might be contrasted 
with the approach then already taken in relation to Hindu and Muslim law in the Presidency 
towns of the East Indies. Prendergast's approach was followed in R v Wairemu Kingi 
(1909),150 Rangi Kerehoma v Public Trustee (1918)151 and In re Wi Tamahau Mahupuku 
(deceased), Thompson and another v Mahupuku (1932).152 
As will become seen as the usual pattern, Prendergast's position on the effect of British 
sovereignty upon traditional Maori rights might be contrasted with that of the Privy Council. 
In Hineita Rirerire Arani v Public Trustee (1919) the Board considered the status of the 
Maori customary law of adoption. The case concerned Maori couples' capacity to adopt a 
European child. For their Lordships Lord Phillimore found that prior to the Native Land Act 
1909 which abolished customary adoption,I53 Maori persons had the choice of adoption by 
customary or statutory means. Although no reference was made to supporting authority, 
none apparently being felt necessary, Phillimore treated Maori customary law as enjoying 
legal status in the absence of legislative provision otherwise. He observed how this 
customary law had adjusted in post-contact years so as to permit adoption of non-Maori 
children. Approving the Maori Appellate Court's "sound" judgment in the Blake-Wellwood 
casei 54 he accepted such change in the customary law as admissible and part of the general 
evidence of the particular custom. This dynamic character set aboriginal customary law apart 
from the customary local laws acknowledged within England. It might well be, he said, that 
the Maori as a race may have some internal power of self-government enabling the tribe or 
tribes by common consent to modify their customs, and that the custom of such a race is 
not to be put on a level with the custom of an English borough or other local area "which 
must stand as it always stood, seeing that there is no quasi-legislative internal authority 
which which can modify it".m 
148 English Laws Act 1858, No. 2, section 2. 
149 (1888) 7 NZLR 235, 240. 
ISO (1909) 12 GLR 175 SC). 
151 [1918] GLR 483, 485 (SC). 
152 [1932] NZLR 1397 (SC). 
153 [1840-1932] (1919) NZPCC 1,6. 
154 "Decisions of Native Land Court and Native Appellate Court ... " AJHR (1907), G5. 
155 Id. 
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One wonders the intrinsic difference between .the customary law of marriage and 
adoption, making the latter subject to a common law presumption of continuity not given 
the other. The real difference in approach doubtless lay in the attitudes of the Privy Council 
and colonial judiciary. By the early twentieth century the Board was routinely dealing with 
aboriginal laws of the East Indies, Africa and New Zealand. Unlike the New Zealand bench 
their Lordships were thoroughly versed in the legal principles underpinning British colonial 
activity. 
Generally, however, the local courts located any continuity of Maori customary law in 
resucitatory legislation rather than common law principles regarding the introduction of 
English law to a new colony. Given the present state of Maori society, - its adoption and 
adaptation of European rules of personal succession, marriage and suchlike, any residual 
vigour of Maori customary law as a matter of common law must be open to some doubt. 
Nonetheless the writer would wish to reserve his position on this question since progression 
onto this inquiry would be another study in itself. It will become clear in the next Part, 
however, that at least where an aboriginal title to or over land is proven the character of this 
property right will be defined by reference to the customary law. 
D. IDENTIFICATION OF MAORI CUSTOMARY LAW 
If on any given occasion a local court is called to adjudicate upon a matter involving an 
issue of customary law the first task will be to assess the cognisability of that custom. In 
theory, it has been seen there may have been some continuity of the pre-colonial law 
notwithstanding a general introduction of English law. To establish any basis for such 
recognition in a particular field of native affairs will require an assessment both of the 
practice within the country and the effect of the relevant statutes. Even if the continuity of 
the customary law in a particular field is shown, it must still be found to have governed the 
relations of those Maori seeking its recognition by the court. This is a necessary 
consequence of the personal character of the continuity of customary law. The following 
Part shows, however, it is clear Maori customary law retains some cognisability at least on 
questions of aboriginal title (that is, traditional property rights over land). Whether this 
cognisability extends to other aspects of contemporary Maori life is a study which 
unfortunately the present work cannot make. 
One recent case where Maori customary law has been recognised as retaining some 
status is Te Weehi v Regional Fisheries Officer (1986).156 In this case it was held that a 
claim to the exercise of a traditional right of fishery will only be enforced in defence to a 
prosecution under the Fisheries Act 1983 where it can be shown the right was exercised in 
accordance with Maori customary law. On the strength of this case it must be supposed that 
156 Unreported, High Court of New Zealand, Christchurch Registry, 19 August 1986 . . 
in the future New Zealand courts will increasingly be required to consider matters requiring 
proof of Maori customary law. It may be noted that section 50 Maori Affairs Act 1953 
provides some means for the ascertainment of that law through submission of a case stated 
from the High Court to the Maori Appellate Court on matters concerning "any questions of 
fact or of Maori custom or usage relating to the interests of Maoris in any land or in any 
personal property." The Maori Appellate Court is composed of judicial personnel with the 
experience in such matters. 
Given that on a particular occasion a New Zealand court has satisfied itself on the issue 
of cognisability of Maori customary law, it must then turn its attention to the content of that 
law. In considering these questions there is considerable caselaw from the colonial British 
East Indies and Africa. 
1. proof of the customary law 
The Privy Council has stressed on several occasions that proof of the customary law is a 
matter of evidence, a position which section 50 Maori Affairs Act 1953 would seem to 
confirm. In 1866 the High Court of Madras stated:1S7 
.. . what the law requires before an alleged custom can receive the recognition of the 
Court and so acquire legal force, is satisfactory proof of usage so long and invariable 
acted upon in practice as to show that it has, by common consent, been submitted to 
as the established rule of the particular family, class, or district of country; and the 
course of practice, upon which the custom rests, must not be left in doubt but be 
proved with certainty. Applying that rule of law here, we are of opinion that the 
evidence wholly fails to support the custom set up. 
On appeal the Privy Council agreed: 158 
Their Lordships are fully sensible of the importance and justice of giving effect to 
long established usages existing in particular Districts and families in India, but it is 
of the essence of special usages, modifying the ordinary law of succession that they 
should be ancient and invariable: and it is further essential that they should be 
established to be so by clear and unambiguous evidence. It is only by means of such 
evidence that the Courts can be assured of their existence, and that they possess the 
conditions of antiquity and certainty on which alone their legal title to recognition 
depends. 
Similarly on appeal from the Supreme Court of the Gold Coast in Kobina Angu v Cudjoe 
Attah (1916) the Board ruled that as "is the case with all customary law, it has to be proved 
in the first instance by calling witnesses acquainted with the native customs until the 
particular customs have, by frequent proof in the Courts, become so notorious that the 
1S7 Sivanananja Peruma'l Se'thura'yar v Muttu Ra'malinga Se'thura'yar (1866) 3 Mad He 75, 77. 
158 Appeal nom Ramalakshmi Ammal v Sivanatha Perumal Sethurayar (1872) 14 Moo Ind App 570, 585 per Sir 
Montague Smith. 
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Courts take judicial notice of them. "159 The Privy Council affirmed this position on proof of 
African customary law on numerous other occasions,l60 indicating its unwillingness to disrupt 
a finding at first instance as to the existence of a particular custom. The same position was 
applied by the Board in relation to New Zealand in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker (1902) when 
Lord Davey commented that the reference in the various local statutes to the Maori title to 
their traditional lands "plainly" assumed "the existence of a tenure of land under custom and 
usage which is either known to lawyers or discoverable by them in evidence. "161 
In practice, the proof of the customary law will require both native testimony and expert 
anthropological evidence. In the aboriginal context Calder v Attorney-General of British 
Columbia (1973)162 and Milirrpum v Nabalco Property Ltd (1971Y63 provide notable and 
relatively recent examples of a court looldng at both types of evidence. In Te Weehi v 
Regional Fisheries Officer (1986) Williamson J considered the evidence of academic 
specialists and the testimony of the elders (kaumatua) of the Ngaitahu tribe before finding 
that the defendant had been exercising a fishing right in accordance with Maori customary 
law. l64 
2. the characteristics of the customary law 
The Case of Tanistry (1608) recognised four criteria by which the courts were to be 
guided in identifying a valid customary law. These were reasonableness, certainty, 
immemorial usage and compatibility with the sovereignty of the Crown, the last 
characteristic being later taken to mean compatibility with statute. These attributes of custom 
are similar to those governing customary rights in England l65 although clearly the rules 
applied in English courts could not be used in the colonial context without modification. In 
general terms the colonial tribunals required proof of a consistent, long-standing practice not 
"repugnant to justice and morality."l66 The latter aspect was evidently interpreted in a much 
wider sense in British India than Africa, resulting in the judicial exclusion of a greater 
159 (1916) [1874-1928) Gold Coast PCC 43. 
160 Kweku Dua III v Kwamin Tandah (1927), [1874-1928) Gold Coast PCC 109; Inasa v Chief Oshodi [1934) AC 
99; Ometa v Chief Dore NUfna (1934) 11 Nig LR 18, WAPC 270; EfJuah Amissah v EfJuah Krabah (1936) 2 
WACA 30; Ohene Akyin III v Kobina Abaka II (1939) 5 WACA 49, WAPC 346; Abiam III v Tromu 1I (1949) 
WAPC 429; Yisa Dawodu v Suwebatu Danmole [1962) 1 WLR 1053; Moukarhim v Coker (1964) WAPC 973. 
161 (1901), [1840-1932) NZPCC 371, 382. 
162 (1973), 34 DLR (3d) 145 (SCC); also, Kruger and Manuel v The Queen [1978) 1 SCR 104, 108; Baker Lake v 
Minister of Indian AfJairs and Northern Developfnent [1980) 1 FC 518 (TD). 
163 (1971) 17 FLR 141. 
164 See Appendix. 
165 Broadbent v Wi/kes (1742) WilIes 360; Fitch v Rawling (1795) 2 Hy Bl 393; Bastard v Smith (1837) 2 Moo & 
R 129; HamTnerton v Honey (1876) 24 WR 603; Alfred F Beckett Ltd v Lyons [1967) Ch 449; and, generally, 
AlIen Law in the Making (7th ed 1964) 67-151; Ha/sbury's Laws of England (4th ed), xn, paras 401-43. Also 
Hannigan "Native Custom, its similarity to English Conventional Custom" [1958) Journal of African Law 101. 
166 Allott New Essays in African Law (1970), 44; Derrett "Justice, Equity and Good Conscience in India" (1962) 64 
Bombay Law Reporter 129 and 145. 
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proportion of customary law. l67 
It is clear the particular custom need not have existed since the beginning of legal 
memory (that is, 1189, being the commencement of the reign of Richard 11) nor is it 
restricted to its pre-colonial format. In Elelw v Officer Administering the Government of 
Nigeria (1931) the Privy Council acknowledged that customs may change over a period of 
time under "the influence of civilisation ... without losing their essential character of 
custom." I68 Native custom is not, in other words, a museum-piece frozen in its pre-colonial 
state. A Canadian example is the recognition that methods of exercising hunting and fishing 
rights can take account of technological progress unthought of in pre-contact times. 169 Rules 
are intrinsically dynamic, no less in the aboriginal than European context, and this position 
does no more than acknowledge this feature. 
It is also plain that certain pre-colonial laws and customs may be unrecognisable on 
grounds of repugnancy. This rule has been traced back to Romano-canonical origins in 
judgments ex aequo et bono.l7O In Picton's Case (1807-08), to give an example, the Spanish 
laws condoning torture and the immolation of Protestant proselytes were held to have been 
suspended immediately upon British sovereignty as repugnant to the fundamental principles 
of English law. l7l Similarly the Hindu custom of suttee (the burning of widows) did not 
survive British sovereignty in the Mofussil although legislation successively authorised then 
declared the custom illegal. 172 Other Hindu and Muslim customs contrary to English law but 
essentially victimless in character, polygamy, sexual relations with ten year old girls and 
suicide were given as examples by Lord Kingsdown in Advocate-General (Bengal) v Ranee 
Surnomoyee Dossee (1863) did not fall within the scope of the test of repugnancy.m In 
Khama v Ratshosa (1931)174 the Privy Council found the native custom allowing West 
African chiefs to raze an offender's property was not one which an English court could 
condone. Similarly in the Elelw case the Board indicated its inability to give effect to a 
'barbarous' custom until its harsher aspects had been ameliorated by exposure to 
'civilisation'.175 The test of repugnancy did not distinguish Christian from non-Christian law. 
The approach taken by the Privy Council to the indigenous laws of British East India and 
Africa show the custom of tanistry would as readily have been held void for repugnancy 
167 Id. 
168 [1931] AC 662; similarly, Sakariyawo Oshodi v Brimah Balogun (1936) 4 WACA 1 (PC). The position is 
directly comparable with the consequences in municipal law of a change in customary international law: Trendtex 
Trading Co v Central Bank of Nigeria [1977] QB 529 (CA) per Denning MR. 
169 Notably Prince and Myron v The Queen [1964] SCR 81 (SCC) approving judgment of Court of Appeal 
(Manitoba), (1962) 40 WWR 234 (at 242-3). 
170 Allott New Essays in African Law, 44; Derrett ''The Role of Roman Law and Continental Law in India" in 
Essays, n, 166. 
171 (1807-08) 30 How St Tr 539. 
172 Forsyth Opinions, 14. 
173 (1863) 9 Moo Ind App 427, 19 ER 786 (PC). 
174 [1931] AC 784 (PC). 
m Id,662. 
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and incompatibility in the nineteenth or twentieth as early seventeenth century. 
E. CONCLUSIONS 
The common law recognised · the continuity of the pre-colonial law subsequent to the 
Crown's assumption of the territorial sovereignty of new lands. This presumption applied to 
the Maori customary law no less than the other pre-existing legal systems, Ouistian and 
non-Christian, in other British colonies. The Crown enjoyed the constituent power for a 
colony, however, and under this power could make a general introduction of English law as 
by establishing courts of judicature with a jurisdiction over all inhabitants. This put the 
indigenous inhabitants under the English law in all their criminal relations and their civil 
disputes with the settlers but left them with their own law at least in their civil relations 
inter se on matters such as marriage, adoption, succession and, most crucially, title to land 
and other property. English law was only introduced to the extent it was suitable to the local 
circumstances. It could hardly have been applied suitably to the family matters and 
ownership rights of the Maori. Even if there had been a suspension de jure of all the 
customary law as a result of the 1840 charter, it was restored by the Imperial Act and 
Instructions of 1846 which required Pakeha courts to take stock of the customary law in 
disputes among the Maori and between Maori and Pakeha. In any event, it will become 
clear the customary law governing the title of the Maori to their land and other property 
continued notwithstanding the general introduction of English law. 
These conclusions regarding the status of Maori customary law upon and in the period 
immediately after the Crown's assumption of the territorial sovereignty of New Zealand 
have brought us back to the distinction constantly made between imperium and dominium. 
The Maori chiefs evidently believed that in signing the Treaty they were to retain the right 
of government within and over their own tribe. They felt they would be retaining what 
might be termed a limited or qualified imperium, a belief confirmed by the reservation in the 
Maori text of the Treaty of Waitangi of their rangatiratanga. It has already been seen that 
the cession of sovereignty took away the chiefs' sovereign authority over their own people. 
In ceding their sovereignty English constitutional theory held that the chiefs thereby 
recognised the Crown thenceforth as the sole source of legislative and judicial authority in 
the islands. That this position was inconsistent with the Maori text of the Treaty was of no 
moment: Once formally declared, the Crown's sovereignty was constitutionally 
incontrovertible. The Crown's charter of 1840 reflected the complete character of its 
imperium, establisrung courts with a jurisdiction over all inhabitants. This was a general 
introduction of English law for there had been no express saving of the customary laws of 
the Maori. Tills meant that those aspects of the law which might be said to have touched 
upon the imperium over the tribes, the native criminal justice system being the most 
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important, were superceded by English law. In contrast those parts of the customary code 
essentially related to dominium (title to property) or which at least did not go to the issue of 
imperium (such as the family laws of the Maori), enjoyed the common law presumption of 
the continuity of the pre-colonial law. The difficulty with this approach was that it had 
equated the Crown's complete imperium as territorial sovereign and the Maoris' status as 
British subjects with amenability to the English laws in those spheres of Maori life touching 
upon imperium. The equation was not intentional, quite the opposite in fact, for Russell had 
instructed Hobson to seek colonial legislation restoring most of the customary law to the 
Maori in their criminal relations inter se and making it cognisable in the resolution of their 
criminal relations and civil disputes with the settlers. When such legislation eventuated as 
the Native Exemption Ordinance 1844 it was so poorly conceived in the Colonial Office's 
eyes that Westminster did the task in 1846, which, in retrospect, the first charter of 1840 
should have performed. The restoration of Maori customary law de jure in 1846 simply 
made it cognisable in the colonial courts, in particular the Resident Magistrates' Courts 
established by Grey. The 1846 Act did not give the chiefs any authority de jure capable of 
description as a delegated imperium for the Aborginal Districts for which it had provided 
were never established. The customary law was thus restored de jure but in a manner which 
completely dissociated it from an imperium in any body other than the Crown. The New 
Zealand courts did not recognize Maori customary law as enjoying any legal status ex 
proprio vigore. This refusal was predicated upon an inaccurate interpretation of the Imperial 
statute and constituent instruments of 1846 and, more fundamentally, unfamiliarity with 
established legal principle underlying British colonization since at least The Case of Tan is try 
(1608). It was no surprise, then, that the Privy Council's position differed from that taken 
by Prendergast CJ in Rira Peti v Ngaraihi te Paku (1888). In the absence of resucitatory 
legislation local courts denied Maori customary law any continuity. 
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PART III 
ENGLISH LAW AND MAORI PROPERTY RIGHTS 
CHAPTER SIX 
THE COMMON LAW STATUS OF TRIBAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This Part considers the extent to which the common law recognised the property rights of 
the New Zealand Maori to their ancestral lands, forests and fisheries upon the British 
assumption of sovereignty over the country in 1840. These rights were expressly guaranteed 
by the Treaty of Waitangi which added the rider that they were to be inalienable save to the 
Crown. The present chapter looks at the general principles of the common law regarding the 
status of tribal property rights upon the assumption of British sovereignty. Although this 
body of rules has only lately acquired designation as the 'doctrine of aboriginal title', it is 
founded on ancient principles and suppositions which have underlaid British colonial activity 
since at least medieval times. The following chapter will discuss the particular application of 
this doctrine to the aboriginal claims of the Maori. 
B. THE COMMON LAW PRESUMPTION OF CONTINUITY 
1. the medieval doctrine of infidel dominium 
The distinction between the sovereign title to territory and private title to land was 
fundamental to British colonial practice by the beginning of the nineteenth century. This 
distinction was epitomised by the Roman law concepts of imperium or government and 
dominium or ownership. During the medieval period, however, these two notions of 
imperium and dominium were blended in the work of the influential canonist lawyers l who 
treated the authority of a ruler over his people as a combination of the government and 
ownership of the territory. This combination was termed, unhelpfully, dominium. Thus, as 
the medieval canonists debated the existence and character of infidel dominium2 they were 
addressing at once what post-medieval lawyers would characterise as separate questions, 
these being, first, the right of Christian princes to supplant a non-Christian ruler and, 
secondly, the right of a Christian prince to dispossess infidel peoples of their land and 
property. 
By the time the Spanish writers came to their celebrated theorizing of the sixteenth 
century the medieval arguments over the existence of infidel dominium had taken two 
distinct lines. Those, such as Hostiensis and Wyclif, who argued in favour of a Christian 
2 
Generally, Muldoon "Contribution of the Medieval Canon Lawyers", (1972) Traditio 483. 
Muldoon Popes, Lawyers and Infidels, passim, esp 12-13, 109-14, 125-29, 144-47; "John Wyc1if and the Rights 
of The Infidels;" (1979) 36 The Americas 301; Pagden The fall of natural man, passim. 
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prince's right to wage war and dispossess the infidel, took the Aristotelian argument that 
some men were slaves by nature.3 Bereft of the ability to reason and being as brutes this 
reasoning saw the heathen as incapable of possessing dominium. 4 Secondly, it was 
maintained that dominium was dependent upon the enjoyment of a state of Christian grace. 
Since the infidel were in a state of mortal sin it followed that they held no dominium. 
These arguments were in the eclipse long before the Age of Discovery began at the end 
of the fifteenth century. The Council of Constance (1414-18) had condemned Wyclifs views 
and it was mostly felt that Innocent IV had got the better of Hostiensis. Generally the view 
that infidel societies were capable of dominium held sway in medieval Europe. 
The Salamanca Divines generally recognised the dominium of the Indian societies of the 
New World in the medieval sense of the term.s These writers, however, were also beginning 
to seperate the question of government of the Indians from that of their right to the 
ownership of their land. Vitoria, to take probably the most influential example, considered 
the right of the Indians to own land. He rejected the Aristotelian argument equating the 
heathen6 with natural slaves:7 
The Indian aborigines are not barred on this ground from the exercise of true 
dominion. This is proved from the fact that the true state of the case is that they are 
not of unsound mind, but have, according to their kind, the use of reason. This is 
clear, because there is a certain method in their affairs, for they have polities which 
are orderly arranged and they have definite marriage and magistrates, overlords, laws, 
and workshops, and a system of exchange, all of which call for the use of reason; 
they also have a kind of religion. 
Similarly Vitoria adopted the Thomist positions that non-belief did not disqualify an infidel 
from true ownership and concluded that the Indians and barbarians could not "be barred 
from being true owners, alike in public and private law, by reason of the sin of unbelief or 
any other mortal sin, nor [did] such sin entitle Ouistians to seize their goods and lands."9 
Las Casas, as most other Spanish writers of the period, took a similar position. lo 
Having recognised infidel dominium, however, the Salamanca Divines proceeded to 
explain the grounds upon which it might be taken by a Christian prince. Generally, it was 
held that any conquest and dispossession of the heathen was just where they had refused to 
let Christians exercise their lawful right of trade and commerce or, more crucially, displayed 
hostility to the word of God. Although it was insisted any such conquest should proceed 
4 
6 
7 
Politics, L 5. 
The debate is des<:ribed in Hanke Aristotle and the American Indian, passim. 
Pagden The fall of natural man, provides a comprehensive account of their position, also Scon The Spanish 
Origin of InJernational Law and Hanke The Spanish Struggle for Justice. 
By which Aristotle had meant all non-Greeks, said Gentili: De Jure Belli Libri Tres (1589), 54. 
De Indis, L 127. 
Id, 123. 
Id, 125. 
10 Brevissma Relacion (1583, Eng trl), RI v. 
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with moderation, judged by the result, the virtual annihhilation of the Indian population of 
Meso-America, the true legality of Spanish conduct in the Indies was seriously in doubt. 
This point did not escape the English pamphleteersll and compilers, notably the Hakluytsl2 
and Purchas,13 of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. These writers did not 
hesitate to recount both the Spanish theorising over the character of Indian rights and 
accounts of the atrocities in the Americas. The flurry of publication in this periodl4 aimed to 
encourage British colonisation of the New World yet, significantly, in deprecating the 
Spanish behaviour the strong implication was that the English relations with the Indians 
would proceed on if not higher then certainly more punctiliously regarded principles. In 
1610 the Virginia Company published a pamphlet which included a condemnation of 
Spanish behaviour in the Indies: "Let the divines of Salamanca, discusse that question", the 
pamphlet sanctimoniously stated, "how the possessor of the west Indies, first destroied and 
then instructed. "I~ 
2. the presumption of continuity in colonial British North America 
By the beginning of the seventeenth century the medieval notion of infidel dominium was 
being replaced by a modem distinction between imperium (right of government) and 
dominium as understood in its Roman law sense of private ownership.16 The disengagement 
of the right of government from the ownership of the territory was, however, incomplete, or 
at least less apparent than later was to be the case, at the time the Crown granted its 
charters for the New World. These charters displayed the classic hallmarks of the medieval 
notion of dominium: The Crown described its power over territory in the New World as 
both a government over its own subjects (an imperium) and as ownership of the land. 
On the face of it these charters appeared inconsistent with the dominium (understood in 
its medieval sense) which European thought and practice had ascribed to infidel societies 
over previous centuries. The Crown's exercise of an imperium over the Indian tribes under 
these charters has already been discussed and it has been shown that no government was 
assumed over these people unrelated to their actual submission to British rule. The other 
aspect of the medieval dominium was the question of the title of the Indians to their land, 
that is their dominium in the Roman law meaning of the word. Were the Crown's courts to 
treat the royal grant of thousands of square miles of the Americas as a suspension of the 
11 eg Eden A treatyse of the newe India (1553) and The Decades of the newe worlde (1555) in Aber, ed The First 
Three English Books on America. 1511-55 (1885); Keymis (attrib) The Discoverie of the Large. Rich and 
Bewtiful Empyre of Guiana (1596). 
12 "Discourse of Western Planting" (1584) in Taylor, ed The original writings ... of the two Richard Hakluyts (1935), 
258-61; "Discovery and Conquest of Terra Florida" (1611) 
13 Purchas His Pilgrims (1625, rep ed 1905-7), XVIll, 80. 
14 See the accOlUlt in Porter The Inconstant Savage, passim, esp Parts I and IT. 
IS A True Declaration of the Estate of the Colonie in Virginia (1610) 5. 
16 Especially, Grotius De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1646 ed), lib 2, cap 3, para 3. 
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Indian title? 
As with the question of imperium the terms of the charters when inspected a little more 
closely frequently revealed that they were never intended as a royal suspension of the Indian 
title to their lands. 17 Several of the charters were issued with the express stipulation that the 
grant was only as "full as that which wee by oure lettres patent maie or cann graunte".18 
This, apparently, was ' a saving prompted by doubts over Indian rights. 19 Other royal 
instruments expressly recognised that the land under grant had been purchased from the 
Indian ,0wners.20 
It is significant that the practice of the colonial authorities under these charters generally 
conformed with the recognition of Indian title. The Indian title was usually quieted by 
purchase from the tribes, a practice to which we will return, or, much less frequently, 
confiscation after w ar. 21 The early legislation of the American colonies was replete with 
instances founded upon a recognition of the legal character of the aboriginal title.22 Colonial 
records show that by the end of the seventeenth century 'plantation' Indians were bringing 
actions in trespass in the colonial courts, often seeking to protect their cultivations from 
wandering European-owned stock.23 Clearly the royal charters were not considered to have 
disrupted the Indian title, a conclusion confirmed by the Royal Proclamation of 1763 which 
declared strongly the proprietary rights of the Indian tribes within and without the 
boundaries of the territory encompassed by the Crown's colonial charters.2A This presumption 
of continuity received an important and influential confirmation by the Supreme Court of the 
United States in lohnson v M'!ntosh (1823).25 
3. Judicial recognition of the presumption of the continuity of lOCal property rights 
The presumption of the continuity of the tribal title recognised in colonial America to have 
survived the Crown's assertion of sovereignty was in many respects but an aspect of the 
17 Slattery "Land Rights of Indigenous Canadian Peoples", 108-112; Springer "American Indians and the Law of 
Real Property", 32 
18 Second Virginia Charter (1609), rcvc, 43; Third Virginia Charter (1612), rcvc, 78; Newfoundland Charter 
(1610), SC, 53; Charter of Georgia (1732), CC, IT, 811. 
19 Juricek "English Territorial Claims in North America", 18. 
20 Royal patent for the Providence Plantations (1643), CC, VI, 3210; Charter for Connecticut (1662), id, I, 529; 
Charter for Rhode Island and Providence Plantations (1663), CC, VI, 3212 These post-Restoration charters were 
the first royal grants to the respective colonies. 
21 Royce compiled a compendious list of the purchase and cessions of the Indian title, ''Indian Lands Cession" 
(1899) in Eighteenth Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology 1896-97. 
22 Examples are given below but see a thorough account of this legislation in Thomas ''Introduction'' to Royce 
"Indian Lands CeSsion", supra. 
23 Shurtleff, ed Records of .. the Massachusetts Bay, I: 259; ID: 233; IV, pt 1: 52, 209-10; IV, pt 2: 153; Trumbull 
and Hoadly, eds Public Records of the Colony of Connecticut, I: 251; Records of the Particular Court of 
Connecticut, 1639-1663, 208; Pulsifer, ed Records of the Colony of New Plymouth, Xl: 137-8, 213; Noble and 
Cronin, eds. Records of the Court of Assistants of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay, 1630-1692, IT: 26; 
Mcllwaine, ed Minutes of the Council and General Court of Colonial Virginia [1670-1675], 365, 369, 370, 518 . 
2A Text in Brigham, ed British Royal Proclamations Relating to America; 212-8. 
25 (1823) 8 Wheat 543 (SC). 
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common law's general presumption of the continuity of the pre-colonial law. Nonetheless 
the common law also recognised that the land rights of the indigenous inhabitants stood on 
special ground entitling them to particular protection.26 This position was evident as early as 
The Case of Tanistry (1608) where it was indicated that whilst there had been a general 
introduction of English law into Ireland the brehon law affecting title to land would still 
survive providing it complied with certain criteria. After observing that the Crown's 
acquisition of new territory was invariably made "Monarchy Royall" the court made this 
important observation:27 
Et p ceo, quant tiele Monarch Royall, que voet governor ses sujects per un just & 
Positive ley, ad fait novell conquest de un re alme , coment que ipso facto il ad le 
seigniory paramound de touts les terres deins tiel realme ... & i1 ad le possession de 
touts les terres queux it voet actualment sieser & retainer en ses proper maines, pur 
son profit ou pleasure, & poet auxy per se grants distributer tiels portions que luy 
plerra a ses serviteurs & gens de guerre, ou al fiels colonies queux i1 veut planter 
immediatement sur le Conquest ... but que si tiel Conqueror receive ascun de natives 
ou antient enhabitants en son protection, & avow eux pur ses subjects, & pennit eux 
de continuer lour possessions, & demourir en son peace & alleagance, p lours heirs 
serront adjudge eins per bon title, sans grant ou confinnation del Conqueror, & 
enjoyeront lour terres solonque les rules de la ley que le Conqueror as allow au 
establish ... 
This passage recognised that where the Crown had taken the local inhabitants into its 
protection and by its conduct pennitted them to continue in the enjoyment of their 
possessions they and their heirs would be adjudged the rightful possessors of their ancestors' 
property without the necessity of fonnal grant or confinnation by the Crown. The right to 
their ancient property was qualified by the Crown's power to seize their lands during the 
conquest (as reward for its servants and soldiers or to plant colonies) and by the rules and 
laws subsequently established by the conqueror. Nonetheless conquest of itself produced no 
ipso jure suspension of the local property rights. 
The presumption of the continuity of tribal rights subsequent to British sovereignty was 
recognised regularly by the Privy Council in appeals from the Canadian, African and, it will 
be seen later, New Zealand courts. In Saint Catherine's Milling and Lumber Company v The 
Queen (1888) Lord Watson indicated the Indian title survived British sovereignty and 
subsisted until such time as it "was surrendered or otherwise extinguished".28 The Privy 
Council reaffirmed the continuity of Indian title in Canada on several other occasions.29 
The Board applied the same presumption to the property of the African tribes under the 
sovereignty of the Crown. The Crown's relations with these tribes had been founded upon a 
26 eg Halsbury's Laws of England (4th ed) VI, 587. para 1194. 
27 (1608) Davies 28. 40-1. 
28 (1888) LR 14 App Cas 46. 
29 Attorney-General (Quebec) v Attorney-General (Canada) [1921] 1 AC 401. 408; Ontario Mining Company v 
Seybold [1903] AC 73. 79; Dominion of Canada v Province of Ontario [1910] AC 637. See also R v Wesley 
(1932) 58 CCR 269. 280-1 per McGillivray JA (Alia CA). 
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strict distinction between imperium and dominium. , Several treaties of the early to mid 
nineteenth century were reminiscent of the Treaty of Waitangi in their cession of 
sovereignty and express reservation of tribal property rights.30 Other treaties purposefully 
contained a cession both of sovereignty and title to the land, a typical example being the 
Convention for the cession of Banco, Tasco and Tombo (1824) which granted "the full, 
entire, free, and unlimited right, possession, and sovereignty" of the specified land.31 This 
method's deliberate combination of the acquisition of the sovereignty and title to land was 
advocated by the Madden Report on the Sierra Leone (1841) which criticised the acquisition 
of sovereignty simpliciter as ineffective and nothing more than the purchase of the right to 
exclude other European nations: 32 
The second question goes to the consideration of the meaning that is attached to the 
term "sovereignty" of the country for that is what Colonel Doherty proposes to 
purchase, and it seems to me that the bare privilege of preventing other powers from 
purchasing the soil or establishing themselves upon it, would be an unprofitable right 
without acquiring any property in the land, but, on the contrary, having the necessity 
of purchasing the latter whenever we thought fit to plant a settlement in the country 
after we had already paid for the worthless privilege of a veto on the question of sale 
or transfer to any other European power. 
As in the case of the North American colonies, this practice was thoroughly consistent with 
the recognition of tribal property rights after British sovereignty, a finding which the Privy 
Council did not hesitate to reach on several occasions.3] In Re Southern Rhodesia, to give an 
important example of one such occasion, Lord Sumner indicated that the continuity of the 
tribal title as a matter of law depended largely upon whether it "belonged to the category of 
rights of private property, such that upon a conquest it is to be presumed, in the absence of 
express confiscation or of subsequent expropriatory legislation, that the conqueror has 
respected them and forebome to diminish or modify them".34 He then made a comment 
which seemed to indicate the presumption of continuity depended upon the degree of 
'civilisation' of the indigenous society. However he modified this position by indicating that 
where the tribal law defined the title with sufficient precision the court would give it the 
appropriate recognition:~ 
30 For example: treaty with King Comba (1827), MAT 2nd, 369-70; treaty with King Combo (1840), id, 373; 
cession by King Firama and King Tom (1807), id, 485; Convention with the Chiefs of the Bananas (1820), id, 
387-8; cession by Banka (1825), id, 491-2; cession of Bacca Loco (1825), id, 494-5; cession of Kafu Bullom 
(1827),496-7. The cession of Lagos (1861) is discussed below. 
31 MAT 2nd, 489-90. Also, for example: deed of cession of the island of Lemain (1823), id, 365-6; Convention with 
the King of Barta (1826) id, 367-8; treaty with the King of Wooli (1829), id, 371; declaration by King and 
Chiefs of Sierra Leone (1788), id, 484; cession by the Chief of Bago (1818), id, 485; cession by the Timmanees 
(1819), id, 486; Convention with the Timmanees of the Quia (1820), id, 487; cession by Soombia Soosoos 
(1826), id, 495-6. 
32 pp (1846), XII, App 15, 260. 
33 Cases below, also The Viiander Concessions Syndicate v Cape of Good Hope Government [1907) AC 186. 
34 [1919) AC 211, 233. 
35 Id, 233-4. 
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The estimation of the rights of aboriginal tribes is always inllerently difficult. Some 
tribes are so low in the scale of social organisation that their usages and conceptions 
of right and duties are not to be reconciled with the institutions or legal ideas of 
civilised society. Such a gulf cannot be bridged. It would be idle to impute to such 
people some shadow of the rights known to our law and then to transmute it into the 
substance of transferable rights of property as we know them ... On the other hand, 
there are indigenous peoples whose legal conceptions, though differently developed, 
are hardly less precise than our own. When once they have been studied and 
understood they are no less enforceable than rights arising under English law. 
Not long after, Lord Haldane observed for the Board that any gradation approach to 
aboriginal title had to "be held closely in check". He affirmed that the tribal title to their 
land "must be presumed to have continued to exist unless the contrary is established by the 
context or circumstances. "36 
Two cases have been cited as authority37 for the proposition that the Privy Council did 
not recognise a general presumption of the continuity of the tribal title subsequent to British 
annexation. 
In Cook v Sprigg (1899) the Board advised that the appellants as grantees of concessions 
made by the paramount ruler of Pondoland could not enforce these rights against the Crown 
after British annexation. During the course of its unanimous opinion the Committee, upon 
which Lord Watson was sitting, made the rather wide observation that "according to the 
well-understood rules of international law a change of sovereignty by cession ought not to 
affect private property, but no municipal tribunal had authority to enforce such an 
obligation. "38 The property rights alleged in this case were, however, not to land but 
contractual and personal in character. In consequence and despite the wide dicta the case 
was soon seen as no more than an application of the rule that tribunals in a British 
possession have no jurisdiction in respect of contractual claims against the Crown based 
upon its succession to the territory of another state against whom such claims would have 
lain.39 
The advice of the Privy Council in Vajesingji Joravasingji v Secretary of State for India 
(1924) contained the following passage:40 
When a territory is acquired by a Sovereign State for the first time that is an act of 
state. It matters not how the acquisition has been brought about. It may be by 
conquest, it may be by cession following upon a treaty, or it may be occupation .of 
territory hitherto unoccupied by a recognised ruler. In all cases the result is the same. 
Any inhabitants can only make good in the municipal courts such rights as that 
sovereign has through his officers recognised. Such rights as he had under the rule of 
36 [1921] 2 AC 399,403. 
37 Calder v Attorney-General (British Columbia) (1971), 13 DLR (3d) 64 (BCCA), 71-2 per Tysoe JA, 103-4 per 
Maclean JA. This position was reversed on appeal: (1973) 34 DLR (3d) 145 (SCC). Milirrpum v Nabalco Pry 
Ltd (1971), 17 FLR 141 (Aust NTSC), 266-7 per Blackbum 1. 
38 [1899] AC 572, 578. 
39 Moore Act of State in English Law (1906), 80-1. 
40 (1924) LR 51 Ind App 357. 
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his predecessors avail him nothing. Nay more, even if in a treaty of cession it is 
stipulated that certain inhabitants should enjoy certain rights, that does not give a title 
to those inhabitants to enforce those stipulations in the municipal courts. The right to 
enforce remains only with the high contracting parties. 
These comments were not inconsistent with the common law presumption of the continuity 
of local (and particularly tribal) property rights. Indeed, the Board's advice was wholly 
consistent with a presumption it had recognised elsewhere. In acquiring the sovereignty of 
the Panch Mahals during the 1860s the Crown had stipulated that certain property ri ghts ,41 
or pattas as they were known, would be the subject of later confirmation.42 This amounted 
to a valid suspension of the property rights pending later confirmation. The appellants' 
attempt to obtain the recognition of their pattas was, therefore, an attempt to enforce not a 
presumption of continuity but the terms of a treaty which had left the property rights subject 
to eventual royal confirmation. This was a case of the valid suspension of the presumption 
of continuity by act of state during the acquisition of the sovereignty. 
The Privy Council's advice in Vajesingji Joravasingji was given midst a series of 
appeals to the Board concerning tribal title to land in the Colony of Southern Nigeria. These 
appeals resulted in an emphatic affirmation of the common law presumption of the 
continuity of local property rights. The particular importance of these cases to the New 
Zealand context lies in their recognition of the continuity of the tribal title and view of the 
status of a treaty of cession (the Cession of Lagos (1861» expressly saving the property 
rights of the indigenous tribal population. 
On 6 August 1861 the eleko (king) of Lagos ceded the island and port of the same name 
to the Crown. The Treaty stipulated that "I, Docemo, do, with the consent and advice of my 
Council, give, transfer, and by these presents grant and confirm unto the Queen of Great 
Britain ... the Port and Island of Lagos, with all the rights, profits, territories, "and 
appurtenances whatsoever thereunto belonging, and as well the profits and revenue as the 
direct, full, and absolute dominion and sovereignty of the said port, island and premises, 
with all the royalties thereof, freely, fully, entirely, and absolutely." The same article 
provided for the inhabitants of the "said islands and territories, as the Queen's subjects, and 
under her sovereignty, Crown, jurisdiction and government, being still suffered to live 
there."43 The second article permitted the King to retain his royal style and authority to 
decide disputes between native inhabitants according to the native law. The native 
community considered the Treaty to have ceded the government of Lagos but with the 
saving of tribal property rights, a belief confirmed by a series of cases during the 1920s and 
41 There was some indication these were personal rather than property rights however the case proceeded on the 
footing the pattas were of the latter variety. 
42 Article 3, Treaty for the cession by Scindia of Gwaliur, 12 December 1860, 123 crs 181. 
43 Treaty with the King of Lagos, 6 August 1861 MAT 1st, 409 and 123 crs 234, 256. 
193 
'30s. 
This series of cases began with the judgment at first instance of Osborne CJ in Attorney-
General v John Holt and Co (1910). This case concerned the claim to certain rights over 
the foreshore as part inter alia of the property rights saved by the Treaty of Cession. 
Osborne found that according to native law a riparian owner had the right known as etisha 
to use the foreshore for access to water to land, embark, moor and otherwise use his canoe. 
Although some form of property interest the right of etisha did not give any exclusive 
ownership of the foreshore according to native custom. Hence the cession of the sovereignty 
to the Crown also passed the title to the foreshore but subject to the property rights (etisha) 
of the riparian owners under native customary law. In reaching this conclusion Osborne 
stressed it "to be quite clear that the Treaty of 1861 was a cession of tenitory, which at the 
same time respected pre-existing rights of private ownership."44 This continuity would be 
recognised and enforced by the courts of the Colony. Sitting on the Full Court (1911) 
Osborne maintained this position upon appeal.4~ Wink field J took a similar approach resting 
the continuity of the local property rights upon both the Treaty of Cession and subsequent 
practice embodied in local ordinances. Significantly he appeared to treat each as separate 
grounds for the continuity of the tribal property rights. With regard to the Treaty he noted:46 
At the time of the cession the natives were aware that the land of the island was 
being ceded. The white-capped chiefs complained that the cession involved the 
abrogation of all private rights of property and they protested that the King could not 
give away their lands. They were assured that the Treaty did not deprive them of 
their private property. 
Winkfield also indicated these property rights remained defined and regulated according to 
native customary law.47 On appeal the Privy Council did not disagree with these findings, 
indicating that the Treaty gave up the sovereignty "subject to the condition that all rights of 
property existing in the inhabitants under grant or otherwise from King Docemo and his 
predecessors, were to be respected." The Board left it open, however, whether the 
recognition of these property rights required "confirmation by subsequent procedure, 
prescribed by way of ordinance or otherwise" (that is, formal grant of the Crown).48 
Two years previous to the Board's advice in the John Holt case the Full Court of 
Southern Nigeria had given judgment in Oduntan Onisiwo v Attorney-General (1912). 
Osborne's judgment was particularly important, not only for its affirmation of his approach 
in the John Holt case but for its later emphatic approval by the Privy Council. This case 
required the Court to consider both the status of property rights subsequent to British 
44 (1910) 2 Nig LR 1. 10-11. 
4~ Id. 27. 
46 Id. 41 and 41-2. 
47 Id. 43. 
48 [1915] AC 599. 
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annexation and the extent of territory ceded by the Treaty of 1861. Relying on Cook v 
Sprigg (1899) the Attorney-General alleged both matters were at the sole determination of 
the Crown but the Court could not agree. So far as the second point was concerned Osborne 
found Cook v Sprigg was no authority for the proposition that a court could not look to the 
terms of a treaty of cession to ascertain the extent of territory ceded. Considering the first 
point, the Chief Justice distinguished Cook v Sprigg on the basis that there the Crown had 
not undertaken to respect private property rights after the change of sovereignty whereas it 
had done so under the cession of Lagos. Although he apparently felt the Treaty was enough 
recognition of itself he noted that the Crown had issued Royal Instructions to Freeman, the 
first Governor of Lagos, and allowed legislation both of which contained a recognition of 
tribal property rights. He did not doubt the accuracy of Cook v Sprigg for the proposition 
that private property rights were at the disposal of the Crown during the assumption of 
sovereignty but no such act of supension had been made, quite the opposite in fact, and by 
the Treaty it "was the intention of the Crown 10 accord to the inhabitants of the ceded 
territories the status and privileges of British subjects."49 Winkfield, however, seemed to 
have had second thoughts since the John Holt case. Relying on Cook v Sprigg he found 
obiter that the recognition of local property rights required either a grant or legislative 
declaration by the Crown. so Stoker J took the middle ground between Osborne and Winkfield 
finding that the administrative as well as legislative practice in Lagos over the past fifty 
years clearly showed "that the Crown had long since generally recognised rights of private 
ownership. "Si 
The Privy Council finally confronted the question it had sidestepped in the John Holt 
case, this being the source of the continuity of tribal property . rights in Lagos, in Amodu 
Tijani v The Secretary, Southern Provinces (1921). This case concerned the rights of the 
White Cap chiefs of Lagos who had been granted lands by the eleko prior to the cession. 
By these grants the White Caps held the right to control the use and management of the 
land, most notably the power to evict miscreant tenants. In the years prior to the cession 
they had also come to exercise the right 10 allot the lands for the purposes of cultivation in 
return for a nominal rent. Land was taken from the plaintiff White Cap under the Public 
Lands Ordinance 1903 so presenting the question of the character and hence compensability 
of the White Caps' ownership under pre-cession grants from the eleko. The Divisional and 
Full Courts of the Colony held that the plaintiff was entitled to compensation on the basis 
of the nominal rent received. The Privy Council overruled these decisions advising that the 
plaintiff was entitled to compensation as the absolute owner of the land. It was found at all 
stages, although not without some contradiction in the lower courts, that the White Caps' 
49 (1912) 2 Nig LR 79, 86, and 83-6. 
so Id, 94-5. 
Si Id, 48. 
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49 (1912) 2 Nig LR 79, 86, and 83-6. 
50 Id, 94-5. 
51 Id,48. 
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rights over their land were proprietary in chalacter and had survived British annexation. The 
Board simply disagreed with the lower courts' interpretation of the character of those 
property rights. 
At first instance Speed CJ indicated the reasoning of the Full Court in the Onisiwo case 
as unimpeachable on the question of the effect of the cession and continuity of local 
property rights. The eleko had made a complete and valid cession of the sovereignty but 
with the saving of the property rights of the White Caps. He found this view confirmed by a 
despatch from Freeman, first Governor of the Colony, of 8 March 1862. This despatch and 
others to and from the Colonial Office were frequently referred to in the colonial courts as 
indicative of the non-disruption of property rights by the cession. Interestingly Speed also 
cited as authority for this continuity both Onisiwo and Cook v Sprigg.52 On appeal to the 
Full Court Speed maintained his position.53 Ross J held that although private rights survived 
the cession in 1861 in virtue of local legislation, the rights claimed in this case (unlike 
Onisiwo) were not for the use and occupation of land but its control and management.54 
Accordingly they were 'public' rights and part of the sovereignty acquired by the Crown 
with the cession. Somewhat contradictorily, however, he held that these rights although 
'public' were compensable as if private rights and on the basis of the nominal rent. Webber 
J found the cession and royal exercise of the constituent power for Lagos - that is, the 
process of annexation, had "left entirely unimpaired the ownership rights of private 
property."55 This position was confirmed by the British government's assurances to the 
White Caps after the cession and was also "recognised, alluded to and implied in subsequent 
legislation allowed by the Crown. "56 He also indicated the nature of these property rights 
was to be determined according to the native law. Pennington J took an approach similar to 
Webber. He agreed private rights were not affected by the cession but insisted the character 
of this continuity had to be interpreted in the light both of the (developing) customary law 
and Ordinances passed after the cession.57 These sources showed the White Caps were not 
the absolute owners of the land and hence not entitled to compensation on that basis. 
It would be fair to say that the Southern Nigeria judges had ,not taken a uniform 
approach to the source of the continuity of tribal property rights subsequent to the cession of 
Lagos. Some had located this continuity in the common law treating the events of 1861 as 
essentially non-disruptive. Osborne was the most notable adherent to this position. Others 
took the lead from Cook v Sprigg and looked either to local legislation or formal Crown 
grant. The Privy Council's avoidance of this question in the John Holt case had not helped 
52 (1915) 3 Nig LR 21, 25-7. 
53 Id, 31. 
54 Id,32-4. 
55 Id,39. 
56 Id. 
$7 Id,44-8. 
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although its response was unequivocal when Amodu' Tijani reached London. For the Board 
Viscount Haldane approved Osbome's judgment in Onisiwo insisting that a "mere change in 
sovereignty is not to be presumed as meant to disturb rights of private owners."58 Although 
by cession the Crown obtained "along with the Sovereignty, ... the radical or ultimate title to 
the land, in the new Colony", this title was acquired "on the footing that the rights of 
property of the inhabitants were to be fully respected. "59 This principle was a "usual one 
under British policy and law when such occupations"6O took place. The Crown's title was 
burdened by the customary property rights of the tribal inhabitants - a result which obtained 
in West Africa so much as the East Indies and Canada. 61 In confirming this position the 
Board referred to an 1862 debate in the Commons62 as well as contemporary despatches and 
other documentary evidence. This material indicated, as did the terms of the cession itself, 
that British annexation was not intended to disrupt the tribal property rights. Thus Haldane 
found that the "original native right" to their lands "must be presumed to have continued to 
exist unless the contrary [was] established by the context or circumstances."63 Given this 
continuity the actual character of the tribal property rights was to be assessed according to 
the rules of native tenure. Haldane commented that it was on this point that Speed CJ had 
erred. Speed had "virtually" excluded "the legal reality of the community usufruct" under 
native custom and so "failed to recognise the real character of the title to land occupied by a 
native community."64 That title was "prima facie based, not on such individual ownership as 
English law has made familiar, but on a communal usufructary occupation, which [might] be 
so complete as to reduce any radical right in the Sovereign to one which only extends to 
comparatively limited rights of administrative interference. "65 In other words, Speed CJ had 
tried to transliterate the native customary title into an English law equivalent distinguishing 
'public' from 'private' rights. By native custom the White Caps retained title to land granted 
by them to members of their community for "usufructuary occupation" and on that basis 
were entitled to compensation as full owners of the land upon its compulsory acquisition. 
The Privy Council's advice in Amodu Tijani recognised the continuity of tribal property 
rights as a matter of common law in the absence of some act of extinguishment by the 
Crown during the assumption of sovereignty. These property rights were to be determined 
according to the customary law. The Board also found that the interposition of a system of 
Crown grants for land subject to a tribal title did not necessarily affect that title where it 
was introduced "mainly, if not exclusively, for conveyancing purposes, and not with a view 
58 [1921] 2 AC 399. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. Emphasis added. 
61 Id. 
62 Id, 406-7. And see GBPD, 3rd ser, CXXIV, 502-11. 
63 [1921] 2 AC 399, 410. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
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to altering substantive title already existing."66 
The Board affinned this position on the tribal title to land in Lagos on at least six 
subsequent occasions. 67 In Sonomu v Disu Raphae/ (1927) the Board confirmed its obiter 
dicta in Amodu Tijani, ruling that a Crown grant of land subject to a native title was to be 
presumed as vesting the land in the grantee subject to the tribal right.68 The Crown grant did 
not extinguish the native title but was taken subject to it. This position was reiterated in 
Sakariyawo Oshodi v Moriamo Dakolo (1930) although it was noted Crown grants were "in 
their form inconsistent with the whole idea of native rights. "69 This was a result requiring 
legislative rather than judicial correction. It was also one highlighting the extent of the 
Board's commitment to the recognition of the continuity of local property rights: In 
principle a Crown grant of land was taken subject to any unextinguished tribal title, a 
proposition re-affinned by the Board in Idowu Inasa v Chief Sakariyawo Oshodi (1934ro 
and Sakariyawo Oshodi (deceased) v Brimah Ba/ogun (1936).71 The same position also 
underlay the advice in Akajaiye v Lieutenant-Governor Southern Provinces (1929) when it 
was alleged that an Ordinance requiring transfonnation of the native title into one based on 
a Crown grant was confiscatory in character in relation to those native owners who did not 
present themselves for Crown grant within the statutorily set period. The Board held 
otherwise, noting that the Ordinance provided the machinery for the transformation of the 
titular ownership from a Crown-recognised to Crown-derived basis.72 
Some years after these cases an important reconsideration and re-affirmation of the 
principles in Amodu Tijani was given by the Board in Oyekan v Adele (1957). The well 
known passage from Vajesingji Joravasingji was repeated and reconciled with the common 
law presumption of the continuity of local property rights. Lord Denning acknowledged that 
subsequent to British annexation local property rights could not be based for municipal law 
purposes solely upon the tenns of a treaty of cession. In order to ascertain what rights 
passed to the Crown and what were retained by the inhabitants "the courts of law look, not 
to the treaty, but to the conduct of the British Crown." Such inquiry, he indicated was 
governed by "one guiding principle": "The courts will assume that the British Crown intends 
that the rights of property of the inhabitants are to be fully respected."73 This position 
confinned that in the absence of any act of state during the process of acquisition the 
recognition of local property rights would depend not solely upon the terms of a treaty 
affecting those rights (as in Vajesingji Joravasingji) but a general presumption arising 
66 Id, at 404. 
67 Below cases, also Eshugbayi E/eko v Officer Administering the Government of Nigeria [19311 AC 662, 672. 
68 [1927] AC 881. 
69 (1930) 9 Nig LR 25 (PC). 
70 [19341 AC 99. 
71 (1936) 4 WACA 1 (PC). 
72 (1929) 9 Nig LR I, esp 5-6 (PC). 
73 [1957] 2 All ER 785, 788 (PC). 
198 
independently though capable of modification by the ' terms of a treaty concluded during the 
acquisition of the sovereignty. 
The Canadian courts have applied the presumption of the continuity of tribal property 
rights on numerous occasions.74 Of these the most influential have been the judgments of the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Attorney-General (British Columbia) v Calder (1973).75 In 
giving judgment the Court recognised the tribal title of the Nishga Indians over their 
traditional tenitory but parted company on the question of extinguishment.76 More recently 
the Court has restated the presumption in the strongest of terms.77 In other parts of Canada 
the aboriginal title can be based upon the telms of the Royal Proclamation 1763 rather than 
a common law presumption of continuity.78 Significantly, however, most courts have 
interpreted the Proclamation as no more than declaratory of the common law title.79 
It should be stressed that the presumption of continuity of local property rights 
recognised in the courts and applied to the aboriginal title was never characterised as the 
retrospective application of latter day legal principle. In the application of the presumption 
the courts have constantly stressed its basis in the historical record. The presumption of 
continuity was no more than a guide to the interpretation of the conduct of the Crown 
during and upon the assumption of the tenitorial sovereignty. The judicial emphasis upon 
the conduct of the Crown was described by the Privy Council in this way:80 
The only legal enforceable rights which the original inhabitants could have as against 
their new sovereign were those, and only those, which the new sovereign, by 
agreement express or implied, or by legislation, chose to confer upon them. Of 
course this implied agreement might be proved by circumstantial evidence such as 
the mode of dealing with them which the new sovereign adopted, his recognition of 
their old rights, and express or implied election to respect them and be bound by 
them. 
The judicial application of the presumption of continuity to the title of the indigenous 
inhabitants of North America, Africa and the East Indies was thoroughly consistent with the 
historical record of the Crown's relations with these societies upon the assumption of 
sovereignty over their tenitory. 
74 eg R v Wesley [1938) 58 CCR 269. 276 per McGillivray JA (Alta CA); R v White and Bob (1964) 52 WWR 
193. 232 per Noms JA (BCCA); Hamlet of Baker Lake v Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development 
(1979). [1980) 1 FC 518 (NWTID). . 
75 (1973) 34 DLR (3d) 145 (SCC). 
76 For a full analysis of this decision see Lysyk 'The Indian Title Question in Canada: an appraisal in the light of 
Calder" (1973) 51 Can Bar Rev 450. 
77 Guerin v The Queen [1984) 2 SCR 335. 
78 The territory subject to the Proclamation is discussed by Slattery. "Land Rights of Indigenous Canadian Peoples". 
244-60; 
79 eg Doe dem Burk v Cormier (1890). 30 NBR 142. 148 per Allen CJ (NBCA); R v Koonungnak (1963) 45 WWR 
282, 302 per Sissons JC (NWITC); R v White and Bob (1964) 52 WWR 193. 221 per Noms JA (BCCA); 
Guerin v The Queen [1984) 2 SCR 335. 379 per Dickson CJ (SCC); 
80 Secretary of State for India in Council v Bai Rajbai (1915) LR 42 Ind App 229. 237 per Lord Atkinson (PC). 
aff'd Vajesingji Joravasingji v Secretary of State for India in Council (1924) LR 51 Ind App 357. 360 per Lord 
Dunedin (PC). 
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In coming later to assess the application of the common law presumption of the 
continuity of the tribal title of the Maori the primary focus, therefore, must be upon the 
actual conduct of the Crown during and upon the assumption of territorial sovereignty. The 
goal of such an inquiry must be identification of the extent to which the Crown suspended 
or modified this presumption during its acquisition of the sovereignty. 
4. the doctrine of 'modified continuity' in the North American colonies 
The encounter on the North American continent between tribal societies with a customary 
code of tenure and English settlers anxious to colonise their land saw the recognition of 
certain principles which subsequently were applied to Maori-settler relations. The principles 
developed in North America concerning the status of Indian title over their lands upon the 
Crown's assumption of the territorial sovereignty were founded upon the adaptation of the 
presumption of the continuity of local property rights. As with the presumption of the 
continuity of the pre-colonial law, however, it was understood implicitly that this 
presumption could not have been applied unqualifiedly to the Indian title. Were that the case 
in theory the acquisition and transmission of title to land would have been regulated by the 
customary code. Again, this problem was never more than notional being averted by the 
introduction and application of English rules of feudal tenure to the title of land held by the 
non-indigenous population of the territory: These settlers acquired their title to the land 
through the fonnal grant of the Crown (or its agents). The settlers required what might be 
termed a 'Crown-derived' title whilst the indigenous inhabitants held a 'Crown-recognised' 
title. This, in effect, created a dual system of tenure within the colony, one aboriginal 
governed by the customary code, the other feudal and subject to the appropriate rules of 
English law. Where the Crown had established this dual system of tenure, North America 
and, later, New Zealand being the notable examples, the accommodation of the two systems 
was facilitated by the Crown's exercise of an exclusive faculty to silence the tribal title. The 
Crown, or those it had authorised, usually silenced this title by purchase. Where the 
purchase had preceded the Crown grant, the grantees took free of the extinguished 
aboriginal title but where the grant was made without such extinguishment they took subject 
to the aboriginal title, the Crown grant giving on the grantees the faculty to silence it by 
purchase. The essence of the rule was a recognition of the continuity of the tribal title but 
with a limitation upon its alienability. In this sense one might speak of a presumption of the 
'modified continuity'81 of the Indian title. 
The restriction of the alienability of the tribal title was an early and invariable theme of 
Indian - settler relations in colonial North America. As early as 1609 the instructions of the 
Virginia Council required Sir Thomas Gates to keep close supervision of all trade with the 
81 The phrase belongs to Slattery Ancestral Lands. Alien Laws (1983), passim. 
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Indiaris, land transactions included, through the appointment of two "truncmasters" for each 
fort. With their appointment he was "by proclamacon or edicte publiquely affixed [to] 
prohibite and forbidd vppon paine of punishement ... all other psons to trade or exchange 
for anythinge"82 with the Indians. A system of land purchase appears to have been adopted 
by the colonial authorities in Virginia there being numerous instances of purchase by 'treaty' 
during the first decades· of settlement.83 By 1655 the colony had grown to an extent that the 
local assembly enacted a law stipulating the land of the plantation Indians should "not be 
alienable by them the Indians to any man de futuro" but that "for the future no such 
alienations or bargaines [between settler and tribe WOUld] be valied without the assent of 
Assembly."84 A few years later Act 51 of the Colony (1657-358) reminded the settlers that 
"where the land of any Indian or Indians bee found to be included in any pattent alreadie 
granted for land ... such pattentee shall either purchase the said land of the Indians or 
relinquish the same ... ".85 Act 72 of the same Assembly stipulated "no Indians to sell their 
lands but at quarter COUrts"86 where it could be entered upon the court records. Private 
purchases of Indian land persisted, however, the settlers usually insisting afterwards that the 
colonial authorities confirm their purchase by patent. A further Act was passed by the 
Colony in 1660 and settled the colony's position conclusively:87 
Act 138. Whereas the mutuall discontents, complaints, jealousies and ffeares of 
English and Indians proceed chiefly from the violent intrusions of diverse English 
made into their lands, The governor ... councell and burgesses .. . enact, ordaine, and 
confirrne that for the future noe Indian king or other shall upon any pretence alien 
and sell, nor noe English for any cause or consideration whatsover purchase or buy 
any tract or parcell of land now justly claymed or actually possest by an Indian or 
Indians whatsoever; all such bargaines and sales hereafter made or pretended to be 
made being hereby declared to be invalid, voyd and null any acknowledgement, 
surrender, law or custome formerly used to the contrary notwithstanding. 
In the New England colonies of Massachusetts Bay, Plymouth, Rhode Island, Connecticut, 
New Hampshire, and New Haven (which merged with Connecticut in 1665) a similar 
pattern prevailed. The "First General Letter" (1629) of the Governor of the New England 
Company to its authorities at Massachusetts Bay contained an express recognition of Indian 
title and acknowledgement that the colony's charter had been taken subject to their rights:88 
If any of the salvages ptend right of inheritance to all or any pt of the lands graunted 
in oure pattent, we pray yoU endeavor to pTchase their tytle, that wee may avoid 
82 Kingsbury,Records of the Virginia Company, m, 12 at 20. 
83 Thomas "Introduction" to Royce "Indian Land Cessions", 563-5. 
84 Hening, ed Laws of Virginia, I, 396. 
85 Id, 456-7. 
86 Id,467. 
87 Id, n, 34. 
88 Shurtleff, ed Records ... of the Massachusells Bay in New England, L 386. Also "Second General Letter" (May, 
1629), id. 
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the least scruple of intrusion. 
The year after enacting a law affinning the Indian title to land within the jurisdiction of the 
colony (1633),89 the General Court of Massachusetts Bay prohibited the purchase of land 
from the Indians without its pennission,9O adding the requirement in 1639 that all authorised 
purchases were to be entered into court records. 91 This law was re-enacted in 164892 and 
enforced by the Court on a number of occasions.93 During the mid-seventeenth century 
similar legislation was passed in Plymouth,94 Rhode Island,95 New Hampshire,96 New Haven97 
and Connecticut. 98 Likewise the colonial authorities of the other British colonies, New 
York,99 Maryland/oo New Jersey/Ol Pennsylvania,I02 Northl03 and South Carolina,l04 and 
Georgial05 reserved the exclusive power to extinguish the tribal title. By the middle of the 
eighteenth century the practice had become a settled basis of colonial relations with the 
Indian tribes. In the detail these laws naturally varied but they were variations upon the 
same theme of modified continuity. The Royal Proclamation of 1763 which applied to the 
Crown's extant colonies as well as its newly acquired territory in Canada and the Roridas, 
gave the principle unifonnity throughout British North America:106 
And whereas great Frauds and Abuses have been committed in the purchasing lands 
89 In Thomas '1ntroduction" to Royce "Indian Land Cessions". 602-3. 
90 Shurtleff. ed Records ... of the Massachusetts Bay. L 112. 
91 Id, 276. The "Generall Court" appointed a Committee (4 November 1646) to purchase Indian lands for the needs 
of the colony. id, IT. 166. 
92 Laws and Liberties of Massachusetts (reprint 1929) 28. 
93 
94 
Shurtleff, ed Records ... of the Massachusetts Bay. IV: 175; V: 216. 328. 352. 361. 371. 399. 486-7. Subsequent 
legislation see Slattery "Land Rights of Indigenous Canadian Peoples". 112-113. 
Shurtleff and Pulsifer. eds Records of the Colony of New Plymouth, ]]: 41. 129, 183 (1643). Subsequent similar 
legislation in Acts and Resolves ... of Massachusetts Bay, IT: 104; ill: 306. 679; IV: 163-4, 530. 974; V: 175, 
459. 1122. 
95 Bartlett., ed Records of the Colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, IT: 236 (1651). Subsequent 
96 
97 
legislation, ibid, I: 403-4 (1658); IV: 396 (1676); Laws and Acts of Her Majesties Colony of Rhode Island, and 
Providence Plantations. 148 (1727). 
Slattery "Land Rights of Indigenous Canadian Peoples". 114 (1641) includes a reference to subsequent legislalion 
(1686 and 1718). 
Hoadly, ed Records of the Colony ... of New Haven, I: 27 (1639); subsequent legislation, id, 200 (1644-45); New 
Haven's Settling in New-England, 49 (1656). 
98 Trumbull and Hoadly, eds Public Records of the Colony of Connecticut. I: 402 (1663); subsequent legislalion, id, 
ill: 422-3 (1687); V: 4 (1706), 30 (1717). 
99 O'Callaghan. ed Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York. I: 44 (Du.tch charter 
1630); IT: 96-10 (1629). 119 (1640). Early authorisations for English settlers to purchase (1664), id. XIII: 395 et 
seq. No law was enacted declaring the pre-emptive right but it was understood as law in the colony: Lords of 
Trade to Justice De Lancey, 19 March 1756, id. VII: 78. 
lOO Bozman, History of Maryland. IT: 112-113 (1638). Subsequent general legislation. id, 584-5 (1649 and in force 
until the Revolution). 
101 Thomas "Introduction" to Royce "Indian Land Cessions", 588 (1672). 589 (1703). 
102 Id, 594-7 (Penn's exercise of his pre-emptive right), 597-8 (laws of 1700, 1729 and 1768). 
lOO Saunders, ed Colonial Records of North Carolina 1:51 (instructions to Berkeley, 1663); CRNC, I: 165 
("Fundamental Constitutions" 1669 art 112); Thomas "Introduction". 628-9 (1715 and 1748) 
104 Thomas "Introduction". 630-4. 
105 Law of circa late 1757 -early 1758, Digest of the Laws of the State of Georgia from 1755 to 1799. 51. 
106 Brigham, ed British Royal Proclamations Relating to America, 212. 216-7. 
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of the Indians, to the great Prejudice of our Interests, and to the great Dissatisfaction 
of the said Indians; in order therefore to prevent such Irregularities for the future, 
and to the End that the Indians may be convinced of Our Justice, and determined 
Resolution to remove all reasonable Cause of Discontent, We do, with the Advice of 
Our Privy Council, strictly enjoin and require, that no private Person do presume to 
make any Purchase from the said Indians of any Lands reserved to the said Indians, 
within those Parts of Our Colonies where We have thought proper to allow 
Settlement; but that if, at any Time, any of the said Indians should be inclined to 
dispose of the silid Lands, the same shall be purchased only for Us, in Our Name, at 
some publick Meeting or Assembly of the said Indians to be held for that Purpose by 
the Governor or Commander in Chief of Our Colonies respectively, within which 
they shall lie ... 
Several comments directly relevant it will be seen, to the aboriginal title of the Maori can 
be made in relation to the NOlth American practice regarding the Indian title. 
First, and perhaps obviously, the various laws of the colonies were predicated upon a 
recognition of the Indian title. The colonial authorities proceeded on the basis that their 
charter from the Crown left them with a title subject to the proprietary rights of the Indians. 
Their assertion of an exclusive right to silence the tribal title was in many respects an 
acknowledgment of their duty to quiet that title before allowing white settlers to plant the 
land under a colonial 'Pattent' (ie Crown grant). In those cases, however, where grants or 
patents were made for land over which some unextinguished tribal right subsisted, the 
colonial authorities as later did the American COUrts lO7 recognised that as in the case of their 
own charters these patents were issued subject to the Indian right. The colonial records are 
full of examples where settlers' patents were recognised as being encumbered by any 
unextinguished aboriginal title. 108 Where this was the case, the grant operated as an 
assignment of the right to silence the title by purchase or agreement with the tribal owners. 
A New England example of the declaration of this principle in colonial legislation may be 
given:I09 
It is also ordered that for all lands whatsoever granted by this Court to particular 
towns or persons within this colony wherein any Indian have right and interest, the 
grantee shall agreellO with the native proprietors respecting their rights to prevent 
further inconveniences that might insue or arise through neglect hereof, and this court 
doth judge requisite to be attended in all former graunts, although it hath not been 
imposed or incerted in the said graunt. 
Secondly, and briefly relating back to the topic of the British imperium over the tribes 
107 Fletcher v Peck (1810) 6 Cranch 87 (USSC) (grantee cannot eject the tribal owners); Johnson v Mc/nJosh (1823) 
8 Wheat 543, 574 (USSC) (grantee takes subject to Indian title); Clark v Smith (1839) 13 Pet 195 (grantee 
assumes unencumbered title upon Indian relinquishment); Beecher v Wetherby (1877) 95 US 517; Cramer v 
United Stales (1923) 261 US 219 
108 eg Pulsifer ed Records of the Colony of New Plymouth, IT: 130-1, 164; III: 104; Shurtlcff, ed Records ... of the 
Massachusetts Bay, IT: 159-60; III: 189; IV, pt 1: 303; Hoadly. ed Records of the Colony of .. . New Haven, I: 5, 
45; MclIwaine, ed Minutes of the Council and General Court of Colonial Virginia [1670-1675], 227. 369, 381. 
109 In Springer, "American Indians and the Law of Real Property". 37. n 52. 
110 Interpreted as including the right to purchase their title; Springer, supra. 
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discussed in the second chapter, the colonial practice regarding the Indian title concerned 
both the independent but, more usually, 'plantation' Indians who lived as tribes within the 
vicinity of the settlements in alliance if not express submission to the nearby colony. In 
contemporary terms, the plantation Indians might be described as Indians under the 
sovereignty of the Crown, a status often betokened by the frequent reference in the colonial 
records to the 'Indians of the colony'. TIlls observation is made simply to emphasis the 
seperation of the question of Indian title from that of the character of the British imperium 
over the tribe. The recognition of the Indian title was never linked with tribal non-
submission to a colony or, in other words, their status as 'domestic, dependent nations'. 
Finally, the modification upon the continuity of the Indian title represented by the 
restriction on its alienabilty was undoubtedly connected with the control of the settlement of 
the colony and maintenance of peaceful relations with the tribes. From the start the unfailing 
and frequently frustrated efforts of the Crown's officials to restrict the purchase of Indian 
lands by private individuals was a constant source of friction within the colonies. The 
colonists, eager to acquire Indian land, had no objection to, indeed advocated, the 
recognition of the Indian title however they objected to the colonies' insistence upon its 
exclusive faculty to silence that title. Many purchased land directly from the Indians and 
founded their claim to a good title on the Indian title and grant. Their complaint lay not in 
the doctrine of the continuity of the Indian title but in the modification of it signified by the 
restriction on its alienation. A pamphlet published by 'The Inhabitants of Boston' (1691) 
justifying their own 'Glorious Revolution' against the Governor of New England, Sir 
Edmund Andros, provided a typical account of the position taken by those who had 
purchased land directly from the Indians. The pamphleteers accused Andros of having acted 
arbitrarily in violation of their 'birthright' to the privileges of English law. TIlls birthright, 
beside the privileges relating to taxation by elected representatives, habeas corpus and jury 
trial, also included the right to the undisturbed enjoyment of property. Andros, the 
'Inhabitants' complained, had refused to recognise their title to land other than where 
evidenced by formal grant under the colonial seal. The title of those who had occupied land 
without such grant rested on two grounds they argued: l1l 
1. By a right of just occupation from the grand charter in Genesis 1st and 9th 
chapters, whereby God gave the earth to the sons of Adam and Noah, to be subdued 
and replenished. 2. By a right of purchase from the Indians, who were native 
inhabitants, and had possession of the land before the English came, and that having 
lived here sixty years, I did certainly know that from the beginning of these 
plantations our fathers entered upon the land, partly as a wilderness of Vacuum 
Domicilium, and partly by the consent of the Indians, and therefore care was taken to 
treat with them, and to gain their consent, giving them such a valuable consideration 
as was to their satisfaction ... and therefore did I believe that the lands of New 
England were the subject's properties, and not the king's lands. 
111 'The Inhabitants of Boston and the Country Adjacent' The Revolution in New-England Justified and the People 
there Vindicated (1691), 19; similarly, Byfield An Account of the Late Revolution in New-England (1689), 9. 
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This passage contains the two grounds typically advanced by colonists wishing to establish a 
legal title to land for which they had no Crown grant. The first, one which Vattel gave 
secular fonn in the mid-eighteenth century, will be discussed presently. The second was 
founded upon the unqualified continuity of the tribal title: Since the Indians were recognised 
as the lawful owners of their land the same status must vest in any person who had 
purchased from them. Such argumentation was to reappear in almost exactly the same form 
one and a half centuries later in the dispute between the Colonial Office and the New 
Zealand Company over the status of the latter's purchases from the Maori tribes. It can be 
noted too that by the end of the seventeenth century the colonists were styling the Crown's 
exclusive power to extinguish the aboriginal title as its 'pre-emptive right' ,112 the same tenn 
which later was to be used in the second article of the English text of the Treaty of 
Waitangi. 
This 'pre-emptive right' had become a recognised principle of colonial law as early as 
1675. That year, eight eminent English counsel113 advised that in the plantations "no people 
have been Suffered to take up Land but by ye Consent and Lycence of ye Govr or 
proprietors under ye princes title whose people made ye First Discovery". In consequence a 
planter could not obtain a "Sufficient" title by purchase from the Indians without "a Grant 
from ye King or his Assignes."1l4 
The principles which the colonial practice exemplified were analysed authoritatively by 
Marshall Cl in lohnson v M'lntosh (1823). This case soon became the leading account of 
the principles governing the Indian title over their lands. This case concerned the title to 
large tracts of land once within the colony of Virginia and later ceded to the United States 
as part of the Northwest Territories. In 1773 and 1775 the lllinois . and Piankeshaw tribes 
sold land directly to a group of land speculators. Subsequently the tribes ceded these lands 
by treaty to the United States which granted the title to a portion of the land to a William 
M'Intosh. An action of ejection was brought against M'Intosh by the devisees of the 
speculators' company who sought to establish title to the lands by right of the earlier sale of 
the Indians. At issue, then, was the nature of Indian title and the capacity of the Indians to 
pass a title which could be sustained at law. 
Marshall opened his judgment with an indication that the relevant principles lay "not 
singly [in] those principles of abstract justice, which the Creator of all things has impressed 
on the mind of his creature Man, and which are admitted to regulate, in a great degree, the 
rights of civilized nations, whose perfect independence is acknowledged; but those principles 
also which our government has adopted in the particular case, and given us as the rule for 
112 'Inhabitants of Boston', Revolution in New-England Justified, supra, used the term. Also Byfield, supra. 
113 John Holt, later Chief Justice, was one. 
114 Text in O'Callaghan, ed Documents relaJing to the Colonial History of the State of New York, XIII: 486-7 . cl 
opinion of Yorke and Talbot (1731), Chalmers Opinions, I: 78, esp 109-10. 
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our decision. "115 Whilst the court might have recourse to the principles of the Jus gentium, 
Marshall clearly felt the primary detenninant to be the conduct of the government. The 
presumption made was that the government had based its conduct on legal principle and so 
the relevant principles were to be found in this conduct. Having established the source of 
the law, Marshall proceeded to show how that his fonnulation of Indian title was based on a 
doctrine of 'discovery',. The "great nations of Europe" had been "eager to appropriate to 
themselves" so much of North America "as they could respectively acquire":116 
But, as they were nearly all in pursuit of the same object, it was necessary, in order 
to avoid conflicting settlements, and consequent war with each other, to establish a 
principle which all should acknowledge as the law by which the right of acquisition, 
which they all asserted, should be regulated as between themselves. This principle 
was that discovery gave title to the government by whose subjects, or by whose 
authority, it was made, against all other European governments which title might be 
consummated by possession. 
The exclusion of all other Europeans, necessarily gave to the nation making the 
discovery the sole right of acquiring the soil from the natives, and establishing 
settlements upon it. It was a right with which no Europeans could interfere. 
Nonetheless, Marshall continued: 117 
In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the original inhabitants were, in 
no instance, entirely disregarded; but were necessarily, to a considerable extent, 
impaired. They were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as 
well as just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it according to their own 
discretion; but their rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were 
necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to 
whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the original fundamental principle that 
discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it. 
While the different nations of Europe respected the right of the natives, as 
occupants, they asserted the ultimate dominion to be in themselves; and claimed and 
exercised, as a consequence of this ultimate dominion, a power to grant the soil, 
while yet in possession of the natives. These grants have been understood by all to 
convey a title to the grantees subject only to the Indian right of occupancy. 
Marshall continned this position by reviewing British practice in North America and its 
adoption by the United States. He observed that it had "never been doubted, that either the 
United States, or the several states, had a clear title to all the lands ... subject only to the 
Indian right of occupancy, and that the exclusive power to extinguish that right was vested 
in that government which might constitutionally exercise it" .118 He gave the Virginia law of 
1779 applicable to the case at bar as an example of the principle. 
115 (1823) 8 Wheat 543, 572. 
116 Id, 572-3. 
117 Id, 573-4. 
118 Id, 584-5. 
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Having noted the continuity of the aboriginal title and the government's exclusive right 
to silence it, Marshall went on to explain the origins of the restriction on the alienability of 
the tribal title. He observed that once the Crown conquered or acquired new territory it 
normally adopted the rule that "the rights of the conquered to property should remain 
unimpaired; that the new subjects should be governed as equitably as the old, and that 
confidence in their security should gradually banish the painful sense of being seperated 
from their ancient connections, and united by force to strangers. "119 This echo of Lord 
Mansfield's propositions in Campbell v Hall (1774) could not, however, be applied to the 
case of the "fierce savages, whose occupation was war, and whose subsistence was drawn 
chiefly from the forest."I20 Marshall indicated that that "law which regulates, and ought to 
regulate in general, the relations between the conqueror and conquered, was incapable of 
application to a people under such circumstances".121 The limitation upon the alienability of 
the Indian title was the result of the necessary "resort to some new and different rule".I22 
The tribal owners were "deemed incapable of transferring the absolute title to others." This 
rule was one which the courts were bound to enforce: l23 
However this restnctlOn may be opposed to natural right, and to the usages of 
civilised nations, yet, if it be indispensible to that system under which the country 
has been settled, and be adapted to the actual condition of the two people, it may, 
perhaps, be supported by reason, and certainly cannot be rejected by courts of justice. 
Having reached his central conclusion that the court could not recognise any private title to 
land in a settler not derived from a Crown or government grant, Marshall turned his 
attention to the effect of a direct purchase by a settler from the tribal owners: l24 
119 
120 
121 
122 
123 
124 
The title of the crown, whatever it might be, could be acquired only by a conveyance 
from the crown. If an individual might extinguish the crown title for his own benefit, 
or, in other words, might purchase it, still he could acquire only that title. Admitting 
their power to change their law or usages, so far as to allow an individual to seperate 
a portion of their lands from the common stock, and hold it in severalty, still it is a 
part of their territory, and is held under them, by a title dependent on their laws. The 
grant derives its efficacy from their will; and, if they choose to resume it, and make 
a different disposition of the land, the courts of the United States cannot interpose 
for the protection of the title. The person who purchases lands from the Indians, 
within their territory, incorporates himself with them, so far as respects the property 
purchased; holds their title under their protection, and subject to their laws. If they 
annul the grant, we know of no tribunal which can revise and set aside the 
proceeding. 
Id, 589. 
Id,590. 
Id. 591. 
Id. 
Id. 591-2. 
Id. 591-2. 
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Marshall's judgment in fohnson v M'lntosh together with an important New Zealand 
case R v Symonds (1847Y25 were, and remain, the fullest accounts of the legal character of 
aboriginal title. l26 Marshall recognised the continuity of the Indian title and its regulation 
amongst the tribal owners by the traditional rules of tenure. The enforcement of the 
customary code lay solely in the hands of the tribal authorities. The 'uncivilised' character 
of this tenure, however, necessitated a modification of the normal presumption of the 
continuity of local property rights upon the Crown's assumption of the territorial 
sovereignty. The modification was the recognition of the Crown's exclusive or 'pre-emptive' 
right to silence the Indian title by fair purchase or, it may be added, legislation. The Indian 
title was recognisable in the colonial courts which would not hesitate to protect it but no 
settler could bring an action for land without a Crown grant. 
The Canadian courts have recognised a doctrine of modified continuity similar if not 
identical to Marshall's approach in fohnson v M'lntosh (1823). In Saint Catherine's Milling 
and Lumber Company v R (1887) the Supreme Court of Canada considered the title of the 
Province of Ontario to Indian lands surrendered by Treaty No 3 (1873). During the course 
of separate judgments the court, which had had the American authorities cited at length in 
argument,127 made several observations on the character and extinguishment of the Indian 
title. Ritchie CJ adopted the American principles holding that the Crown held the legal title 
to all land in Ontario "subject to the Indian right of occupancy in cases in which the same 
has not been lawfully extinguished absolutely to the Crown".I28 Upon the extinguishment of 
this title the land passed to the Crown in right of the Province by reason of the British 
North America Act 1867. Strong and Gwynne JJ dissented on the ground that this Imperial 
Act simply gav~ the Province title to those lands which it held at the enactment of the 
statute. Since land subject to an unextinguished aboriginal title was not vested in the 
Province at the time of confederation its subsequent extinguishment could not vest title in 
the Province. 129 Strong took a similar position as Ritchie on the question of Indian title, 
however, and expressly applied the Marshall doctrine. After referring to the American cases 
and their summary in Kent's Commentaries, he stated: 130 
It thus appears, that in the United States a traditional policy, derived from colonial 
times, relative to the Indians and their lands has ripened into well established rules of 
law, and that the result is that the lands in the possession of the Indians are, I.1ntil 
surrendered, treated as their rightful though inalienable property, so far as the 
12.5 (1847), [1840-1932] NZPCC 387 (SC). 
126 The cases are analysed thoroughly by Slattery Ancestral Lands, Alien Laws. 
121 (1887) 13 SCR 577, 587-8, 592-3, 596, 598-9. 
128 Id,599. 
129 Id. 605. 
130 Id. 612-3. Other important occasions where Canadian judges have expressly adopted the Marshall doctrine 
include R v White and Bob (1964). 50 DLR (2d) 613, 646-7 (BCCA); Warman v Francis (1958). 20 DLR (2D) 
627. 630 (NBSC); Calder v Attorney-General of British Columbia (1973) 34 DLR (3d) 145. 190-6 (SCC); 
Guerin v The Queen (1985). 13 DLR (4th) 322. 335-8 (SCC). 
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possession and enjoyment are concerned; in other words, that the dominium utile is 
recognised as belonging to or reserved for the Indians, though the dominium directlun 
is considered to be in the United States. Then, if this is so as regards Indian lands in 
the United States, which have been preserved to the Indians by the constant 
observance of a particular rule of policy acknowledged by the United States courts to 
have been originally enforced by the Crown of Great Blitain, how is it possible to 
suppose that the law can, or rather could have been, at the date of confederation, in a 
state any less favourable to the Indians whose lands were situated within the 
dominion of the Blitish Crown, the original author of this beneficent doctrine so 
carefully adhered to in the United States from the days of the colonial government? 
Therefore, when we consider that with reference to Canada the uniform practice has 
always been to recognise the Indian title as one wruch could only be dealt with by 
surrender to the Crown, I maintain that if there had been an entire absence of any 
written legislative act ordaining this rule as an express positive law, we ought, just as 
the United States courts have done, to hold that it nevertheless existed as a rule of 
the unwlitten common law, wruch the courts were bound to enforce as such ... 
Upon appeal the Privy Council did not dwell upon the question of Indian title. Lord Watson 
indicated approval of the approach taken by the majority of the Supreme Court. He found it 
"sufficient" to state the Indian title was a "personal and usufructuary right" and that the 
Crown had a "substantial and paramount estate" underlying the Indian title which "became a 
plenum dominium whenever that title was surrendered or otherwise extinguished."131 The 
Board reaffirmed their position in the Star Chrome case (1920) interpreting the 'personal' 
aspect of the Indian title as simply an indication of its inalienability other than to the 
Crown.132 In R v Smith (1983) the Supreme Court indicated that the aboriginal title was 
'personal' in the sense that it was133 
a personal right which by law must disappear upon surrender by the person holding 
it; such an ephemeral right cannot be transferred to a grantee, be it the Crown or an 
individual. The right disappears in the process of the release, and a release couched 
in terms inferring a transfer cannot operate effectively in law on the personal right 
any more than an express transfer could. In either process the right disappears. 
In Guerin v The Queen (1985) Dickson CJ held that the inalienability of the Indian title 
save to the Crown coupled with the Crown's status as holder of the legal title to its 
ungranted lands placed the Crown in a fiduciary position vis ~ vis the tribal owners. This 
duty particularly arose in those cases where the Crown was obtaining the tribal 
relinquishment or, in Canadian terminology, surrender of their aboriginal title: l34 
Indians have a legal right to occupy and possess certain lands, the ultimate title to 
which is in the Crown. While their interest does not, strictly speaking, amount to 
beneficial ownersrup, neither is its nature completely exhausted by the concept of a 
13l (1888), 14 App Cas 46, 55. The point was reiterated later when he stated the Crown 'bas all along had a present 
proprietary estate in the land, upon which the Indian title was a mere burden" (at p 58). 
132 [1921] 1 AC 401, 410-1. 
133 (1983) 147 DLR (3d) 237. 
134 (1985) 13 DLR (4th) 321, 339 per Dickson J (Beetz, Chouinard and Lamer JJ concurring). See also Simon v R 
[1985] 2 SCR 387. 
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personal right. It is true that the sui generis interest which the Indians have in the 
land is personal in the sense that it cannot be transferred to a grantee, but it is also 
true ... that the interest gives rise upon surrender to a distinctive fiduciary obligation 
on the part of the Crown to deal with the land for the benefit of the surrendering 
Indians. These two aspects of Indian title go together, since the Crown's original 
purpose in declaring the Indians' interest to be inalienable otherwise than to the 
Crown was to facilitate the Crown's ability to represent the Indians in dealings with 
third parties. The nature of the Indians' interest is therefore best characterized by its 
general inalienability, coupled with the fact that the Crown is under an obligation to 
deal with the land on the Indians' behalf when the interest is surrendered. Any 
description of Indian title which goes beyond these two features is both misleading 
. and unnecessary. 
The land subject to an unextinguished aboriginal title in Guerin was vested in the Crown so 
the case did not consider the effect of a Crown grant of land subject to an unextinguished 
aboriginal title. The colonial practice and lohnson v M'lntosh (1823) indicate such grants 
were treated as encumbered by any subsisting aboriginal title. The precise extent to which a 
Crown grantee assumed the fiduciary duties of the Crown by reason of the mere grant 
awaits judicial detennination although the West African cases give some indication that a 
tribal grantee at least holds subject to the customary rights. Despite some uncertainty over 
the relationship of the Crown grantee to the aboriginal owners on the question of 
extinguishment it is at least clear that such grants were encumbered by the aboriginal title. 
It may be said by way of closing comment that the doctrine of modified continuity 
recognised as part of the common law of North America was essentially a means of 
recognising yet accommodating and limiting the tribal tenure. The Indians' title to their land 
and its regulation by the customary law was acknowledged in the colonial courts yet 
limiting the alienation of it to the Crown or its grantees ensured the application of English 
law to the title of the settlers. The settlers who had purchased direct from the Indians tried 
to accomplish the incorporation of their title into some English-like system by dressing their 
purchases in deeds with the tribes and other fonnalities of conveyance (even livery of 
seisin)13S practiced in England. But in the end, the introduction and application of the feudal 
rules of English law to the settlers' titles meant that if any were to be recognised and 
enforced in the colonial courts a Crown grant was necessary. 
5. the introduction of feudal principles of land tenure to a British colony 
According to the principles of English law the Crown's sovereignty over its territory is 
defined in tenns reminiscent of the medieval notion of dominium. The Crown is 
constitutionally recognised as the ultimate, indeed only, sovereign authority in its territory. It 
135 In Bartlett, ed Records of the Colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Ill: 143-4, 172. As to the 
formality of settlers' ar,quisition of Indian title (usually by deed) see Springer "American Indians and the Law of 
Real Property", 39-49. 
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has, in other words, whether in its legislative or executive capacity, the imperium 
(government) over its territory. The Crown is also considered the ultimate landowner of its 
territory, the tenn dominium eminens describing this 'prerogative' of sovereignty.136 
The feudal rules of land tenure developed from Nonnan times have their basis in the 
Crown's ultimate ownership of its territory. There is 'nulle terre sans seigneur', no land 
without a lord, and so all title to land in England was located ultimately in the grant of the 
Crown. The feudal doctrine of tenures was simplified over the years, in preventing 
subinfeudation the statute Quia Emptores (1290)137 established a more direct link between 
lord and tenant whilst the fonns of tenure were progressively reduced over the years. 
Nonetheless the doctrine of tenures was the notional basis of all title to land in England and 
still underlies English land law, as in the case of escheaL 138 Sitting at the apex of the feudal 
pyramid the Crown had the dominium directum of its land in England, that is the power to 
make a grant to a subject who thereby acquired the dominium utile or use of the land as a 
tenant. Plenum dominium, the tenn used by Lord Watson in the Saint Catherine's Milling 
case, was a combination of both. 139 
The feudal code of land tenure must be carefully distinguished from the Crown's 
constitutional position as the ultimate owner of its territory. Although the feudal doctrine 
developed from this constitutional premise it did not follow that the Crown's assumption of 
the sovereignty and hence underlying ownership of its newly-acquired territory brought with 
it the feudal rules of title to land in the territory. The many cases recognising the continuity 
of the local non-English laws of land tenure (Christian and otherwise) subsequent 10 the 
Crown's assumption of the territorial sovereignty were founded upon the implicit separation 
of feudal doctrine from the Crown's sovereignty.14O Were that not so the presumption of the 
continuity of local property rights could not have been made by the common law. Instead 
all titles to land would have required the grant of the Crown. In short, the feudal rules 
goveming title to land were not imported into a colony as that part of English law incidental 
to the sovereignty of the Crown: The Crown held the dominium eminens in virtue of its 
sovereignty but the existence of any dominium directum depended upon the extent to which 
feudal rules were introduced, if at all, into a colony. In Attorney-General v Brown (1847) 
Stephen Cl observed for the Supreme Court of New South Wales that the fiction of English 
law supposing title to all land to be in the Crown was a proposition "depending for its 
136 The tenn belonged to Grotius (De Jure Belli ac Pacis, trsl ed, 218-9,385,796-7,807) who considered eminent 
domain an attribute of sovereignty. Bynkershoek Quaestionum Juris Publici (1737) indicated imperium eminens 
more accurately described the sovereign's right (lib 2,ch XV,p 218). Also Vattel Le droit de gens (1758), lib 7, 
para 244. 
137 18 Edw 1 cc I, 2. 
138 eg Cowell, The Interpreter (1607), np, def "Propertie"; Rastell Les terms de la fey (1624), fols 254 r-v; Noy 
Treatise of the Principall Grounds and Maximes of the Lawes of this Kingdome (1641), cap 19, tit "Tenures"; 
Bla Comm, IT: 44; Megarry and Wade The Law of Real Property, (4th ed), 13-39. 
139 Aylmer "'Property' in Seventeenth-Century England", (1980) 86 Past and Present, 87 at 89. 
140 The distinction was stressed in Johnson v M'Intosh (1823) 8 Wheat 543, 595-6. 
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support on no feudal notions or principle."!4! 
A lengthy and important assessment of the introduction of the feudal rules of land title to 
the Crown's colonies was made in doe dem Silveira v Texeira (1845). This case concel11ed 
the applicability of the feudal rule of escheat to land in Bombay. Bombay, it may be 
recalled, was acquired by the English by cession from Portugal in 1661. The Crown granted 
the island to the East mdia Company in 1668, the general introduction of English law 
being dated from a Proclamation under authority of the 1668 letters patent. 142 In 
Silveira the defendants claimed that the English (feudal) rules of succession had never 
applied in Bombay but that the old Portuguese laws which made no distinction between 
succession to land and personal property had been followed. After opening with a reference 
to the presumption of the continuity of the local property rights, Anstruther R continued:!43 
The subjects of each estate, in planting new colonies, must be supposed to carry with 
them the law of the mother country, so far as it applies to their situation as colonists; 
for human society cannot exist without some definite rule as to the rights to property: 
and where no other is prescribed, the former law of the people must be supposed to 
continue. The law which English colonists carry with them, if not otherwise fixed, 
and if left to this natural inference, is therefore, in its very nature, the law which 
follows the persons of Englishmen. But the law of descent of land belongs to, and 
remains with, the land of England to which it is attached. It has nothing to do with 
the persons and cannot follow them. It is a fruit of feudal tenures, and was 
introduced for the purpose of preserving to the lord of each fief the entire service for 
his vassal, and the whole fruits of the vassalage. 
Anstruther developed this theme after stating that the King might introduce feudal tenure 
during the acquisition or subsequently by legislation: l44 
... as the whole principle of tenure of land is a mere creature of the feudal system, as 
applicable to the particular soil in which that law is established, I do not think that 
the lands of a new colony can be the subject of tenure at all, unless it were divided 
into manors, or honours, or other feudal divisions, as the land may be divided for 
feudal purposes, into parishes, if the Crown thought proper so to do ... but unless 
such direct act of legislation appeared, or unless it could be presumed from the 
uniform practice of the place, I do not see any reason for thinking that the principle 
of the feudal, or of the ecclesiatical polity, or of tenure, or of titles, as derived from 
either of those principles, are at all a necessary part of the law of England, when the 
persons are removed from the soil to which the laws of tenure and of title apply. 
Here the existing practice not only does not warrant the presumption of any such 
legal enactment of feudal principles, but is wholly inconsistent with it, and negatives 
its existence. 
This conclusion would apply, Anstruther indicated, even were Bombay "a new plantation 
14! (1847). 1 Legge 312. 318. 
!42 Perozeboye v Ardaseer Curseljee (1843) 4 Ind Dec (OS) 614 (Bomb HC); Bera'mji v Rogers (1867) 4 Bomb 
HCR 1; Keith "Bombay and English Constitutional Law" (1935). XI Ind HQ 57. 
143 (1845) 4 Ind Dec (OS) 529: 538 (Bomb Rec Ct). 
144 Id. 543-4. 
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and colony of Englishmen." The fact, however, that there were indigenous Hindu and 
Muslim who enjoyed title to their land according to their own laws strengthened his finding 
that the English rules had not been introduced to Bombay:w 
I can see no reason to overturn the course of succession which has obtained here; we 
can only do so by supposing the King of England to have at once annihilated all the 
preceding rights of the whole native landholders of Bombay, and of every English 
settlement in India. We must suppose, that, either by the mere fact of English 
conquest or acquisition, or by the subsequent act of establishing Courts of Judicature 
upon the principles of English law, all former titles to land were at an end; that the 
land of British India immediately, ipso facto, became the property of the King; and 
that all rights now existing in lands in British India are emanations from the 
universal property of the Sovereign. I should have supposed such a proposition to 
have been, in the very statement of it, sufficient to carry its own refutation ... We 
must not in our zeal for the principles of the English law, forget that land may in 
nature be a subject of property in individuals, independently of any grant from the 
Crown. This seems to me to be the state of landed property in India; that not being a 
subject of tenure at all, it ought not to follow the law of descent of the subjects of 
tenure. 
These words are significant if only as a direct antithesis to the approach which the New 
Zealand courts were later to take to the customary Maori land tenure subsequent to British 
sovereignty. More precisely, Anstruther found that although there had been a general 
introduction of English law to Bombay it had only been introduced to the extent it was 
suited to the circumstances of the colony. The practice adopted in the colony indicated the 
I application of English rules of tenure to be unsuitable to the circumstances of the indigenous 
Hindu and Muslim inhabitants as well as the European. The former had title to their land 
regulated by the customary code whilst the European population applied the old Portuguese 
rules. There existed no special act of the Crown introducing the feudal rules and making 
them applicable to the title of all the inhabitants. 
By the middle of the nineteenth century investigation into the applicability of the feudal 
rules of English land law to British colonies was regular judicial activity. In Mayor of Lyons 
v East India Company (1836-37) the Privy Council found that the law forbidding aliens 
from holding and devising real property was based upon feudal notions of allegiance and 
fealty. This rule had not accompanied the general introduction of English law to Calcutta. 146 
In Freeman v Fairlie (1828) it was found that the English law of succession applied to the 
title of European landowners in Calcutta but did not extend to the natives as a rule 
unsuitable to their circumstances. 147 In Attorney-General v Brown (1847) the feudal rule of 
escheat was applied to settlers' land titles in the colony of New South Wales. The court 
indicated that the title of the Crown to the waste lands of the colony not only as an aspect 
145 Id, 544-5. 
146 (1836) 1 Moo PC (lnd App) 175 (PC). 
147 (1828) 1 Moo PC (lnd App) 305 (Ch). 
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of its sovereignty but also in the feudal sense was integral to the foundation of the colony. 
The applicability of the feudal rules (including primogeniture) was confirmed by the public 
colonial records as well as Imperial statutes affecting the colony.l48 
Such cases illustrate the proposition that the introduction to the Crown's colonies of 
feudal principles of English land law required some express act of the Crown. Even then the 
presumption was that any such introduction would be qualified by the circumstances of the 
colony, in particular with regard to the land tenure of the indigenous inhabitants: Bombay 
had been granted to the East India company in "free and common socage" as of the manor 
of East Greenwich yet this notwithstanding the Silveira case found that the local practice 
was proof against any comprehensive introduction of feudal rules of land tenure. The 
Crown's charters for North America generally took either of two forms, one being modelled 
on the joint stock company in England with its socage tenure and lands held as of the 
manor of East Greenwich,149 the other following the seignorial grants found in Ireland with 
tenure provision that the land be held of the Crown in capite. ISO These features l51 coupled 
with the early assertion of the Crown's pre-emptive right to silence the aboriginal title 
settled the question in North America: The feudal rules of title were generally applicable to 
the title of the settlersl52 but the Indian title was spared. This was the ratio of Johnson v 
M'lntosh. The feudal doctrine requiring title to land to emanate from the grant of the Crown 
was certainly not a rule of English law incidental to the sovereignty of the Crown nor did it 
come into a colony on the coat-tails of a general introduction of English law. 
6. the extent of the aboriginal title 
One important issue presented by the British colonisation of North America from the 
seventeenth century concerned the extent of the Indian title over their land. It was agreed on 
all hands that the Indian had title to the land in their actual occupation, that is cultivations, 
village sites" pastures and suchlike. Their title over the forests and rivers, the apparent wild 
lands wherein they foraged, hunted and fished, was, however, less clear. The Indians for 
their part considered their hunting and fishing grounds as included in their territory. The 
148 (1847), 1 Legge 312. 
149 eg first charter to Virginia Company (1606), TCVC, 1,10; third charter to Virginia Company (1612), TCVC, 
76,79; charter to the Plymouth Company (1620), CC, ill: 1827, 1834; charter of Connecticut (1662), CC, I: 529, 
535; charter of Hudson's Bay Company (1670) in Martin Hudson's Bay Company's Land Tenures, 163 at 167. 
ISO eg charter of Avalon (1623) in Prowse History of Newfoundland 131 at 132; charter of Carolina (1629), CRNC, 
I: 64, 65; grant of Nova Scotia (1621) in Slafter Sir William Alexander and American Colonization, 127; 
151 Discussed fully in Barnes "Land Tenure in English Colonial Charters of the Seventeenth Century" in CM 
Andrews, ed Essays in Colonial History, 4-40. 
152 Thus the rule of escheat was applied to settlers' titles: opinion of A-G. Somers and S-G Trevor (circa 1692), 
Chalmers Opinions, L 121-2; opinion of Northey, 19 October 1705, id, 123-4. 
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colonial authorities generally recognised the Indian title over such landls3 however the New 
England colonies did not display complete willingness. 
During the mid-seventeenth century the New England colonies had enacted laws 
declaring that the "Indians in this Jurisdiction have an undoubted right to such lands as they 
have possessed and improved by subduing the same, and may not be disposssessed thereof 
without their consent and licence of the General Court".IS4 The authority for this law was 
given as the Old Testan1ent's injunction to 'subdue' and 'replenish' the earth. In 1664 
special royal commissioners had been appointed inter alia to consider the complaints of the 
"Nanyaganset Indians" who complained of ill-treatment since their submission to the New 
England government. ISS The General Court protested that it had been "conscientiously 
carefull"IS6 to observe the Indians' rights however the commissioners were unable to 
reconcile that with the limitation of the Indian lands to those in their actual occupation. The 
Biblical authority for this limitation was found wanting: 1S7 
... for it seemes as if they were dispossessed of their land by ScIipture, which is both 
against the honor of God & the justice of the king; yet in Gen 1st, 28, 'subdue the 
earth' is but equivalent to 'have dominion over the fish of the sea'; in Gen 9, 1 
'replenish' relates to generation, not husbandry; in Psa 115, 16, 'children of men' 
comprehends Indians as well as English; & no doubt the country is theirs till they 
give it or sell it, though it be not improoued. 
In practice, however, the New England authorities had not generally interpreted 
'possessions' and 'improvement' in a narrow sense limited to the Indian villages, 
cultivations and nearby pastures. The Indian deeds of the late seventeenth and eighteenth 
century indicated that the Indian title was interpreted to include hunting grounds, fishing 
stations and the reserves of secondary forest used for shifting agriculture. l58 The title over 
colonial land by right of Biblical injunction was in practice treated as supplementary to 
rather than independent of Indian grant. Ultimately this was a position dictated by common 
sense for were the recognition of the Indian title limited to their villages and immediate 
vicinity conflict between the tribes and colonies would have been inevitable. 
Nonetheless the theoretical position that Indian title was limited to the land in their 
actual occupation did not die with the decline of Puritan control over New England during 
the early eighteenth century. Although English lawyers of the seventeenth century had taken 
the position that within England all rights to land were ultimately located in the Crown as 
1S3 Thomas ''Introduction'', 549-562. The Royal Proclamation of 1763 was based upon recognition of Indian title 
over their hunting grounds: Egremont to the Lords of Trade, 5 May 1763, noting the Indians "are entitled to [be) 
most cautiously guarded agairlst any Invasion or Occupation of their hunting Lands", O'Callaghan ed Documents 
Relative to the Colonial History of New York, VU: 478-9. 
154 Shurtleff, ed Records ... of the Massachusetts Bay, ill: 282, IV(l): 102. 
ISS Id, IV(2): 190. 
156 Id, 198. 
lS7 Id, 213. 
158 Sprmger "American Indians and the Law of Real Property", 45-6. 
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its dominium directum, they conceded quite readily that in non-feudal systems occupation of 
~ land simpliciter furnished legal title.159 Indeed the English themselves took the civil law rule 
of occupatio and applied it to the title they claimed in the New World as against the other 
t European nations. l60 Were one to search for the theoretical justification for the seventeenth 
century recognition of the Indian title, then, one would locate it in the simple fact of the 
Indian use and occupation of their territory. By the end of the seventeenth century, however, 
property rights were being characterised as an emanation from the owner's labour rather 
than his occupation of the land. Zouche found that property was "gained by industry" .161 
Locke's influential Second Treatise of Government (1689) stated that as "much Land as a 
Man tills, Plants, Improves, Cultivates, and can use the Product of, so much is his 
Property."162 This was a secularisation of the Biblical injunction to subdue the earth and was 
employed by those who would have limited the Indians' title to land which they had 
actually occupied and cultivated.l63 
This position received further influential support from Vattel's Le droit de gens (1758) 
where it was found tllat a nation could not appropriate to itself "more land than they had 
need of or can inhabit and cultivate."I64 Vattel commented that "if each Nation had desired 
from the beginning to appropriate to itself an extent of territory great enough for it to live 
merely by hunting, fishing, and gathering wild fruits, the earth would not suffice for a tenth 
part of the people who now inhabit it."165 Hence he would have restricted the territory over 
which the Indian tribes of North America could claim both ownership and sovereignty to 
those lands in their actual occupation. He praised, however, the "moderation" of the English 
and their respect for the Indian title over land which upon the strict application of his 
dictum they might have justifiably treated as res nullius. l66 In expressing his admiration 
Vattel might have been conceding the impractability of a position which if adopted would 
have led to most unhappy if not ruinous European - Indian relations on the colonial frontier. 
Certainly he acknowledged that the English had followed a more generous rule. This rule 
may have been more generous than that which the 'labour' theorists of property rights 
would have chosen but it was adopted and existed such theorising notwithstanding. 
159 Digges. "Arguments provinge ... the Corone just and lawfuII owners of all lands" (circa 1568-9) in Moore 
History of the Foreshore (1888). 185,193; Cowell Institutes of the Lawes of England (trl ed 1651), cap 12, fol 
57; Callis Reading ... Upon the Statue ... of Sewers (1622), fol 22; Selden Of the Dominion, or. Ownership of the 
Sea (1652), fol 21. Grotius took a similar position De Jure Belli ac Pacis, 191-2. 
160 Goebel Struggle for the Falklands Islands, 99-119. 
161 Cases and Questions Resolved in the Civil-Law (1652), 21. 
162 Cap Y. para 32. 
163 Bulkley "An Inquiry into the Right of the Aboriginal Natives to the Lands in America, and the Titles derived 
from them" (1724) in Coli Mass Hist Soc (1st ser), (1810). 159 used Gen 1: 28 and Locke to support the 
limitation of Indian title to the land they have improved. 
164 Le droit de gens (1758), lib I, cap xviii. para 208. 
165 Id. para 209. 
166 Id. 
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The North American courts followed the lead of ,the colonial authorities and recognised 
the Indian title over lands beyond those in their actual use and occupation. Baldwin J's 
comments in Mitchel v United States (18) were representative of the United States 
position:l67 
Indian possession' or occupation was considered with reference to their habits and 
modes of life; their hunting grounds were as much in their actual possession as the 
cleared fields of the whites; and their rights to its exclusive enjoyment in their own 
way and for their own purposes were as much respected, until they abandoned them, 
made a cession to the government, or an authorized sale to individuals. 
The Canadian courts have also supposed that the exercise of customary hunting and 
fishing rights may be evidence and part of a subsisting aboriginal title. l68 The cause of action 
in the Baker Lake case, for example, was the disruption of the traditional hunting grounds 
by mineral exploration. l69 In short, the common law aboriginal title extended not only to 
lands in actual use and occupation but to the 'unimproved' forest land used for foraging, 
hunting and fishing. The courts founded the common law aboriginal title in the simple fact 
of tIibal use and occupation of their territory. 
7. the extinguishment of aboriginal title 
In those cases where a court has considered the question of the extinguishment of an 
aboriginal title it invariably faced a de facto state of affairs, the continued exercise of the 
traditional incidents of the aboriginal tenure such as hunting or fishing rights, in search of 
recognition de jure. This continues to be the case with claims based on a common law 
aboriginal title. 
The position in the United States is typified by the opinion of Davis J in Upan Apache 
Tribe v United States (1967) that an aboriginal title subsists in "the absence of a 'clear and 
plain indication' in the public records that the sovereign intended to extinguish all of the 
claimants rights" to their land.l7O A similar approach had been taken in Choate v Trapp 
(1912) when it was stated "the rule of construction recognised without exception for over a 
century has been that 'doubtful expression' instead of being resolved in favour of the United 
States, are to be resolved in favour of a weak and defenceless people, who are wards of the 
nation, and dependent wholly upon its protection and good faith. "171 This approach 
167 (1835) 9 Pet 711, 746 (USSC). 
168 eg R v Wesley ([1932] 58 CCR 269, 276 per McGillivray lA (Alta CA); R v White and Bob (1964) 52 WWR 
193 (BCCA), espjudgment of Norris lA; R v Koonungnak (1963) 45 WWR 282, 306 (NWITC); Daniels v 
White and Reginam (1968) 64 WWR 385, 402-03 (SCC); Kruger and Manuel v The Queen [1978] 1 SCR. 
169 (1979), 107 DLR (3d) 513 (FCfD); see Bickenbach 'The Baker Lake Case: A Partial Recognition of Inuit 
Aboriginal Title" (1980), 38 U Tor Fac L Rev 232. 
170 (1967), 180 Ct Cl 487, 492. 
171 (1912) 224 US 665, 675 (USSC); also United States v Santa Fe Pacific Railroad Company (1941) 314 US 339, 
347 (USSC). 
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originated, in turn, from Johnson v M'lntosh (1823) where Marshall CJ had said Indian 
treaties "must be construed, not according to the technical meaning of their words, but in the 
sense in which they would naturally be understood by the Indians."\72 The American courts 
have applied this canon of interpretation to statutes as well as treaties and other 
engagements affecting aboriginal title. 
The Canadian position is less settled. In CaLder v Attorney-GeneraL (British CoLumbia) 
(1973) Hall J held that aboriginal title being a legal right of property "could not therefore be 
extinguished except by surrender to the Crown or by competent legislative authority, and 
them only by specific legislation."173 He based this position upon the Upan Apache case. By 
contrast Judson J found that an aboriginal title might be extinguished by implication of 
legislation.174 In Hamlet of Baker Lake v Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern 
DeveLopment (1979) Mahoney J attempted a compromise test of 'necessary' implication: 17S 
To say that the necessary result of legislation is adverse to any right of aboriginal 
occupancy is tantamount to saying that the legislator has expressed a clear and plain 
indication to extinguish that right of occupancy. 
The standing of this test must be in considerable doubt since the judgments of the 
Supreme Court in Guerin v The Queen (1985).176 In this case, it will be recalled, it was held 
that the aboriginal title was a unique property right placing the Crown as holder of the legal 
title in a fiduciary position vis A vis tl1e traditional owners. Given this, it is hard to see 
why or how an aboriginal title should be on any different footing to other rights of property 
the expropriation of which requires express legislation. The provincial courts of first instance 
have resisted this interpretation of Guerin strenuously and have taken the 'implied 
extinguishment' position of Judson in Calder. 177 These cases concern important and large 
areas of provincial land and are presently upon appeal. The writer feels that ultimately 
Hall's test of express extinguishment will prevail as it is consistent with the American 
position as well as that recently adopted in New Zealand. l78 
\72 (1823), 8 Wheat 543. Similarly Nowegijick v R [1983) 1 SCR 29, 144 DLR (3d) 193 (SCC) and Simon v R 
[1985] 2 SCR 387 (SCC) at 402 per Dickson CJ. 
173 (1973), 34 DLR (3d) 145, 208. 
174 Id, 156-160. 
m (1979) 107 DLR (3d) 513,552 (FCTD). 
176 (1985) 13 DLR (4th) 321 (SCC) 
177 Attorney-General (Ontario) v Bear Island Foundalion (1984) 15 DLR (4th) 321 (Ont HC); MacMillan Bloedel v 
MulUn [1985) 2 WWR 1 (BCSC). 'This JXlsition is shared with the federal government which has considered 
claims "based on aboriginal title to be supercedcd by law in instances in which ... general legislation ... and third 
party alienations [are) inconsistent with continued aboriginal use and occupancy" (Canada. Department of Indian 
Affairs and Northern Development Living Treaties. Lasting Agreements (1985) at 44). This subscription to the 
Judson approach in Calder has been challenged by the Task Force report, op cit, and must be in doubt given the 
Supreme Court's judgments in Guerin and Simon v R [1985) 2 SCR 387. 
178 Te Weehi v Regional Fisheries Officer, unreJXlrted. 19 August 1986, expressly adopting the approach in Lipan 
Apache Tribe v United Stales, supra. 
If aboriginal title can be extinguished only be express legislation, as would appear to be 
the case, it follows that in the absence of stipulation otherwise the common law will 
presume a right of compensation. In United States v Creek Nation (1935) the Supreme 
Court of the United States ruled that the federal government's exercise of its sovereign 
powers "did not enable the United States to give the tribal lands to others, or to appropriate 
them for its own purposes, without rendering, or assuming an obligation to render just 
compensation for them; for that 'would not be an exercise of guardianship, but an act of 
confiscation' ."179 Similarly Hall J indicated in Calder that the common law rule that only 
express words to that effect would authorise a legislative taking without compensation 
applied to aboriginal title. ISO Lord Denning stated in Oyekan v Adele that where 
expropriatory legislation had been passed "the courts will declare the inhabitants entitled to 
compensation according to their interests, even though those interests are of a kind unknown 
to English law."lsl 
It is possible, however, that legislation affecting an aboriginal title may be regulatory 
rather than confiscatory in character and hence not subject to a right of compensation. In 
France Fenwick and Co v The King (1927) Wright J stated: l82 
I think that the rule of compensation can only apply .. . to a case where property is 
actually taken possession of, or used by, the Government, or where, by the order of a 
competent authority, it is placed at the disposal of the Government. A mere negative 
prohibition, though it involves interference with an owner's enjoyment of property, 
does not, I think, merely because it is obeyed, carry with it at common law any right 
to compensation. A subject cannot at common law claim compensation merely 
because he obeys a lawful order of the state. 
In Kruger and Manuel v R (1978) the Supreme Court of Canada considered the argument 
that the provincial Wildlife Act had extinguished the claimants aboriginal hunting rights but 
left intact the right to compensation. In the end the British Columbia Court of Appeal and 
Supreme Court skirted the issue ruling that the federal Indian Act made provincial laws of 
general application applicable to the Indians in the case at bar. The Supreme Court did 
however venture the following obiter dicta: 1S3 
It has been argued that absence of compensation supports tl1e proposition that there 
has been no loss or regulation of rights. That does not follow . Most legislation 
imposing negative prohibitions affects previously enjoyed rights in a ways not 
deemed compensatory. The Wildlife Act illustrates the point. It is aimed at wild life 
management and to that end it regulates the time, place, and manner of hunting 
game. It is not directed towards the acquisition of property. 
179 (1935) 295 US 103, 109-110 (USSC); also Minnesota v Hitchcock (1901) 185 US 373 (USSC). 
ISO (1973) 34 DLR (3d) 145, 153. 
ISI [1957] 2 All E R 785, 788 (PC). Also Amodu Tijani v Secretary of Southern Nigeria [1921] 2 AC 399; 
Sakariyawo Oshodi v Morianw Dakoto [1930] AC 667. 
182 [1927] 1 KB 458,467. 
183 [1978] 1 SCR 104, 108. 
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Whilst this dicta might assist the interpretation of legislation affecting aboriginal title one 
must be mindful that in certain cases (as where the sole incident of the claimed aboriginal 
title is the right to hunt or fish) 'regulation' may amount to confiscation. This appears to 
have been at the back of the mind of the Supreme Court in Kruger and Manuel for the 
opening paragraph of the judgment noted that the Indians could have "readily" obtained and 
had previously obtained the necessary pennits required by the provincial statute. In other 
words the Wildlife Act was a regulation rather than confiscation of the aboriginal title for it 
simply added a bureaucratic aspect (the acquisition of pennits) to the exercise of the 
traditional hunting right. One wonders, though, what would have been the case had the 
Wildlife Act produced a serious interference with the Indian lifestyle which in many regions 
of Canada is heavily reliant on subsistence hunting and fishing. 
8. Conclusion 
The important ingredients of the common law doctrine of aboriginal title might be 
summarised accordingly: 
1) The common law presumed the continuity of pre-existing tribal property rights upon the 
Crown's assumption of the territorial sovereignty of new territory in the absence of an act of 
state during the process of acquisition suspending those property rights. 
2) The presumption of continuity had been modified in North America by a restriction of 
the alienability of the tribal title making it alienable only to the Crown or its grantees. This 
modification ensured that the settlers' titles to their lands were based upon the feudal 
principle of Crown-derived tenure. The Indian title stood apart from this as a Crown-
recognised title. 
3) The Crown's status as the ultimate owner of its territory (dominium eminens) was an 
incidental aspect of its sovereignty distinct to its position as feudal overlord (dominium 
directum). Even where feudal tenure had been introduced into a colony its applicability was 
qualified by the circumstances of the colony, in particular the land tenure of the indigenous 
inhabitants which was excepted from feudal rules. Therefore two systems of tenure could 
arise in a colony, one Crown-recognised and based upon the presumption of continuity 
(modified or not), the other Crown-derived and based upon the introduction and application 
of feudal principles of title to a certain class (invariably non-indigenous) of inhabitants. 
4) A subsisting aboriginal title extends over all the traditional lands of the customary owners 
and includes all aspects of the tribal exploitation, including hunting, fishing and foraging 
rights. 
5) Apart from voluntary relinquishment (by sale or cession) to the Crown or its grantees or 
abandonment by the traditional owners, an aboriginal title can be extinguished only by 
express legislation. 
220 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE ABORIGINAL TITLE OF THE NEW ZEALAND MAORI 
A. INTRODUCfION 
The remaining chapters in this Part are concerned with the extent to which the general 
principles reviewed in the previous chapter applied to the land rights of the Maori 
subsequent to the Crown's assumption of the territorial sovereignty of New Zealand. This 
inquiry is conducted at two important stages: First, we consider the manner in which the 
doctrine of modified continuity was recognised during the late l830s and early days of the 
colony. It is clear that during tllis period a certain position was adopted regarding the Maori 
aboriginal title and this underlay the early land policy of the colony. Secondly, we will look 
at the treatment given this aboriginal title by the New Zealand courts. It will be seen tllat 
from the last quarter of the nineteenth century the courts adopted a position on aboriginal 
title at odds with the early history of the colony. Having clarified the basis of this position 
and isolating what the writer considers to be its important and crucial flaws, we pass on to 
consider briefly the residual vigour of the doctrine of aboriginal title. It is clear that the 
doctrine still has some effect upon the land and other related claims of th Maori. 
B. THE RECOGNITION OF MAORI PROPERTY RIGHTS BY THE CROWN 
1. Early British position on Maori land rights. 
The British did not treat the character of the Maori title over ilieir land as an issue until 
ilie late l830s when settlement of ilie country began in earnest. Until then, the British 
assumed the Maori had a full title to their land. l The missionaries had purchased mission 
sites and small areas of farmland from the Maori,2 an indication of the prevalent belief, 
taken to an extreme by de Thierry,3 that the Maori could confer a valid title to land in the 
islands. Since the Crown recognised the sovereignty of the tribes their title to their property 
and capacity to alienate it appeared incontrovertible. 
By 1838 land purchases from the Maori were a regular feature of ilie New Zealand 
frontier. These purchases were described in detail by numerous witnesses before the Lords 
2 
eg Macquarie to Bathurst, 24 June 1815 RSCNZ (1840), App 2,137; Bathurst to Macquarie, 9 April 1816, 
HRNZ,I.407; Stephen, note, 25 May 1830, CO 201/215:696; Busby A Brief Memoir (1831), in CO 209/1:183,197. 
Adams Fatal Necessity, 175. 
De Thierry claimed the right of sovereignty over New Zealand in virtue of his purchase of land through Thomas 
Kendall: "Address to the New Zealander settlers", 14 September 1835 CO 209(2:87, 89-90. This blended 
imperium and dominium - Busby attacked de Thierry's claims to both: Busby to de Thierry, 30 October 1835 CO 
209/2:99; Busby to Bourke, 31 October 1835 CO 2(1)/2:95 ~ 
Committee on New Zealand (1838). The Maori tenure these witnesses often described as 
feudal in that the land was vested in a paramount chief from whom the lesser chiefs held as 
tenants, but they noted, too, that a chief would not claim a greater right over the land itself 
than that of an ordinary tribe member. Generally they noted that any sale required tribal 
permission. A purchaser would deal with the local chiefs in the first instance but the 
transaction was subject to the veto of the superior chief and the approval of the tribe at 
large. This was usually signified by some formal meeting at which tribal approval and the 
payment of the consideration would be made, a process not unlike the common law form of 
livery of seisin. The European purchaser usually presented a deed to which the chief(s) 
maldng the sale would inscribe his (their) mark(s). Frequently the purchaser and native 
vendors would walk around the boundaries of the land being alienated. It would seem that 
during the 1830s and possibly into the 1840s the Maori had a limited comprehension of tlle 
absolute character of a sale of land: To them the transaction signified the grant of 
permission to a European to come and live upon their land. In other words, a sale was the 
grant of a licence to use and occupy the land, a usufructuary interest rather than an 
abandonment of the tribal title. If the European purchaser did not come upon the land wiiliin 
a reasonable period some chiefs felt iliemselves able to 'sell' the land again.4 
Until ilie beginning of 1839 the Colonial Office had not seriously considered the 
question of the Maori title to their lands for the problem of the New Zealand frontier had 
until recently been one of lawlessness amongst the English traders and escaped convicts 
resorting to the islands. Landjobbing was only becoming an issue in early 1837 when Busby 
reported disputes arising from European purchases.s By the middle of iliat year he was 
describing not only the effects upon Maori society of European lawlessness, liquor and 
disease but the "distressing evils" of "the Consequences of me sale of their lands to British 
Subjects".6 Busby's accounts were underlined by Hobson's report received in London early 
in 1838,7 me evidence before the Lords Committee in me ntiddle of mat year, and, most 
crucially, me rejuvenation in mid-1837 of me colonial reform movement wim its plans to 
undertake the large scale systematic colonisation of New Zealand. The extreme hostility of 
the missionary societies to the settlement of New Zealand8 further emphasised me problems 
which me continued and unregulated purchase of land in New Zealand would bring. 
4 
6 
7 
8 
Lords Committee (1838), Watkins: 16-18,24,26-28; Fl att: 34, 37-44,48,50; Montefiore:37,61-3; Polack: 80-83,87; 
Willdnson: 96,99-101; Hinds: 134-5,138; Baring: 148-151; Fitzroy: 165,171-172,174,176. Similarly: Mackay, 
report, 17 March 1890, OVANJ, 1-2; Martin The Taranaki Question (1860),; Board of Inquiry, Report to 
Governor Browne; 1856, OVANJ, 6; Clarke to Fitzroy, 29 July 1844, id, 8-9; Hadfield, August 1860, id, 9-10; 
Wilson, id, 13-14; McDonnell, "The Power of the old New Zealand Chiefs; or, Maori Law", Evening Post, 12 
May 1888, id, 16-17; Maning, 'The Nature of Title according to Maori Custom", 26 November 1877, id, 17-21. 
Busby to Bourke, 30 January 1837 CO 209/2:301,304-5; Busby to Bourke, 28 March 1837 CO 209/2:313,314-6. 
Busby to Bourke, 16 June 1837 CO 209/2:333,338. 
Hobson to Bourke, 8 August 1837, C0209/2:30,35 reporting "Cast accumulating" purchases by British subjects. 
eg Lords Committee (1838), evidence: Coates (CMS), 180-275; Garratt (CMS), 277-285; Beecham (WMS), 286-
315. 
222 
The Colonial Office's position on these land purchases started from the fundamental 
distinction "so familiar to ourselves"9 between the sovereignty of the islands (imperium) and 
ownership of the land (dominium). This distinction was, of course, embodied in the Treaty 
of Waitangi by which the Maori ceded their sovereignty whilst retaining and being 
guaranteed their land rights. The distinction was expressly applied to the New Zealand 
islands as early as 1830· when James Stephen spoke of the Maori "owners & Sovereigns" of 
the country.lO His draft instructions to Hobson (1839) emphasised the distinction although 
this part of the instructions were subsequently deleted on other grounds. Hobson was to 
have been instructed to "exert all your power to explain to the Chiefs, and to convince them 
that the security of their proprietary rights will not be impaired but greatly strengthened by 
their abdication of their Sovereign Authority" to the Crown. ll Some years earlier Busby had 
made a similar point when he advised that the Maori "if protected in the enjoyment of their 
landed property, and their personal rights ... would, I am sure gladly become the subjects of 
the King, and yield up the Government of their country to those who are more fitted to 
conduct it".12 The same distinction between sovereignty and property rights was made by 
Lord Glenelg as he reacted to the New Zealand Association's overtures. He stressed that any 
British colony in New Zealand would not be pennitted to proceed in "abrogation" of the 
Maoris' rights "whether of Sovereignty or of Property".13 The distinction between the 
acquisition of sovereignty and the title of the Maori to their land was treated as a 
fundamental premise of British relations with the Maori tribes. 
Anxiety over the land purchasing activity of British subjects in the New Zealand islands 
heightened by the prospect of large scale settlement (were the Colonial Refonn movement 
successfully to bend the ear of his political overlords), led James Stephen early in 1839 to 
consider that it might "be necessary to declare the invalidity of any title to Land, not 
acquired through the Crown - a declaration which may be safely made when the 
preponderating numerical interest is in favour of it but not afterwards" .14 Stephen wanted the 
Crown to step in and control land purchasing from the Maori before it was too late for as 
"large tracts of the most valuable lands are obtained from the Chiefs, and in proportion as 
the erection of a regular Government shall be delayed, the possibility of any well regulated 
Land system being introduced, will be diminished".ls The exclusive control of land 
purchases by one body which Stephen had suggested in January 1839 was hardly novel in 
relation to the New Zeland frontier for the New Zealand Association had planned upon 
assuming the monopoly of land purchases from the Maori and subsequent disposal to the 
9 Stephen, draft instrUctions to Hobson, circa 13-14 August 1839, CO 209/4:260. 
10 Note, 25 May 1830 CO 201/215 :696. 
11 Supra. 
12 Busby to Bourke. 26 January 1836 CO 209/2:152,156. 
13 Glenelg, memorandum, 15 December 1837 CO 209/2:409. 
14 Stephen. minute, 21 January 1839 CO 209/4:193,200-1. 
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English settlers. 16 Stephen had based his position, however, not only on the desirability of an 
orderly system of land titles for the settlers but also "the protection of the Aborigines" .17 
The first draft instructions to Hobson (24 January 1839)18 showed that within days 
Stephen's suggestion that the Crown should be the sole source of title to land for any 
English settlers had become Colonial Office orthodoxy. The second draft instructions of 
March that year contained' a further recognition of the principle, stating that Parliament 
would be approached to make a "Declaration that no title to land in New Zealand" would 
have "any validity unless it be founded upon or derived from a Grant from Her Majesty".19 
In the meantime, "immediately upon the foundation of the Colony", Hobson was to issue a 
Royal Proclamation "giving notice to all persons that Her Majesty would not recognise any 
title to Land in any part of New Zealand which should be subsequently acquired from the 
Natives, or afford any protection to such acquisitions even if they should at any future time 
be brought within the limits of the British Sovereignty".2O The New Zealand Company was 
immediately opposed to this position, advising its agent in the islands that "all the world is 
free to purchase lands in New Zealand".21 By mid-1839, however, the Colonial Office was 
responding to inquiries from those who had purchased land in New Zealand through the 
Company or from the tribes with a refusal to guarantee any such title should the islands 
become British. This refusal was consistently repeated over the following months.22 
The final instructions to Hobson were dated 14 August 1839. He was told not only to 
obtain "the mere recognition of the sovereign authority of the Queen" from the chiefs but 
also to induce them "to contract with you, as representing Her Majesty, that henceforward 
no lands shall be ceded, either gratuitously or otherwise, except to the Crown of Great 
Britain".23 The instructj.ons set out fully the grounds for this stipulation:24 
Contemplating the future growth and extension of a British colony in New Zealand, 
it is an object of the first importance that the alienation of the unsettled lands within 
its limits should be conducted, from its commencement, upon that system of sale of 
which experience has proved the wisdom, and the disregard of which has been so 
fatal to the prosperity of other British settlements. With a view to those interests, it 
is obviously the same thing whether large tracts be acquired by the mere gift of the 
Government, or by purchases effected on nominal considerations from the 
16 eg "Abstract of an Act of Parliament for the British Colonization of New Zealand", 21 November 1837 CO 
209/2:402-7, clause 19. 
17 Slephen to Labouchere, 15 March 1839 CO 209/4:326,327. 
18 First draft instructions to Hobson, 24 January 1839 CO 209/4:203,214-5. 
19 Second draft instructions to Hobson, circa 8 March 1839 CO 209/4:221,235-6. 
20 Id. 
21 "Instructions to the New Zealand Company's Governor in New Zealand", enclosure in Hutt to Normanby, 29 
April 1839 CO 209/4:535. 
22 eg Normanby to Green, 20 July 1839 CO 209/5:227; Russell to Greenwood, 4 September 1839 CO 209/5:233, 
Vemon Smith to Beilby, 18 January 1840 CO 209/7:270-1; Yemon Smith to Woollcombe, 4 March 1840 CO 
209/8:399-400; Gairdner to Webster, 7 July 1840 CO 209/7:500-1; Gairdner to Rooke, 29 June 1840 CO 
209/7:480; Yemon Smith to Blackbum 30 June 1840 CO 209/7:2Jl,4. 
23 Normanby to Hobson, 14 August 1839 CO 881/1:#25,1,2. 
24 Id. 
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Aborigines... Indeed, in the comparison of· the two methods of acqumng land 
gratuitously, that of grants from the Crown, mischievous as it is, would be the less 
inconvenient, as such grants must be made with a least some kind of a system, with 
some degree of responsibility, subject to some conditions and recorded for general 
information. But in the case of purchases from the natives, even these securities 
against abuse must be omitted; and none could be substituted for them. You will, 
therefore, immediately on your arrival, announce, by a proclamation addressed to all 
the Queen's subj~cts in New Zealand, that Her Majesty will not acknowledge as 
valid any title to land which either has been or shall hereafter be acquired, in that 
country which is not either derived from, or confirmed by, a grant to be made in Her 
Majesty's name, and on her behalf. 
These instructions recognised two grounds for the rule that all title to land other than that 
held by the tribes under their aboriginal title was to derive from the Crown. These were, 
first, the protection of the tribes from landjobbing and, secondly, the establishment of an 
orderly system of tenure for the colonists. Normanby stressed to Hobson that the bona fide 
European purchasers need not be concerned because the New South Wales Legislative 
Council would enact legislation appointing Commissioners to investigate and recommend the 
confinnation of those purchases "acquired on equitable conditions".2S 
The Crown's intention to reserve the exclusive right to accept the relinquishment of the 
tribal title and to act as the sole source of title to land for the non-indigenous inhabitants 
was well known in London by the end of 1839.26 The New Zealand Company had certainly 
been apprised of the Crown's position as had the various individuals, amongst whom the 
Archbishop of Canterbury27 and descendants of James Cook,28 who had made inquiry of the 
Colonial Office. 
By January 1840 Hobson was in Sydney. Before Hobson left for New Zealand, Governor 
Gipps issued the Proclamation29 
to all Her Majesty's subjects in New Zealand, that Her Majesty will not acknowledge 
as valid any title to land which either has been or shall be hereafter acquired in that 
country, which is not either derived from or confirmed by a grant to be made in Her 
Majesty's name and on Her behalf... 
The Proclamation went on to state that any purchases from the Maori landowners after that 
date would be treated as "absolutely null and void". The Proclamation had a salutary effect 
in Sydney, Gipps reported to Russell, speculation in New Zealand land ceasing almost 
immediately.30 
2S Id,3. 
26 Nonnanby's instructions to Hobson (14 August 1839) plus other documents on the subject had been published by 
order of the House of Commons (see, for example, Vemon Smith to Blackbum, 30 June 1840 CO 209n:284). 
27 Russell to Archbishop of Canterbury, 6 July 1840 CO 209n:302-4. 
28 Vemon Smith to Cook, 27 April 1840 CO 209n:298-9. 
29 Proclamation, 14 January 1840 CO 209/6:11. 
30 Gipps to RusseIl, 9 February 1840 CO 209/6:5,6. 
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Upon arrival in New Zealand at the end of January and having formally announced his 
office as (prospective) Lieutenant-Govemor,31 Hobson issued a Proclamation to the British 
subjects32 in the islands: 33 
... Her Majesty does not deem it expedient to recognize any titles to land in New 
Zealand which are not derived from or confirmed by Her Majesty ... And ... that all 
purchases of land in any part of New Zealand, which may be made from any of the 
chiefs · or native tribes thereof, after the date of these presents, will be considered as 
absolutely null and void, and will not be confirmed or in any way recognised by Her 
Majesty. 
The speculators and settlers were not slow to controvert the legality of Gipps' and 
Hobson's Proclamations, villifying them as legislation by Proclamation similar to that 
attempted by the early Stuarts.34 Gipps defended the Proclamations sternly and convincingly, 
insisting they were no more than a statement of the Crown's intentions with regard to the 
land titles within the territory over which it planned to acquire the sovereignty.35 He might 
have underlined this by referring to Campbell v Hall (1774) where although finding the 
Crown had lost its prerogative legislative power for Grenada by grant of a representative 
assembly in 1763, Mansfield treated as valid a subsequent Proclamation dealing with the 
disposal oflands in the colony.36 Similarly Marshall CJ found in fohnson v M'lntosh (1823) 
that the Royal Proclamation of 1763 prohibiting the purchase of lands from the Indians was 
valid being an indication by the Crown of the conditions upon which it would dispose its 
lands in North America. The power to make such pronouncements was a necessary result of 
the Crown's position as the feudal owner of all undisposed lands in North America (which 
technically the tribal lands were albeit subject to the burden of the aboriginal title).37 Both of 
these cases were known to Gipps38 and although not cited reinforced the legality of his and 
Hobson's Proclamations prohibiting direct land purchases from the Maori. 
By the beginning of 1840 and before the process of the acquisition of the sovereignty 
had commenced, the Crown had fixed its position in relation to the land titles within the 
prospective colony of New Zealand. So far as the Maori title was concerned the same 
principle of modified continuity recognised in North America was to apply. The Maori were 
treated as the proprietors of their land but the tribal title was to be alienable to none but the 
Crown. As with the Royal Proclamation of 1763 for the North American continent, the aim 
31 Proclamation, 30 January 1840 CO 209/6: 13. 
32 A category which at the time excluded, of course, the Maori inhabitants. 
33 Proclamation regard,ing British subjects' land titles, 30 January 1840 CO 209/6:14. 
34 Wentworth, debate in the New South Wales Legislative Council, 9 July 1840, in Gipps Speech ... on the Second 
Reading of the Bill for appoinJing Commissioners to enquire into claims to granJs of land in New Zealand 
(1860), 4-5. 
35 Id. 
36 (1774) Lofft 655, 661-2 and 747. 
37 (1823), 8 Wheat 543, 595-6. 
38 He referred to both in his Speech ... on the Second Reading, 5-6,7-10. 
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of this rule was both to protect the aboriginal owners (or at least prevent land disputes 
between settler and native) and to establish an orderly system of land tenure for the 
colonists. The Crown's formal adoption of this principle of modified continuity also signified 
an express but limited introduction of the feudal doctrine of tenures to New Zealand. As 
Gipps' and Hobson's Proclamations made clear, the feudal Crown-derived system of tenure 
was to be restricted to the land titles of the settlers. 
2. The Treaty of Waitangi 
The principles which would govern land titles in New Zealand once it became British 
had been determined by the Crown before the Treaty of Waitangi and were known to the 
settlers before the first Maori signatures in February 1840. In that sense the recognition in 
article 2 of the Treaty of the principle of modified continuity was no more than declaratory 
of rules which would have applied in any event: The title of the Maori to their lands, forests 
and fisheries was guaranteed but its alienability was limited to the Crown. 
It has been said by one influential writer that in agreeing to the Crown's 'pre-emptive 
right' in the second article of the Treaty, the Maori chiefs thought they were giving the 
Crown no more than a right of first refusal. Ross supports this view by claiming, 
incorrectly, that in legal usage the word 'pre-emption' meant the right of first refusal, further 
ammunition for her general conclusion that the Treaty was "ambiguous and contradictory in 
content".39 She suggests that Hobson and his helpers at Waitangi lacking legal experience 
and advice40 could have had no idea of the proper and legal meaning of the term. 
Whilst it may be true that Hobson, the missionaries and Busby failed to communicate to 
the Maori the exact meaning of the term 'pre-emption' as used by them, it is apparent that 
in chosing this term at least Hobson and Busby had in mind the North American practice in 
relation to Indian land. The term had been frequently used in North American legislation 
affecting Indian lands, it had appeared occasionally in the report of lohnson v M'Intosh 
(1823) and had obtained a clear meaning in relation to aboriginal title. In 1858 Busby 
explained thar1 
the word in the English version of the Treaty, is used in the technical sense, in 
which it has always been used in dealing with the American Indians (and, as far as I 
am aware, the use of the word is peculiar to such transactions), - that is, as an 
exclusive right to deal with them for their lands. The etymological sense of the word 
'pre-emption' may be different, but it assuredly was never understood by the Natives 
that the Queen was only to have the first offer of the land; which would have been a 
mere mockery. The relinquishment of the right to sell land to anyone but agents 
39 ''Te Tiriti 0 Waitangi", (1972) 6 Nz/H, 129,154. 
40 She herself had relied on the advice of the late Or Warwick McKean (letter 22 March 1972, in which she 
admitted neglecting inquiry into the American Indian analogy), who in conversation with the writer before his 
untimely death agreed revision of his position in line with that herein taken. 
41 Southern Cross, 15 June 1858, supplement 
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appointed by the Queen was as absolute in the Maori version of the Treaty as one of 
the best Maori scholars could make it. 
Hobson, for his part, had been briefed exhaustively in London during 1839 and his 
instructions alluded to the problems caused in other colonies (meaning North America) by 
direct purchases of lands from the tribal owners. Indeed the same problem had lately 
reappeared in Upper Canada where the Six Nations had been selling land to settlers without 
going, as required, through the colonial authorities:42 Whilst in Sydney Hobson had 
discussed his New Zealand mission with Gipps who was definitely aware of the principle of 
'pre-emption' applied in British North America and, most recently, his own colony New 
South Wales.43 Given that the term 'pre-emption' had been frequently used in North 
America as describing the Crown's exclusive right to silence the aboriginal title, its 
appearance in the Treaty of Waitangi could hardly have been a matter of surprise much less 
evidence of ambiguity. The term might have had two meanings at law but in the context of 
the Treaty of Waitangi it plainly had one legal meaning. The colonial inhabitants who soon 
afterwards attacked the choice of the term were usually those who would want to or had at 
some time purchased land directly from the Maori. There may have been an unfortunate 
failure to communicate precisely the meaning of the term to the Maori signatories but 
Hobson and, of those who assisted him, at least Busby knew exactly what the term meant. 
Their view was legally correct as O1apman J indicated in R v Symonds (1847):44 
... the Court must look at the legal import of the word, not at its etymology. The 
word used in the Treaty is not now used for the first time ... the framers of the Treaty 
found the word in use with a peculiar and technical meaning, and, as a short 
expression of what would otherwise have required a many-worded explanation, they 
were justified by very general practice in adopting it. 
3. the constituent instruments for the colony of New Zealand 
The charter seperating the colony of New Zealand from New South Wales and letters 
patent commissioning Hobson as Governor passed the Great Seal of the United Kingdom on 
16 and 24 November 1840 respectively. The charter gave the Governor power to make 
grants of the colony's "waste lands" . The charter added the important proviso, however, 
"that nothing in these our letters patent shall affect or be construed to affect the rights of 
any aboriginal natives ... to the actual occupation or enjoyment in their own persons ... of any 
42 Conunission on Indian Affairs (Upper Canada), Appendix 10, in CO 42/516:118 et seq. For example, 
memorandum regarding Wilkes' claim to Indian tract near Brantford by direct purchase from Indian owners, 
September 1840, by Jarvis, Chief-Superintendent Indian Affairs, id, 194-201; Jarvis to Harrison (Provincial 
Secretary), 12 September 1840, id, 202 reporting the "illicit traffic with the Indians for the sale or occupation of 
their lands which for many years past has been carried on into an extent almost incredible and in defiance of the 
repeated proclamations". Generally, Palmer Patterson, The Canadian Indian (1972) 83. 
43 Below, text accompanying notes 63-91. 
44 (1847). NZPCC 387 (SC). 390-91. also 397 per Martin CJ. 
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lands ... now actually occupied or enjoyed by such natives".4~ The same proviso appeared in 
paragraph 37 of Hobson's fonnal Instructions (5 December 1840) under the royal sign 
manual. Hobson's power to make grants of the unappropriated or waste lands was conferred 
with the rider that nothing in the charter was to "affect the rights of any aboriginal 
inhabitants ... [to] any lands ... then actually occupied or enjoyed" by them.46 
These constituent instruments were accompanied by infonnal instructions to Hobson in a 
despatch from Russell of 9 December 1840. This despatch referred back with approval to 
Nonnanby's instructions of the previous year regarding the native title to their lands and 
settlers' claims under purported purchase and conveyance from the tribes. Russell noted that 
the New South Wales Legislative Council had been impressed into passing legislation on 
this matter which Hobson would soon supercede with that of his own Counci1.47 
The constituent instruments seperating New Zealand from New South Wales therefore 
continued the same principles which had been recognised in 1839 and maintained through 
early 1840 in the fonn of Gipps' then Hobson's Proclamations and the Treaty of Waitangi: 
The native title was recognised as a burden on the Crown's title to the unappropriated lands 
of the colony but its alienability was restricted to the Crown. The settlers' title to land 
would have to derive from the grant of the Crown. 
On Christmas Eve 1840, soon after sighting a copy of the constituent instruments for 
New Zealand and learning of the Colonial Office's recent agreement with the New Zealand 
Company regarding its claims under alleged land purchases from the tribes and expenditure 
on colonization,48 the Aborigines Protection Society petitioned the Crown fearing its 
intention to grant lands while yet in the possession of the native owners.49 Stephen wrote a 
lengthy minute in response, referring to the charter and instructions very recently forwarded 
to Hobson:~o 
"It seems to me scarcely possible that any Governor, or Commissioner appointed 
[under the land claims legislation], should so far mistake the meaning of those 
instructions, as to suppose they authorize the dispossession of the Natives from so 
much as an Acre of Land, unless they first freely sold it to the Governor, or unless, 
antecedently to the proclamation of British Sovereignty, they had sold it for a 
equivalent price, and according to their Native customs. I do not see how this 
injunction could be rendered more clear by any additional words". 
Stephen progressed to consider the character of the agreements reached by the Crown with 
the tribes in purchasing their aboriginal title:~1 
4S pp (1841),#311:31,32. · 
46 Id, para 37. 
47 Russell to Hobson, 9 December 1840 CO 209/8:460-504. 
48 Vemon Smith to Somes, 8 November 1840 CO 881/1:#29, encl 32,60-2. 
49 Memorial of the Aborigines Protection Society, 24 December 1840 CO 209/8:424-5. 
so Stephen to Vemon Smith, minute, 28 December 1840 CO 209/8:443. 
SI Id, 445-6. 
... I would take care that the mere forms and phraseology of the Contracts should 
embody and recognize the great cardinal principle, that the Lands are not only ours, 
but theirs - that we have no title to them except such as we derive from purchase -
and that their future Claims on us in respect of such lands, are the claims not of 
Paupers for Alms, but of Vendors for the fulfillment of a binding Contract. 
A note by Russell on New Years Eve confirmed Stephen's position.52 In January 1841 
Russell wrote to Hobson reminding him that53 
1. Her Majesty, in the royal instructions under the sign manual, has already 
established the general principle, that the territorial rights of the natives must be 
respected, and that no purchases hereafter to be made from them shall be valid, 
unless such purchases be effected by the governor of the colony, on Her Majesty's 
behalf. 
The title of those who had purchased previous to the Crown's sovereignty were to be 
determined according to the procedure of the colonial land claims legislation.54 
The Colonial Office took the position that the constituent instruments seperating New 
Zealand from New South Wales recognized the aboriginal title of the Maori. Although these 
lands were part of the unappropriated or waste lands of the colony the Maori were not to be 
dispossessed in their enjoyment of their property rights. Apparently the view was that the 
Governor should not make a grant of the undisposed lands while there remained an 
outstanding aboriginal title however this position was not plain from the terms of the 
constituent instruments. Even were the Governor to have made such a grant, however, it was 
clear that any grantee would take subject to the unextinguished aboriginal title. The 
aboriginal title was considered a property right inalienable other than to the Crown and 
hence capable of being the subject matter of a contract in which the Crown was under the 
utmost requirement of probity and good faith. 
4. colonial legislation recognising the principle of modified continuity 
Once Governor Gipps had been advised of Hobson's formal annexation of New Zealand 
as a dependency of New South Wales in May 1840,55 he presented a Bill to his Legislative 
Council for the appointment of Commissioners to investigate settlers' claims to title to land 
in New Zealand by purchase from the Maori owners.56 The Bill recited the Crown's 
52 Russell, note, 31 December 1840 CO 209/8:452-3 ("according to the ... Instructions the lands occupied by the 
Natives, and not sold by them, should be recognized as their property"). 
53 Russell to Hobson, 28 January 1841 CO 881/1:#27,13. 
54 Id. 
55 Act of the New South Wales Legislative Council declaring the laws of New South Wales extend to Her 
Majesty's Dominions in the Islands of New Zealand, 16 June 1840, 3 Vict No 28. 
56 Gipps had declared this intention at the opening of the Legislative Council's ordinary session for 1840, 28 May 
1840, at which he characterized the Europeart land claims "by virtue of purchase or cession" from the Maori as 
having "no foundation in law": CO 209/6:103. 
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Instructions to Hobson of 14 August 1839 stipulating ·that "all titles to land in New Zealand 
which are not, or may hereafter be allowed by Her Majesty, are, and shall be, absolutely 
null and void" .~7 It may be added that the "titles" to land to which the Bill referred were not 
those of the Maori but those claimed by non-indigenous persons "by virtue of purchases or 
pretended purchases, gifts or pretended gifts, conveyances or pretended conveyances, or 
other titles, either mediately or immediately from the chiefs or other individuals of the 
aboriginal tribes".~8 The Bill was passed and in September Gipps issued commissions to two 
officers, Godfrey and Richmond, to inquire into the land titles claimed by right of purchase. 
This Act was eventually disallowed because by late 1840 it had been overtaken by 
events: New Zealand was about to be seperated from New South Wales with a Legislative 
Council of its own~9 and an accommodation of sorts had been reached with the New 
Zealand Company regarding the claims arising from their land purchasing activity amongst 
the Maori tribes.60 By the time news of the disallowance would have reached the southern 
hemisphere Hobson would have enacted through his Council legislation similar but in the 
detail more up to play than the New South Wales Act. Nonetheless the Colonial Office 
thoroughly endorsed the principles embodied in the New South Wales Act and Gipps' strict 
obedience to the Crown's Instructions.61 
In June 1841 the Legislative Council of New Zealand passed the Land Claims 
Ordinance. This important Ordinance, the second statute passed in the fledgling colony, 
repealed and replaced the New South Wales Act of the previous year, making similar 
provision for the appointment of Land Commissioners to investigate land titles founded 
upon purchases from the Maori. The second section of the Ordinance made this significant 
provision:62 
And whereas it is expedient to remove certain doubts which have arisen in respect of 
titles of land in New Zealand, be it therefore declared, enacted, and ordained, that all 
unappropriated lands within the said colony of New Zealand, subject however to the 
rightful and necessary occupation and use thereof by the aboriginal inhabitants of the 
said colony, are and remain Crown or domain lands of Her Majesty, Her heirs and 
successors, and that the sole and absolute right of pre-emption from the said 
aboriginal inhabitants vests in and can only be exercised by Her said Majesty ... and 
that all titles to land in the said colony of New Zealand, which are held or claimed 
by virtue of purchases or pretended purchases, gifts or pretended gifts, conveyances 
or pretended conveyances, leases or pretended leases, agreements, or other titles, 
either mediately or immediately from the chiefs, or other individual or individuals of 
~7 New Zealand Land Bill (NSW) 1840, clause 1. 
S8 Id, preamble. 
S9 The charter of 16 November 1840 provided for the separation of New Zealand from New South Wales under the 
authority of 3 & 4 Vict c 62, section 2. The separation was proclaimed and published on 3 May 1841, Hobson to 
Russell, 29 May 1841 CO 209/9:60, enclosing Proclamations (ff 61-63). 
60 Vemon Smith to Somes, 18 November 1840 CO 881/1:#29, encl32,60-2. 
61 Russell to Gipps, 21 November 1840 CO 209/8:250-1; Stephen to Vemon Smith, note, 12 March 1840 CO 
209/13:367; Gipps to Russell, 28 March 1841 CO 209/9:12-13; Russell to Gipps, 16 April 1841, pp 
(1841),#311,60 (commending his "able and zealous exertions"). 
62 Land Claims Ordinance, 9 June 1841, No 2, section 2. 
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the aboriginal tribes inhabiting the said colony, and which are not, or may not 
hereafter be allowed by Her Majesty ... are and the same shall be absolutely null and 
void. 
This was a clearer recognition of the principle of modified continuity than had been the case 
with the New South Wales Act. The Ordinance recognised the introduction of the feudal 
rule of title to land in New Zealand: The Crown was to have the legal title to "all 
unappropriated lands" within New Zealand but that title was "subject to the rightful and 
necessary occupation and use thereof by the aboriginal inhabitants". The Maori title was to 
be inalienable other than to the Crown and the settlers' title to their land required a grant 
from the Crown. The Ordinance, like its New South Wales predecessor and the Treaty of 
Waitangi, was a declaration par excelllence of the doctrine of aboriginal title. 
5. the constitutional premises 
The constitutional premises underlying the recognition of aboriginal title in the earliest 
colonial land claims legislation as well as Hobson's instructions, the Treaty of Waitangi and 
the colony's constituent instruments were made explicit in a speech in July 1840 by 
Governor Gipps to his Legislative Council during the Second Reading of the New South 
Wales Bill. This speech was reprinted privately in Sydney and in widespread circulation 
within Australasia during the 1840s. The speech, which Russell approved,63 provided the 
earliest, authoritative exposition of the constitutional sources of the rules affecting title to 
land in the newly acquired colony of New Zealand. 
Gipps first dismissed arguments against the Bill based on the illegality of his and 
Hobson's Proclamations of January that year declaring the Crown's position on land titles 
within New Zealand. He discounted the alleged expropriatory effect of the Bill. The real 
questions which the Bill presented were two, said Gipps:64 
They are, first, whether uncivilized tribes, not having any settled form of government, 
and not having any individual property in the land, can confer valid titles to land, on 
individuals not of their ,own tribes, and secondly, whether the right of extinguishing 
the native title or the right of pre-emption, as it is technically called, does, or does 
not, exclusively exist in the government of the nation which may form a settlement 
in the country occupied by such uncivilized tribes. 
These principles were incorporated into American law, Gipps indicated, and "if it can be 
proved to be the English law, the preamble of the Bill will be vindicated, and all the 
enactments of it be conformable to justice" .65 
63 Russell to Gipps, 16 January 1841, pp (1841), #311,78-9. 
64 Speech ... on the Second Reading, 9 July 1840, 7. 
65 Id. 
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Before progressing onto a review of the American law Gipps stressed the origin of the 
relevant principles in the practice of the Crown:66 
We know, in fact, that there is no such thing as a Code of the Law of Nations. 
Nations have never met together by their representatives, and passed Acts of 
parliament, neither have they established any international court to judge of their 
disputes. The Law of Nations is to be deduced only from the practice of nations, as 
the unwritten or common law of England is deduced from the practice of England; -
with this difference, however, that for the want of an international court, and of 
international judges, there are no decisions to refer to in contested cases, binding 
upon all nations. Each nation will, however, be found to contend that its own 
practice is agreeable to the Law of Nations. No government will admit that it breaks 
the Law of Nations; its own practice is for it, - the Law of Nations, - and hence I 
deduce, that the practice of England is, for Englishmen at least, the Law of Nations. 
This I consider important to my argument, namely, that in cases wherein the Law of 
Nations is appealed to, that law is, as far as Englishmen are concerned, to be 
deduced from the practice of England. 
Gipps saw the practice of the Crown as being founded upon and hence reflective of legal 
principle. These legal principles derived from that part of the Law of Nations which by the 
practice of the Crown had been incorporated into English law. 
Having established the origins of the relevant legal principles Gipps proceeded "to show 
that the right of pre-emption by the government was the law of England, and the law also 
of the colonizing Powers of Europe, before it was the law of the United States; and that the 
Americans themselves profess to derive it from the English".67 He then quoted lengthy 
extracts from Stort' and KentM summarizing Marshall's judgment in lohnson v M'lntosh 
(1823). These passages indicated, Gipps said, "that in the opinion of the Americans 
themselves, their law on this subject was derived from the English law; or, in other words, 
that the law which prohibited individuals from purchasing land from the natives was English 
law before it was American law".70 
Gipps then insisted that these principles which had become incorporated into American 
law were "English law still", citing the opinions of three of "the most eminent of living 
lawyers".71 These opinions had come to his possession as a result of the purchase of land in 
Port Phillip (New South Wales) by several persons styling themselves the Port Philip 
Association from the Aboriginal occupants. This purchase of 100,000 acres had been 
performed by deed under the sponsorship of one John Batman from whom the transaction . 
took the name 'Batman's Treaty'. It had been immediately disallowed by Governor Bourke. 
The disgruntled Association sought legal advice in London to justify their purchases from 
66 Id,8. 
67 Id. 
68 Story ConstitUlion of the United States ... a brief commentary (1840), chap 1,5-6. 
69 Kent Commentaries on American Law (1832), 57. 
70 Speech ... on the Second Reading, 9 July 1840, 12. 
71 Id. 
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the Aborigines. These opinions were not favourable and so were used by Gipps as 
declaratory of the relevant principles of English law and hence support for his Bill. 
The opinion of William Burge,n an eminent colonial lawyer, was concurred in by 
Thomas Pemberton and William Folletl73 Burge's opinion (1836) was that it had been a 
principle "adopted by Great Britain as well as by the other European states, in relation to 
their settlements on the · continent of America" that they held "ultimate dominion in and 
sovereignty over the soil, even whilst it continued in the possession of the Aborigines" .74 
However, Burge proceeded,7' 
this principle was reconciled with humanity and justice towards the Aborigines, 
because the dominion was qualified by allowing them to retain, not only the rights of 
occupancy, but also a restricted power of alienating those parts of the territory which 
they occupied. It was essential that the power of alienation should be restricted ... The 
restriction imposed on their power of alienation consisted in the right of pre-emption 
of these lands by that state, and in not permitting its own subjects or foreignors to 
acquire a title by purchase from them without its consent. Therein consists the 
sovereignty of a dominion or right to the soil asserted and exercised by the European 
Government against the Aborigines ... 
Burge amplified his opinion making reference to the North American charters by which the 
Crown granted title to extensive reaches of territory. These grants were taken subject to the 
Indian title and understood to have given the grantees the sole right to extinguish the 
aboriginal title. Burge also referred to fohnson v M'lntosh in which it was held, he said, 
"that the Indian title was subordinate to the absolute ultimate title of the Government, and 
that the purchase made otherwise than with the authority of the Government, was not 
valid".76 Accordingly, Burge concluded, the Association's purchases from the Aborigines at 
Port Philip were not valid. 
Having tabled Burge's opinion Gipps presented another, this by Doctor Lushington and 
also concerning the Association's purchases but given in the mistaken belief that Port Philip 
was not within the Crown's dominions, an "erroneous impression" which made "his opinion 
far more valuable" in considering the land purchases of British subjects from the Maori 
prior to the annexation of New Zealand.n In a brief opinion Lushington found that the 
"grants obtained by the Association were not valid without the consent of the Crown".78 He 
advised that any title to land ostensibly claimed by acquisition from the tribal owners 
required "confirmation or grant from the Crown" .79 To hold otherwise would condone the 
n The whole opinion is given id, 14-16. Burge had written a text on colonial law in 1838. 
73 Id, 16. 
74 Id, 14. 
7' Id. 
76 Id, 15. 
77 Id, 17 (reproduced in whole). 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
234 
"planting of a new colony" in contravention of the established prerogative of the Crown.80 
Gipps amplified this last point by discussing the unlawful attempts of the New Zealand 
Company to form their own colony under a government derived from voluntary compact 
amongst the settlers rather than the formal grant of the Crown.81 
Gipps then turned to the argument that the pre-annexation purchases from the Maori 
were valid because the Crown had previously treated with the tribes as the full sovereigns of 
the islands. If they were admitted as the full sovereigns of their territory could not they 
convey a full and valid title to their lands? Gipps answered in the negative. He conceded 
that Normanby had rather overstated the recognition of Maori sovereignty but, more 
importantly:82 
... it is not Independence which confers on any people the right of so disposing of 
the soil they occupy, as to give individuals not of their own tribes a property in it; it 
is civilization which does this, and the establishment of a Government capable at 
once of protecting the rights of individuals, and of entering into relations with 
Foreign Powers: above all, it is the establishment of law, of which property is justly 
said to be the creature. Independence without civilization could no more give to the 
New Zealanders the right to dispose of their soil to strangers, than it could take the 
tattoo marks off their faces, or give them garments wherewith to cover their 
nakedness. 
Although Gipps disparaged the Declaration of Independence ("a paper pellet fired off at the 
Baron De Thierry"),83 his real point was that the Maori lacked a system of law equipped to 
deal with the transmission of land title to civilized persons. What law the Maori tribes 
possessed fell far below the standards of protection which purchasers of land in a civilized 
legal system would rightly expect. Gipps supported this position by a reference to 
~ . 
Robertson's History of America in which the writer related the lack of a civilized if, indeed, 
any legal system amongst the American Indian.84 Given the uncivilized system of law 
amongst the Maori it was inconceivable that a European purchaser would be able to claim a 
title under their law. This essentially was the same justification for the modification of the 
tribal title (ie by its inalienability) as Marshall had given in lohnson v M'lntosh (1823). 
Speaking of the Bill itself, Gipps turned to other justifications for the Crown's position 
on land titles in New Zealand. He noted that the Select Committee on Aborigines (1837) 
had recommended that the acquisition of aboriginal land by "Her Majesty's Subjects, upon 
any title of purchase, grant, or otherwise, from their present proprietors should be declared 
illegal and void" .8S Gipps then stressed the positive aspects of the Bill, namely the 
80 Id. 
81 Id, 18-22. 
82 Id,24. 
83 Id. 
84 Robertson History of America (1777), lib 4,sect 3. This book was extremely popular being reprinted (with some 
revisions) 8 times in the years 1778-1800. 
8S pp (1837),#425,78. 
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appointment of Commissioners to investigate bona {ule purchases from the Maori and to 
recommend their confirmation by the Crown. It was "not a bill to take away any man's 
tenementum, but to give him a tenementum, provided he can show that he has a fair and 
equitable claim to it".86 The other positive aspect of the Bill was the protection of the Maori 
who were, in many respects, "as minors, or wards of Chancery"87 entitled to the 
guardianship of the Crown. The Bill was as much intended to prevent the settlers 
"despoiling these poor savages of their lands"88 as to establish an orderly system of tenure 
for the non-indigenous inhabitants of the new colony. 
In England at the same time, the Select Committee on New Zealand (1840) was also 
pondering the status of land titles in New Zealand and citing the same authorities as Gipps. 
The Committee recommended the enforcement of the rule by which the Crown was 
recognised as the sole source of title in a colony, a principle which they noted had been 
"adopted by the United States" and "solemnly declared by the Supreme Court of Judicature 
in the United States to be a principle of international law" .89 Edward Gibbon Wake field 
informed the Committee that the Crown's repudiation of the doctrine of discovery in relation 
to its sovereignty over New Zealand precluded the application of the rule of Crown pre-
emption to land titles in the colony acquired previous to the annexation (then pending). He 
linked the principle of Crown pre-emption to the diminished sovereignty of the American 
tribes in virtue of the application of the doctrine of discovery.90 The Committee appeared to 
take the point:91 
The acknowledgement of the independent nationality of the natives has given a 
sanction to the acquirement of lands by individual purchasers, because, when the 
right of the natives to sell to all the world was admitted by the British Government, 
it followed that all persons, whether British subjects or others, had a right to buy 
without its sanction. Hence the Crown, which, by pursuing a different line of policy 
from the time of discovery, might have prevented the acquirement of land by private 
purchasers at all, appears to be now precluded from applying the proper remedy to 
the evil. 
Aside from its misconception over the basis of the American caselaw, the fundamental flaw 
in this approach was the confusion of imperium and dominium. Nonetheless it expressed the 
basic theme of the argument soon afterwards taken by those who had purchased land prior 
to annexation and objected to their titles being declared and treated as invalid. 
86 Second Reading ... on .the Bill, 9 July 1840, 27. 
87 1d,28. 
88 Id,29 . 
89 "Report of the Select Committee on New Zealand", (3 August 1840), pp (1842),#582,iii,citing lohnson v 
Macintosh (sic) and Kent's Commentaries, m,376, also p 48 where Committee refers in questioning to Cherokee 
Nation v Georgia (1831) 5 Peters 1 (USSC). 
90 Id, 48-9. 
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6. the constitutional premises debated 
Gipps had made an erudite and convincing defence of the application to the colony of 
New Zealand of the principle of modified continuity . He had not based his position on 
some decision by the Crown to introduce a new policy regarding title to land in the colony, 
that is to say mere political grounds. Gipps had located the origins and applicability of the 
rules regarding the status of land titles in New Zealand in the constitutional principles 
governing the Crown's acquisition of territory inhabited by a tribal society. It is not 
surprising, then, that the settlers' upset with this position chose to attack it on constitutional 
grounds. 
These objections were raised by the purchasers who had acquired land from the Maori 
tribes prior to the annexation of New Zealand. Although those who sought to acquire land 
directly from the Maori after the annexation heavily criticized the Crown's pre-emptive right 
they did not do so on constitutional grounds for in that respect there was no gainsaying the 
power of the Crown. The unhappiness with the position insisted by the Crown arose most 
vociferously amongst those who saw it as a retroactive rule undermining their land titles 
acquired by purchase from the natives before New Zealand became a British colony. This 
group, comprised in the main of the New Zealand Company and those styling themselves 
the 'old settlers' ,92 did not dispute the recognition of the Maori's title to their traditional 
lands. Indeed the whole of their argument against the Crown was based upon its full 
recognition. It was the modification of the tribal title which had rendered it inalienable to 
any other than the Crown to which they objected on grounds, inter alia, of constitutional 
principle. 
The constitutional grounds upon which this objection was placed were identified in an 
opinion of December 1840 by one Garratt, a lawyer and committee member of the Church 
MiSSionary Society. The Society was worried the Land Oaims (New Zealand) Act passed in 
New South Wales would upset the title of the missionaries and their families to lands 
purchased from the Maori as mission sites and small farms for their upkeep.93 Garratt argued 
that the missionaries had acquired their land whilst New Zealand was under the sovereignty 
of the Maori chiefs and therefore had taken a valid title according to Maori law. This 
applied especially in the case of the title of a person born in New Zealand of British parents 
who was, by his reckoning, "'quoad hoc' not a British subject, but a New Zealander".94 The 
argument here was the same as that of the Select Committee on New Zealand (1840) - the 
Crown had recognised the sovereignty of the New Zealand chiefs and hence must 
acknowledge any titles to land acquired under that sovereignty and according to Maori 
92 It also comprised a few companies which had purchased lands, particularly in the Waitemata district, as well as 
French and American settlers and the missionaries, all of whom had purchased from the Maori. 
93 Coates to Russell, 12 December 1840 CO 209/8:201-4. 
94 Garratt to Coates, 8 December 1840, id, 205,206. 
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custom. Stephen was sympathetic to the Society's claim and recommended a confinnation of 
their claim. He also agreed with Garratt's argument regarding the title of the purchasers 
born in New Zealand of British parentage. He stated that these persons "were born in 
allegiance to the New Zealand Chiefs, and are as well entitled as if they belonged to the 
Native Race to the benefit of all the Native Customs, and that benefit is claimed for them 
only in cases where their purchases were made without fraud or undue influence".95 Vernon-
Smith made short work of Stephen's position on the status of New Zealand-born children of 
British parentage as "new and doubtful". "Can the Chiefs eat them?" he asked with a 
rhetorical flourish. The proposition "would sound absurd - but earlier they claim protection 
as British subjects against the rule of the New Zealanders and only count themselves their 
subjects for the sake of the advantage".96 The argument went no further, the Society being 
told the Commissioner would assess their claims "in a spirit of justice and fairness".97 
Nonetheless the association of the validity of their pre-annexation purchases with the 
Crown's previous recognition of the sovereignty of the Chiefs became the fundamental 
theme of the old settlers' argument 
Early in March 1842 a Petition against the land claims legislation was presented to 
Hobson by a group of old settlers who objected to the proposed investigation of their 
purchases by the commissioners appointed under the Ordinance. They insisted the Crown 
should not investigate but could only confinn their title derived from the Maori vendors 
prior to the annexation. 98 The Petition was reprinted in The Bay of Islands Observer together 
with an unattributed article most probably written either by Busby, the fonner British 
Resident,99 or Earp, a fractious and subsequently expelled member of Hobson's Legislative 
Council who had fiercely opposed the investigation of the old settlers'titles.lOO The article 
exhorted its readers: lol 
95 Stephen, note, 14 December 1840, id, 208 recto. 
96 Yemon Smith, note, 15 December 1840, id. 
97 Russell, note, nd, id; Yemon Smith to Coates, 28 December 1840, id, 209. 
98 The Bay of Islands Observer, 3 March 1842, Yol 1 No 2, front page. Copy in CO 209119:139. Also Petition of 
'Old Settlers', 10 February 1842, in Hobson to Stanley, 29 March 1842 CO 209/14:310,324-5; Petition of Land 
Claimants, nd (probably that reproduced in The Observer, op cif), id, 328-30; Petition of old settlers, 22 April 
1842, encl in Willis to Stanley, 9 August 1842 CO 209119:359,361; Petition of old settlers, 16 May 1842 CO 
209/15:124-7. Hobson conceded some basis to the old settlers' argument, Hobson to Stanley, no 2, 29 March 
1842 CO 209/14:334. The Colonial Office took the position that the old settlers could be accommodated within 
the existing arrangements provided their claims were proven before the Commissioners: Stephen to Hope, minute, 
20 August 1842, id, 336-7; Hope to Stanley, 29 August 1842, id, 337 recto. 
99 Busby had purchased land from the Maori the day before Hobson's Proclamation of 30 January 1840 prohibiting 
direct purchases by British subjects from the tribes. Busby, who probably knew the Proclamation was imminent 
but may have been unaware of Gipps' similar Proclamation a fortnight earlier (14 January 1840), therefore had a 
vested interest in defending the old settlers' claims. He refused to submit his purchases to investigation by the 
Land Claims Commissioners: Hobson to Stanley, 18 June 1842 CO 209/15:255-7,260-71 (enclosures, Busby's 
correspondence and Commissioner's reports). Busby had appeared before the New South Wales Legislative 
Council in July 1840, defending his land claims (50,000 acres): Gipps to Russell, No 2, 16 August 1840, pp 
(1841), #311,62. 
lOO Hobson to Stanley, 20 March 1842 CO 209/14:161-6,167-78 (encl) reporting Earp's unruliness in the local press 
and Council ("a shameless tissue of malignity, treachery, and egotism") in defence of the old settlers' claims. 
101 The Bay of Islands Observer, 3 March 1842, in CO 209/19:1349 recto. 
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· .. not to be frightened out of their propeny. We maintain, and will maintain that the 
best of all land titles in this country are those derived directly from Native 
sovereigns. The titles given by the Crown are only secondary. We will not agitate the 
question whether a "sovereign" alone can give title to lands, or whether that doctrine 
be ... a mere obsolete fiction of the feudal ages. We wish only at present to observe, 
that, admitting the truth of the dogma, it is an ample guarantee for the claimants, on 
the ground of direct purchase from the aborigines in their state of sovereignty. If the 
doctrine be true, what right, we ask, has Governor Hobson to suspend the prosperity 
of New Zealand for years together by calling such titles in question? We totally, in 
the name of law, common sense, and human nature, refuse to concede such a right to 
any mortal power. Say it belongs to sovereignty to give titles to property, and to law 
. to create property, who will allow that the law and sovereignty meant are those of 
Great Britain alone? If the assertion be true at all, it is true in relation to the laws 
and sovereignty of every state under the sun, and then the sovereign chiefs of New 
Zealand and their customs, standing in the place of statutory enactment, had a power 
to grant titles which the law of England can only confirm. Sovereignty is the same 
thing, although transferred to other hands, and it is to sovereignty, and act of the 
hands that hold it, the supposed prerogative belongs. 
A fortnight later The Observer carried another article developing this argument This 
article confronted those, such as Gipps, who were "very fond of appealing to the law 
authorities of America" in defence of "the right of the Crown to the preemption of ALL the 
lands of this country".I02 The writer had taken "some little pains to examine the nature of the 
parallelism between the case contemplated by the American authorities, and that of this 
country" ,103 As applied in America the rule of pre-emption derived from the doctrine of 
discovery, the writer insisted, according to which the Crown had claimed the sovereignty of 
North America "as against all foreign nations",I04 Admitting "the 'right of discovery' 
principle as correct in itself, and as originally applicable to New Zealand", the writer noted, 
quoting Edward Gibbon Wakefield in SUpport,I05 the Crown had foregone that "paramount 
right" which discovery would have given it. This "threw the sovereignty entirely into the 
hands of the natives" and sovereignty was sovereignty "whether in the hands of Great 
Britain, the United States, or the New Zealand Chiefs".I06 Hence the article drew the 
parallelism to which it had referred thuS: I07 
Original Sovereign of United 
States and territories 
contiguous by discovery 
GREAT BRITAIN 
Derivative Sovereign of above 
territories, holding & 
Original Sovereign of New 
Zealand by the repudiation of 
the only other claimant -
THE NATIVE CHIEFS 
Derivative Sovereign of above 
country, holding and inheriting 
102 The Bay of Islands Observer, 17 March 1842, Vol 1, No 4, in CO 209/19:105-6. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
Ins EO Wakefield, evidence, 13 July 1840, Select Committee on New Zealand (1840), pp (1840),#582, in reply qn 
ll,p 5; qns 280-7, pp 48-9. 
106 Observer, supra. 
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inheriting from Great Britain 
the original sovereign by 
treaty - THE UNITED STATES 
from Native Chiefs, the original 
sovereigns by treaty - GREAT 
BRITAIN 
Given this, "if it be a prerogative peculiar to sovereignty to alienate lands, and the American 
authorities to which we appeal maintain this, we are bound to carry out the conclusion ... that 
the power to alienate lands is the same in hands of Great Britain and the United States on 
the one side, and in those of the Native Chiefs of New Zealand and Great Britain of the 
other, before and after the respective treaties, by which sovereignty was transferred" .108 
Busby, who had taken upon himself the advocacy of the old settlers' claims and may 
have been responsible for the above article, took an identical position in a letter to Hobson 
two months later accompanying a Petition of the old settlers:109 
The right to the Sovereignty and the soil being thus in the most solemn manner 
recognized as vesting in the Natives, up to the date when the sovereignty and right 
of preemption were ceded to Her Majesty by the Confederated Tribes, and the chiefs, 
not members of the Confederation, it is certain that this case is not parallel to that of 
the British Settlements in America, however strongly the precedents cited from that 
country have been relied on as invalidating the purchases of land in New Zealand 
from the native proprietors. For in no case was the right of the natives of America to 
the sovereignty or the demesne of their country admitted by the Crown. Both were 
considered to have been discovered by right of discovery or conquest, and both were 
granted to individuals or to corporations with as little reference to the Aboriginal 
inhabitants, as if they had no existence. 
The Colonial Office did not respond to these refutations of the American principles 
regarding title to land in territory occupied by tribal societies. There were, however, 
important shortcomings in the argumentation which should not go unnoticed. Most 
fundamentally, the old settlers' advocates mistakenly equated dominium (the ownership of 
land) with imperium (the sovereignty or government over the territory). The doctrine of 
discovery articulated in the American courts under Marshall CJ did not recognise the Crown 
as the absolute sovereign of North America. Certainly they found it was sovereign as against 
other European powers but they also held that the Indian tribes had been left with a 
diminished and limited sovereignty. Marshall never linked this residual sovereignty with the 
character of Indian title. He distinguished imperium from dominium by locating the 
restrictions upon the alienability of the Indian title not in the doctrine of discovery, as the 
likes of Busby incorrectly supposed, but in the uncivilized character of their laws and hence 
unsuitability of the application of such law to the title of white purchasers. Gipps had done 
exactly the same. Although he showed some impatience with the over-emphasis Normanby 
had placed upon the recognition of Maori sovereignty, he seperated this recognition from the 
question of the character of the Maori title to their land. The uncivilized character of the 
108 Id. 
lOO Busby to Hobson, 30 April 1842 CO 209/15:88,89-90. 
240 
Maori customary law meant they could not pass on , a valid title to land under that law to 
white settlers which subsequently the Crown's courts would recognise and enforce, The 
aboriginal title to their lands derived not from their supposed sovereignty but independently 
and in virtue of the simple fact of their use and occupation of land. 
Although it tended to fudge the matter by associating the Maori imperium (original 
sovereignty) with their dominium wherever it suited their argument, on at least one 
important occasion the New Zealand Company acknowledged the real origin of the 
modification of the tribal title and so provided an unwitting rebuttal of the old settlers' 
fundamental premise:110 
However unjust may have been some of the practices of early colonists, when 
unchecked by authority or public opinion, the principles on which the law of England 
has professed to deal with the rights of the native population of our foreign 
possessions are perfectly consonant with justice and humanity, The sweeping right of 
conquest has nowhere been asserted to the extent of dispossessing the peaceable 
owners of the soil, Wherever we have acquired a territory, occupied by a people 
whose degree of civilisation had established rights of property in land, we have 
respected those rights to the fullest extent in which they existed, according to the 
notions of the country, If we acquired a portion of the French, or Spanish, or Dutch 
possessions, we have invariably recognised all proprietary rights which we found in 
existence, Whatever degree of power over property the refinement of the civil law, or 
the peculiar institutions of feudality might give, however complicated and intangible 
the rights which the various laws of inheritance, mortgage, bequest, trust or tenancy 
might have created, we have always respected and enforced them, The same practice 
has been extended to Turkey, to India, and even to countries enjoying less of regular 
government and civilization, provided that the laws in force had reached such a 
degree of perfection as to give individuals a property in land, The Crown never 
thought of asserting a prerogative over the lands, either in Canada or in Oude, which 
it found in the possession of individuals, whether natives of the country or 
Englishmen, who had previously purchased under the laws of the country. But an 
obvious difference of circumstances necessarily led to a different practice with 
respect to those vast regions, which the early discoverers found occupied by scanty 
tribes of savages, These people it was immediately seen, had no idea of property in 
land according to our notions, Particular tribes claimed a right to exclude others from 
making use of lands in their neighbourhood; and may be said to have possessed such 
right, as long as force or fraud gave them the power of checking intrusion, But of 
any individual rights in the soil - tenures whereby different degrees of advantage 
accrued to different persons from the same portion of land - of laws regulating 
peaceful sale or transmission - these people had no notion. The law of England 
rightly held that they could be treated as possessing rights, of which they had not 
even formed a conception to themselves, What rights they enjoyed and used, the law 
acknowledged; for it respected their actual occupation ... and on the same principle, 
the Crown refused to recognise the validity of purchases effected from the natives; 
for it would have been inconsistent to have treated the native as having a power of 
transferring rights which he did not possess, did not even understand, 
The 'native leases' were a practical expression of the settlers' attempts to circumvent the 
modification of the continuity of the tribal title. The European settlers of the Thames and 
110 Somes to Stanley, 24 January 1843 CO 209/26:35,74-7, Immediately after this passage Somes returned to the 
usual mischaracterisation of dominiwn as an emanation from imperiwn, 
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Wairarapa districts had obtained land on lease from ,the tribes, defending their transactions 
on the grounds that a leasehold tenure was not a 'title' but, according to English law, a 
contractual or personal right. Hobson felt "it must be obvious to every reasonable man, that 
all titles must include leasehold".1ll The Attorney-General of New South Wales gave a 
vague response,112 so Hobson asked Gipps how the problem might be handled. The lesses 
holding the lands, he wrote, "not laying claim to them in fee, do not deem it necessary to 
prefer any claim to the Commissioners, but continue to occupy and cultivate them as tenants 
under the chief'.113 The appropriate response recommended by Gipps was the purchase of 
the tribal title so that it bore the character of waste land at the Crown's disposal "and it it 
be rightly understood that leases from the natives will not be admitted as valid by the 
Crown after the lands may have been purchased, the practice of taking land on lease will, I 
apprehend, speedily fall into disuse" .114 Failing that, he suggested a legislative enactment 
prohibiting such leases might be necessary:1l5 
Such an enactment must be based upon the principle that uncivilised tribes, not 
having an individual right of property in the soil, but only a right analogous to that 
of commonage, cannot, either by a sale or lease, impart to others an individual 
interest in it, or, in other words, that they cannot give to others that which they do 
not themselves possess. I I 
Gipps thus reaffirmed the position that the modification of the tribal title derived solely from 
its uncivilized and communal character. The Colonial Office approved his position. 
The 'native leases' were a fitful and abortive effort by the settlers to use the legal 
character of the native title as a basis for a derivative right cognisable in the colonial courts. 
These attempts recognised the continuity of the tribal title but sought to get about its 
modification. The failure of this device only aggravated the settlers' unhappiness with the 
modification, that is the inalienability, of the native title. This unhappiness must have grown 
considerably after the Supreme Court's judgment in 1847 stressing the legal character of the 
principle of modified continuity. The settlers' scheming and constitutional argumentation had 
come to naught. 
7. R (on the prosecution of C.H. Mclntosh) v Symonds (1847) 
This case presented virtually the identical issue as that before the Supreme Court of the 
United States in lohnson v M'lntosh (1823). McIntosh had purchased land directly from a 
tribe under a certificate issued by Governor Fitzroy waiving the Crown's right of pre-
III Hobson to Gipps, 25 October 1840 CO 209/9:90. 
112 Plunkett, A-G (NSW) to Gipps, id, 91. 
113 Hobson to Gipps, 17 February 1841, id. 
114 Gipps to Hobson, 6 March 1841, id. 
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emption. Fitzroy's successor subsequently issued a Crown grant for the land to another 
person, Symonds. The waiver issued by Fitzroy had been granted under the purported 
authority of an unlawful Proclamation suspending the Crown's pre-emptive right to purchase 
native land. 116 The Supreme Court therefore faced two competing claims to the land, one 
based on the direct purchase from the native owners, the other evidenced by Crown grant. 
Both judges held that the person with the Crown grant held the only title of which the Court 
could take cognizance. In so ruling both judges, particularly Chapman J, made important 
observations on the character of the Maori title to their traditional lands upon the Crown's 
assumption of the territorial sovereignty of New Zealand. 
a) Chapman J's position 
Chapman opened his judgment by noting that the question before the court involved 
"principles of universal application to the respective territorial rights of the Crown, the 
aboriginal Natives, and the European subjects of the Crown". He then amplified this location 
o~. the relevant law in what he had called 'principles of universal application':ll7 
The intercourse of civilized nationas, and especially of Great Britain, with the 
aboriginal Natives of America and other countries, during the last two centuries, has 
gradually led to the adoption and affirmation by the Colonial Courts of certain 
established principles of law applicable to such intercourse. Although these principles 
may at times have been lost sight of, yet animated by the humane spirit of modem 
times, our Colonial courts, and the Courts of such of the United States of American 
as have adopted the common law of England have invariably supported and affirmed 
them; so that at this day, a line of judicial decision, the current of legal opinion, and 
above all, the settled practice of the colonial Governments, · have concurred to clothe 
with certainty and precision what would otherwise have remained vague and 
unsettled. These principles are not the new creation or invention of the colonial 
Courts. 'They flow not from what an American writer has called 'the vice of judicial 
legislation'. They are in fact to be found amongst the earliest settled principles of our 
law; and they are in part deduced from those higher principles, from charters made 
in conformity with them, acquiesced in even down to the charter of our own Colony; 
and from the letter of treaties with Native tribes, wherein those principles have been 
asserted and acted upon. 
This repeated what by then was the familar location of the relevant principles in the actual 
conduct of the Crown which was assumed to follow and hence reflect legal principle. 
Chapman then turned to clarify the character of those 'settled principles' of the common 
116 Proclamations of 26 March 1844 and 10 October 1844, published in New Zealand Gazette on respective dates. 
Also Fitzroy to Stanley, 15 April 1844, pp (1845),#131, 18-25; Fitzroy to Stanley, 14 October 1844, pp 
(1845),#369, 20-27 explaining that the natives wished to sell their land as they pleased and complaining "that the 
words of the English treaty 'exclusive right of pre-emption' were not translated correctly, and have a meaning 
not generally understood by the natives, who would never have agreed to debar themselves from selling to 
private persons ... " Earl Grey to Governor Grey, 10 February 1847, pp (1847),#837,34, stating these 
Proclamations were "plainly" unlawful being in excess of Fitzroy's authority in the colony's charter, his 
commission and instructions "which created and limited his powers". 
117 (1847) [1840-1932] NZPCC 387 (SC), 388. 
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law. 
He commenced by observing that it was "a fundamental maxim of our laws, springing no 
doubt from the feudal origin and nature of our tenures, that the King was the original 
proprietor of all lands in the kingdom, and consequently the only legal source of private 
title". This principle, he proceeded, "has been imported with the mass of the common law, 
into all the colonies settled by Great Britain; it pervades and animates the whole of our 
jurisprudence in relation to land".118 Strictly speaking this was not so. The introduction of 
the feudal doctrine of tenures into a colony, it has been seen, required some special act of 
the Crown. Nonetheless it was clear in relation both to New Zealand and North America 
that somesuch act of the Crown existed and Chapman's judgment proceeded on that basis:119 
As a necessary corollary from the doctrine, "that the Queen is the exclusive source of 
private title", the colonial Courts have invariably held ... that they cannot give effect 
to any title not derived from the Crown (or from the representative of the Crown, 
duly authorized to make grants), verified by letters patent. This mode of verification 
is nothing more than a full adoption and affirmation by the colonial Courts of the 
rule of English law; "that (as well for the protection of the Crown, as for the security 
of the subjects, and on account of the high consideration entertained by the law 
towards Her Majesty) no freehold, interest, franchise, or liberty can be transferred by 
the Crown, but by matter of record ... " that is to say, by letters patent under the great 
seal in England, or (what is equivalent thereto in the Colony) under the public 
colonial seal. 
The case before him might end there, Chapman noted, since Syrnonds unlike Mclntosh had 
a title by Crown grant 120 However he felt it necessary to proceed with an investigation into 
the character of the Maori title to their ancestral lands. 
He opened this inquiry with a recognition of the Crown's exclusive right to silence the 
aboriginal title: l21 
It seems to flow from the very terms in which the principle, "that the Queen is the 
only source of title", is expressed, that no subject can for himself acquire new lands 
by any means whatsoever. Any acquisition of territory by a subject, by conquest, 
discovery, occupation, or purchase from Native tribes (however it may entitle the 
subject, conqueror, discoverer, or purchaser, to gracious consideration from the 
Crown) can confer no right on the subject Territories therefore, acquired by the 
subject in any way vest at once in the Crown. To state the Crown's right in the 
broadest way: it enjoys the exclusive right of acquiring newly-found or conquered 
territory, and of extinguishing the title of any aboriginal inhabitants to be found 
thereon. 
He then noted the inalienability of the tribal title subsequent to the Crown's sovereignty, 
referring to North American examples as well as the Port Phillip incident in New South 
118 Id. 
119 1d,388-9. 
120 Id,389. 
121 Id. 
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Wales. lll These were given as illustrative of the failure of direct purchases by settlers from 
the natives to confer a valid title until confirmed by formal Crown grant. Having thus noted 
the general inalienability of the aboriginal title before and after the sovereignty of the 
Crown, Chapman considered its extinguishment by the Crown stressing that this was usually 
performed with the consent of the tribal owners: l23 
The practice of extinguishing Native titles by fair purchases is certainly more than 
two centuries old. It has long been adopted by the Government in our American 
colonies, and by that of the United States. It is now part of the law of the land, and 
although the Courts of the United States, in suits between their own subjects, will not 
allow a grant to be impeached under pretext that the Native title has not been 
extinguished, yet they would certainly not hesitate to do so in a suit by one of the 
Native Indians. 
Chapman then cited with approval the position taken by the Supreme Court of the United 
States under Marshall CJ as showing "the principles of the common law as applied and 
adopted from the earliest times by the coloniallaws".I2A He thus stated: l25 
Whatever may be the opinion of jurists as to the strength or weakness of the Native 
title, whatsover may have been the past vague notions of the Natives of this country, 
whatever may be their present clearer and still growing conception of their own 
dominion over land, it cannot be too solemnly asserted that it is entitled to be 
respected, that it cannot be extinguished (at least in times of peace) otherwise than 
by the free consent of the Native occupiers. But for their protection, and for the sake 
of humanity, the Government is bound to maintain, and the Courts to assert, the 
Queen's exclusive right to extinguish it. 
These general principles showed the Treaty of Waitangi was no more than declaratory of 
common law rules which would have applied in any event l26 
It follows from what has been said, that in solemnly guaranteeing the Native title, 
and in securing what is called the Queen's pre-emptive right, the Treaty of Waitangi, 
confirmed by the Charter of the Colony, does not assert either in doctrine or in 
practice anything new and unsettled. 
Chapman then explained that the "legal doctrine as to the exclusive right of the Queen to 
extinguish the native title" did not affect the tribal law of tenure. They remained able to 
"deal among themselves, as freely as before the commencement of our intercourse with 
them".127 This recognised two systems of tenure within the country, one Crown-derived and 
governed by feudal principle, the other limited to the tribal inhabitants and regulated by 
122 Id. 390. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
121 Id. 391. 
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their customary law. This accommodation of the tribal system was accomplished by the 
severe restriction upon its alienability which made it "technically ... inferior to what we call 
an estate in fee":I28 
But this necessarily arises out of our peculiar relations with the Native race, and out 
of our obvious ,duty of protecting them to as great an extent as possible, from the 
evil consequences of the intercourse to which we have introduced them, or have 
imposed upon them. To let in all purchasers, and to protect and enforce every private 
purchase, would be virtually to confiscate the lands of the Natives in a very short 
'time. The rule laid down is, in the actual circumstances, the only one calculated to 
give equal security to both races ... The existing rule contemplates the Native race as 
under a species of guardianship. Technically it contemplates the Native dominion 
over the soil as inferior to what we call an estate in fee; practically, it secures to 
them all the enjoyments from the land which they had before our intercourse, and as 
much more as the opportunity of selling portions, useless to themselves, affords. 
From the protective character of the rule, then, it is entitled to respect on moral 
grounds, no less than to judicial support on strictly legal grounds. 
Finally Chapman harmonised this title with the Crown's position as ultimate owner of its 
territory: 129 
Anciently, it seems to have been assumed, that notwithstanding the rights of the 
Native race, and of course subject to such rights, the Crown as against its own 
subjects, had the full and absolute dominion over the soil, as a necessary 
consequence of territorial jurisdiction. Strictly speaking, this is perhaps deducible 
from the principle of our law. The assertion of the Queen's pre-emptive right 
supposes only a modified dominion as residing in the Natives. But it is also a 
principle of our law that the freehold can never be in abeyance; hence the full 
recognition of the modified title of the Natives, and its most careful protection, is not 
theoretically inconsistent with the Queen's seisin in fee as against her European 
subjects. This technical seisin against all the world except the natives is the strongest 
ground whereon the due protection of their qualified dominion can be based. 
He then alluded to Fletcher v Peck (1810)130 as authority for the proposition that the 
Crown's ownership of the unappropriated, that is ungranted, lands of its colonies was 
subject to the unextinguished aboriginal title. The Crown had formally granted land in North 
America to British settlers and groups whilst that land remained subject to an 
unextinguished aboriginal title. The grantees took subject to that title, he found, and were 
bound to extinguish the aboriginal title by fair purchase. Fortunately, this "ancient" practice 
had been abandoned "for more than a century certainly":131 
To part with the Crown's interest during the existence of the Native title, leaving it 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 (1810) 6 Cranch 87 (USSC), 142-3 where it was said that the "majority of the court is of opinion that the nature 
of the Indian title, which is certainly to be respected by all courts, until it be legitimately extinguished, is not 
such as to be absolutely repugnant to seisin in fee on the part of the state". 
131 NZPCC 387,392. 
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to the grantee to acquire that title, is obviously fraught with evil to both races, and 
with great inconvenience and perplexity to the colonial Governments. 
In swnmary it may be said that Chapman's judgment provided a clear and authoritative 
guide both to the origins and character of the Maoris' aboriginal title. He insisted hat the 
common law recognised the continuity of tribal ownership of their land and the traditional 
laws governing it This title was, however, inalienable other than to the Crown and to that 
extent he spoke of the 'modified dominion' of the natives. He obviously considered the 
recognition of Maori sovereignty by the Crown not to have affected the pre-annexation 
inalienability of their land. Both before and after the Crown's sovereignty this title was 
inalienable other than to the Crown. The corollary was the introduction of the feudal 
doctrine of title so far as the land titles of all inhabitants other than the aboriginal owners 
were concerned. The Crown thus held the legal title to the ungranted land (in consequence 
of its sovereignty as well as the introduction of feudal doctrine) but subject to any subsisting 
aboriginal title. This legal ownership coupled with the pre-emptive right enabled both the 
protection of the Maori from landjobbing and the introduction for the other inhabitants of an 
orderly system of tenure based on English law. Legislative extinguishment (unmentioned by 
Chapman) and confiscation after rebellion aside, this title could only be extinguished with 
the free consent of the owners. Not only the title of the Crown to the ungranted lands but 
that of any grantee was taken subject to the unextinguished aboriginal title. Although these 
principles were embodied in the constituent instruments and legislation of the colony, as 
well, most dramatically, as the Treaty of Waitangi, they originated from the common law. 
b) Martin CJ's position 
The judgment of Martin CJ paid much less attention to the question of aboriginal title 
than that of Chapman, focussing more upon the power of the Crown to dispose of its waste 
lands. m Martin opened with a statement of the general principles regarding settlers' titles to 
lands in a colony previously uninhabited or occupied by tribal societies:133 
Now the general law of England, or rather of the British colonial empire, in respect 
of the acquisition of lands, such as those which are comprised within the claimant's 
purchase and the defendant's grant, has from very early time stood as follows: · 
Wherever, in any country to which (as between England and the other European 
nations) England had acquired a prior title by discovery or otherwise, there were 
found lying waste and unoccupied, and the same came to be occupied and 
appropriated by subjects of the British Crown it was holden that such subjects did 
not and could not thereby acquire any legal right to the soil as against the Crown. 
132 Even before leaving England for New Zealand to take up his appointment. Martin had offered suggestions for the 
guidance of the land claims Commissioners: Martin to Howard, 10 March 1841 CO 209/13:185-8; Stephen, note, 
12 March 1841, id, 367; (noting Martin was probably not aware of the legislation which had been passed); 
Vemon Smith to Martin, 24 March 1841, id, 189-90. 
133 NZPCC 387, 393. 
247 
I I 
I 
And this rule was understood to apply equally, whether the country was partially 
peopled or wholly unpeopled and whether the settlers entered and obtained 
possession with or without the consent of the original inhabitants. Accordingly, 
colonial titles have uniformly rested upon grants from the Crown. This was the case 
in the oldest British colonies in America; and it is notorious that the same rule has 
been acted upon without deviation or exception in the more recent colonization of 
Australia. 
This passage did not deny the existence of an aboriginal title - elsewhere in his judgment 
Martin recognised this title quite explicitly, so much as indicate its general irrelevance to the 
title of the settlers: Whether the settlers' alleged title derived from purchase or usurpation of 
the natives was meaningless for the only title they could set up successfully in the Crown's 
courts were those by grant of the Crown. 
Martin then referred with approval to Chapman's judgment and the American authorities 
recognising the native title and the Crown's exclusive right to silence it. l34 Noting that the 
Treaty of Waitangi and Lands Claims Ordinance 1841 had asserted similarly, he summarised 
the basis of the rule restricting the alienability of the aboriginal title: 135 
This rule then does in substance and effect assert that, whenever the original Native 
right is ceded in respect of any portion of the soil of these islands, the right which 
succeeds thereto is not the right of any individual subject of the Crown, not even of 
the person by whom the cession was procured, but the right of the Crown on behalf 
of the whole nation, on behalf of the whole body of subjects of the Crown; that the 
land becomes from the moment of cession not the private property of one man, but 
the heritage of the whole people, that accordingly no private right shall be recognised 
as interfering with the public and national right; that no single member of the nation 
shall have any power to impede in any way the progress and working of the plan 
ordained by the Supreme Authority of the nation for the nation's benefit. 
Although this rule might have had its origins in either the Crown's sovereignty itself or the 
introduction and application of feudal doctrine vesting "the supreme dominion and ultimate 
ownership of all land personally in the Sovereign",136 Martin preferred to locate its modem 
basis in the desirability of the Crown's supervision of the settlement of its newly-acquired 
colony. The rule that so "soon as the Native title is withdrawn the soil vests entirely in the 
Crown for the behoof of the nation" permitted "the Sovereign right of control, without 
which no uniform or central system" of land ownership for the settlers would be possible. m 
The remainder of Martin's judgment dealt with the legality of Fitzroy's Proclamations 
dispensing with the Crown's pre-emptive right. Martin found the Proclamation had been 
unlawful and that no person who had purchased directly from the tribal owners in reliance 
upon it could claim a Crown-derived title. 
134 Id,393-4. 
135 Id,396. 
136 Id,395. 
137 Id. 
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In . many ways Martin's judgment complemented Chapman's for the latter had 
concentrated upon the protective aspect of the doctrine of aboriginal title whereas Martin 
emphasized its provision of a means for the orderly settlement of the colony under the 
Crown's supervision. In consequence, Chapman's judgment was a more detailed examination 
of the character of the Maoris' aboriginal title. Nonetheless Martin had explicitly recognized 
the basic thrust of the doctrine and referred with approval to Chapman's approach. He 
accepted that the aboriginal title was a burden upon the Crown's ownership of the ungranted 
lands of the colony. Any extinguishment of this title by purchase of the settlers vested the 
land absolutely in the Crown freed of the aboriginal burden. These basic postulates were 
sufficient basis for the emphasis which he had given his judgment. 
Martin's position in Symonds on the native title is best read in tandem with his extra-
judicial statements in the pamphlet The Taranaki Question (1860). This pamphlet was 
occasioned by the Waitara dispute in the Taranaki. This dispute arose from the attempt by 
the colonial authorities in 1859 to exclude the superior chiefs power of veto over a sale by 
its primary aboriginal owners (the sub-tribe) unless he could establish a hereditary primary 
right to the land in common with the ordinary owners (ie membership of the sub-tribe). A 
minor chief of the Puketapu, Teira, had sold the Waitara block to the Government despite 
the objection of the acknowledged leader, Wiremu Kingi. Governor Browne justified this 
modification of the previous recognition of the veto right of the paramount chief "because 
had I admitted the right of a chief to interfere between me and the lawful proprietors of the 
soil, I should soon have found further acquisition of territory impossible in any part of New 
Zealand".138 Kingi's men interfered with the surveys of the block and Browne determined to 
enforce the 'purchase' by military means. Martin's pamphlet was written amidst the dispute 
and questioned the constitutionality of the Government's action. 
Martin noted an opinion of December 1859 by the law officers upon the entitlement of 
the Maori to the electoral franchise in which the following passage had appeared:139 
Could he (one Native) bring an action of Ejectment or Trespass in the Queen's Court 
in New Zealand? Does the Queen's Court ever exercise any jurisdiction over real 
property in a Native District? We presume, these questions must be answered in the 
negative. 
If this opinion was correct - and he indicated his feeling that it was not, it followed, said · 
Martin, that Kingi had "no legal and peaceable means of redress".14O 
This, however, put the proverbial shoe on the wrong foot: It was up to the Government 
to show the lawfulness of their action:141 
138 Quoted by Ward A Show of Justice, 114. 
139 Quoted in The Taranaki Question (1860), 74. 
140 Id. 
141 Id, 75. 
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This is the point which was forgotten throughout, that the Governor, in his capacity 
of land buyer, is as much bound by law as other land buyers. The rights of William 
King [Wiremu Kingi] and his people, in respect of that piece of land, were not 
altered by the fact of the Governor being the purchaser. They were the same as if 
Teira had sold to a private person. The Governor has no more right to seize land 
upon the decision of his own agent than any other land buyer would have. He has no 
right to take possession, except where a private buyer would have such a right: no 
more right in the case where he is buying land from a Maori, than where he is 
buying from a pakeha ... As there was no legal decision upon the Native rights, so 
there was no legal warrant for the Government to take the land". 
Kingi and his men should not be condemned, Martin proceeded, because they knew but 
little, if any, of "Constitutional rights or English law". They had "a sufficient natural sense 
of fairness to know that they had not been fairly treated" .142 Their failure to appeal to the 
courts or even the Queen herself was hardly surprising. "They met force by force".143 Martin 
clearly felt the Maori were able to bring an action in the Crown's courts for the protection 
of their property rights. He emphasized the Maoris' status as British subjects and the 
recognition of their right to their land from which followed unmistakeably, the protection of 
their land rights by the law. The tribal title was "clearly a right of property", being 
"expressly recognised and protected by the Treaty of Waitangi".I44 
It must be added that the law officers' opinion of 1859 was not so much a negation of 
the Maori right to bring actions in the colonial courts to defend their aboriginal title so 
much as an indication of the infrequency of such steps. The law officers' were illustrating 
the failure of the Maori to have attained civilized and individualized notions of property as 
to justify the grant of the franchise. They referred to the right of "one Native", that is an 
individual tribe member, to sue in trespass or ejectrnent This was an unlikelihood given the 
communal character of the tribal title. Since the franchise required an individual to own a 
certain amount of property the subsumption of the tribe member's interest into the 
communal title disqualified him from the franchise. Similarly the law officers' comment 
upon the failure of the Queen's courts to exercise jurisdiction over real property in a Native 
District was a reference to the Districts specifically set aside under statutory authority and 
wherein the courts' jurisdiction was excluded by statue. In this context, the law officers' 
opinion of 1859, three bare sentences touching upon native land ownership, was hardly a 
negation of any aboriginal title. 145 
8. other early recognition of the Maori's aboriginal title 
142 Id,76. 
143 Id. 
144 Id,9. 
145 Prendergast A-G, opinion as to the legal status of rebelious M aoris , 30 June 1869, in Turton, ed Epitome of 
Official Documents (1883), 191,192-3 opined this opinion was incorrect in the "inferential... impression. .. that the 
Queen's Courts would not redress personal wrongs when suffered by Maoris". His opinion on violations of 
Maori property rights was not the same. 
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The judicial, legislative and administrative activity during the period of Crown colony 
govennent presupposed the legal existence of a communal native title to their traditional 
land. Besides the fonnal recognition already noted one might instance other activity from 
the same period. Ward, for example, reports the occasional suit in trespass by a tribe under 
its aboriginal title. l46 Colonial legislation such as the Cattle Trespass Ordinance 1841, framed 
partially with a view to the protection of Maori cultivations from roaming European stock, 
presupposed some property right in the aboriginal owners. I• 7 Another example would be the 
Proclamation of Acting-Governor Shortland (12 July 1843) by which he "publicly" wamedl48 
... all persons claiming land in the Colony, in all cases where the claim is denied or 
disputed by the original Native owners, from exercising acts of ownership thereon, or 
otherwise prejudicing the question of title to the same, until the question of 
ownership shall have been heard and detennined by one of Her Majesty's 
Commissioners appointed to investigate Claims to Land in New Zealand. 
Imperial legislation, as well as the constituent instruments drafted in London, 
presupposed the existence of an aboriginal title. The New Zealand Constitution Act 1852 
gave the colonial General Assembly jurisdiction over the disposal of waste lands "wherein 
the Title of Natives shall be extinquished as hereinafter mentioned". 149 Legislative 
jurisdiction over native title was however witheld from the Assembly.lso The Act committed 
the colonial authorities to the continued observance of the Maori aboriginal title:m 
It shall not be lawful for any Person other than Her Majesty, Her Heirs or 
Successors, to purchase or in anywise acquire or accept from the aboriginal Natives 
Land of or belonging to or used or occupied by them in common as Tribes or 
Communities, or to accept any Release or Extinguishment of the Rights of such 
aboriginal Natives in any such Land as aforesaid; and no Conveyance or Transfer, or 
Agreement for the Conveyance or Transfer of any such Land, either in perpetuity or 
for any Tenn or Period, either absolutely or conditionally, and either in Property or 
by way of Lease or Occupancy, and no such Release or Extinguishment as aforesaid, 
shall be of any Validity or Effect unless the same be made to, or entered into with, 
and accepted by Her Majesty ... 
It is submitted that there is overwhelming evidence from the first two decades of New 
Zealand's colonial history establishing the recognition of the aboriginal title of the Maori. 
This body of judicial, legislative and administrative practice was actuated by much more 
146 A Show of Justice, 50-55. if Adams Fatal Necessity, 222-3. This topic, requiring access to court archives in New 
Zealand, would be a fertile area of inquiry for a legal historian. 
147 Cattle Trespass Amendment Ordinance 1844, No 14. See Fitzroy to Stanley, 22 October 1844, pp 
(1845),#369,40,43. Similarly Tax upon Raupo (reed) Houses Ordinance 1842, Sess II. No 17. 
148 New Zealand Gazette, moNo 28,183. Also CO 209122:105-6. 
149 15 & 16 Vict c 72, section 72. 
ISO The Crown law officers' reported that the colonial General Assembly, which had been given legislative 
jurisdiction over "waste lands", lacked the same power over "lands of the natives belonging to them 'in common 
as tribes or communities'" as not being part of the colony's waste lands: Crown law officers to Rogers, 4 July 
1862 CO 885/10:#121,1-2. 
ISI New Zealand Constitution (UK) Act 1852, section 73. 
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than a simple belief that the aboriginal title of , the Maori was merely some moral 
imperative. The Crown, its colonial representatives and the settlers, their acquisitive eyes set 
on the Maoris' land, took the position that the tribes had a legal as well as moral title over 
their ancestral lands. This conclusion is submitted as inescapable. 
9. the extent of the Maori aboriginal title 
The British colonial authorities as well as the settlers recognised the aboriginal title of 
the Maori tribes. Faced with the difficulty of extinguishing this title the proposition was put 
during the period 1842 - 1847 that this title was limited to the lands in the actual occupation 
of the tribes. Had it been adopted this proposition would have meant the tribal title was 
limited to their cultivations, pa (villages) and burial sites. The restriction the aboriginal title 
was eventually rejected not least on the ground that its enforcement would have provoked 
extreme Maori reaction. The argument was uncannily reminiscent of the efforts in previous 
centuries to contain the Indian title and its eventual repudiation also gave it an identical fate. 
It was clear to the British even before the annexation of New Zealand that the tribes laid 
claim to the whole of the country. As early as 1835 Busby had informed Bourke that as "far 
as can be ascertained, every acre of Sand in this Country is appropriated amongst the 
different Tribes, and every Individual in the Tribe has a distinct interest in the property 
although his possession may not always be separately defined".1S2 Witnesses before the Lords 
Committee on New Zealand (1838) similarly described the tribes' title as comprehending all 
the islands.m Captain Fitzroy, later Governor of New Zealand, reported his belief "that 
every Acre of land in those Islands is the Property of one or another Tribe" .1S4 Although 
Wakefield was subsequently to change his mind, his position in the period before and during 
the Crown's assumption of the sovereignty indicated subscription to a similar view of the 
native title. The missionary societies certainly held the view that the tribal title encompassed 
the fishing, hunting and foraging grounds as well as the cultivations, pa and burial grounds. 
The Crown's behaviour during the acquisition of the sovereignty showed it accepted the 
tribes' title over most of the islands, their uncultivated lands included. Normanby's despatch 
accompanying the first constituent instruments for the colony instructed Hobson "to obtain, 
by fair and equal contracts with the natives, the cession to the Crown of such waste lands 
as may be progressively required for the occupation of settlers resorting to New Zealand" .15$ 
The English text of the Treaty of Waitangi guaranteed the chiefs and tribes "the full, 
exclusive, and undisturbed possession of their lands and estates, forests, fisheries, and other 
properties which they may collectively or individually possess, so long as it is their wish 
152 Busby to Bourke. 31 October 1835 CO 209/2:95.98. 
153 Lords Committee (1838). Nicholas: 11; Fitzroy:168. 
1S4 Supra. 
155 Nonnanby to Hobson, 14 August 1839 CO 881/1:#25.1.3 (emphasis added). 
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') 
and desire to retain the same in their possession". 1$6 
Once New Zealand had been annexed the comprehensive character of the tribal title was 
acknowledged by a number of important and local authorities, some in response to the 
controversy sparked by the New Zealand Company's attempts to limit the extent of the 
aboriginal title. Sir William Martin, Chief Justice and a year before his judgment in R v 
Symonds (1847) commented:157 
So far as yet appears the whole surface of these islands, or as much of it as is of any 
value to man, had been appropriated by the Natives, and, with the exception of the 
part which they have sold, is held by them as property. Nowhere was any piece of 
land discovered or heard of... which was not owned by some person or set of 
persons... There might be several conflicting claimants of the same land; but, 
however the Natives might be divided amongst themselves as to the validity of any 
one of the several claims, still no man doubted that there was in every case a right 
of property subsisting in some one of the claimants. In this Northern Island, at least, 
it may now be regarded as absolutely certain that, with the exception of lands 
already purchased from the Natives, there is not an acre of land available for 
purposes of colonisation but has an owner amongst the Natives according to their 
own customs ... 
Martin reiterated this position in The Taranaki Question (1860).158 The first Attorney-General 
of the colony, William Swainson, took an identical view:159 
Their tenitorial claims are not confined to the land they may have brought into 
cultivation: they claim and exercise ownership over the whole surface of the country, 
and there is no part of it, however lonely, of which they do not know the owners. 
Forests in the wildest parts of the country have their claimants. Land apparently 
waste is highly valued by them. Forests are preseIVed for birds, swamps and streams 
for eel-weirs and fisheries. Trees, rocks, and stones are used to define the well-known 
boundaries. Land is held by them either by the whole tribe or by some family of it, 
or sometimes by an individual member of a tribe. Over the uncultivated portions of 
tenitory held by a tribe in common every individual member has the right of fishing 
and shooting. 
Over the following years numerous local authorities on Maori tenure, legal and otherwise, 
confirmed that the Maori had appropriated the whole of the country and that a tribe's title 
embraced its hunting, fishing and foraging grounds as much as the tribal cultivations, pa and 
burial sites.l60 
The extent of the Maori aboriginal title became an issue towards the end of 1842. Until 
then, the colonial authorities in London, New South Wales and New Zealand had assumed 
the aboriginal title included the uncultivated lands used by the tribe. Adams has argued that 
156 Treaty of Waitangi, article two. 
IS] OVANT, 3. 
158 The Taranaki Question (1860),1-3. 
159 OVANT, 10. 
lOO Many of these were collated in OVANT (1890). See also tho$e cited in Smith Maori Land Law, 88-94. 
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at least Russell and Gipps took a more limited , view of Maori title161 however his 
interpretation of their position is marred by a confusion of Maori original sovereignty 
(which they were inclined to but demurred from taking a limited view) with their rights -of 
land ownership. In addition when Gipps and Russell spoke of the aboriginal "right of 
occupancy" they were referring not to the limitation of the tribal title to those lands in their 
actual occupation and cultivation so much as the Marshall limitation of the alienability of 
the tribal title. Adams thus infers an intention to limit the extent of the aboriginal title from 
Gipps' and Russell's position on the separate question of its modification, For their part, 
Hobson and Fitzroy certainly recognised the aboriginal title to uncultivated as well as 
cultivated land. 162 
In November 1840 the Crown had reached an agreement with the New Zealand 
Company by which the Government undertook to give the Company four acres of land for 
every pound it had spent on land purchases from the Maori, emigration, surveys and 
suchlike. l63 In return the Company waived its claim to the millions of acres allegedly 
purchased from the tribes. The Lands Claims Commissioner, William Spain, had begun 
investigating these purchases and found that the Company had occupied and sold land to 
settlers in Port Nicholson and along the west coast of the lower North Island in 
circumstances which called these purchases into extreme doubt. In other words, the 
aboriginal title over these lands was unextinguished and in order to clear the settlers' land 
titles some body would have to purchase or at least compensate properly the tribal right. 
The Company claimed this duty was incumbent upon the Government The Crown for its 
part held that the agreement with the Company had been made on the supposition that the 
Company's purchases from the Maori had been genuine (if by the rule of pre-emption 
invalid). James Stephen notedl64 
For the purpose of the agreement, his Lordship took the title of the Company for 
granted, as against the Natives, If that assumption was erroneous in point of fact, the 
Company's concession was of no value. They give; and by such a Cession, they 
acquired no claim to anything from the Govt. 
The debate through the period 1842 - 48 over the extent of the aboriginal title related to the 
compensation to be paid the Maori for lands over which their aboriginal title had been at 
best but partially extinguished. If the aboriginal title was limited to the land in their actual 
occupation the amount would be comparatively meagre. Since the Crown was determined 
161 Fatal Necessity, 179-80 . . 
162 Id, 181,185-6. 
163 Vernon Smith to Somes, 18 November 1840 CO 881/l:#29,encl 32, 60-2; Somes to Russell 19 November 1840 
CO 20918:257-8; Vemon Smith to Somes, 2 December 1840 CO 20918:259-62. 
164 Stephen, note, 14 November 1842 CO 209/18:324 recto. Stephen had signalled this position as early as 10 March 
1841 when learning of the Maori chiefs disputing the Company's purchases at Port Nicholson: '1f as against the 
chiefs they [the Company] have no valid title the Crown cannot of course dispossess the Chiefs in their favor": 
CO 20917:185,187. Vemon Smith indicated agreement, id. 
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this duty lay with the New Zealand Company the argument divided into two camps, the 
sympathisers and members of the Company who tried to restrict the title and those whose 
sympathies lay more with the Maori. In the end the attempt to limit the extent of the Maori 
aboriginal title was an issue of pound and pence. l 6.5 
In advocating the restriction of the aboriginal title the Company's sympathisers 
deprecated both Normanby's despatch of August 1839 to Hobson and the Treaty of 
Waitangi. They pointed to the incompatibility of the comprehensive recognition of the Maori 
title with 'general principle'. In December 1842 Somes protested to Stanleyl66 
... if the aborigines are to be regarded as being, with the exception of such small 
portions as they may have legally sold, proprietors of the whole surface of New 
Zealand, ninety-nine hundredths of which are probably covered with the primeval 
forest, then, doubtless, the claims of the natives would be co-extensive with those of 
the Company, an inquiry into them would put their title to their whole property again 
at issue, and the agreement and award would be mere nullities. But the only interest 
in land which our law has ever recognized as possessed by savages is that of "actual 
occupation or enjoyment"; and this would obviously be a peculiarly fitting measure 
for the rights of an agricultural population like that of New Zealand, requiring no 
extent of territory for hunting or pasture, but confining itself to the small area which 
it could cultivate ... If the claims of the natives be limited to such lands in their actual 
occupation, as they may now assert that they did not alienate to the Company, the 
question can, at the utmost, be one only of a few patches of potato-ground and the 
rude dwelling-places, and can involve no matter of greater moment than some few 
hundreds of acres. 
Hope replied for Stanley that some lands claimed by the Company not actually occupied by 
the Maori might indeed by "waste", that is not subject to a native title, but that would 
require a local investigation of the native title over the land in question. l67 This was exactly 
what the Company was seeking to avoid. Stanley was, in short, not prepared to concede the 
principle restricting the Maori' s aboriginal title to lands in their actual occupation. 
The New Zealand Company continued to villify Normanby's despatch and the Treaty of 
Waitangi "as reconcilable neither with sound reason nor with the acknowledged principles of 
our law".I68 Stanley's reply grew firmer. He was "not prepared, as Her Majesty's Secretary 
of State, to join with the Company in setting aside the Treaty of Waitangi, after obtaining 
the advantages guaranteed by it, even though it might be made 'with naked savages', or 
though it might 'be treated by lawyers as a praiseworthy device for amusing and pacifying 
16.5 Adams describes the manouvering on this aspect, Fatal Necessity, App 4, 256-7 concluding that "it was not so 
much the principle of paying compensation to which the company objected, but the possibility that a much larger 
ammmt of money than was first thought would be needed for the purpose". 
166 Somes to Stanley, 21 December 1842 CO 209/18:376-87. Similarly "Memorandum left at Colonial Office by the 
New Zealand Company", circa 11 November 1842, id, 325-34. 
167 Hope to Somes, 10 January 1843, id, 388-400. 
1611 Somes to Stanley, 24 January 1843 CO 209/26:35-92. 
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savages for the moment"'.)(~ The Crown's position was that it took a "different view of the 
respect due to obligations contracted by the Crown of England".170 The Maori title over all 
their land, cultivated and otherwise, would be respected. 
The controversy continued through 1843171 and into 1844 when the Select Committee on 
New Zealand (1844) castigated the Treaty of Waitangi as "injudicious" and insisted upon 
"the exclusive title of the Crown to all land not actually occupied and enjoyed by 
Natives".112 The Committee pointed to the charter of the colony (1840) and the Treaty of 
Waitangi itself as justifying this restriction of the tribal title: 173 
In this charter and instructions, 'actual occupation and enjoyment' are clearly pointed 
out as alone establishing a right of property in land in the natives; and the rule is 
laid down that all other lands must be considered as vested in the Crown, in virtue 
of the sovereignty that had been assumed, and that they must be dealt with 
accordingly. The Treaty of Waitangi (which had previously reached England and 
been approved), it may therefore fairly be assumed, must, when this charter and the 
instructions which accompanied it were forwarded to the colony, have been 
understood as bearing a meaning not inconsistent with the terms in which they are 
couched. The lands held 'collectively', of which the possession was guaranteed to the 
aboriginal inhabitants of New Zealand, must, therefore, have been regarded as the 
lands actually occupied by them, and cultivated in common by a tribe, in the manner 
frequently practised, and the forests as those actually used for cutting timber. 
This interpretation was consistent, the Committee reported, "with the ancient and 
acknowledged principles of colonial law".174 The New Zealand Company had not been 
without substantial influence among the members of the Committee whose advice Stanley 
was unwilling to swallow. He instructed Fitzroy to continue in the recognition of Maori title 
over their uncultivated lands insisting that the restriction of the Maori title to lands in their 
actual occupation "appeared ... wholly irreconcilable with the large words of the Treaty of 
Waitangi".m The restriction, Stanley insisted, was also inconsistent with Normanby's 
instructions to Hobson which contained directions that "had not only been promulgated, but 
acted upon in the colony or an early period after the sovereignty had been assumed".176 
Stanley soon afterwards defended his position in the Lords declaring that "the limits and 
rights of tribes" to their land were known and decided by native law" since by "them we 
169 Hope to Somes, 1 February 1843, id, 117-20. Also Stephen to Hope, minute, 28 January 1843, reply stating "that 
no person, and that no Govt, can possibly contract a legal, honorary, or moral obligation to commit injustice. or 
to despoil others of their lawful and equitable rights", id, 95. 
170 Id. 
171 Notably: Somes to Stanley, 15 February 1843 CO 2fY)f26: 280-304 insisting the Company recognized the native 
tile "to be, as it has always been held by our law, paramount to every other" but limited to lands in their actual 
occupation; Hope to Somes, 1 March 1843, id, 305-7; Somes to Star1ley, 4 March 1843, id, 398-403. 
112 "Report from the Select Committee on New Zealand", pp (1844),#556.xii.xiii (Resolutions 2.3 and 6). 
173 Id, vi. 
174 Id. 
175 Stanley to Fitzroy, 13 August. pp (1845),#1,3-9. 
176 Id. 
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have agreed to be bound, and by them we must abide".1n He instructed Governor Grey to 
"honourably and scrupulously" fulfill the terms of the Treaty of Waitangi. 178 
Stanley's view of the extent of the tribal title was not shared by his immediate 
successors at the Colonial Office.179 Earl Grey instructed Governor Grey to take the 
restrictive view of the Maori's aboriginal title. His instructions noted that the Maori at the 
commencement of European settlement "were not a people of hunters" but lived "in a great 
measure at least, upon the produce of the soil ... and practiced to a certain extent a rude sort 
of agriculture".180 According to the "most trustworthy accounts" these cultivations formed 
"far less than one-hundredth part" of the "naturally fertile" land: 181 
To contend that under such circumstances civilized men had not a right to step in 
and take possession of the vacant territory, but were bound to respect the supposed 
proprietary title of the savage tribes who dwelt in but were utterly incapable to 
occupy the land, is to mistake the grounds upon which the right of property in land 
is founded. To that portion of the soil, whatever it might be, which they really 
occupied, the aboriginal inhabitants, barbarous as they were, had a clear and 
undoubted claim; to have attempted to deprive them of their patches of potato-
ground, even so to have occupied the territory as not to leave them ample space for 
shifting, as was their habit, their cultivation from one spot to another, would have 
been in the highest degree unjust; but so long as this injustice was avoided, I must 
regard it a vain and unfounded scruple which would have acknowledged their right 
of property in land which remained unsubdued to the used of man. 
The Instructions under the sign manual accompanying the second charter of the colony, both 
sent with the above despatch, affirmed Earl Grey's position. The Instructions stipulated that 
the native title was to be recognised where the tribe "have actually had the occupation of 
the lands ... and have been accustomed to use and enjoy the same, either as places of abode, 
or for tillage, or for the growth of crops, or for the depasturing to cattle, or otherwise for 
the convenience and sustenation of life, by means of labour expended thereon" .182 
Fortunately Governor Grey gave these Instructions an expansive interpretationl83 identical to 
that which had previously obtained realising that otherwise conflict with the tribes would 
become inevitable. l84 Instead he offered a policy of more aggressive purchase of Maori land 
by the Government and commenced an orgiastic land-purchasing programme which certainly 
In BPD (1845), 3rd ser vol 82, 318-9; Adams, Fatal Necessity, 186. 
178 Stanley to Grey, 13 June 1845, pp (1847),#337,68-72. Stephen's draft of these instructions, May 1845 CO 
209138:251 -92, had said the Treaty of Waitangi was to be followed "as a question of honour and justice no less 
than of policy". 
179 Adams Fatal Necessity, 187 on Gladstone's and Earl Grey's positions. 
ISO Earl Grey to Governor Grey, 23 December 1846 CO 209/47:272-4. 
181 Id. 
182 New Zealand charter, 23 December 1846, para XlV,id,72-5; Instructions under sign manual accompanying 
charter, id, 76, cap xiii, paras 9 and 11. 
183 The enforcement and enforceability of these Instructions radically reducing the thitherto recognized extent of the 
Maoris' aboriginal title sparked controversy within the colony. Space inhibits discussion, but see Wards The 
Shadow of the Land, 385-9. The missionaries' and legal officers (Martin and Swainson) sided with the fullest 
recognition of the extent of the aboriginal title. 
184 Gov Grey to Earl Grey, 15 May 1848 CO 209/60:229-32; Adams Fatal Necessity, 187. 
took advantage if not exploited the tribes. In 1848 Labouchere, President of the Board of 
Trade, infonned the Commons that the Crown recognised the rights of the Maori to their 
uncultivated lands as guaranteed by the Treaty of Waitangi.18~ The right of the Maori to the 
title of their land as detennined by their customary law had been restored if, indeed, it had 
ever been suspended. Thus Stout CJ was able to observe in Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-
General (1912) that "[a]lI the old authorities have agreed that for every part of the colony 
there was a native owner ... [t]he Governor and Legislature of New Zealand accepted this 
position" .186 
The authorities to which those who would have limited the aboriginal title to land in the 
actual tribal occupation appealed were those who had taken the 'labour' theory of property 
rights. Earl Grey's despatch to Governor Grey of December 1846, already quoted above, 
contained a passage from Dr Arnold: l87 
Men were to subdue the earth: that is, to make it by their labour what it would not 
have been by itself; and with the labour so bestowed upon it came the right of 
property in it Thus every land which is inhabited at all belongs to somebody: that is, 
there is either some one person, or family, or tribe, or nation, who have a greater 
right to it than anyone else has; it does not and cannot belong to everybody. But so 
much does the right of property go along with labour, that civilized nations have 
never scrupled to take possession of countries inhabited only by tribes of savages -
countries which have been hunted over, but never subdued or cultivated. It is true, 
they have often gone further and settled themselves in countries which were 
cultivated, and then it becomes a robbery; but when our fathers went to America and 
took possession of the mere hunting-grounds of the Indians - of lands on which man 
had hitherto bestowed no labour they only exercised a right which God had 
inseparably united with industry and knowledge. 
This passage was a typical blend of the injunction in Genesis to subdue and replenish the 
earth with its secularization in the 'labour' theory of property rights popularised by Locke 
and, more especially, Vattel, the writer usually invoked to justify the limitation of the 
aboriginal title to the lands in their actual occupation. 
William Fox, Inner Temple and a New Zealand Company functionary in the colony for 
nearly nine years, wrote The Six Colonies of New Zealand (1851) almost immediately upon 
his return to England. There were, he said, "two theories ... propounded" on the native title 
to the waste (uncultivated) lands: 188 
According to one, the savage inhabitants of an unreclaimed country have an absolute 
right of proprietorship in its soil, based upon the mere fact of their residing on some 
portion of it. Thus, because they live in New Zealand, New Zealand belongs to them. 
1~ BPD (1848), 3rd ser, vol 96, 349. 
186 (1912), 32 NZLR 321 (CA), 340-1. 
187 'The Labourers of England" in The Englishman's Register, No 6, 11 June 1831. Reprinted in Miscellaneous 
Wor.c (1845),VII,155 at 156-7. Amold equated law with establishment of a civil society and saw property rights 
as an emanation from law. This was the same position as Mill and Austin. 
188 Six Colonies of New Zealand, 89-90. 
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According to the other theory (which I give in the words of Vattel), it is contended 
that, in an unreclaimed country, "in which there are none but erratic natives, 
incapable of occupying the whole, they cannot be allowed exclusively to appropriate 
to themselves more land than they have occasion for, or more than they are able to 
settle and cultivate. It is urged that their unsettled habitation in those immense 
regions cannot be accounted a true and legal possession, and that the people of 
Europe, too closely pent up at home, are lawfully entitled to take possession of the 
waste and settle it with colonies". 
Fox found the latter theory was correct in point of law. He had never "seen anything worthy 
of the name of an argument in favour of native right"189 to their uncultivated lands. His own 
position was confirmed, he said, by the Crown's charters for the New World wherein no 
express saving of the aboriginal title appeared and Kent's account of the position adopted by 
the New England Puritans on the extent of the Indian title. Fox conceded, unwittingly 
contradicting himself, that the American courts had "laid down a different rule for their own 
guidance" but this could not "affect the common law right of the British Crown"190 to the 
wild lands of its colonies. Elsewhere in the book, in a portion apparently ghosted if not 
written by Henry Sewelllater Attorney-General of the colony , 191 the admission was made:192 
The right of the natives to the waste lands though so contrary to principle, and 
attended with so many bad consequences to themselves and to colonization, is now 
in practice, and ex necessitate, admitted, while the right of the Crown is reduced to a 
mere right of pre-emption; that is to say, it retains the privilege of being the only 
purchaser from the natives, and prohibits its subjects from doing so. Hence, it is 
through the instrumentality of the Crown alone (or, in other words, of the Colonial-
office and the local government) that every acre which is to be reclaimed from the 
waste and subjected to colonizing operations, must be obtained. And it follows that 
every private title must (to be valid) be traced back to a grant from the Crown. 
The Crown's pre-emptive right, it was added, did not emanate solely from "mere feudal or 
prerogative" rules vesting the Crown with ultimate ownership of the land but was founded 
"on a wise and constitutional principle, by virtue of which it assumes the office of 
189 1d,90. 
190 Id. 
191 A pencilled note, p 98, on the Hocken Library reprint states the section was "written by Henry Sew ell" . 
192 Id,98. 
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regulating the future settlement and occupation of the country".I93 
The likes of Fox, Earl Grey and those who would have limited the aboriginal title to the 
land in the actual occupation of the Maori tribes had been refuted at length by 
Chamerovzow and Phillimore and Woolmer in opinions appended to The New Zealand 
Question (1848). Chamerovww's book contained important legal assessments of Maori 
rights, all contributors confirming both the aboriginal title and its inclusion of all tribal 
lands, those uncultivated as well as actually occupied. 
Phillimore, after affirming the Treaty of Waitangi as the basis of the Crown's 
sovereignty,l94 indicated the Crown's absolute ownership of land in the colony derived not 
from feudal theory but a general principle of the law of Nations. 195 Although extremely wary 
of the principle of the modification of the tribal title represented by the Crown's pre-emptive 
right, he had little time for those limiting the tribal title to the land in their actual 
occupation. The Treaty's reservation of tribal land, forests, fisheries and other properties was 
"to be construed with every latitude of explanation which the ordinary acceptance and use of 
the words"l96 would admit. He hardly thought Dr Amold an "overwhelming authority on a 
question of this nature".197 He observed: l98 
It is obvious that if his doctrine were pushed to the full extent in the present 
instance, it might lead to usurpation and injustice, as it might be made use of to 
dispossess independent chiefs and native tribes from property occupied by them and 
their ancestors for successive generations, although they have hitherto neither 
bestowed labor nor cultivation on their lands ... [T]he right of property is the same in 
all men. That such right can neither be modified nor altered by difference of religion, 
nor by difference of customs and manners - and finally, that the law of Nature - the 
just and only true source of the Law of Nations never conferred a right on Christian 
Countries to wrest, forcibly, from their actual possessors; and to appropriate to 
themselves, lands and districts effectually and permanently occupied by savage 
Nations. 
Woolmer's opinion emphasised the coincidence of the Law of Nations with the law of 
England but concentrated on the latter. Unlike Phillimore he indicated the Crown's ultimate 
ownership of all land in New Zealand derived from its feudal title. This, he found, 
footnoting Chapman and Martin's judgments in Symonds was the basis of the Crown's pre-
emptive right as against its own subjects. 199 He noted, however:200 
The law of England also follows the law of Nature in recognizing a just title to the 
193 Id. 
194 The New Zealand Question (1848), app 1,7. 
195 Id. 8-9. 
196 Id. 8. 
197 Id. 13. 
198 Id, 14. 
199 Id. 38. 
200 Id. The quote he gives is from Chitty. Prerogatives of the Crown (1820), 25. 
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possession of their lands, in the natives of any such countries, so far as they really 
occupy and enjoy them, and will not exercise any of its powers to deprive them of 
their possessions, without their free consent and concurrence; but as to all 
lmoccupied and waste lands, these are the demesne of the Crown, and may be 
granted out - this right is a part of the prerogative royal, and the prerogative is an 
attribute of sovereignty; 'and the attributes of the sovereign which are inherent in and 
constitute his political capacity, prevail in every part of the territories subject to the 
British Crown ... ' . 
Elsewhere Woolmer intimated the continuity of the native title was modified by its 
uncivilised nature. there being "no species of tenures analogous to those introduced by 
refined civilisation into European States".201 But as to those lands which the Crown "by 
virtue of its prerogative, may acquire and grant out, such lands will be held in the nature of 
tenancies in common socage or freeholds". He thus recognised two systems of tenure, one 
uncivilised and limited to the aboriginal population, the other Crown-derived and based on 
feudal principles. The extent of the Crown's prerogative title, if any, to uncultivated Maori 
lands was ascertained by reference to its own conduct Referring to the Treaty of Waitangi, 
the Crown's early instructions to Hobson, Earl Grey's invocation of Dr Amold but 
subsequent withdrawal from the limited view of the extent of Maori title, Woolmer found 
the tribal title extended over all lands claimed by the customary law.m He expressly located 
this position in the "Common Law of England and the High prerogative of the Crown".203 
Chamerovzow's investigation of the extent of aboriginal title - like Phillimore and 
Woolmer he took the legal recognition of some title for granted, was much lengthier and a 
little less legalistic. He noted Earl Grey's use of Dr Arnold referring also with disapproval 
to Bulkley and Cotton Mather whom, it was seen in the previous chapter, had 
unsuccessfully argued a similar limitation of the North American Indian's aboriginal title. 
Chamerovzow scorned the "Amoldian theory" and the "evil results of applying this false 
theory".204 If the theory were to be applied consistently, he mused, should not the vast 
hunting estates and wild moorlands of England be incapable of ownership other than by the 
Crown as part of its prerogative? "Give up your estates, then, you who hold them not by 
right of labor, and who eat the bread of idleness" ,2J)!, he demanded colourfully. More fatally, 
however, he insisted the labour theory of property rights did not acknowledge its own vital 
predicate: "It surely has never occurred to our opponents that industry cannot constitute the 
first title to land, because there must exist a right precedent, namely; a right to enter upon it, 
for the purpose of expending labour".W6 He thus concluded:20'7 
201 Id,47-8 . 
202 Id, 41-5. 
203 Id,45. 
204 Id, 196. 
2J)!, Id, 197. 
W6 Id, 199. 
207 Id. 
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It is not a question with us whether tribes called savage ought or ought not to be left 
in the undisturbed possession of their uncultivated lands, when for the requirements 
of civilization those lands may be necessary. On this point we cannot entertain a 
doubt; but it being proved that the right to the soil of their country, is not derived 
from the expenditure of industry thereupon, but rests upon an antecedent right of 
occupancy, under whatever conditions or circumstances acquired, we must maintain 
that civilized nations possess no abstract right of extinguishing native title, save by 
purchase, or by other adequate compensation; and that the fulfilling of this condition 
of acquiring new territory is imperative upon them, as long as they continue to 
violate, in their own case, the law by which they assert that their acquisitions are 
regulated. 
The remainder of Chamerovww's discussion continued in the same vein. He reviewed 
colonial practice in British North America, noting most especially for our purposes how 
Campbell v Hall had upheld the validity of the Royal Proclamation of 1763 recognising 
aboriginal title to its fulmost extent and the recognition of Indian title in the Marshall 
Court208 His subsequent chapters observed how the constituent instruments for the colony, 
instructions to the Governors, imperial as well as colonial legislation had all recognised the 
property rights of the Maori tribes. In all, Chamerovzow's study was exhaustive and one 
which New Zealand judges in later times would have done well to consult 
Finally reference might be made to a tract written in 1870 solely (it appears) for the use 
of the Colonial Office. This work. written by one E Fairfield took the same title as 
Chamerovzow The New Zealand Question. The writer acknowledged Maori consent as the 
basis of the Crown's sovereignty over New Zealand, observing how the recognition of 
native title and the Crown's pre-emptive right provided for in the Treaty of Waitangi had 
been incorporated into colonial practice. This tribal title was defined by the native customary 
law. ThuS:209 
In one block of land the Government might find it necessary to extinguish six classes 
of title. There were first, the title by occupation - that of the sub-tribe living on the 
land; second, the seignorial title of the head chief of the whole tribe; third, the title 
by conquest - that of a distinct tribe which had formerly conquered the occupying 
tribe, and only left them the land as an act of grace; fourth, title by attempt at 
conquest - that of a tribe which had tried to conquer the occupying tribe, and fought 
great battles, and endured great sufferings in the attempt; fifth, title by burial - that 
of a tribe whose ancestors were buried in the block; sixth, title by exercising the 
privilege of hunting and fishing over the land. 
Thus was the aboriginal title of the Maori according to their customary law recognised 
irrespective of the traditional exploitation of the land. 
The 'general principles' to which the advocates of a limited aboriginal title appealed 
were the 'labour' theorists of property rights. The difficulty with this appeal was that such 
theory had not been incorporated into colonial law. The title of the American Indian to their 
mI Id, 203-4. 
2J1) Text in CO 881/2:#8,6. 
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lands · both cultivated and wild was recognised. This was also the case with the Maori 
notwithstanding the advocacy otherwise. The aboriginal title was defined by reference to the 
native law, as Stanley had infonned the Lords (1845), and so extended to all the regions 
claimed under that code even if unreclaimed and used simply for fishing, hunting and 
foraging. 
10. Crown-recognised into Crown-derived title 
Throughout the first two decades of the colony's history, even after the grant of a 
representative assembly in 1852, the Colonial Office maintained its control over native 
policy in New Zealand. The New Zealand Constitution Act (UK) 1852 had practically 
sanctified the recognition of the Maori's aboriginal title and the Crown's pre-emptive 
right.21O This committed the colonial authorities to a rigorous land purchasing programme as 
British settlement and emigration grew dramatically through the 1850s. During this period 
the Maori had begun to resist the pressure on their land through mobilisation of the 
paramount chief's recognised power to veto the sale of land. The Maori tribes of the central 
North Island had appointed a 'King' and established what the settlers deprecated as a 'Land 
League' by which the paramount chiefs of the various tribes agreed to veto sales agreed by 
lesser chiefs and hapu vested with the primary right of occupancy. The Waitara dispute 
which escalated into the Maori Wars was sparked by an attempt by the colonial government 
to evade the customary veto which, as they saw it, could be used to inhibit severely the 
growth of the colony. The denial of the paramount chief's veto was not only a challenge to 
the traditional rules of Maori tenure to which the Crown had pledged its respect but, more 
crucially, an affront to the mana and authority of the chiefs. Paradoxically, therefore, the 
Imperial Parliament's eventual grant to the colonial assembly of full legislative jurisdiction 
over Maori affairs,1I1 including their aboriginal title, was prompted by civil conflict arising 
from the colonial authorities' efforts to sidestep the earlier limitations on their jurisdiction. 
The attempt to control native policy from London had failed. 
In retrospect the Maori Wars and consequential grant of a legislative jurisdiction over 
native affairs, particularly land, were crucial moments for the recognition of the Maori 
aboriginal title as together they meant the primary identification and application of the 
relevant constitutional principles had shifted from London to Wellington. The important 
result of this was the Native Lands Act 1865. This colonial statute established a Native 
(today Maori) Land Court with the function of transfonning the "native", that is aboriginal, 
title into a Crown-derived tenure. The Court was required to investigate the ownership of a 
block of land according to customary law and to issue a certificate to no more than ten 
210 15 & 16 Vict c 72, sections 72 and 73. 
211 25 & 26 Vict c 48, section 8. 
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owners.212 This certificate was to be freely alienable ·and could be exchanged, either by the 
owners specified in the order or by a purchaser, for a Crown grant 213 This system devastated 
the traditional rules of tenure ousting, most notably, the superior chiefs' right of veto. Its 
avowed purpose was to make Maori land more readily marketable,214 a goal in which it was 
remarkably successful. The effects of the transformation by the Native Land Court of the 
native title into a Crown-derived tenure will be assessed at a later stage. It will be suggested 
that the attempt to incorporate the common law aboriginal title into a Crown-derived system 
of title has been only partially accomplished and that subsisting aboriginal titles remain 
throughout the country. 
212 Native Lands Act 1865, No 71, section 23. 
213 Id, sections 47.74 (sales to be completed before a JP). 75. 
214 Comments of H Sewell, Minister of Justice, in the Legislative Council, (1870) NZPD,9,361. 
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CHAPTER 8 
ABORIGINAL TITLE IN NEW ZEALAND COURTS 
A. THE EARLIEST CASES 
During the first two decades of the colony's history, it was universally recognised that 
the tribal title to the ancestral lands survived the Crown's assumption of the territorial 
sovereignty of New Zealand and that the principles of 'modified continuity' (comprising 
what has been termed the doctrine of aboriginal title) defined this right. The aboriginal title 
was regarded as a property right taking the form of a burden upon the Crown's ultimate 
ownership of land within the country. This ultimate ownership came not with the Crown's 
sovereignty, which would simply have given it the dominium eminens, but in consequence 
of the introduction of feudal principles of title to the land in the colony. The aboriginal title 
of the tribes was recognised by the Crown, its immediate advisors in London and colonial 
representatives as well as the settlers and the colonial judiciary in R v Symonds (1847).1 If 
there was any argument over the aboriginal title it did not concern its existence, which was 
never in doubt, but the extent to which it included the uncultivated lands of the tribes. This 
shortlived dispute was resolved in the tribes' favour. It was submitted that in embodying the 
doctrine of aboriginal title the Treaty of Waitangi did no more than declare what would 
have obtained as a matter of law in any event. 
R v Symonds gave judicial expression to the prevailing understanding regarding the 
character of the tribat title to their land. This case articulated a position which was not upset 
until the important judgment of Prendergast CJ in Wi Parata v The Bishop of Wellington 
(1877).2 In the period between Symonds and Wi Parata a cluster of cases appeared in the 
earliest colonial law reports touching upon the question of aboriginal title. These cases, in 
judgments delivered by Martin's successor, Arney CJ, described the aboriginal title as 
almost a matter of course. 
R v Fitzherbert and others (1872) arose from the 1839 purchases of land by the New 
Zealand Company by deed from the Maori owners. Eventually the title to these lands in 
Port Nicholson (today Wellington) was clarified as between the Company and the Crown so 
that in 1851 a Crown grant was made of the land upon which a hospital had been built 
some years earlier. The Maori inhabitants of Port Nicholson brought a writ of scire facias to 
repeal the grant alleging aboriginal ownership of the land. Amey CJ commented:3 
2 
The allegation that the lands have never been ceded to the Crown, and that the 
(1847) [1840-1932] NZPCC 387 (SC). 
(1878) 3 NZ Jur 72 (SC). 
(1872) 2 NZ (CA) 133, 172-3. 
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Native title thereto has never been extinguished, may be shortly disposed of. No 
formal act of cession to the Crown was necessary. From and after the purchase of 
these lands by the Company from the Natives, they became, by virtue of the 
alienation itself, part of the demesne lands of the Crown; insomuch that even if the 
purchase by the Company had been investigated by Commissioners under the Lands 
Claims Ordinance No. 1, and the same had been approved, and the Commissioners 
had recommended grants or a grant to the Company accordingly, it would have 
remained at the discretion of the Crown to make or refuse such grant. 
In other words, the aboriginal title over the land had been relinquished by sale to the New 
Zealand Company. Although the original tribal owners apparently argued otherwise, the 
court was satisfied that this extinguishment had been agreed on fair and equitable grounds. 
Given this, the land vested in the Crown free of the aboriginal title and hence could not 
affect any Crown grant. 
The same year the Court of Appeal assessed the colonial Native Lands Act 1865. Under 
this Act the Native Land Court ascertained the owners of native land and issued certificates 
of ownership which, if granted pursuant to section 23 of the Act, were freely alienable by 
the specified tribal owners. Usually there was a time lag between the Court's order for the 
certificate to issue and its actual issue in which time it was common practice for the 
prospective grantees to make an alienation of their land. In Re 'The Lundon and Whitaker 
Claims Act, 1871' (1872) the Maori owners had agreed to lease their land to De Hirsch and 
Graham prior to the issue of the certificate but upon its receipt alienated the land to Lundon 
and Whitaker. Because the Native Lands Act 1869 permitted the backdating of the 
certificate to the date of the Court's order, the lease to De Hirsch and Graham took priority. 
A special Act was passed to allow the Court to assess Lundon and Whitaker's claim. In the 
course of this assessment Arney CJ made on behalf of the Court some important comments 
on the character of the aboriginal title. Under the Native Lands Act 1865 two forms of 
certificate could issue in respect of the tribal land. A certificate under section 23, the form 
which the Maori owners had obtained in this case, made the land freely alienable even 
before exchange for a Crown grant. The Court of Appeal found that as a result section 23 
modified section 73 of the Constitution (UK) Act 1852 which had (further) codified the 
Crown's pre-emptive right to purchase the aboriginal title. The Court found, however, that it 
was the certificate itself and not the order for its issue which 'commuted' the native title. 
This meant the tribal land remained inalienable until the actual date of issue of the 
certificate. The second form of certificate, one issued under section 43 of the Act, gave the 
traditional owners a Crown-derived title but it maintained the inalienable character of the 
aboriginal title. Arney indicated that section 43 disclosed "no indication of a purpose to 
legalize alienation which could be supposed to override the prohibitions of the common law 
and of the Constitution Act".' In another passage the common law doctrine of aboriginal 
(1872) 2 NZ (CA) 41,47 (emphasis added). 
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title was addressed more explicitly;5 
The Crown is bound, both by the common law of England and by its own solemn 
enagagements, to a full recognition of Native proprietary right. Whatever the extent 
of that right by established Native custom appears to be, the Crown is bound to 
respect it. But the fullest measure of respect is consistent with the assertion of the 
technical doctrine, that all title to land by English tenure must be derived from the 
Crown; this of necessity importing that the fee-simple of the whole territory of New 
Zealand is vested and resides in the Crown, until it be parted with by grant from the 
Crown. 
Amey repeated his view that the Crown held the fee-simple of the country subject to any 
unextinguished aborrignal title in lohns v Rivers (1873). He stated that "by the common law 
the whole territory of the colony originally vested in the Crown as its demesne, subject only 
to the rightful and necessary use thereof by the aboriginal inhabitants".6 He noted, though, 
that the Crown had by statute temporarily divested itself of part of its demesne in favour of 
the New Zealand Company. There was no suggestion that during this period the New 
Zealand Company had taken the title to the land on any fuller basis than that by which the 
Crown had held it, that is subject to the unextinguished aboriginal title. 
The above cases show Amey to have been of the clear view that the Crown held the fee 
to all the ungranted lands of the colony in virtue of the introduction of feudal rules of land 
title. This position was underlined by his judgment in Veale v Brown (1868) where he 
affinned the applicability to the colony of feudal rules of land title and, hence, the rule of 
escheat:' 
The feudal system, long extinct in England itself as a social and political system, is 
yet the source of all the doctrines of the English law of real property. It is a 
fundamental principle of that law that all lands are held of some superior lord -
according to the old French maxim, Nulle terre sans seigneur. In other words, the 
doctrine of tenure is a fundamental principle of the English law of real property; and 
to say that the doctrine of tenure is not to prevail in this Colony, is as much to say 
that the English law of real property is not in force here. This we may safely treat as 
an absurdity. 
Although the writer might not accept the soundness of the general proposition implicit in 
this passage - that feudal principle came to a colony with the general introduction of English 
law, there can be no doubting the correctness of Amey's proposition that the feudal doctrine 
had come to New Zealand. 
Amey had no occasion to develop his position upon aboriginal title into a sophisticated 
account such as that provided by Chapman in Symonds but implicit in his judgments was a 
similar hannonisation of feudal doctrine with the recognition of aboriginal title. He was 
6 
, 
Id,49. 
(1873) 2 NZ (CA) 344,359-60. 
(1868) 1 NZ (CA) 152,157. 
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emphatic that the fee to the ungranted land in the colony was vested in the Crown but was 
as unequivocal in his indication that this title was burdened by the aboriginal title which by 
common law and the Constitution (UK) Act 1852 was a property right inalienable other than 
to the Crown. 
B. ABORIGINAL TITLE IN NEW ZEALAND COURTS UNDER CHIEF JUSTICE 
PRENDERGAST (1875-99) 
1. Wi Parata v The Bishop of Wellington (1877). 
In this case the Supreme Court comprising Prendergast CJ and Richmond J considered 
the effect of a Crown grant to the Bishop of Wellington. The grant had been made without 
the knowledge or consent of the aboriginal owners. Previously the tribe had reached an 
understanding with the Bishop that they would grant the land as an endowment for the 
establishment of a school for their community. No school was ever established. Learning of 
the Crown grant the aboriginal owners sought a declaration "that the grant was issued by the 
then Governor without the knowledge or consent of the chiefs and members of the Ngatitoa 
tribe, and was a violation of the agreement and understanding between the native donors of 
the land and the Bishop, and a fraud upon the donors".8 
Prendergast CJ's ruling for the Supreme Court was simple: He held that the court had 
"no jurisdiction to avoid a Crown grant, or anything therein contained, on the pretence that 
the Crown [had] not conformed in its grant to the terms on which the aboriginal owners ... 
ceded their rights in the land, or that the native title [had] not been extinguished".9 
Prendergast intimated that the court might be able to avoid such grants upon a writ scire 
facias brought by the Crown but on the general rule his position was clear: The courts had 
no jurisdiction to entertain any claims based upon a supposed aboriginal title. 
Prendergast indicated that the Maori lacked an aboriginal title both at common law and 
as a matter of statutory interpretation. He rested his findings against a common law source 
of aboriginal title on two grounds. 
His explanation of the first ground opened by denying that the Treaty of Waitangi had 
ever been a valid instrument of cession. It was, he said, a "simple nullity".1O This position, 
the difficulties with which have been considered in an earlier chapter, gave him the basis for 
the conclusion that the tribes lacked any enforceable property rights because their laws of 
tenure were uncivilized in character. He observed: ll 
(1878) 3 NZ JUT 72,76. 
9 Id,77. 
10 Id,78. 
11 Id. 
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On the cession of territory by one civilised power to another, the rights of private 
property are invariably respected, and the law of the old country is administered, to 
such extent as may be necessary, by the courts of the new sovereign. In this way the 
British tribunals administer the old French law in Lower Canada, the Code Civil in 
the island of Mauritius, and Roman-Dutch law in Ceylon, in Guinea, and at the 
Cape. 
This could not be the case, however, with the land rights of the Maori tribeS:12 
. But in the case of primitive barbarians, the supreme executive Government must 
acquit itself, as best it may, of its obligation to respect native proprietary rights, and 
of necessity must be the sole arbiter of its own justice. Its acts in this particular 
cannot be examined or called in question by any tribunal, because there exist no 
known principles whereon a regular adjudication can be based. Here, then, is one 
sufficient reason why this Court must disclaim jurisdiction which the plaintiff is 
seeking to assume. 
As authority for this conclusion Prendergast cited Gipps' speech during the second reading 
of the New Zealand Land Claims (New South Wales) Bill 1840, "the American jurists, Kent 
and Story, who, together with Chief Justice Marshall, in the well-known case of lohnson v 
M'lntosh. have given the most complete exposition of this subject"13 and R v Symonds 
(1847). In using these sources, however, Prendergast had taken the comments about the 
modification of the continuity of the tribal title, that is the justification for its general 
inalienability, as going to the question of the existence of the property right. These 
authorities had used the uncivilised character of the aboriginal tenure to explain the 
modification of the presumption of the continuity of tribal property rights whereas 
Prendergast used it to deny any legal continuity whatsoever. It was a crucial shift of 
emphasis for the tribal (hence to Prendergast 'barbaric') character of the Maori title and 
tenure now prevented rather than modified the legal continuity of their property rights 
subsequent to the Crown's assumption of the sovereignty. 
Prendergast's second reason for judgment against any common law right was that upon 
"such a settlement as has been made by our nation upon these islands, the sovereign of the 
settling nation acquiring on the one hand the exclusive right of extinguishing the native title, 
assumes on the other hlmd, the correlative duty, as supreme protector of aborigines, of 
securing them against any infringement of their right of occupancy".14 This meant that 
"[t]ransactions with the natives for the cession of their title to the Crown are thus to be 
regarded as acts of State, and therefore are not examinable by any Court" .15 There were 
several major flaws in this conclusion. Earlier Prendergast had ruled that the Treaty of 
Waitangi was a "simple nUllity" yet here he seemf d contradictorally to restore if not tribal 
12 Id. 
13 3 NZ Jur 72 at 77. 
14 Id,78 . 
u Id,79. 
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sovereignty then certainly some juridical capacity to the tribes to enter into formal relations 
with the Crown. More fatally, he termed transactions between the tribes and Crown 'acts of 
state'. This violated the fundamental rule of common law that as against its own subjects 
the Crown could make no act of state.16 By 1877 the status of the Maori as British subjects 
had long been fixed, Prendergast, whilst Attorney-General, having given an opinion some 
years earlier on that basisY As a matter of common law this status had arisen with the 
Crown's formal annexation of the islands in 1840. The Maori may even have become 
British subjects earlier if Prendergast was to be taken at his word18 that the Crown's 
sovereign title over New Zealand arose from the time of the foundation of the colony of 
New South Wales (1788), an interpretation which chapter three has shown to be without 
support. But even if New Zealand had become British at that early stage and had the Maori 
not acquired British subjecthood in 1788, this legal position could only have been achieved 
through the application of a Marshall-like doctrine of discovery with its notions of partial 
and divided sovereignty. British constitutional theory of the time was unable to 
accommodate any such theory. Certainly the Maori were British subjects by 1877 if only as 
a result of the declaration to that effect in the Native Rights (NZ) Act 1865.19 Moreover, in 
Rira Peti v Ngaraihi Te Paku (1888), some years later, Prendergast insisted the Maori were 
British subjects and governed by the laws of the land.2O This insistence hardly sat easily 
beside the Wi Parata ruling that there was a class of British subject, aboriginal owners, 
against whose property rights the Crown could act arbitrarily if it chose and without fear of 
being required to show lawful reason. Prendergast's "second reason" would appear difficult 
if not impossible to sustain. 
Having denied the existence of a common law aboriginal title Prendergast considered 
whether some such title had come into being by statute. He quoted section 3 of the Native 
Rights Act (NZ) 1865 parenthesizing an important comment:21 
"9. The Supreme Court and all other Courts of Law within the colony ought to have, 
and have, the same jurisdiction in all cases touching the persons and property, 
whether real or personal, of the Maori people; and touching the title to land held 
under Maori custom and usage, as they have, or may have, under any law for the 
time being in for~" - [this, we presume, is meant to include the common law] "- in 
all cases touching the persons and property of natural born subjects of her Majesty". 
16 Enlick v Carring/on (1765) 19 St Tr 1030; Campbell v Hall (1774) 1 Cowp 204, 208-10; Walker v Baird [1892] 
AC 491 (PC), 496-7; Johns/one v Pedlar [1921] 2 AC 262 (HL), 272 per Viscount Finlay; Allorney-General v 
Nissan [1970] AC 179 (HL), 207 and 213 per Lord Reid, also comments of Lords Morris (p 221), Pearce (pp 
226-7), Wilberforce (p 235) and Pearson (p 240). 
17 Opinion by Prendergast A-G on the legal status of the Maoris now in anus, 30 June 1869 in Turton ed Epitome 
0/ Official Documents, A, 191-4. 
18 Wi Parata v Bishop o/Welling/on, supra, 78. 
19 The Native Rights Act 1865, No 11, section 2 declaring and deeming every "person of the Maori race ... whether 
born before or since New Zealand became a dependency of Great Britain" to be "a natural-born subject of Her 
Majesty to all intents and purposes whatsoever". 
20 (1888) 7 NZLR 235 (SC),239. 
21 Wi Parala v Bishop o/Welling/on, supra, 79. 
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He then emasculated this section with the observation thaez 
... a phrase in a statute cannot call what is non-existent into being. As we have 
shown, the proceedings of the British Government and the legislation of the colony 
have at all times been practically based on the contrary supposition, that no such 
body of law existed; and herein have been in accordance with good sense and 
indubitable facts. 
Finally Prendergast reiterated his general conclusion: The issue of a Crown grant was 
conclusive in all courts "against any native person asserting that the land therein comprised 
was never duly ceded".23 He admitted that Chapman had intimated otherwise in R v 
Symonds but this had not been a "legitimate inference"24 from the American authorities. The 
true American position, Prendergast claimed, was that although a Crown grantee took his 
title subject to any unextinguished Indian title, the Indians were unable to bring an action in 
the American courts under this title either generally or to impeach the grant. This was a 
severe distortion of the American position which simply held that in suits between citizens 
of a state the court would not question the validity of the patent on the grounds of an 
unextinguished aboriginal title. Even in suits between grantee and Indian occupants the 
patent would not be invalidated but it would be legally qualified (perhaps to the extent of 
being virtually valueless to the grantee) by the unextinguished aboriginal title.2j The 
American courts certainly recognised the standing of the tribe to sue on their aboriginal title. 
The inferences Chapman had made from the American authorities were certainly more 
"legitimate" than those of Prendergast. 
Despite the manifest flaws in Prendergast's judgment Wi Parata v The Bishop of 
Wellington became an influential case. The Supreme Court's newfound refusal to accept any 
doctrine of aboriginal title whether derived from the common law or even statute, flew in 
the face of clear evidence to the contrary. There were no portions of the judgment in which 
important errors of detail or interpretation did not occur. Perhaps the most damning 
indictment of the case was the washing of the judicial hands of questions of Maori claims to 
their traditional lands. Law only came to the protection of Maori land owners where the 
machinations of the Native Land Court had transformed the 'barbarous' communal title into 
a Crown-derived title. 
2. later cases 
22 Id. 
23 Id,80. 
24 Id. 
2j Fletcher v Peck (1810) 6 Cranch 87 (USSC) (grantee under Government patent cannot eject Indians); lohnson 
and Graham's Lessee v M'lnJosh (1823) 8 Wheat 543 (USSC) 574 (grantee takes subject to unextinguished 
Indian title); Clark v Smith (1839) 13 Pet 195 (grantee takes full title only upon Indian relinquishment of title); 
Beecher v Wether by (1877) 95 US 517; Cramer v United States (1926) 261 US 219 (approved Hall I. in 
Attorney-General (British Columbia) v Calder (1973) 34 DLR (3d) 145 (SCC) 200-1). 
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The position taken by Prendergast CJ in Wi Parata was developed in his courts through 
the remainder of the nineteenth century. During this period the New Zealand courts did not 
move from their Chief Justice's view that the Maori had no aboriginal title either by right of 
common law or statutory recognition because the tribal law defining that title was 
'uncivilised' and hence beyond the cognisance of the courts. 
In Mangakahia v The New Zealand Timber Company (1881 - 82) Gillies J held the 
Native Rights Act 1865 was "merely a declaratory Act", which recited "the pre-existing 
right of natives to appeal to this Court for the protection or vindication of their personal 
rights and of their rights to their lands".26 He then commented upon the character of the 
aboriginal title:27 
What title does legally recognised ownership according to native custom confer? I 
answer that no title known to English law is thereby conferred. A pre-existing right 
according to native custom is thereby recognised and declared - an exclusive right to 
occupation - a right to inherit not according to the rules of English law but according 
to native custom - all these are recognised and declared, but though in many respects 
they are analogous to, they are not equivalent to a fee simple. If a recognised and 
declared native owner sell to a European the purchaser does not derive his title from 
the vendor, he merely extinguishes the vendor's right of occupation, but derives his 
title from the Crown, subject nevertheless to the 'full, exclusive and undisturbed 
possession of their lands", guaranteed to the natives by the treaty of Waitangi which 
is no 'simple nullity", as it is termed in Wi Parata v The Bishop of Wellington. 
One might have thought these comments would have led to an enforcement of the aboriginal 
title. Perversely, however, Gillies held that the aboriginal owners who had been put out of 
occupation by non-natives could not bring an action for recovery of that right. The basis of 
any such action was that "the owner being out of possession [might] by entry obtain such a 
constructive possession as to entitle him by virtue of his freehold title to sue a trespasser".28 
This right, however, was one "of the attributes or incidents of the ownership of land in fee 
simple under English law".29 The aboriginal owners bringing the action had a memorial of 
ownership under the Native Lands Act 1873, which was not a Crown-derived title but one 
held by native custom (and hence not "an estate recognized by law"). Thus, continued 
Gillies, the "right of entry by which constructive possession can be obtained", was "an 
incident of title held under the Crown, not of title according to native custom".30 This meant 
that tribal owners put out of possession could bring no action for recovery of that right in 
colonial courts (unless their title had been transformed into the Crown-derived variety). He 
added, however, that "bare possession" was "sufficient to entitle the possessor to bring 
26 (1881-2) 2 NZLR (SC) 345.351. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 350. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 351. 
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trespass,i. 31 The basis of this right, he implied, was the superiority of the tribal occupation to 
that of the trespasser. Where that possession was lost, so was the basis for proof of a right 
superior to the alleged trespasser. In all, Gillies' conclusions did not square with his earlier 
comments about the "legally recognised" character of the aboriginal title. 
Gillies' judgment in Mangakahia seemed to infer that aboriginal owners put out of 
possession should resort to their customary law to regain that right. The previous year, 
however, when aboriginal owners had tried precisely that the Court of Appeal had found 
that an indictment for forcible entry could proceed against them despite the fact that their 
aboriginal title was unextinguished. In R v Niramoana (1880) the Maori defendants had 
broken into a wooden building, an inn, with sticks, staves and other weapons and, asserting 
their aboriginal title, had put the occupant out of possession. The court affirmed the 
conviction at trial insisting that the supposed aboriginal title was no lawful justification and 
that the Queen's peace must be maintained.32 If the implication intended was that the native 
owners should have resorted to the courts, the decision a year later in Mangakahia put paid 
to that means of redress. So much for the right of 'undisturbed' tribal ownership recognised 
in the Treaty of Waitangi. 
The status of the memorials of ownership issued by the Native Land Court under the 
various Native Lands Acts and which had not been exchanged for a Crown grant came up 
for judicial assessment on several occasions during the late nineteenth century. It has been 
seen that Gillies J took the position in the Mangakahia case that such certificates did no 
more than identify the owners according to native custom and did not give the aboriginal 
title any of the incidents of title under English law. The problem with this approach was 
that in those cases where the certificate holders had sold their native . title, as permitted by 
statute, a non-Maori purchaser who had yet to exchange the certificate for a Crown grant 
could hardly be said to hold under native customary law. This problem was adverted to 
indirectly in Ani Waata v Grice (1884). The Court of Appeal indicated that such licences 
gave "a right of possession, as against all the world, save the Crown" who, it was left 
unstated but implied, enjoyed unfettered power over all land which had not been brought 
into the Crown-derived system of title. 33 In Hobson v Sheehan (1884 - 85) Richmond J 
commented upon the nature of the estate taken by native owners holding under the 
memorials of ownership without a Crown grant: 34 
That title is a native title, and in the absence of express proVISIOn there is no 
alienable quality in such a title. It is not capable of transfer to Europeans. In order to 
give such a title an alienable quality an express enactment was requisite. 
31 Id,349. 
32 (1880) 0 B & F (CA) 76. 
33 (1884) 2 NZLR 95 (CA). 
34 (1884-5) 3 NZLR,SC 230,232 (approved Hira Tamati v District and Registrar [1957] NZLR 231 (SC) 236). 
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Richmond proceeded to state that the bare certificate ef the Native Land Court was35 
... a recognition by the Court that the holders are owners according to native custom. 
But ownership according to native custom, whatever be its exact nature, is certainly 
not the same thing as ownership in fee simple. The power of absolute alienation 
which is an incident of an estate in fee is the creation of a highly artificial state of · 
society. Probably the native notion of property in land never included more than an 
usufructuary right: 
He had admitted the inalienable character of the aboriginal title was the necessary result of 
its uncivilised character, a finding which would suggest the source of this inalienability was 
the common law, without, however, identifying the source of the rule. Some years later in 
judgment for the Court of Appeal in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker (1894) he intimated the 
location of the rule in the statutory regime (as opposed to common law rules) affecting 
tribal ownership of traditionallands.36 
The general position taken was that the certificates or memorials of ownership issued by 
the Native Land Court did not make the land the subject of tenure until exchanged for a 
Crown grant. Any person holding under such a certificate did so subject to the plenary right 
of the Crown over land not alienated from it. This was a straight application of the 
principles expressed by Prendergast CJ in the Wi Parata case. 
Related to the question of the legal character of certificates from the Native Land Court 
was that of the status of agreements between the Crown and tribal owners for the cession of 
their aboriginal title. It was seen Wi Parata held that such transactions were 'acts of state' 
and that a Crown grant could not be read as qualified by any unextinguished aboriginal title 
or agreement between the Crown and aboriginal owners. Prendergast reaffirmed this position 
in Moore v Meredith (1889). The aboriginal title conferred "no estate in the land known to 
the law beyond, possible, a tenancy at will".37 The aboriginal owners could not compel the 
Crown to grant them any estate even where it had made such a promise in return for the 
cession of their title. This maintained the 'act of state' characterisation of these transactions, 
a position taken by other judges during the remaining years of Prendergast's tenure. 38 
In a very short judgment in Ani Kanara v Mair (1885) Prendergast held that where a 
Crown grant had been issued to certain Maori individuals they took the title absolutely and 
not on trust for the tribe (claiming right by way of aboriginal title).39 This holding was a 
continuation of the Wi Parata approach in that it treated a Crown grant as absolute on the 
face of it and unqualifiable by any aboriginal (or other pre-existing private) rights over that 
35 Id,234. 
36 (1894) 12 NZLR 483 (CA) 488. 
37 (1889) 8 NZLR 160 (CA). 
38 Aitken v Swindley (1897) 15 NZLR 517 (SC); Chalmers v Busby (1897) 16 NZLR 287 (SC). Teira Te Paea and 
others v Roera Tareha and another (1896) 15 NZLR 91 (CA) 114 per Edwards J (Crown has prerogative power 
to extinguish unilaterally the aboriginal title). 
39 (1885) 4 NZLR (SC) 216. 
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land. By the time of this decision it appears Crown 'grants had frequently been issued with 
the intention (not apparent from the terms of the grant) the grantees hold as trustees for the 
tribe. Such was the outcry against tllis decision the Native Equitable Owners Act 1886 was 
passed.4O This Act empowered the Native Land Court to investigate whether on the creation 
of the title it had been intended the grantees take on a representative basis. If the court 
answered an inquiry favourably it was unable simply to declare the trust but was required to 
amend the record by including all those omitted on the rectified title.41 The Native Land 
Court Certificate Confirmation Act 1894 made it clear that thereafter the Court could not 
award a freehold title to tribal representatives,42 a provision surviving in Part XV Maori 
Affairs Act 1953.43 Prendergast's ruling presupposed that the Maori had no pre-existing right 
to their land other than the mere goodwill of the Crown. The Crown grant was thus the 
exclusive legal source of any tribal right to their traditional lands. This obsession with 
Crown-derived tenure might be contrasted with the series of West African appeals heard by 
the Privy Council during the 1920s and '30s considered in the opening chapter of this Part. 
The Board consistently held that the grants of land in Lagos subject to an unextinguished 
tribal title to one or more members of the tribe were taken on a representative basis. The 
means used to transmute the native tenure in Lagos into a system based on Crown grants 
were virtually identical to those employed in New Zealand. The Privy Council proceeded on 
the basis that a Crown grant transformed rather than created or negated the pre-existing 
private title 10 the land. The Board presumed such grants to bring the least possible 
interuption of the original tribal title. The contrary position of the New Zealand courts under 
Prendergast CJ culminated with the eventual appeal to the Privy Council in Nireaha Tamaki 
v Baker. 
The plaintiff in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker had commenced an action to prevent the 
disposal of lands by the Commissioner of Crown Lands over which he alleged his tribe 
enjoyed a subsisting aboriginal title. Richmond J held for the Court of Appeal that Wi 
Parata was a "direct authority":44 
... the mere assertion of the claim of the Crown is in itself sufficient to oust the 
jurisdiction of this or any other court in the colony. There can be no known rule of 
law by which the validity of the dealings in the name and under the authority of the 
Sovereign with the Native tribes of this country for the extinction of their territorial 
rights can be tested. Such transactions began with the settlement of these Islands; so 
that Native custom [ie the pre-European customary law] is inapplicable to them. The 
Crown is under a solemn engagement to observe strict justice in the matter, but of 
necessity it must be left 10 the conscience of the Crown to determine what is justice. 
40 NZPD (1886),54,141 (2nd Reading) and 303 (Committee stage). 
41 Native Equitable Owners Act 1886, No 16, sections 3 and 4. The Act did not apply to land previously alienated 
by the titular owners (section 5). 
42 Native Land Court Certificate Confirmation Act 1894, No 44, section 6. 
43 Maori Affairs Act 1953, No 94, sections 169-172; also the Maori Land Act 1931, No 31, sections 130-5 and the 
Native Land Act 1909, No IS, sections 103-108. 
44 (1894) 12 NZLR 483 (CA) 488. 
275 
I I 
'[ 
The secUIity of all titles in the country depends on maintenance of this principle. 
Accordingly the Court ruled that it had no jurisdiction to interfere with the Commissioner's 
disposal of lands on behalf of the Crown, there being no legal basis upon which a court 
could intervene to protect the unextinguished aboriginal title. 
Commencing with . the Wi Parata judgment, the New Zealand courts developed a 
consistent theme with regard to the aboriginal title of the Maori. They held that the native 
inhabitants had no title to their land recognisable in the courts. The Crown could dispose of 
such land as it willed and municipal courts would not question or challenge any such acts 
on grounds of an unextinguished aboriginal title. Although it was intimated that a tribe 
could sue in trespass this right was not based on any title to the land so much as a superior 
right (a tenancy at sufferance) to that of the trespasser. The courts refused to find that the 
common law or even statute had ever provided otherwise. 
3. the conceptual basis of the Prendergast position 
The technical flaws in the Wi Parata judgment have been noticed but underlying it, and 
the position which it encouraged Prendergast's judges to take, was a fundamental 
misconception as to the basis of land titles in the colony. The colonial bench was clearly of 
the view that the sole form of title to land in New Zealand was Crown-derived and that the 
only rights in land which could be recognised by the courts were those incidental to a 
Crown grant In Wi Parata Prendergast had conceded that some forms of Crown-recognised 
title could be given effect in the colonial courts of the Crown but these were only those of 
'civilised' societies. A society met this requirement of civilisation if prior to the Crown's 
sovereignty it could be said to have been 'sovereign'. Being 'uncivilised' Maori society 
lacked this original sovereignty and hence a land tenure system and rights to land cognisable 
in the colonial courts. The Treaty of Waitangi did not affect this since so far as it purported 
to cede the sovereignty of the islands it was a 'simple nullity' . Having taken this position 
Prendergast handed his judges feudal blinkers which saw the sole title to land in the colony 
as nothing other than Crown-derived, there never having been any previous sovereign from 
whom another legally recognisable system of title could have derived. 
Prendergast's position reduced to its simplest form was this: All property rights derived 
from a grant by a sovereign. If a society lacked an original sovereignty so too did it lack 
any property rights upon the acquisition of its territory by the Crown. In reaching this 
equation Prendergast, unwittingly to be sure, had synthesised a number of legal traditions 
into one: feudal rules of land title mixed with Austinian theory and emergent notions of 
international law. Unfortunately Prendergast' s grasp of these principles was not that of a 
Marshall or H.S. Chapman. 
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The equation of a right to property with the grant or permission of a sovereign was 
feudal in its concern for the relationship of lord and tenant, ie some superior from whom the 
right to use the land was derived. The feudal notion sat easily beside and was, indeed, 
enhanced by the influential utilitarian ideas of property developed through the nineteenth 
century. According to the traditional utilitarian view, civil society existed to maximize the 
means of happiness for the maximum number of individuals. Since the acquisition of 
property and security in its enjoyment was necessary to the achievement of happiness civil 
society required a system of property rights.4.5 Property rights were thus an emanation from 
the law of a civil society. Onto this utilitarian premise we might add Austin's definition of 
'law' as the command of a sovereign who was a "determinate and common superior" to 
whom the bulk of the population owed habitual obedience. The American Indian tribes were 
sovereign-less, Austin decided, because they lacked any such determinate superior being 
composed of loose and independent societies who behaved, so far as he could tell, in 
whatever manner suited the savage temperament. Austin insisted that a society without a 
sovereign was without law. He rejected a vice versa argument that the presence of law 
implied the existence of a sovereign, again by reference to the North American Indians. The 
customs of the tribes he characterised as nothing more than the "general opinion" of the 
savage community unsupported by "legal or political sanctions".46 This was not law nor 
could it imply any sovereignty in such societies. The Austin view, then, was that a society 
without a sovereign was without law and, it followed, without property rights. This was 
simply a way of intellectualising the feudal view of property as a sovereign-derived right. 
Prendergast's formulation also incorporated aspects of the standard of civilisation then 
becoming recognised by international law. According to the position taken towards the end 
of the nineteenth century by a very limited group of English writers the standard of 
civilisation was an absolute threshold for international personality. This Austinian-influenced 
position, it has been seen, missed the subtleties of international practice and, in any event, 
was not an intertemporal rule of international law in 1840 when the Crown acquired the 
sovereignty of New Zealand. The Crown had always recognized the juridical capacity of 
tribal societies to make a valid grant of an imperium. The civilisation of the Maori, or lack 
thereof, did not nUllify this recognition. The failings of the Wi Parata judgment on this 
point have been noted elsewhere. 
Finally, and by way of general comment on the Prendergast approach to aboriginal title, 
it should be observed that there is nothing intrinsically compelling in the preoccupation with 
the sovereign-derived character of property rights. Celtainly some of the early writers on the 
common law did not find this characteristic intellectually explicable other than as an 
45 For a general account of the utilitarian's position see Becker Property rights - philosophic foundations (1977), 
57-74. 
46 The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (1832), lect VI, 208-10. For Austin's influence in Australasia see 
Morison John Austin (1982), 151-60. 
277 
accident of the reception in England of the feudal system:7 If one were to seek an 
intellectual or theoretical justification for a right of property any number of formulations 
other than the sovereign-derived variety come to mind. The common law doctrine of 
aboriginal title sidestepped any such theorising in so far as it located the title in the fact of 
the tribal occupation of their land under a customary if 'barbaric' system of tenure. 
Theorists of property rights might have shunned any such justification of the title, indeed we 
have seen the abortive attempts to inject 'labour' theories of property rights into the rules 
affecting aboriginal title, but from the start the aboriginal title was based on the simple, 
provable fact of tribal occupation. 
C. THE PRIVY COUNCIL INTERVENES (1901-03) 
1. Nireaha Tamaki v Baker (1901) 
Prendergast's position on aboriginal title first came before the Privy Council twelve 
months almost to the day after the expiry of his term as Chief Justice. In delivering their 
advice in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker (1901), the facts of which have been related earlier, the 
Board expressed firm disagreement with Prendergast. The Board criticised his approach for 
its failure to accept that the various statutes had recognised an aboriginal title to which the 
courts were bound to give effect. The advice avoided explicit comment on Prendergast's 
approach to the common law origins of the Maori's aboriginal title however strong 
disagreement was also apparent if not so emphatically delivered. 
Davey noted that the issues had been presented to the Board as two, the first being 
whether "the interest of the Crown in the subject-matter of this suit [could] be attacked by 
this proceeding".48 He confessed that their Lordships had been "somewhat embarrassed by 
the form" in which that issue had been framed:49 
If it refers to the prerogative title of the Crown, the answer seems to be that title is 
not attacked, the Native title of possession and occupancy not being inconsistent with 
the seisin in fee of the Crown. Indeed, by asserting his Native title, the appellant 
impliedly asserts and relies on the radical title of the Crown as the basis of his own 
title of occupancy or possession. 
This meant that the major issue was that given as the second question for determination, 
namely the jurisdiction of the Court to inquire into the character of the Crown's title and the 
47 For example: Digges "Arguments provinge ... Kings of England are by the lawes of the Corone just and lawfull 
owners ... " (1568-9), reprinted in Moore History of the Foreshore, 185; Cow ell, The Interpreter ... (1607). tit 
"propertie" and Institutes of the Lawes of England (1651), 57 c 12; callis Reading ... Upon the Statute ... of Sewers 
(1647), 22; Rastell Les termes de la ley (1624), tit "propertie". See generally Aylmer "Meaning and Definition of 
'Property' in Seventeenth-Century England" (1980) 86 Past and Present, 87. 
48 (1900-01) [1840-1932) NZPCC 371,379. 
49 Id. 
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extent to which it might be encumbered in point of ,law by a subsisting aboriginal title, In 
describing the native title as "not being inconsistent with the seisin in fee of the Crown" the 
Board had already intimated the position which it was about to adopt. 
Davey attempted to distinguish the present case from Wi Parata which the Court of 
Appeal had treated as a "direct authority".so He indicated Wi Parata had been a case in 
which the actions of the Crown in making a grant of the land subject to the aboriginal claim 
had been called into question whereas the case before it involved a Govenunent functionary 
acting under authority "derived solely from the statute" establishing his office.~1 In the end, 
however, nothing turned on this distinction for in both situations the issue concerned the 
courts' jurisdiction "to decide whether the Native title has or has not been extinguished by 
cession to the Crown".~2 
Addressing the issue of cession to the Crown, Davey considered the Wi Parata view that 
there was no customary law of the Maori "of which the courts of law [could] take 
cognizance" .~3 Prendergast had based this conclusion on the uncivilized character of tribal 
law and hence the impossibility of its recognition by the colonial courts when confronted 
with questions of aboriginal title. Davey finnly disagreed with this conclusion pointing to 
the express recognition of Maori property rights in the Native Rights Act 1865:S4 
Their Lordships think that this argument goes too far, and that it is rather late in the 
day for such an argument to be addressed to a New Zealand Court. It does not seem 
possible to get rid of the express words of ss. 3 and 4 of the Native Rights Act, 
1865, by saying (as the Chief Justice said in the case referred to) that "a phrase in a 
statute cannot call what is non-existent into being". It is the duty of the Courts to 
interpret the statute which plainly assumes the existence of a tenure of land under 
custom and usage which is either known to lawyers or discoverable by them by 
evidence. 
The Privy Council took the view, then, that the recognition of the aboriginal title of the 
Maori was required by statute. Davey added that this conclusion was required not only by 
the tenns of the Native Rights Act but the whole of the various enactments touching upon 
questions of aboriginal title:55 
The legislation both of the Imperial Parliament and of the Colonial Legislature is 
consistent with this view of the construction and effect of the Native Rights Act, and 
one is rather at a loss to know what is meant by such expressions "Native title", 
"native lands", "owners", and "proprietors", or the careful provision against sale of 
Crown lands until the Native title has been extinguished if there be no such title 
cognizable by the law and no title therefore to be extinguished. Their Lordships think 
~o Id,380. 
SI Refer Te Raihi v Grice (1886) 4 NZLR (CA) 219, 238-40 per Williarns J (not cited by Lord Davey), 
~2 NZPCC, 381. 
~3 Id,382. 
S4 Id. 
5~ Id, 382-3. 
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that the Supreme Court are bound to recognize the fact of the "rightful possession 
and occupation of the Natives" until extinguished in accordance with law in any 
action in which such title is involved, and (as has been seen) means are provided for 
the ascertainment of such a title. 
Thus the Board advised that "if the appellant [could] succeed in proving that he and the 
members of his tribe [were] in possession and occupation of the lands in dispute under a 
Native title which [had] not been lawfully extinguished", he was able to maintain an action 
"to restrain an unauthorized invasion of his title".56 
The Board proceeded to cast doubt upon the Wi Parata position that the issue of a 
Crown grant implied a declaration by the Crown that the native title had been extinguished. 
This was dicta which Davey said went "beyond what was necessary for the decision".57 
Although the Board expressly left open the question whether the Crown could extinguish the 
Native title by exercise of the prerogative apart from the statutory procedures laid down, 
that is by issue of a Crown grant to other than the aboriginal owners, the criticism of the 
dicta in Wi Parata strongly suggested a negative answer. The direct implication was that the 
Crown's paramount title to land in the colony was subject to the unextinguished aboriginal 
title. The source of any such rule could only have been the common law. This was, 
however, a point into which the Board felt no need to inquire further as no such disposal 
had been made in the case before it; indeed the litigation had been prompted by an attempt 
to prevent it occurring. The Board did comment, and this too was thinly veiled criticism of 
the Wi Parata approach, that if the Crown held such power to effect a unilateral 
extinguishment by exercise of the prerogative, it was "all the more important that Natives 
should be able to protect their rights (whatever they are) before the land is sold and granted 
to a purchaser".58 To underline this position the Privy Council endorsed Chapman's 
judgment in Symonds, especially his comment that the courts were to respect an aboriginal 
title which could not be extinguished "otherwise than by the free consent of the Native 
occupiers", or, the Privy Council added, "otherwise than in strict compliance with the 
provisions of the statutes" .59 Curiously, the Board took the position that the American cases 
were unhelpful being based upon a doctrine of discovery inapplicable to New Zealand.60 
This hinted that they considered the substantive basis of the Crown's sovereignty over New 
Zealand to be the Treaty of Waitangi which they had quoted in full at the opening of their 
advice. This also challenged a vital ingredient of the Wi Parata position, although the 
association of the doctrine of discovery with the tribal right to their land had misinterpreted 
Marshall's position. 
56 Id,383. 
57 Id,384. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id, Davey referred to New Zealand as a "conquest" inferring that the country had been a conquered or ceded 
colony at common law. 
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In swnmarizing the advice of the Privy Council in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker it may be 
said at least to have commanded the New Zealand courts to take a 'statute-based' approach 
to the aboriginal title of the Maori. That is, the statutes applicable in the colony had given 
overwhelming recognition to the aboriginal title which, even if only on that basis, was to be 
respected. Although the reference to a common law source of the aboriginal title was not so 
explicit there were several important indications of the Privy Council's belief that the 
aboriginal title had a basis in the principles of common law. This position was confirmed by 
its judgment soon after in Wallis v Solicitor-General (1902-03). 
The reaction to Nireaha Tamaki v Baker in New Zealand showed the local awareness of 
the implications of the Board's holding that the traditional Maori title was legal in character. 
It meant local titles were in jeopardy to the extent that where it could be shown the 
aboriginal title had not been properly extinguished, the title to the land might be invalidated 
in virtue of the unsuccessful extinguishments. 
In July 1902 the Minister of Native Affairs was asked in the House of Representatives 
whether he was aware of the possible invalidation of Crown grants as a result of the 
ineffective extinguishments of the native title. The Minister replied that the Government 
would not intervene as the matter was sub judice.61 Some months later the Court of Appeal 
delivered its judgments in Hohepa Wi Neera v The Bishop of Wellington (1902),62 Stout 
resorting (it will be seen) to a dubious interpretation of the Native Rights Act 1865 to 
justify a result avoiding the potential upsetting of the colony's land titles. The Government 
must have realised the fragility of the Court of Appeal's assessment and the likelihood of 
reversal on appeal to the Privy Council. Fortunately for the settlers' titles, an appeal did not 
eventuate, the Maori litigants' funds being exhausted. Sensing the vulnerability of the Wi 
Parata position and doubtless worried that future litigation by the Maori might eventually 
succeed, the Land Titles Protection Act 1902 was passed. 
The Preamble of this Act recited how after a lapse of over thirty years certain Maori 
persons had been calling into question Crown grants issued in consequence of orders of the 
Native Land Court under the 1865 statute. It also alluded to the Hohepa Wi Neera case, 
suggesting the futility of such litigation:63 
And whereas the said actions have been dismissed by the Court of Appeal, and the 
Native plaintiffs have been cast in costs and expenses amounting in the aggregate io 
at least two thousand pounds: And whereas, through the death or retirement of 
Judges of the Native Land Court and other responsible officers of the public service 
who could give official evidence, the defence of such actions may be a matter of 
great difficulty if not an impossibility; And whereas considerable alarm has been 
caused amongst the European landholders of the colony at such attacks upon their 
titles, and it is expedient that reasonable protection should be afforded to the holders 
61 NZPD (1902),120,450 (per Fraser, MP) and 451 (CarroU's reply). 
62 (1902) 21 NZLR 655 (CA). 
63 The Land Titles Protection Act 1902, No 37, Preamble. 
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of such titles ... 
Section 2(1) provided that the validity of any order of the Native Land Court or Crown 
grant "purporting to have been issued under the authority of a law which has subsisted for 
not less than ten years prior to the passing of this Act shall not be called in question in any 
Court" without the consent of the Governor in Council first obtained. The ten year period 
ostensibly excepted from the Act was window-dressed surplus age for the Native Land Court 
Certificate Confirmation Act 1894 deemed all Crown grants issued thereafter to have vested 
title absolutely in the tribal grantees. 
The Native Minister, James Carroll, had explained the measure to the House in the 
Committee stages of the Bill:64 
The whole start of the thing arose from the Tamaki - Baker case ... The Privy Council 
decided that the question of Maori title was yet open to review by the Courts here. 
That was taken to be a victory, and it was enlarged upon and magnified to such an 
extent as a Maori land victory that the whole race arose up in arms to do and dare in 
the field of litigation. The fever spread in its most malignant form among the 
Natives, and it became quite an easy work for lawyers to say to the Natives, 'If you 
will only instruct us to bring cases against the European holders we can get you back 
all the lands you have parted with, or make them pay. Your victory is assured, 
because we have the Tamaki versus Baker case to go by'. 
Other members agreed with Carroll, noting that Europeans had purchased titles under the 
statutory procedure established in 1865 and believing the title they had acquired was 
absolute and good. How then, they demanded, could those titles be invalidated on the 
grounds of an improperly extinguished native title? The Member for Northern Maori 
disagreed: "The effort of the Bill now before us", he complained, was "to bar a section of 
His Majesty's subjects in New Zealand from exercising their right as British subjects in 
bringing cases which they may believe, or which they may be counselled to believe, they 
have a perfect right to bring".6S This was a direct violation of the Treaty of Waitangi in that 
legislation was taking from the Maori legal rights held as British subjects. Here, he 
protested, was "an alteration of the law by legislation which will prevent any Maori from 
taking action in the Supreme Court where he considers he has a justifiable right to bring a 
case in respect to the title to land". 66 Nonetheless the Bill was passed and the proposition 
established by statute that an improperly extinguished aboriginal title (that is, one not 
extinguished with the consent of all the traditional owners) could not invalidate a Crown 
grant or order of the Native Land Court. This legislation still left the possibility of a Crown 
grant being affected by a subsisting aboriginal title in some way not amounting to 
invalidation. Moreover the statute had not addressed the relation between the Crown and 
64 NZPD (1902),120,375. 
6S Id,375 . 
66 Id. 
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aboriginal owners, a question which the Privy Council was soon to consider in Wallis v 
Solicitor-General (1902-03). 
2. Wallis v Solicitor-General (1902-03) 
This case was another installment in the saga of litigation spawned by the 1848 grant of 
land to the Bishop of Wellington by the tribal owners in order that a school might be 
established on their land. The former tribal owners were not a party to the litigation 
although the character of their title at the time of the grant and hence validity of the trust 
was at issue. The appellants were the trustees who had begun the suit. They sought a 
direction for the administration of the trust cy-pres as no school had been erected according 
to the terms of the 1848 agreement. The Court of Appeal had accepted the Solicitor-
General's argument, ruling the endowment "null and void from its very commencement" and 
declared the property to have become vested in the Crown absolutely. The trustees appealed 
to the Privy Council who upheld their claim in the strongest possible terms. 
The advice given for the Board by Lord Macnaghten turned on the character of the 
purported cession of 1848. His Lordship indicated that the cession in August 1848 from the 
natives to the Bishop conveyed him the beneficial interest in the land subject to the terms of 
the cession. The Lieutenant-Governor of the Province had sanctioned the cession in October 
1848 and in December 1850 a Crown grant issued to the Bishop conveying him legal title 
to the land. The Board found the Bishop's title to the land was, therefore, governed by two 
sources: His legal title derived from the Crown grant, the equitable title the terms of the 
grant from the native owners in October 1848. The Court of Appe;il had taken the position 
that the Crown had the full original title to the land in law and equity and that the Bishop's 
title rested solely on the grant of the Crown. Where the condition specified by the grant had 
not been met (the establishment of the school) the property was not to be administered cy-
pres but revested in the Crown for the failure of the grant. The Privy Council could not 
share this approach. They did not dispute that the Crown had legal title to the land but 
treated it as originally burdened by an aboriginal title comprising the equitable ownership of 
the land. By the rule of pre-emption any cession of that title by the tribal owners would also 
have vested the equitable title in the Crown, however in this case the Crown had agreed to 
'waive' its right of pre-emption. This meant that in issuing the Crown grant "the Crown had 
no beneficial interest to pass". It had disavowed its claim on this title so that the basis of the 
trust was the direct relation between native benefactors and the Bishop. The Crown grant 
was not, therefore, the sole basis of the title of the Bishop's trustees to the land.67 
It should be explained that the Board's position was no departure from the rule 
prohibiting direct alienation of land from aboriginal owners to European. The rule of pre-
67 [1903] AC 173. 
emption prevented a direct purchaser of aboriginal land laying claim to a legal title to the 
land as against the Crown and subsequent Crown grantees or, in other words, prevented the 
creation of a legal estate by conveyance of the aboriginal title to a European without the 
medium of a Crown grant. That rule, in 1848 embedded in colonial and imperial legislation, 
was not violated by the 'waiver' made in this case for a Crown grant was issued and the 
Bishop's legal title founded upon it. In agreeing to the endowment the Crown had not 
surrendered or disavowed its original legal title over the land but had permitted the passage 
of the beneficial estate from Maori to Bishop on their agreed terms. In that sense the 
Government had not waived the Crown's statutorily-declared right of pre-emption by an 
executive act beyond its lawful authority, as, for example, was the case with Fitzroy's 
Proclamations of 1844 purporting to allow a European to acquire a legal title by direct 
purchase from the aboriginal owners. The legal title of the trustees thus emanated from 
Crown grant but the basis of their duty as trustees although recognised by the grant derived 
from the approved endowment of the native owners. The Privy Council did not make itself 
as clear on this point as it might have, a failing which coupled with other aspects of the 
report would prompt an extremely hostile reaction in New Zealand. 
The Privy Council could not have reached their finding that the doctrine of cy-pres was 
applicable without supposing that the original aboriginal title was a property right capable of 
being the subject-matter of a trust. Their location of the equitable duty of the trustees in the 
cession of 1848 and their willingness to give it effect were consistent with no other position. 
'This was affirmed by Macnaghten when, after quoting the Court of Appeal's recitation of 
what to them was the received Wi Parata-inspired approach, he commented upon their 
Lordship's inability "to follow this observation".68 Another more provocative rejection of the 
Wi Parata doctrine occurred towards the end of the report. The basis of the Crown's 
argument had been that the equitable as well as legal title to the land (before and after the 
tribe's cession) was in the Crown. 'This was a way of stating that the aboriginal owners had 
never had an interest in their lands capable of being recognised in the courts as the subject-
matter of a trust. The Crown's administration of the native title was thus put solely at its 
own discretion and beyond the jurisdiction of the courts albeit subject to the ultimate 
authority of statutory enactment. The Privy Council repudiated this argument in the strongest 
language. The proposition, which the Court of Appeal had accepted, was:69 
... certainly not flattering to the dignity or the independence of the highest Court in 
New Zealand, or even to the intelligence of the Parliament. What has the Court to do 
with the executive? Where there is a suit properly constituted and ripe for decision, 
why should justice be denied or delayed at the bidding of the executive? Why should 
the executive Government take upon itself to instruct the Court in the discharge of its 
proper functions? Surely it is for the Court, not for the executive, to determine what 
68 Id, 187. 
69 Id, 188. 
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is a breach of trust. 
We might summarise the Privy Council's position as this: The Board treated the aboriginal 
title as a beneficial title to Crown land. This title could not be conveyed to give a direct 
purchaser from the tribal owners a legal title to the land, the grant of the Crown being 
necessary. But where somesuch grant of legal title was made and the Crown had approved 
the aboriginal owners' cession to a European of their 'equitable estate', the equitable title 
was passed subject to the terms of the approved cession. The enforcement of the cession 
laid not in the executive hands as a matter of high policy, as Wi Parata held, but was fully 
justiciable in the ordinary judicial tribunals of the country. Quite simply: the aboriginal title 
was a property right cognisable in the courts.70 
D. ABORIGINAL TITLE IN NEW ZEALAND COURTS UNDER CHIEF JUSTICE 
STOUT (1899 - 1926) 
1. early cases 
Whilst the above two appeals to the Privy Council were outstanding local courts, now 
under recently appointed Chief Justice Robert Stout, twice considered the question of 
aboriginal title. 
In Mueller v Taupiri Coal Mines (1900) Edwards J expressed the Court's agreement with 
Gillies' comments in Mangakahia v New Zealand Timber Company that the fee of all lands 
in the colony had been held by the Crown subject to the Maori right and that the Treaty of 
Waitangi was no 'simple nullity'. The Treaty, he said, "declared the existence of the 
proprietary rights of the Natives".7I This position, much like that of Gillies, was hard to 
reconcile with his subsequent adoption of the Wi Parata approach that all dealings between 
the Crown and aboriginal owners were beyond the jurisdiction of the courts. 
In re an application by Beare and Perry for mining area in the Arahura River (1900) 
Stout considered the status of the Maori right to the Arahura River bed. The Crown had 
agreed with the aboriginal owners of the region that the whole course of the riverbed 
belonged to them. It had accepted the cession of their aboriginal title subject to their 
continued ownership of the whole river and the setting aside of certain land ('the reserve '). 
The Crown then gave the tribal owners a Crown grant for the reserve. Stout considered an 
application for mining rights over the portion of the river outside the reserve. Although the 
Mining Act prohibited the issue of mining licences for "Native land", Stout found that the 
riverbed outside the reserve did not so qualify. According to the rule of English law "the 
70 For a similar analysis see Hookey "Millirrpum and the Maoris", [1972] OLR 63. cf Cooke, ed Portrait of a 
Profession (1969) 22 dismissing this holding as per incuriam. 
71 (1900) 20 NZLR 89 (CA) 123. 
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bed of an unnavigable stream" belonged "to the proprietors on each side".71 Since the native 
title to the land beside the stream outside the reserve had been extinguished and the native 
right over the bed had been reserved by an instrument for the cession of an aboriginal title 
beyond the cognisance of the court, Stout ruled that mining licences could issue irrespective 
of the aboriginal owner's objections and formal agreement with the Crown. The refusal to 
give effect to the cession 'of the aboriginal title was a direct application of the doctrine in 
Wi Parata. Stout's judgment showed, however, an incipient movement towards a 'statute-
based'approach to the recognition of aboriginal title. He was apparently ready to accept that 
there was such a thing as 'native title' of which he was required by statute to take 
cognisance but left the question of its extinguishment (and the enforceability of agreements 
made thereupon between Crown and tribal owners) to the rules in Wi Parata. 
The advice of the Privy Council in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker in 1901 required the New 
Zealand courts to take stock of their position on aboriginal title. The slightly revised 
approach adopted in Hohepa Wi Neera v The Bishop of Wellington (1902) took the lead 
Stout had given two years earlier. 
Hohepa Wi Neera v The Bishop of Wellington arose from the cession in 1848 of the 
native chiefs of Porirua to the Bishop of Wellington. In Wallis v Solicitor-General, it may 
be recalled, the Court of Appeal had found that the Crown grant of 1850 had been void 
from its commencement. Whilst the appeal to the Privy Council from this judgment was 
outstanding, the Maori of the Porirua region brought an action alleging that the land should 
be revested in them, their aboriginal title never having been extinguished. In refusing this 
application Stout Cl referred to the Native Lands Act 1862 which had provided that 
"nothing herein contained shall be construed as rendering the rights of Natives in respect of 
such lands, or the usages or customs on which such rights depend, cognisable or 
determinable by any Court of law or equity judicature, until the same shall have been 
defined and a certificate of title... issued according to the provisions of this Act".73 Stout 
observed that it had "always been assumed - at all events up to the decision in Tamaki v 
Baker - that the declaration in the Act of 1862 which I have quoted was a true declaration 
of the law".7. This interpreta,tion was founded on the Wi Parata doctrine that there was no 
such thing as a 'native title' cognisable in the courts. More fatally, the rule established by 
the 1862 Act was simply a means of requiring litigants to have their aboriginal title proven 
by the special panel established under the 1862 Act before bringing suit upon it. The rule 
was shortlived, probably being the cause of some inconvenience if not hardship, for it was 
reversed by sections 3 and 4 of the Native Rights Act 1865 by which, as Lord Davey had 
stressed in Nireaha Tamaki,7~ all courts were to have jurisdiction in all cases "touching the 
72 (1900) 2 GLR 242 (SC) 243. 
73 The Native Lands Act 1862, No 42, section 3. 
7. (1902) 21 NZLR 655 (CA) 665. 
7~ NZPCC, 382. 
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persons, and property, whether real or personal, of the Maori people and touching the titles 
to land held under Maori custom and usage" as they had in cases concerning the natural-
born subjects of the Crown. Stout commented that this Act did not bind the Crown, a point 
which he noted the Pdvy Council as missing in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker.76 In so 
commenting, however, Stout neglected the Privy Council's more general conclusion that the 
Native Rights Act was but one of a series of statutes (including Imperial legislation which 
had most certainly bound the Crown) recognizing the 'Native title', 'Native lands', 'owners' 
or howsoever else the aboriginal title had been styled. Perhaps Stout did not attach much 
weight to this observation because he said that in any event in the view of the Privy 
Council Wi Parata had been "rightly decided" despite the disapproval "of certain dicta in 
the judgment".n This interpretation of Nireaha Tamaki was at best an inference from the 
report and an incorrect one at that. Nonetheless it encouraged Stout to maintain the Wi 
Parata position that the issue of a Crown grant implied the extinguishment of any native 
title over the land included in the grant. Strictly speaking this aspect of his judgment was 
dicta for Stout found that there had in fact been an extinguishment of the aboriginal title 
since the grant to the Bishop in 1848 had been described by the chiefs as a "full and final 
giving up" .78 Stout ruled that in their dealing with the Crown for the extinguishment of the 
aboriginal title the customary law required the tribe members to abide by the decision of 
their chiefs and acknowledged leaders. These leaders had made the complete cession of the 
aboriginal title so that it could not now be asserted that it remained unextinguished. 
Williams concurred with Stout's position observing that Wi Parata had not been 
overruled by the Privy Council and that its ratio remained. The present case was 
indistinguishable from Wi Parata and on its authority the fact that a Crown grant had issued 
was conclusive proof of the extinguishment of any aboriginal title over the land.79 
The judgments of the Court of Appeal in Hohepa Wi Neera were a deliberate attempt to 
contain the damage to the authority of Wi Parata inflicted by the Privy Council. The local 
courts were now prepared to concede the existence of some native title recognisable in the 
courts - Stout even took judicial notice of the customary right of the chiefs in the sale of 
tribal lands, but fought to maintain the Wi Parata doctrine giving the Crown wide, 
r 
unreviewable powers to effect the extinguishment of that title as an 'act of state'. 
2. the Protest of Bench and Bar (1903) 
76 Supra, 667. 
n Id. 
78 Id. The dicta had important ramifications, however, for land titles in the colony where the native title had not 
been properly extinguished (as by an alienation by ten owners named as owners on the certificates issued under 
the Native Lands Act 1865). 
79 Id, 671. 
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The telms in which the Privy Council had delivered its advice in Wallis v Solicitor-
General were incendiary so it was little surprise that when news of it reached New Zealand 
the reaction was explosive. At an adjourned sitting of the Court of Appeal on Saturday, 25 
April 1903, the Chief Justice and two of his fellow judges gathered members of the local 
Bar and publicly censured the Privy Council. 
Stout opened the proceedings with a formal 'Protest' in which he challenged the Privy 
Council's "direct attack ... upon the probity of the Appeal Court in New Zealand".80 Although 
there were other aspects, for present purposes the important parts of his Protest lay in his 
dogged insistence that the Board had been wrong to think there was any such thing as a 
Native title cognisable in the courts. "The root of title being in the Crown", he said, "the 
Court could not recognise Native title". As authority he cited Symonds, Wi Parata and 
Nireaha Tamaki where the Privy Council did not "entirely overrule this view".81 
Stout had not only misrepresented the position taken in Symonds and, indeed, Nireaha 
Tamaki but maintained the Wi Parata fixation with Crown-derived title as the sole source of 
right to land. He also neglected the settled rule that feudal principle where introduced to a 
colony was only applicable to the extent it was suitable to local circumstances. The Crown's 
formal and constant recognition of the native title indicated the feudal principle was not to 
be applied without regard to Maori ownership. 
Turning to the Privy Council's position that the trust for the land arose from the native 
donation rather than Crown grant, Stout insisted this could not be:82 
The fee-simple was in the Crown, and the Crown gave that to the Bishop. The legal 
title came from the Crown, and in that sense the Crown was the donor. 
The Privy Council had not disputed the position that the Crown held the fee of the 
country although Stout's description of the Crown's title as the fee-simple was a misleading 
rendering of the character of the Crown's title to land subject to an unextinguished 
aboriginal title. The term he had used implied a dominium plenum. The Privy Council 
accepted the Crown had the dominium but refused to infer from this, as Stout and those 
subscribing to the Wi Parata approach, that this was a title which the courts would 
recognise as full and unencumbered by the aboriginal title. The Privy Council had treated 
the aboriginal owners' right as one of property which although subject to the legal title of 
the Crown was capable, with the permission of the Crown, of forming the subject-matter of 
a valid and enforceable trust Stout was mistaken if he thought the Board had called into 
question the technical doctrine by which the legal title to the ungranted lands of the colony 
was in the Crown. 
80 [1840-1932] NZPCC App, 730. 
81 Id,732. 
82 Id,734. 
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Developing his Protest, Stout insisted that cessions of the native title were acts of state 
beyond judicial cognisance.83 This was the basis upon which the Court of Appeal was 
unable to consider the terms of the natives' cession in 1848. The Privy Council had used the 
courts' inability to look at such 'acts of state' to make "baseless imputations" that "this 
Court had declined jurisdiction, had denied justice, and had lost its dignity and independence 
through dread of the Executive Government". It was "hardly ... becoming in the highest 
tribunal in the Empire to make such charges against any Court"84 without conclusive proof 
which here was complete lacking. 
In closing, Stout pointed the Privy Council to other errors they had made in recent 
judgments on appeal from New Zealand, including Nireaha Tamaki v Baker. These showed 
how out of touch with the circumstances of the colony the Privy Council had become. Stout 
closed in a tone of self-righteous indignation which questioned the continued value of 
appeals to the Privy Council:8s 
The matter is really a serious one. A great Imperial judicial tribunal sitting in the 
capital of the Empire, dispensing justice even to the meanest of British subjects in 
the uttermost parts of the earth, is a great and noble ideal. But if that tribunal is not 
acquainted with the laws it is called upon to interpret or administer, it may 
unconsciously become the worker of injustice. And if such should unfortunately 
happen, that Imperial spirit that is the true bond of union amongst His Majesty's 
subjects must be weakened. At present we in New Zealand are, so far as the Privy 
Council is concerned, in an unfortunate position. It has shown that it knows not our 
statutes, or our conveyancing terms, or our history. What the remedy may be, or can 
be, for such a state of things, it is not at present within my province to suggest. 
To give Stout some due there was justification for his unhappiness in that the Privy 
Council's tone had been needlessly provocative and the report contained some minor errors 
of detail. Nonetheless his grounds for disputing the Board's recognition of the native title 
were unfounded. He had adopted and argued the Wi Parata position but this, it has been 
stressed, was one which it was difficult to maintain with technical much less historical 
accuracy. It is hard, therefore, to read the above passage without a sense of irony. The Privy 
Council had not bothered to refute the Wi Parata position in the detailed and precise fashion 
which the New Zealand judiciary's subscription to it doubtless required. The Privy Council 
could have made its own premises more apparent, in particular the location of the aboriginal 
title in the common law recognition of tribal property rights subsequent to British 
annexation. This, however, did not alter the fundamental differences between it and the 
colonial judiciary. The Board was prepared to accept Crown-recognised as well as a Crown-
derived title to land whereas the New Zealand bench, blinkered in its adherence to feudal 
doctrine, could not do likewise. It hardly occurred to the New Zealand judges that a tribunal 
83 Id. 742. 
84 Id. 744. 
8S Id. 746. 
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sitting at the heart of the British Empire would be ·in a better position to assess the legal 
principles upon which the Crown's relations throughout its colonies had been based. The 
Privy Council had shown its instinctive willingness to protect the various tribes' title to their 
land throughout the Crown's colonial possessions and Wallis v Solicitor-General was part of 
that tendency. This was hardly a "worker of injustice" to the Crown's subjects, who, Stout 
seemed to overlook, induded the Maori as well as those who in the "Imperial spirit" had 
ventured forth from England to establish the colony of New Zealand. 
The sequel to this spectacle was the intervention of the New Zealand legislature to 
codify the Wi Parata rule that the Crown was not bound by the aboriginal title. Section 84 
of the Native Land Act 1909 provided that "save so far as otherwise expressly provided in 
any other Act the Native customary title to land shall not be available or enforceable as 
against His Majesty the King by any proceedings in any Court or in any other matter". This 
legislation passed its Second Reading without any debate despite its constitutional 
importance. In moving the Bill be read a second time the Attorney-General Dr Findlay 
acknowledged that this provision was designed to clarify once and for all the position of the 
native right to their traditional lands in the colony.86 The position chosen, not surprisingly, 
coincided with the feelings of local lawyers. It may be added that the "customary title" the 
Act rendered unenforceable against the Crown did not cover all the fonns of aboriginal title 
which being untouched by section 84 and its successors retained their full standing under 
the common law rules.87 Section 86 of this Act also re-codified the rule in the Land Titles 
Protection Act 1902, stipulating that a Crown grant was not to be impeached or adversely 
affected by any subsisting "customary title". The 1909 Act thus amounted to a statutory 
reversal of the common law principles so far as they might previously have protected the 
Maori "customary title". 
3. later cases 
The codification of the Wi Parata decision was doubtless seen by Stout as a vindication 
of his position on aboriginal title. If so, it put him in a conciliatory mood towards the 
question of Maori rights to their traditional lands, forests and fisheries. Prior to Wallis he 
had been moving towards a statute-based approach but his Protest did not touch the 
possibility of somesuch foundation to aboriginal title. His later judgments showed his 
position had mellowed with the years. 
In Baldick v lackson (1911) Stout considered the statute 17 Edw 11, c 11 which made 
whales found within the territorial waters royal fish. He held that the rule in the statute was 
86 NZPD (1909), 148 at 1273. 
87 See the writer's "The legal status of Maori fishing rights in tidal water" (1984) 14 VUWLR 247. 
290 
inapplicable to the circumstances of the colony:88 
I am of opinion that this statute has no applicability to New Zealand, and that though 
the right to whales is expressly claimed in the statute... as part of the Royal 
prerogative, it is one not only that has never been claimed, but one that would have 
been impossible to claim without claiming it against the Maoris, for they were 
accustomed to . engage in whaling and the Treaty of Waitangi assumed that their 
fishing was not to be interfered with; they were to be left in undisturbed possession 
of their lands, estates, forests, fisheries etc". 
Stout agreed that whales were royal fish as part of the royal prerogative but found the 
assertion of this prerogative unsuitable to the circumstances of the colony because, amongst 
other reasons, of the Treaty of Waitangi. In so ruling he appeared to hold that the 
prerogative rights of the Crown could be qualified by an aboriginal right to their lands, 
forests and fisheries. It was but a step from the prerogative right to royal fish to the 
prerogative title to the ungranted lands in the colony but Stout seemed unaware of this 
implication which, if taken, would have amounted to a dramatic reversal of his previous 
attitude to aboriginal title. 
Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-General (1912) showed Stout in his true if softer colour. 
This case dealt with the jurisdiction of the Native Land Court to entertain a claim by the 
Maori to the customary title to the bed of Lake Rotorua in the face of a claim by the 
Attorney-General that the land was Crown land. Stout opened by noting that the Crown was 
under a duty to respect the aboriginal title of the Maori by reason of the Treaty of Waitangi. 
He maintained, however, that any native right relied on the mere goodwill of the Crown not 
being a Crown-derived title. However, the Crown had kept faith with the Maori, he insisted, 
and recognised their title over the whole of the country:89 
The Governor and Legislature of New Zealand accepted this position and numerous 
Ordinances and Acts of Parliament have been passed to enable the Maoris to 
transmute their customary title into freehold. The position assumed all along has been 
that the lands are vested in the Crown, and until the Crown issues a freehold title the 
customary titles cannot be recognized, but that the Crown will give to all who prove 
that the land was theirs a freehold title. The Crown has not assumed that land could 
be taken or kept by the Crown from the Natives unless the Natives ceded their rights 
to the Crown. Thousands of purchases in both islands have been made by the Crown, 
and thousands of deeds are in existence. 
Stout cited the "classic judgment" of H.S. Chapman J agreed in by his brother Martin CJ in 
Symonds as authority for the rule that the courts recognised no native title until transmuted 
into Crown-derived Jorm.90 The Wi Parata judgment, he found inaccurately, had emphasized 
the Symonds ruling that "the Native customary title was a kind of tenure that the Court 
88 (1911) 13 GLR 398 (SC). 
89 (1912) 32 NZLR 321 (CA) 340. 
90 Id, 341. 
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could not deal with".91 Nonetheless, Stout continued, statutes could recognise the natives' 
traditional rights over their land and where this was done the statute-recognised right 
became incapable of executive abridgement without statutory authority. Ignoring the 
possibility that earlier statutes affecting Maori traditional lands could have provided a basis 
for this 'statutorily recognised' title, the response the Privy Council had demanded in 
Nireaha Tamaki v Baker (1901), Stout held it to have been created by the 1909 legislation.92 
This ruling enabled Stout to adopt the statute-based approach without upsetting the position 
he had taken in his Protest some years earlier. 
Stout's brethren took the same approach that whatever its original status the Maori 
aboriginal title had become recognised by the 1909 legislation. It was thus a statutorily-
recognised right of property incapable of defeat by the mere claim of the Crown. 93 Any 
claim by the Crown that certain land was not subject to a subsisting aboriginal title had to 
follow the formalities specified in sections 85 and 86 of the Native Land Act. Section 85, 
which had taken earliest form as section 105 of the Native Rights Act 1865, stipulated that 
a proclamation by the Governor that land vested in the Crown was free of the native 
customary title was to be taken as conclusive proof by a court. Section 86 stated that no 
alienation of Crown land by grant, lease or otherwise was to be affected by reason of the 
fact that the native customary title had not been duly extinguished. As the Crown had never 
made a formal act evidencing the extinguishment of the native title to the bed of Lake 
Rotorua, the Court held that the Maori Land Court had jurisdiction to determine the 
customary owners. It should be noted that the statute in which the Court located its new-
found acceptance of the aboriginal title as a recognisable and enforceable property right, the 
Native Land Act 1909, was in content not significantly different to the many earlier statutes 
affecting the Maori title. Still the Court used this Act as the excuse for its tardy adoption of 
a statute-based approach. Thereafter this became the standard approach of the New Zealand 
courts to the question to aboriginal title. 
By Waipapakura v Hempton (1914) Stout was not only admitting the statute-based 
approach but indicating the Privy Council's advice in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker to be its 
source. Still this concession, a response which he had not initially made to the Privy 
Council's advice, did not alter so much as underline his unwillingness to find that the 
common law had ever given any recognition to the aboriginal title. He stated, incorrectly, 
that Nireaha Tamaki supported such a position and had not overruled Wi Parata. It was 
"clear" from the Board's advice that "until there was some legislative provision as to the 
carrying-out of the treaty, the Court was helpless to give effect" to its recognition of the 
91 Id. 
92 Id,345. 
93 Id, 346-8 per Williams J; 349-51 per Edwards J; 354-55 per Chapman J (but refers to legislation preceding the 
1909 Act). 
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property rights of the Maori in their lands, forests and fisheries.94 In Waipapakura v 
Hempton Stout was facing a Maori claim to a common law right of fishery unscathed by a 
Fisheries Act drafted with the proviso that nothing in the Part of it dealing with sea fisheries 
was to "affect any existing Maori fishing rights" .95 The provision was held to apply only to 
those fishing rights conferred by legislation and in the absence of such Wi Parata and 
Nireaha Tamaki were "authorities for saying that until given by statute no such right" could 
be enforced.96 One wonders where Stout's recognition of Maori fishing rights in BaLdick v 
Jackson (where nothing had turned on the point) had gone. 
In summary it may be said that goaded by the Privy Council, the New Zealand courts 
under Stout CJ finally treated aboriginal title as a property right rather than a form of 
licence dependent on the goodwill of the Crown. They based this position upon the Native 
Lands Act 1909, a facesaving step which did not undermine the 'Protest of Bench and Bar' 
in 1903. This was a belated step which had certainly been available to the local courts, as 
the Privy Council pointed out in Nireaha Tamaki, since at least 1865, twelve years before 
the Wi Parata judgment. In strong contrast to the Privy Council, however, the local courts 
refused to see the common law as a source of a cognisable aboriginal title binding upon the 
Crown's legal title to its ungranted lands or the title of its grantees. Section 84 of the Native 
Lands Act 1909 codified this position. The colonial courts maintained that except where 
statute had provided otherwise the only form of property right in land was Crown-derived. 
In this respect Wi Parata was still treated as good law, any dubious aspect of it simply 
being the refusal to take the statute-based approach now practiced in the local courts. 
Despite the Privy Council's advice delivered clumsily and heavY-handedly it must be 
admitted, the courts remained blinded by feudal doctrine and insensitive to the major flaws 
in the Wi Parata judgment. 
E. SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS IN NEW ZEALAND COURTS 
The question of the aboriginal title of the Maori resurfaced in Hoani Te Heu Heu Tukino 
v Aotea District Maori Land Board (1939 - 41). The owners of Maori freehold land 
argued that a charge imposed on their land by section 14 Native Purposes Act 1935 was 
invalid being in violation of the Treaty of Waitangi. This statutory charge had been imposed 
by Parliament as a compromise to an ongoing dispute between the Maori owners and a 
timber company over the timber felling rights granted it many years previously. In the Court 
of Appeal Myers CJ gave judgment without considering the common law status of the land 
guarantee in the TreatY of Waitangi. He stressed the court's duty to give effect to legislation 
94 (1914) 33 NZLR 1065 (se) 1070. 
95 The Fisheries Act 1908, No 65, section 77 (2). See now the Fisheries Act 1983, No 14, section 88 (2) which 
omits the word 'existing'. 
96 Supra, 1070. 
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and its inability to go behind the clear tenns of an Act of Parliament.97 He discounted the 
argument that the Treaty of Waitangi had been constitutionally entrenched by Westminster 
through sections 72 and 73 New Zealand Constitution Act 1852 (UK), pointing to the power 
given the local assembly in 1862 to amend or repeal these sections. This power had been 
used to repeal section 73 in 1873 and to the extent that section 72 entrenched any land 
guarantee it would have to be read as modified by "necessary implication" from subsequent 
legislation.98 Myers brethren agreed99 but the disgruntled Maori owners appealed. 
In argument before the Privy Council Denning KC, who elevated to the Lords would 
later deliver the Board's advice in Oyekan v Adele (1957),100 had conceded the common law 
aboriginal title for the respondent Board. lol He emphasised the nub of the appellant's case 
was the contention that the Treaty of Waitangi was a limitation on the legislative capacity of 
the New Zealand assembly, a proposition with which the Board expressed impatience. Their 
Lordships dismissed the appellant's argument rather peremptorily, citing Vajesingji 
Joravasingji and Cook v Sprigg.102 As a result their advice has been taken as supporting the 
I proposition that the land guarantee in the Treaty of Waitangi lacked any legal basis absent 
\ 
recognition by statute. 103 If one looks carefully at the case, however, it is no more than an 
authority for the simple, unremarkable proposition that promises in a treaty of cession 
cannot act as a restraint upon the legislative supremacy of Parliament.104 
Maori claims to the aboriginal ownership of the foreshore and navigable riverbeds of the 
country were made before the New Zealand courts during the late 1950s.105 
The Maori claim to ownership of the Wanganui River fonnally commenced in 1938 
when an application was filed in the Maori Land Court to have the customary title to the 
riverbed investigated and a freehold order issued by the Court. The question of aboriginal 
title did not reach any conclusive determination until the Court of Appeal had delivered its 
second opinion in 1962. Taken together the judgments held that the Maori enjoyed no 
aboriginal right to the riverbed based either upon general principles of constitutional law or 
the Treaty of Waitangi. In this respect the opinions continued the . statute-based' approach of 
97 [1939] NZLR 117. The argument was not made in the Supreme Court hearing before Smith J (id, 112-4). 
98 Id, 121. 
99 Id, 122 per Callan and Northcroft n. 
lOO (1957) 2 All ER 785 (PC). 
101 [1941] AC 308 (PC) 315. 
102 Id, 324 per Viscount Simon LC. A recent case where the Board has reacted with similar impatience is Winfa! 
Enterprise (HK) Ltd v Attorney-General [1985] 2 WLR 786 (PC). See Wesley-Smith "Acts of State: Lord 
Diplock's curious inconsistency" (1986) 6 Legal Studies 325. 
103 Re Bed of the Wanganui River [1955] NZLR 419 (CA) 462 per North J; Re the Ninety Mile Beach [1960] NZLR 
673 (SC) 675 per Turner J; [1963] NZLR 461 (CA) 477 per TA Gresson J. Molloy 'The Non-Treaty of 
Waitangi" [1971] NZLl 194; Haughey "Notes on the Maori Land Question" (October 1982) Int Bar News, 7; 
O'Keefe "Waitangi Tribunal 'Decision'" [1983] NZLl 136; DV Williams "Waitangi Revisited", id, 214; Haughey 
'The Treaty of Waitangi - its legal status" [1984] NZLl 392. 
104 O'Connell State Succession, I, 255; Roberts-Wray Commonwealth and Colonial Law, 634; Hookey "Milirrpum 
and the Maoris", 72; Slattery "Land Rights of Indigenous Canadian Peoples", 49,53. 
105 Generally, Haughey "Maori Claims to Lakes, River Beds, and the Foreshore (1966) 2 NZULR 29. 
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earlier cases. The Court of Appeal held in its first judgment that at the time of British 
annexation the Maori claimants 'owned' the riverbed as part of their tribal territory which 
rights of ownership had been recognised by statute.106 However, its second hearing ruled that 
when the Maori Land Court issued freehold orders for the customary land adjoining the 
riverbed the ad medium filum presumption of English law applied so that traditional rights 
attaching to the river were transformed into riparian rights such as those enjoyed by any 
freeholder with land fronting onto a river.l07 Effectively this ruling applied the ad medium 
filum rule to deny the riverbed as a separate strip of land (such as Maori custom strongly 
suggested it to be) the title to which was ascertained independently to that of the adjoining 
land. 
A similar line of reasoning was applied against the claim by the Te Aupori and Te 
Rawara tribes to the foreshore of the Ninety Mile Beach. In the Supreme Court Turner J 
held simply that section 150 Harbours Act 1950 excluded the Maori Land Court's 
jurisdiction to issue a freehold order for this section required any grant by special ACt. I08 
The Court of Appeal, however, took the approach it had taken in Re Bed of the Wanganui 
River (No. 2). All judges agreed that the Maori enjoyed no right to enforce their aboriginal 
claims against the Crown other than by reliance on a statute which recognised their rights. 
Both North JI09 and Gresson J (Gresson P concurring)"O applied feudal principles to justify 
this decision, despite the former's homage to Chapman's "classic judgment" in Symonds and 
his quotation from the passage in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker stating "the prerogative title of 
the Crown and the Native title of possession and occupation [were] not inconsistent with 
seisin in fee of the Crown". Along with his fellow judges North found statutes had 
recognised the Maori right to lands held according to their ancient customs and usage. This 
, 
meant that statute law had placed a burden upon the Crown's paramount title to land in the 
colony of New Zealand. Hence the Maori Land Court was able to make a freehold order 
fixing the boundary of land franting the sea at the low-water mark. Where, however, the 
Court had not fixed the boundary as other than the sea the presumption was that the grant 
took effect to the high-water mark freed from "the obligation which the Crown had 
undertaken when legislation was enacted giving effect to the promise contained in the Treaty 
of Waitangi".lll This was rather a backhanded way of avoiding the inconvenience of finding 
the presence of a surviving Maori right for most freehold orders simply named the sea as 
the boundary without addressing the suitability of making the grant to the high or low-water 
106 Re the Bed of the Wanganui River [1955] NZLR 419 (CA), 427 per Hutchison J, 433 per Cooke J agreeing with 
North J at 462. . 
107 Re the Bed of the Wanganui River [1962] NZLR 600 (CA), 609-10 per Gresson P, 618 per Cleary J, 623 per 
Turner J. 
108 [1960] NZLR 673 (SC), 676-7. 
109 [1963] NZLR 461 (CA) 468. 
110 Id, 475-6. 
III Id,473. 
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mark. In all, the judgments in Re the Ninety Mile Beach had much the same effect as Re the 
Bed of the Wanganui River in denying the foreshore to be a separate strip of land (as Maori 
custom suggested) the title to which was ascertained independently to that of the adjoining 
land. 
New Zealand courts considered a claim based on an aboriginal title on two other 
occasions during the late '1950s. The defendants in Inspector of Fisheries v Ihaia Weepu 
(1956) had been charged with an offence under the Fisheries Act 1908 and sought to invoke 
section 77 (2) excepting "existing Maori fishing rights" from the statutory regime. FB 
Adams J applied Waipapakura v Hempton, holding that since the fishing rights claimed by 
the Maori defendants were not derived from any other statute the prosecution would have to 
be upheld. 112. The judge thus rejected any common law source of fishing right. The same 
ruling was given a few years later in Keepa v Inspector of Fisheries (1965).113 In the other 
case of this period, Hira Tamati v District Land Registrar (1957) North J considered the 
meaning of the term "land... alienated... from the Crown" in section 70 Land Transfer Act 
1885. He found the phrase excluded land held by the Crown subject to an unextinguished 
tribal title but gave the legal basis of the traditional title as "the early Native Land Acts" of 
1862 and 1865.114 He cited Symonds and Nireaha Tamaki v Baker as the authorities for this 
approach but neglected these cases' recognition of a common law source as well as statutory 
basis for Maori property rights. 
By the 1970s the Maori had largely abandoned any attempt to obtain judicial recognition 
of their traditional property rights. The argument was put in Hita v Chisholm (1977) that 
traditional Maori fishing rights protected by the Treaty had become referentially incorporated 
into municipal law through the New Zealand Day Act 1973 and Treaty of Waitangi Act 
1975.l1s This argument was quickly, and correctly, dismissed by Henry J. 
It has been seen that the New Zealand courts of superior jurisdiction have consistently 
failed to adopt any common law doctrine of aboriginal title. The technical deficiencies in 
this position, emanating as it did from Prendergast's judgment in Wi Parata v Bishop of 
Wellington and corrected only by the belated adoption of a statute-based approach, have 
been noted. It must be added, however, that to some extent this failing may be explained as 
a consequence of the emphasis placed by Maori litigants upon the terms of the Treaty of 
Waitangi. The location of Maori claims to traditional property rights exclusively in the 
guarantees of the Treaty contributed a measure of inevitability to the approach taken by the 
New Zealand courts inviting the invocation of the wide dicta in Cook v Sprigg and 
112. [1956] NZLR 920 (SC). 
113 [1965] NZLR 322 (SC). 
114 [1957] NZLR 231 (SC) 242. In Re the Ninety Mile Beach [1963] NZLR 461 (CA) 468 North located the 
statutory recognition in the Land Claims Ordinance 1841, remarking how legislation had "quickly implemented" 
the land guarantee in the Treaty of Waitangi. 
m Unreported judgment of Henry J, Supreme Court, Auckland Registry, 8 February 1977. Counsel for the Maori 
appellant had clearly relied on Molloy's suggestion in [1971] NZLl 194 that the Treaty of Waitangi might be 
referentially incorporated into New Zealand law. 
Vajesingji Joravasingji. Had the Maori claims been framed in tenns of a common law 
presumption of continuity affinned by treaty (as was the case in the West African appeals to 
the Privy Council) the chances of Maori success might have been greater. This, of course, 
cannot justify so much as partially explain the fundamental difference in approach between 
the Privy Council and New Zealand courts on the question of the traditional tribal title to 
land. The emphasis upon the Treaty in legal argument was but a reflection of its status in 
Maori society as their take or cause of action against the Crown. In the end, the aboriginal 
title of the Maori might have been better protected by the courts without the complication of 
the Treaty or by a less explicit land guarantee (as for example with the Cession of Lagos 
(1861)). 
F. ABORIGINAL TITLE IN THE NATIVE LAND COURTS 
The Native Land Court was established by statute to transmute the tribal title under 
customary law into one based upon a grant from the Crown. The function of the Court was 
strongly associated with policies of assimilation and exposure of Maori land to market 
forces encouraging its alienation. Nonetheless, in dealing with the tribal title the Native 
Land Court took a position which in a general sense resembled the common law doctrine of 
aboriginal title. 
The Native Land Court had traditionally functioned under what has become known as its 
'quasi-parental jurisdiction'. The Court took the position that its function under the statutory 
regime was to shield Maori land from the harsher aspects of a Pakeha system of tenure. ll6 
Within the constraints and limited protection of this regime, Maori land tenure, with the 
Maori Land Court as its focal point, has shown a large degree of resilience.lI7 The protective 
duty given the Court may be seen as a statutory delegation of the duty of guardianship held 
by the Crown under the doctrine of aboriginal title (and the tenns of the Treaty of 
Waitangi). The rule of pre-emption, it may be recalled, was intended as much to protect the 
tribal owners from landjobbing so much as to ensure the orderly colonisation of the 
country.llB In this general sense there is a continuity between the position of the Crown 
under the doctrine of aboriginal title119 and the statutory functions of the Maori Land Court 
in relation to Maori freehold land. 
Two celebrated judgments of the Native Land Court have considered the question of 
aboriginal title. These cases are Chief Judge Fenton's Kauwaeranga Judgment (1870), 
116 Burnett v Lethbridge [1916] GLR 258; Aotea District Maori Land Board v State Advances Superintendent [1927] 
GLR 557, 560; In re Mangatu Nos 1,3 & 4 Blocks [1954] NZLR 624,627; Alexander v Maori Appellate Court 
[1979] 2 NZLR 44. Also Report of the Royal Commission on The Maori Land Courts (1979), 7-18. 
117 Kawharu Maori Land Tenure (1977), passim. 
118 R v Symonds (1847), [1840-1932] NZPCC 387 (SC) 391 per Chapman J. 
119 See also Guerin v The Queen (1984) 13 DLR (4th) 591 (SCC) where the Crown's guardian duties under the 
doctrine of aboriginal title were described as fiduciary in character, and Hurley 'The Crown's Fiduciary Duty: 
Guerin v The Queen" (1985) 30 McGill U 559. 
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referred to by FB Adams J as "impressive" in Re Bed of the Wanganui River (1955)/20 and 
Judge Acheson's Omapere Lake judgment (1929), presented to the Privy Council in 
argument in Hoani Te Heu Tukino v Aotea District Maori Land Board (1941).121 
The Kauwaeranga Judgment dealt with a claim to the aboriginal ownership of tidal 
mudflats. An application had been lodged in the Native Land Court for a freehold order so 
that legal title could vest in the Maori applicants. They had based their claim on their 
exclusive traditional use of the fisheries on the flats. Fenton ruled that the applicants were 
not entitled to a freehold order which would enable a Crown grant to issue for the land.l22 
Aboriginal exploitation by way simply of fishery fell short, he indicated, of the exclusive 
titular ownership but was sufficient to justify an order of the Court recognising the right of 
fishery.l23 In terminology which will be explained at a later stage, he found the evidence did 
not establish a 'tenitorial' aboriginal title but was proof of a 'non-tenitorial' title. 
Fenton's judgment, given some years before the Wi Parata decision, was clearly 
predicated upon a common law doctrine of aboriginal title. After a detailed review of the 
process by which the Crown acquired the sovereignty of New Zealand he concluded:l:M 
I am of opinion, especially remembering the very clear and almost stringent nature of 
the instructions given to Captain Hobson, that it was the intention of both parties to 
the compact to guarantee to the aborigines the continued exercise of whatever 
tenitorial rights they then exercised in a full and perfect manner, until they thought 
fit to dispose of them to the Crown. The natives kept to themselves what Vattel calls 
the 'useful domain' while they yielded to the Crown the 'high domain'. 
Convinced that the aboriginal claims to the mud flats amounted at least to a "privilege or 
easement, .. . included in the word 'fishery' used in the treaty", Fenton proceeded to consider 
the applicability of feudal doctrine: 115 
The fundamental principle of the feudal doctrines is that all land is holden of some 
superior lord, originally with the view of keeping up a certain organisation for 
supplying fighting men, for the service of the lord or the king. And although the 
original cause of the foundation of feudalism has long since disappeared, yet the 
doctrine of tenure remains as the law of real property. But real property means land 
actually or by presumption held of or at some time or other granted by the Crown. 
Land owned by natives according to their customs or usages can in no sense be 
deemed subject to the same rules as real property in its technical sense. 
120 [1955] NZLR 419 (CA) 447; also In re the Ninety Mile Beach [1963] NZLR 461 (CA) 471 per North J tenning 
it an "erudite judgment", and 479 per TA Gresson J calling it a "most infonnative examination of the historical 
background". 
121 [1941] AC 308, 313. 
122 Text of judgment published in the Daily Southern Cross, 10 December 1870, in CO 209/221: 42-47 (The writer 
is grateful to Dr G. Marston, Sidney Sussex College for this reference). Also reprinted with an introductory note 
by A Frame (1984) 14 VUWLR 227-45. 
123 A claim to a right of mere fishery "would not suffice to support a claim in the natives to the foreshore of 
sufficient value to be turned into an absolute freehold interest in the soil, for a 'fishery' will mean an interest of 
no higher character than a privilege or easement", id, 11. 
I:M Id, 8. 
115 Id, 10. 
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Fenton then referred to the example of lreland l16 where private rights of fishery having a 
basis in ancient custom and usage had been recognised notwithstanding the Crown's 
acquisition of title to all land in Ireland by conquest. The direct inference of this, evident 
also in his reference to Vattel, was that whilst the Crown might be able to claim a 
prerogative sovereign title to the foreshore this title was qualified by any Maori customary 
rights. This was an adoption and application of a presumption of continuity identical to that 
underlying the common law doctrine of aboriginal title. 
In 1929 the Native Land Court considered an application on behalf of the Ngapuhi tribe 
for the investigation of title and grant of a freehold order for Omapere Lake, a non-tidal 
inland lake in Northland covering over 3000 acres. Judge Acheson considered the tribal 
claim to a customary title over the lake by posing a series of questions. The substance of 
his judgment took the following form: He found first that the annexation of New Zealand 
had not disrupted the continuity of Maori property rights. He located this continuity both in 
the common law and local legislation but not the Treaty of Waitangi. 127 Instead he turned to 
the Treaty to amplify the character of this continuity, using it as proof the Crown had 
intended all Maori property rights to survive its assumption of sovereignty. The Treaty of 
Waitangi was thus not a source so much as clarification of the principle of continuity. He 
indicated the character of these property rights was to be determined according to Maori 
customary law. On the application before him he found the character of the aboriginal claim 
was territorial rather than non-territorial: The Ngapuhi had used the lake for fishing, had dug 
for kauri gum on its shores and had "not only asserted their rights continuously, but... [had] 
secured the stopping of acts by Crown officers that might possibly have been construed into 
acts of ownership if permitted" .I28 This title had never been ceded to the Crown or 
extinguished by legislation. 129 Accordingly, he found the lake was "customary land" for the 
purposes of the Native Land Act 1909 so that a freehold order could issue.13O 
O. TE WEEHI v REGIONAL FISHERIES OFFICER (1986) 
This case concerned a prosecution under the Fisheries Act 1983. The defendants 
successfully invoked section 88(2) of the Act exempting those exercising "any Maori fishing 
right". The defendants had been convicted by Judge Paters on in the District Court whQ 
found that on the balance of probabilities no customary right was proven. m On appeal to the 
126 He could have assisted his argument by citing The Case of Tanistry (1608) Davies 28. 
127 Applications by Ripi W Hongi and other Natives for Investigation of Title to Omapere Lake, Judgment of Judge 
FOY Acheson, 1 August 1929, Bay of Islands MB 11, folio 253,263-5. (The writer is grateful to Mr P Temm 
QC for supplying a copy of this judgment). 
128 Id, 277. 
129 Id, 265-6. 
130 Id, 277-8. 
131 Regional Fisheries Officer v Te Weehi and Hauraki, District Court, Christchurch, undated transcript, 5-6. 
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High Court Williamson J quashed the convictions, holding that the defendants had been 
exercising a non-territorial aboriginal title over the Motunau beach of the South Island.m 
This case is the first important occasion since Symonds (1847) upon which the common 
law docu;ne of aboriginal title has been recognised by a New Zealand court of superior 
jurisdiction. In reaching judgment Williamson expressly adopted the common law approach 
of the pre- Wi Parata period citing the relevant Privy Council and Canadian cases in 
support. He noted the gap that had opened between the Privy Council and New Zealand 
bench on the question but did not dwell upon the technical deficiencies in the Wi Parata 
position. Instead he emphasised the common law presumption of the continuity of local 
property rights which he indicated to have applied irrespective of the original constitutional 
status of the colony.l33 This last finding was particularly significant because local courts had 
previously associated New Zealand's original designation as a 'settled' colony with the 
failure of the Treaty of Waitangi as an instrument of cession by reason of the Maori tribes' 
lack of international personality.134 Since New Zealand was legally as desert and uncultivated 
land, the reasoning implicitly ran, the tribes lacked any legal right to the recognition of their 
tribal land rights upon British annexation. This approach was identical to that expressly 
taken by Blackbum J in Milirrpum v Nabalco Property Lld (1971).13S It has also been taken 
by academic commentators,136 most notably D V Williams who has argued that 
categorisation of New Zealand as a 'settled' colony was a device to supplant any 
recognition of tribal law and property rights.137 The historical record cannot sustain this 
cynical and superficial interpretation. Indeed, it will be recalled, a whole chapter has been 
devoted to clarification of the function of designation of the common law status of a colony. 
The association of the county's original constitutional status with the question of the 
continuity of local property rights confused the process by which a colony populated by 
tribal communities received its common law status with late-nineteenth century ideas of 
sovereignty, property rights and the standard of civilisation in international law. The two 
were seperated intellectually as well as historically. Williamson's judgment therefore 
represents the judicial dismissal of any link between the continuity of tribal property rights 
upon annexation and the original constitutional status of the colony of New Zealand. A 
similar rejection can be found in the judgment of Hall J in the Calder case (1973)138 and the 
132 Te Weehi v Regional Fisheries Officer, High Court Christchurch, 19 August 1986, lDlIeported. 
133 Id, 11 citing Camp bell v Hall (1774) 1 Cowp 204. 
134 Wi Parata v Bishop · of Wellington (1877) 3 NZ Jur (NS) SC 72,78; Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-General 
(1912) 32 NZLR 321 (CA) 354 per Chapman J; Waipapakura v Hempton (1914) 33 NZLR 1065 (SC) 1070 per 
Stout CJ; In re the Ninety Mile Beach [1963] NZLR 461 (CA) 475 per TA Gresson J. 
135 (1971) 17 FLR 141 (FC). 
136 Foden The Constitutional Development of New Zealand, 179-190, esp.l84 and 188; Molloy "The Non-Treaty of 
Waitangi", 194; Haughey "Notes on The Maori Land Question", 7. 
137 'The Use of Law in the Process of Colonization", ch 2. 
138 (1973) 34 DLR (3d) 145 (SCC),199. 
recent Report of the Australian Law RefoOll Commission on Aboriginal Customary Law.139 
The Te Weehi judgment recognised two foOlls of aboriginal title: The first type was a 
territorial abOliginal title, this being a claim to full, exclusive titular ownership of the land. 
In the words of Viscount Haldane in Amodu Tijani (1921) this is a title "so complete as to 
reduce any radical right in the sovereign to one which only extends to comparatively limited 
rights of administrative interference" .1.0 A non-territorial aboriginal title, such as that 
recognised in the Kauwaeranga Judgment and the Canadian cases dealing with those Indian 
hunting and fishing rights severed from a claim to the titular ownership of the land,141 is a 
charge analogous to a profit a prendre or easement over land other than Maori 
"customary" land. Although a territorial aboriginal title will be equivalent to a customary 
title and hence its common law status diminished by Part XIV Maori Affairs Act 1953 a 
non-territorial title is not so affected. Since many • aboriginal servitudes' continue to be 
exercised over land the length and breadth of New Zealand irrespective of the ownership of 
the land under Pakeha laws of tenure, the Te Weehi judgment opens the possibility of their 
enjoyment of some legal status. 142 The extent of these implications have yet to be felt. 
Finally it can be noted that Williamson J indicated the character of an aboriginal title 
was to be defined by reference to Maori customary law. To enlist the protection of section 
88 (2) Fisheries Act 1983 a Maori must show compliance with tribal law and cannot be 
fishing for commerical gain. If, for example, the particular fishery is subject to a rahui 
(tribal banning order)143 the fisheries officials are able to enforce the Act against those tribe 
members defying the customary code. Williamson J treated proof of customary law as an 
issue of fact. He assessed the evidence of both academic specialists and the Ngaitahu 
kaumatua (elders).I44 
The judgment in Te Weehi has brought this Part full circle. We started with the early 
recognition of Maori aboriginal title in the practice prior to, during and subsequent to British 
annexation and the early judgment of the colonial Supreme Court in R v Symonds (1847). 
This recognition of the legal basis of the Maori right to their traditional lands, forests and 
fisheries (qualified only by the pre-emptive right of the Crown) was eclipsed by the severely 
flawed judgment of Prendergast CJ in Wi Parata v The Bishop of Wellington (1877). The 
approach of New Zealand courts stood in contrast to that of the Privy Council in relation 
not only to tribal title in New Zealand but throughout the British Empire. Belatedly the New 
Zealand courts accepted that statutes had recognised the traditional property rights of the 
Maori, the statute-based approach as it was telmed, but until the Te Weehi case never 
139 The Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Laws (1986), I, paras 60-68. 
1.0 [1921] 2 AC 399 (PC). 
141 Discussed in the writer's "Maori Fishing Rights and the North American Indian" (1985) 6 OLR 62. 
142 See the writer's "Aboriginal servitudes and the Land Transfer Act 1952" (1986) 16 VUWLR 313 . 
143 Smith NaJive Custom affecting Land, 46. 
144 Te Weehi v Regional Fisheries Officer, App 2, 2-4. 
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returned to the common law rules used in Symonds and by the Privy Council. With Te 
Weehi it has become re-accepted that British annexation did not disrupt the continuity of 
Maori propelty rights. This continuity derived from the common law rules affecting the 
, acquisition of territory by the Crown rather than article two of the Treaty of Waitangi. If the 
Treaty had any relation to the legal status of traditional property rights upon annexation it 
was simply as a declaration by the Crown that during the assumption of the sovereignty 
there would be no act of state disrupting the continuity of those property rights. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
CONCLUSION 
When the Maori chiefs agreed to British sovereignty by signing the Treaty of Waitangi 
(1840) they did so in the belief that their rangatiratanga (internal tribal government) and 
property rights were not to be disrupted. Indeed, the Treaty was represented to them as an 
express protection of these rights. Since British sovereignty brought with it civilised 
society's 'rule of law' one would have thought these rights recognized by the Treaty were 
somehow incorporated into the legal fabric of the new colony. De facto, of course, British 
sovereignty of itself - mere legal ceremony, could hardly have upset the enjoyment of such 
rights. Instinctively one would have expected the legal position to have had some 
correspondence to this continuity. By the end of the nineteenth century, however, 
Prendergast CJ had held that the Maori enjoyed no legal right to their customary law (Rira 
Peti v Ngaraihi Te Paku (1888))1 and that their rights to the traditional lands, forests and 
fisheries subsisted at the mere sufferance of the Crown (Wi Parata v The Bishop of 
Wellington (1877)).2 These cases established the New Zealand orthodoxy according to which 
legislative recognition became the sole source of Maori rights under their customary law. 
The writer has attempted to confront and assess the basis for the exclusion of a common 
law recognition of Maori rights manifest in the orthodox approach of New Zealand courts. 
The most general conclusion of the present inquiry must be the lack of support and 
sophistication in the received position. The belief that the common law failed altogether to 
recognise the tribal rights embodied in the Treaty of Waitangi simply cannot be sustained. 
New Zealand was not acquired in a legal vacuum carried over post-annexation to the 
relations of the Crown and tribes. 
The distinction between imperium (the right of government) and dominium (rights of 
ownership) has been fundamental to the format adopted in this dissertation. The first Part 
considered the rules governing the Crown's acquisition of an imperium over the Maori 
tribes. It was found that the Crown acknowledged the sovereignty of the Maori tribes and 
conducted itself on the basis that any imperium it might establish over the islands required 
formal Maori consent. This position culminated in the Treaty of Waitangi. The second Part 
looked at the reception of English law in New Zealand, assessing the extent of the 
importation of English law into the Crown's new colony. The consequences which this had 
for the customary law of the Maori was assessed. It was concluded that the common law 
recognised the continuity of Maori customary law but this was substantially affected by the 
general introduction of English law by charter of the Crown (1840). It was this rather than 
2 
(1888) 7 NZLR 235 (se). 
(1877) 3 NZ Jur (OS) 72 (SC). 
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the Crown's sovereignty which from a legal point of view impaired the rangatiratanga of 
the chiefs. Nonetheless Maori customary law still retained some viability at common law in 
the 'civil' relations of the Maori inter se and to that extent, albeit limited, the chiefs 
retained some rangatiratanga. More importantly, however, at least so far as contemporary 
Maori claims are concerned, Part III found the dominium or property rights of the tribes 
were unaffected by British sovereignty. The aboriginal title of the Maori was recognised by 
the common law principles of 'modified continuity' and thus reflected the land guarantee in 
the Treaty of Waitangi. The thrust of the conclusions in each Part tends heavily against the 
orthodox position of the New Zealand courts. 
The first chapter of Part I considered the rules governing the Crown's acquisition and 
erection of an imperium over and amongst non-Christian societies. Although this practice 
was organic and necessarily varied in practice two related principles underpinned it 
throughout the sixteenth to early twentieth century. In the first place the Crown acted on the 
basis that such societies, tribal or otherwise, held the capacity to enter into formal relations 
with the Crown so long as they had obtained a perceptible degree of social organisation 
with recognised leaders with whom the Crown's representatives could treat. Secondly, the 
Crown rarely erected an imperium over these societies without their consent or, 
exceptionally, forcible submission. Their juridical capacity extended at least to the ability to 
grant such rights to the Crown even once the standard of civilisation became incorporated 
into international law during the second half of the nineteenth century. So far as English 
courts were concerned the subscription to these principles was a matter solely within the 
Crown's election relating as they did to its exercise of the nation's foreign relations. 
Nonetheless where the Crown had followed such principles these . necessarily became a 
matter of judicial cognisance. It hardly lay within the judicial province to tell the Crown its 
recognition of the sovereignty of a particular society had been mere fiction. The primary 
determinant of international personality was the Crown's conduct. Thus the Privy Council 
regularly recognised the sovereignty of the princely states of the East Indies, tribal rulers of 
Africa as well as Maori chiefs in the treaties by which these indigenous authorities granted 
the Crown powers of government within their territory. 
Chapter three dealt with the particular application of these principles to New Zealand 
during the late 1830s and 1840 as the Crown's sovereignty was established. It was seen that 
Maori consent was treated as a legal prerequisite to British annexation of New Zealand. 
Britain had solemnly recognised the sovereignty of the Maori chiefs and saw their consent 
to the assumption of sovereignty as an unavoidable concomitant. Maori agreement was 
undoubtedly the substantive basis of British sovereignty. Once, however, that sovereignty 
was formally established it became absolute and indivisible in point of English law. Unlike 
the Indian tribes of the United States, the Maori chiefs could not claim a residual legal 
sovereignty from which a legal right of rangatiratanga might have been derived. 
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Some commentators, judicial and otherwise, have 'seen the conclusions reached in Part I 
as refuted by the constitutional status of New Zealand as a 'settled' colony. According to 
this view, status as a 'settled' colony meant, first, the original Maori sovereignty was a 
'simple nullity' and, secondly, that the introduction of English law into such a colony was 
comprehensive and unqualifiable by the indigenous tribal laws. Thus the common law status, 
if any, of Maori customary law was implicitly tied to the original constitutional status of the 
colony. The first chapter of Part 11 addressed this association. After reviewing the origin and 
basis of the distinction between the two forms of colony it was concluded that the 
distinction was never formulated to affect the rights of the indigenous population to their 
customary law. It was simply a device to explain the relation of the Crown to the English 
settlers and an expression of the settlers' 'birthright' to English law in the absence of a pre-
existing Christian legal system to which their conformity could reasonably be expected. 
Chapter five looked at the common law rules governing the continuity of non-Christian lex 
loci in British territory. Although Maori customary law theoretically survived annexation this 
continuity was affected by the general introduction of English law in the first charter of the 
colony (1840). This did not mean, however, the complete suspension of Maori customary 
law. Since the property rights of the tribes had not been suspended by an 'act of state' 
during the process of annexation so much of the customary law as defined these rights 
survived (as Te Weehi v Regional Fisheries Officer (1986) would indicate).' Similarly 
certain portions of the customary law covering the 'civil' relations of the Maori (marriage, 
adoption and succession) probably survived in point of law. In any event Imperial legislation 
(1846) and constituent instruments under its authority restored Maori customary law to a 
fuller legal basis in that colonial courts were allowed to have recourse to tribal law in 
dispensing justice to the Crown's Maori subjects. Still this measure did not give the chiefs 
any of the powers to enforce the tribal code such as they had held previous to the general 
introduction of English law. A series of local judgments towards the end of the nineteenth 
century denied any continuity to Maori customary law as a matter both of common law and 
interpretation of the 1846 statute and instruments under its authority. The correctness of 
these judgments was treated as doubtful. 
The final Part of the thesis turned to the question of greatest controversy, being the 
extent to which the common law recognised the right of the Maori tribes to their traditional 
land, forests and fisheries upon British annexation. Chapter six looked at the common law 
principles comprising what has become known as the doctrine of aboriginal title. It was 
found that in principle the common law recognised tribal property rights survived British 
sovereignty. These principles of 'modified continuity' were seen to have been declared but 
not derived from the Treaty of Waitangi as well as other royal proclamations prior to 
annexation, the early constituent instruments for the colony and colonial and Imperial 
Unreported, High Court, 19 August 1986. 
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legislation. The rules received an important and early recogrutIOn in local courts with the 
judgments in R v Symonds (1847): The recognition of the aboriginal title of the Maori was 
thus everywhere confirmed in the fonnalities attending the process of annexation and its 
immediate aftermath. On what basis, then, did local courts commencing with Prendergast's 
influential judgment in Wi Parata v The Bishop of Wellington (1877) deny the aboriginal 
title? None could be found by the writer nor, it must be added, the Privy Council whose 
position contributed to strained relations between the Board and local judiciary during the 
early years of this century. Legislation eventually codified the Wi Parata approach but was 
not comprehensive. As the recent judgment in Te Weehi v Regional Fisheries Officer (1986) 
rejecting the Wi Parata position shows, this legislation did not affect the 'non-territorial' 
aboriginal title of the Maori. Part III closed with the suggestion that the doctrine of 
aboriginal title may be far from spent in New Zealand notwithstanding the commutation of 
the 'territorial' aboriginal title into 'Maori freehold land' through the agency of the Maori 
Land Court. 
The common law was far from silent on the question of Maori rights upon British 
annexation. There was no legal vacuum wherein the Crown was left as the supreme arbiter 
of its own justice. Indeed, the common law had so much to say of Maori rights that this 
thesis has been unable to go beyond an assessment of the general principles. Aspects which 
have not been explored in detail include the legal status of treaties of cession - the position 
taken has characterised the Treaty of Waitangi as declaratory rather than a separate source 
of right,S and the actual practice of the colonial courts in relation to Maori customary law as 
well as the residual status of this law so far as it affects the contemporary internal relations 
of Maori society.6 It is clear, for example, that customary adoptions and dying declarations 
(ohaki) are still practiced within Maoridom. Nor did the thesis explore in any depth the 
residual status of the doctrine of aboriginal title either in terms of its continued 
enforceability7 or the more general sense of the constitutional basis it can bring to Maori 
land claims.s The writer hopes, however, that this thesis has established a platform for future 
research and that it will contribute towards the rehabilitation of the common law as a source 
of Maori rights. The judgment of Williamson J in Te Weehi v Regional Fisheries Officer 
(1986) is an encouraging sign as also the response of the Govemment,9 Waitangi Tribunallo 
4 
6 
7 
(1847) [1840-1931] NZPCC 387 (PC). 
The matter is discussed by the writer in "Maori Fishing Rights and the North American Indian" (1985) 6 OLR 62 
at 82-7. 
The statutory regime is discussed in Smith Native custom affecting land (1942) and Maori Land Law (1960). 
For example, the writer's "The legal status of Maori fishing rights in tidal water" (1984) 14 VUWLR 247; 
"Aboriginal servitudes and the Land Transfer Act (1986) 16 VUWLR 313. 
See the writer's argument in "The Constitutional Role of the Waitangi Tribunal" [1985] NZLf 224. 
A Bill of Rights for New Zealand (White Paper, 1985), 75; Interdepartmental Committee on Maori Fishing Rights 
First Report. para 24. 
10 Kaituna Claim (1984) 10,45; Manukau Claim (1985). 50-2. Also Chief Judge ETJ Durie "Address to the New 
Zealand section of the International Commission of Jurists" (10 May 1985) and "Part IT and Clause 26 of the 
Draft New Zealand Bill of Rights" in Legal Research Foundation A Bill of Rights for New Zealand (1985) 175. 
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and recent academic commentatorsll to the common law argument. There was no wide 
divergence between the principles obtaining de jure and the promises contained in the 
Treaty of Waitangi. 
11 Kenderdine "Statutory Separateness (1)" [1985] NlLf 249; Law Reform Commission (Australia) Recognition of 
Aboriginal Customary Law (1986) IT, paras 898-905 (finding legislative recognition of Aboriginal servitudes 
preferable). 
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